

**THE NATURE OF CARTHAGINIAN
IMPERIAL ACTIVITY:
TRADE, SETTLEMENT, CONQUEST,
AND RULE**

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ABSTRACT

Carthage was a powerful and influential state in the Central and Western Mediterranean from the ninth to the second century BC. From its humble beginnings as a Phoenician trading port on the coast of modern Tunisia, Carthage grew rapidly, assuming control of much of the Phoenician territory in North Africa, Spain, Sardinia, and Sicily. In addition to these major territories, the Carthaginians, like the Phoenicians before them, were active beyond the boundaries of the contemporary ancient world in the Atlantic, Africa, Europe, and Southern Britain. In many respects, Carthage continued the activities of its Phoenician forebears by trading, colonising, and maintaining an empire. However, based on its Phoenician heritage, intermingling with North African Berber culture, and foreign influence, Carthage developed its own distinctive society and culture.

Carthaginian society was constantly evolving. This had an obvious effect on its activities and the nature of its empire. Carthage and the Punic culture it spawned is often characterised by this empire and its associated activities, as they were primary to its economy, society, and function in antiquity. Aspects of Carthaginian activity were changeable and often inter-related and like Carthage's society were constantly developing. Associated Carthaginian motivation and methods are often distinguishable and can be identified as defining factors in greater areas of society and history.

This thesis addresses a much maligned and mysterious society based primarily on its activities and tactics abroad. The main object is to establish a Carthaginian character as distinctive from its Phoenician predecessors and that of other contemporary nations in the Western Mediterranean such as the Greeks and Romans. This study addresses various forms of such activity over a broad chronological period in relation to internal developments and foreign pressures and influences. Carthaginian activity was defined by various and mutable forms of trade, settlement, and active expansion. These remained integral parts of Carthaginian society in general and are vital factors in our understanding of this civilisation and its interaction with others.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AJAH</i>	<i>American Journal of Ancient History.</i>
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology.</i>
<i>Annales</i>	<i>Annales Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations.</i>
<i>ANET</i> ²	<i>Ancient Near Eastern Texts</i> ² , James B. Pritchard (ed.), (Princeton 1955)
<i>ARE.</i>	<i>Ancient Records of Egypt</i> , James Henry Breasted (ed.), (Chicago 1927)
<i>ARAB.</i>	<i>Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia</i> , D.D. Luckenbil (ed.), (Chicago 1926-1927)
<i>Atti Acc. Lincei</i>	<i>Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei.</i>
<i>BABesch</i>	<i>Bulletin antieke beschaving.</i>
<i>BCTH</i>	<i>Bulletin archéologique du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques. Africa du Nord.</i>
<i>BIAL</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Archaeology.</i>
<i>BMC</i>	<i>Catalogue of the Greek Coins from the British Museum</i> , R.S. Poole, B.V. Head, G. Hill, <i>et al.</i> (eds.) (London 1873-)
<i>CEA</i>	<i>Cahiers des études anciennes.</i>
<i>CIL.</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.</i>
<i>CIS.</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum.</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly.</i>
<i>CRAI</i>	<i>Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres.</i>
<i>GGM.</i>	<i>Geographi Graeci Minores</i> , C. Müller (ed.), (Paris 1855-1861)
<i>EA.</i>	<i>The Amarna Letters</i> , (Tell el-Amarna Tablets) William L. Moran (ed.), (Baltimore and London 1992)
<i>F.Gr.Hist.</i>	<i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , F. Jacoby (ed.), (Berlin 1923-1929, Leiden 1940-1958, Boston 1998-1999)
<i>FHG.</i>	<i>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum</i> , C. Müller (ed.), (Paris 1841- 1870)
<i>HAAN</i>	<i>Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord</i> , Stéphane Gsell, (Paris 1913- 1928)
<i>HDT.</i>	<i>Hittite Diplomatic Texts</i> , Gary Beckman, Harry A. Hoffner Jr. (eds.). (Atlanta 1996)

<i>HN</i> ²	<i>Historia Numorum</i> , Barclay V. Head (Oxford 1911)
<i>IG</i> .	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> .
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i> .
<i>JRA</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Archaeology</i> .
<i>KAI</i> .	<i>Kanaanäische und Aramäische Inschriften</i> , H. Donner, W. Röllig (eds.), (Wiesbaden 1969-1979)
<i>Mus. Helv.</i>	<i>Museum Helveticum</i> .
<i>PCPhS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i> .
<i>REA</i>	<i>Revue des études anciennes</i> .
<i>RstudFen</i>	<i>Rivista di studi fenici</i> .
<i>SGDI</i> .	<i>Sammlung der griechischen Dialektinschriften</i> , H. Collitz, F. Bechtel <i>et al.</i> (eds.), (Göttingen 1884-1915)
<i>SHHA</i>	<i>Studia Historia. Historia Antigua</i> .
<i>Syll</i> ³	<i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , W. Dittenberger (ed.), (Leipzig 1915-1924)
<i>Tod</i>	<i>Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> , M.N. Tod (ed.), (Oxford 1933-1948)

INTRODUCTION

It is interesting that one of the more important non Greco-Roman peoples in antiquity remains the most mysterious. The Carthaginians dominated large areas of the Western Mediterranean for several centuries, maintaining a large empire on both land and sea. Carthage conquered, influenced, and interacted with a large number of peoples in many territories. From its strategic location on the central North African coast it oversaw much of the traffic in the Western Mediterranean. Following their Phoenician forbears, the Carthaginians expanded into large areas of North Africa, Spain, Sardinia, and Sicily along with numerous other smaller islands and territories. The Carthaginians also actively explored and settled parts of the Atlantic coastlines of West Africa and Europe. Through such means as colonisation, trade, and conquest the Carthaginian presence was felt in most areas in the West as well as areas in the developed East.

It is likely that Carthage was founded some time around the end of the ninth century as one of many Phoenician coastal ports along the North African coast. Alongside the likes of Hadrumentum, Leptis Magna, and Utica, Carthage fulfilled its initial function as part of a larger trade network which spanned most of the North African coast. Such a network was also instituted in coastal areas of Southern Spain, Sardinia, Western Sicily and islands such as Malta and the Balearics. In their base on the Levantine coast, the Phoenicians grew wealthy from such settlements. Phoenician opportunity in the West was far greater than in the East. The Phoenicians were under the near-constant overlordship of more powerful peoples such as the Egyptians, the Hittites, and the Assyrians from the second half of the second millennium onwards. Nevertheless, excelling in the maritime and mercantile activities, the Phoenicians were able to placate their eastern masters by functioning as useful merchants fulfilling the latter's needs for various commodities. The Phoenicians' ability to move beyond the control and interest of such powers enabled them to create a trade-based 'empire' of their own. Although comprised of separate city-states, the Phoenician identity was bound by trade and the sea, opening the Western Mediterranean several centuries before the arrival of any developed rival.

The Phoenician legacy to Carthage cannot be underestimated. Apart from a common social and cultural heritage, the Phoenician appetite for trade and exploration

was transmitted to Carthage. The rapid development of Carthage coupled with the decline of Phoenician influence in the West during the sixth century, nominated a clear successor. Carthage gradually assumed the Phoenician 'Empire' in the West as its own, along with the lucrative trade routes, settlements, and partnerships with many peoples. As in the time of the Phoenicians, several core provinces comprised the Carthaginian Empire: North Africa, Spain, Sardinia, and Western Sicily. Nevertheless, from the end of the sixth century Carthage developed this inheritance both to solidify what it had, as well as to increase its power and territory. It is instantly clear that Carthage was willing to depart from the established methods of the Phoenicians to operate its empire. The nature of the Carthaginian Empire was unique, employing and adapting older methods, while instituting its own foreign policies, which would ultimately define it as Carthaginian.

THE BASIC NATURE OF THE CARTHAGINIAN EMPIRE

The nature of the Carthaginian Empire is not easily classified. The Carthaginians employed several characteristic techniques to expand and maintain their influence within and beyond the boundaries of their empire. The Phoenician legacy of trade naturally remained important for them. Despite contemporary accounts of more aggressive military encounters overshadowing the mercantile nature of Carthage, it continued to trade extensively as the Phoenicians had done before. Although gradually supplemented with other industry, trade remained the mainstay of the Carthaginian economy and a driving force behind Carthaginian expansion abroad.

Like the Phoenicians and the Greeks, the Carthaginians also maintained an active policy of settlement abroad. This manifested itself in several forms from as early as the seventh century. There are several solid examples of Carthaginian settlements which fit well into a more traditional Greek model. The Carthaginians did not however, adhere solely to a Greek, or for that matter Phoenician model. We find a number of distinctive Carthaginian patterns of settlement emerging. One of the strongest was certainly their remodelling of the older Phoenician 'Empire' which saw regions redeveloped or resettled as Punic settlements, rather than older Phoenician or indigenous foundations. Even within characteristic settlement patterns there were

major variances in Carthaginian policy. Carthaginian settlement was as distinctive as it was changeable.

Then there is the nature of Carthaginian military activity. The role of military aggression of various design is evident in most empires, both ancient and modern, and Carthage is no exception. Unlike the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians were often willing to employ a strong military policy to enforce their influence in a certain area or over a certain people. As with other aspects of Carthaginian activity abroad, this was conducted without a standardised policy, i.e. separate areas or instances were dealt with by various methods. Thus we find the Carthaginians active in military, diplomatic, and political spheres in areas both under their control, and in neighbouring states. The size and diverse nature of the empire meant that a single military policy would not suffice in every area, and as a result we find varying degrees of military involvement and activity in separate areas often over long periods of time.

The main methods Carthage used to maintain and expand its empire aid in defining it. Such methods were often interrelated or prompted the use of another: for example, if Carthage wanted to facilitate trade, it would create new settlements or go to war to protect or expand settlements and trade routes. As previously stated, it is not a simple task in defining the exact nature of the Carthaginian Empire and its methods abroad.

MODELS OF SETTLEMENT

When discussing aspects of Phoenicio-Punic settlement, it is natural to compare it to the nearest contemporary model, i.e. that of the Greeks. It is difficult to discuss the nature of both Phoenician and Carthaginian settlement as an entirely unique process as in many respects its mechanisms fit into the limits of the Greek model of colonisation. Given the time, the means, and the contact between these groups it is natural for similarities to occur. Although one tries not to consider Phoenician or Carthaginian settlement in Greek terms, it is often unavoidable owing to such correspondence. It is perhaps better to view these groups of colonising peoples as working within a similar system, but with different agendas.

The Greek model of colonisation is a familiar development in Greek society stretching from the eighth to the sixth century traditionally, but in fact surviving well

into the fifth century. Reasons behind such motivation for colonisation are often identified as overpopulation and potential trade.¹ The fundamental characteristic of Greek colonisation was that each new colony was designed as an independent replica of its metropolis. Social, political, and cultural traditions were continued in a colony usually with little deviation from those established in the metropolis. The vast majority of Greek colonies adhered to such a practice and in doing so became permanent settlements with established political and social functions. Another common feature of such sites was their connection with arable territory. As these sites were designed as permanent city-states, they needed to be self-sufficient, and therefore needed land for agricultural use. The concept of trade was by no means foreign to Greek states, and there are a number of Greek *emporia* or colonies which were certainly geared for trade.² However, this remained a secondary function to most colonising states and colonies alike. The preference in the Hellenic world was to colonise primarily for social needs; mercantile interests, although apparent, were certainly less important.

The Phoenician practice of settlement, although working within a similar system, was the opposite of the Greek model. The Phoenician emphasis on trade as the primary motive for settlement resulted in large networks of *emporia* with a smaller emphasis on permanent civic and social settlement. The Phoenicians preferred to settle coastal areas with any number of smaller foundations rather than large single settlements. Again they were not averse to settling permanent independent foundations, but coastal *emporia* were certainly preferred. We find large coastal networks of Phoenician settlement in areas of Southern Spain, Sardinia, North Africa, Atlantic Africa, and to a lesser extent Sicily consisting of any number of coastal *emporia* of varying size. These networks also usually contained a larger and more

¹ The problem of overpopulation appears as the defining factor behind most Greek colonies. We find most of the major colonising states dominating small areas of fertile land. With an increase of population and the lack of primogeniture in Greek law, states such as Corinth, Chalcis, and Thera were able to cope by relieving their overpopulation through colonisation. The idea of a Greek colony settled primarily as *emporia* is less clear. Most Greek colonies, however, were settled with possibility of developing trade. This is often considered a secondary function as a Greek *emporion* functioned independently from its metropolis. States such as Massilia, Byzantium, and Syracuse all grew wealthy from the subsequent trade they generated.

² There are several forms of *emporia* throughout the Greek world. The Massiliot colony of Emporion certainly lived up to its etymology by becoming a major port for trade in Northern Spain. Naucratis in Egypt also operated as a type of *emporion* although it was operated as a type of treaty port used by several Greek states. Other settlements such as Epidamnus were settled to dominate a specific trade route. It is likely that the Phocaeans of Alalia on Corsica were also operating the site as an *emporion* as well as a base for piracy.

permanent settlement which was more akin to the Greek model. Sites such as Gades, Motya, Caralis, and even Carthage developed into primary provincial centres, which presumably helped manage smaller settlements. Despite this settlement pattern, the Phoenicians rarely commanded large amounts of territory. By not committing manpower to conquest, they could manage their empire more easily with limited resources. The coastal nature of the majority of Phoenician settlements certainly suggested a strong connection with the sea, and in particular trade. This is emphasised by the fact that Phoenician settlements generally did not command large stretches of adjoining agricultural land. A number of sites such as Leptis Magna, Malaga, and Tharros did maintain rich agricultural hinterland, but it was by no means a prerequisite for settlement. Even the larger sites of Gades and Motya were settled on offshore islands, while Carthage only commanded large stretches of fertile land after later conquest. Presumably a large number of Phoenician settlements relied on seaborne traffic to supply them with basic commodities. This naturally meant Phoenician sites were less durable than their permanent Greek counterparts, and often remain relatively unknown.

The Carthaginian model of settlement was based primarily on that of the Phoenicians. Carthage maintained its inherited desire to trade and settled accordingly. By inheriting the settlements of the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians did not need to send out as many of their own. Generally they relied on redeveloping their empire, but from the few examples we possess, it appears that Carthage settled new networked *emporia* as well as permanent centres designed to dominate specific territories. As we will see, Carthage did not maintain a standard colonial policy but still operated within the conventions of contemporary settlement.

UNDERSTANDING CARTHAGE – ANCIENT AND MODERN INTERPRETATIONS

As previously mentioned, for one of the most powerful empires in antiquity the Carthaginians remain somewhat enigmatic. This often stems from the nature of our sketchy literary accounts. Our knowledge of the Carthaginians is dictated by ancient literary opinion, which unfortunately is mostly hostile. It is natural that Greek and Roman authors were unwilling to praise or even to describe fully the Carthaginians

who were at best rivals and at worst enemies. This problem is compounded by the almost complete lack of Phoenicio-Punic sources. The handful of inscriptions or basic testimonia we possess, although insightful regarding certain aspects of Carthaginian history or society, are sporadic and ultimately insufficient. We are therefore nearly completely reliant on Greek and Roman authors for a literary tradition.

The nature of the literary evidence we have regarding Carthage is an incomplete mosaic spread throughout a large number of ancient authors. The main periods of Greek and Roman interest were naturally those which concerned them most, i.e. the Greek wars on Sicily and the Punic Wars. The accounts of Timaeus and Ephorus (which survive in part in Diodorus) as well as those of Appian, Polybius, and Livy comprise the largest narrative accounts regarding Carthage. As the opposing and victorious sides wrote these accounts, they are generally biased and often flawed. Otherwise we must rely on the likes of Aristotle and Justin for brief but sometimes detailed accounts of the Carthaginian constitution or of historical events respectively. Presumably more detailed works once existed such as those of Mago and Philinus, but are now lost to us. The nature of the bulk of literary information we possess regarding Carthage is fragmentary and often sensational or anecdotal in nature. Even in these shorter accounts a degree of hostility against Carthage can often be identified. At best the literary picture of Carthage is threadbare in a number of areas of history or aspects of society. The first chronological reference to Carthage dated after its settlement in 814 was the founding of Ebusus in 654/3; then the battle against the Phocaeans in ca. 600; following that the victory at Alalia in 535; and then finally a more coherent picture emerges with the first major Carthaginian invasion of Sicily in 480. In between such events there are basic references, which can be placed in a broader chronological context. To gain a reasonable picture of any aspect of Carthaginian history or society often requires grafting several separate sources together.

Owing to the scarcity of literary facts regarding Carthage, one must often turn to alternate sources of information. Archaeological information is proving increasingly useful at piecing aspects of Carthaginian society together. Fortunately Carthage and its empire remained mercantile by nature and material remains often attest a detailed Carthaginian presence and often the nature of that presence in a number of areas. This is particularly evident in areas of Phoenicio-Punic activity where the literary record is poor such as Sardinia and Malta. Material remains based

on trade and settlement provide a more complete picture of the Carthaginians' activity in all areas of their empire and their contact with peoples both in mainstream cultures such as the Etruscans and the Greeks and with less developed localised peoples.

The archaeological record of Carthage, its empire, and its contacts is by no means complete. Subsequent settlement of Punic sites by Rome and in later times renders surveys of Carthaginian activity at many sites incomplete. This is evident in the likes of Leptis Magna and Lilybaeum by the Romans and Tingis (Tangier) and New Carthage (Cartagena) in later times. This is compounded by the superficial nature of Phoenicio-Punic settlement. As mentioned previously, many Phoenician and, to a lesser extent, Carthaginian *emporia* were small coastal settlements depending on trade. These were often little more than seasonal or temporary ports which left little enduring trace on archaeological records. The conceivable number of such settlements which may have existed and since vanished is considerable. Another problem that affects our archaeological record is a lack of Punic wares or distinguishable commodities in developed areas. There is relatively little physical evidence of Punic remains in Greek, Egyptian, and Roman centres. The amount of foreign imports in Carthage and throughout its empire suggests heavy trade. Presumably Carthage was exporting commodities which did not leave enduring remains on the respective archaeological records of its more developed trading partners.

One interesting aspect of Carthaginian trade in relation to material remains is its late adoption of systematised coinage. The adoption of coinage in Carthage followed increased contact with the Greeks but did not surface until the late fifth century. As a result, we only possess numismatic evidence demonstrating trade and production from the late fifth century, leaving earlier periods of contact unattested.

Finally the size of the Carthaginian Empire poses obvious problems in obtaining a detailed survey of activity. The sheer expanse of coastline suggests numerous settlements that remain unknown. Otherwise Carthage dominated areas that bordered *terra incognita*. There is evidence suggesting Carthaginian activity beyond the Pillars of Heracles and Saharan North Africa. The size of both areas coupled with the often superficial nature of Carthaginian activity has left little indelible evidence in these areas. The extent of any Carthaginian presence will likely remain unknown. All the same, despite some consequential flaws in our archaeological record of Carthage

and its empire, it still provides an essential insight into areas of Carthaginian activity which is often missing from our literary records.

The nature of the evidence we possess regarding Carthage has an obvious effect on modern understanding and scholarship. In many respects the partiality of the Greek and Roman writers has endured to the present. The general lack of coverage afforded to Carthage and its affairs in antiquity has naturally limited modern interpretation. The extremely limited Phoenicio-Punic literary tradition coupled with the nature of Greek and Roman sources has left gaping holes in our knowledge of Carthaginian history and society. The relative increase of archaeological material and interpretation has certainly helped address this problem. Large areas of Carthaginian activity are being illuminated by evidence of settlement, trade, and interaction with other peoples. This is particularly true regarding the Carthaginian provinces in Spain, Sardinia, and Western Sicily. However, the archaeological record is by no means complete and is also hindered by a corresponding literary tradition.

As a legacy of the nature of our literary and, to a lesser extent, archaeological tradition regarding Carthage, modern interpretation has naturally been attracted to periods of Carthaginian history or society which have better coverage in ancient sources. While these accounts have greatly increased our understanding of aspects of Carthage, they generally follow set parameters. As a result, there are still major areas of Carthaginian civilisation which remain unaddressed.

Warmington's history of Carthage was primarily based on the accounts of Diodorus and Polybius with the main focus beginning in the fifth century.³ Such a survey of Carthage was useful, but a typical treatment. A standard history of Carthage includes an introduction with the Phoenicians, culminating in the foundation of Carthage in the late ninth century. This usually continues after a gap of over three hundred years with the Greek wars on Sicily. This period coincides with the growth of Carthage, its empire, and the development of Punic culture. From an historical view this treatment continues with the wars against the Greeks and then the Romans during the three Punic wars, until the destruction of Carthage in 146. In between the historical narrative, there is room for discussion of trade, basic society, political organisation (based on the accounts of Aristotle and Polybius), and religion. The

³ B.H. Warmington, *Carthage* (London 1960).

nature of our surviving literary tradition has dictated such a course to a large degree, and this is obvious in modern scholarship.

More recent accounts of Carthage have tended to be more detailed, with the likes of Walter Ameling⁴ and Werner Huss⁵ providing more comprehensive accounts of Carthaginian military, political, and social spheres. These more recent accounts continue the tradition of Stéphane Gsell⁶ who wrote the first detailed account of Carthaginian society and growth in North Africa as part of his *magnum opus* on the entire history of the region. Further general study into the social and cultural aspects of Carthage have been presented by the Picards in an attempt to piece together a more detailed picture of the city and its people.⁷ There have also been several comprehensive studies regarding Carthaginian activity in specific areas. Pedro Barcelo has compiled a compendium of Carthaginian activity and settlement in Spain before the Barcid invasion in the second half of the third century.⁸ Linda-Marie Hans has studied Carthaginian activity and relationships in Sicily.⁹ Sabatino Moscati has covered several areas of Carthaginian involvement including Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy.¹⁰ There have also been several specific studies of Carthaginian Sardinia by Ferruccio Barreca.¹¹

The archaeological profile has provided further depth to modern interpretation of Carthaginian activity. By nature this information is more selective than comprehensive. Some specific sites are studied in detail, however others remain relatively unknown to modern interpretation. More prominent and unoccupied sites have provided the most useful information. Carthage, along with several North African sites continue to provide large amounts of material remains and the best physical picture of Carthaginian activity. In Sicily, Motya and Panormus provide relatively detailed archaeological records, especially for the Punic period. This is also evident in several other sites including Elymian Eryx. In Sardinia and Spain we have

⁴ Walter Ameling, *Karthago – Studien zu Militär Staat und Gesellschaft* (Munich 1993).

⁵ Werner Huss, *Die Karthager* (Munich 1990); *Geschichte der Karthager* (Munich 1985).

⁶ Stéphane Gsell, *HAAN II* (Paris 1921).

⁷ Gilbert Charles and Collete Picard, *Carthage – A Survey of Punic History and Culture from its Birth to the Final Tragedy*, translated by Dominique Collon (London 1987); *The Life and Death of Carthage*, translated by Dominique Collon (London 1968); *Daily Life in Carthage at the Time of Hannibal*, translated by A. E. Foster (London 1961).

⁸ Pedro A. Barcelo, *Karthago und die Iberische Halbinsel vor den Barkiden* (Bonn 1988).

⁹ Linda-Marie Hans, *Karthago und Sizilien* (Hildesheim 1983).

¹⁰ Sabatino Moscati, *Italia Punica* (Milan 1986).

¹¹ Ferruccio Barreca, *La civiltà fenicio-punica in Sardegna* (Sassari 1988); *La Sardegna fenicia e punica* (Sassari 1974).

widespread evidence of specific settlements and larger areas of Carthaginian activity. Southern Spain and Sardinia provide comprehensive archaeological evidence of Phoenician and Carthaginian provincial settlement, organisation, trade, and industry. The major flaw in our archaeological record remains its selective nature. As mentioned previously, there is little physical evidence of Carthaginian interaction with more developed peoples in the archaeological records of the latter. Presumably trade was considerable with the Romans, Egyptians, Greeks, and Etruscans, however, there is relatively little Carthaginian evidence amongst these cultures. The extent of the Carthaginian Empire and its activities beyond this also make it difficult to provide a comprehensive archaeological survey. Presumed activity and settlement in large areas, coupled with the often superficial method of Phoenicio-Punic settlement, have revealed little information. This is obvious in areas such as the Atlantic, the Sahara, but also in parts of the North African coast, as well as contact with areas of Italy, Southern France and North-eastern Spain.

The problem remains that our knowledge of Carthage is dictated by the selective nature of our sources both literary and archaeological. Even modern interpretation suffers a similar fate of being forced to omit large areas of Carthaginian history, society, and culture through a general lack of evidence. Unfortunately any wide-ranging survey of Carthage and its empire is threatened by the nature of this problem.

CARTHAGE AND ITS EMPIRE

As we have seen, developing the idea of any comprehensive survey of almost any aspect of Carthaginian society or history is fraught with difficulty based on the limited evidence. This is certainly the case when attempting to create a detailed account of Carthage's history or salient aspects of its society such as politics or religion. The scattered nature of information, both geographically and chronologically is not conducive to such research. The nature of the Carthaginian Empire provides a different interpretation using such information owing to the large size of the empire and the long period which it existed. The scattered nature of our evidence provides widespread information regarding Carthage, its provinces, and its activities abroad. Although this information is by no means complete, it is possible to make several

conclusions regarding the Carthaginian Empire and activity which in turn help elucidate our incomplete knowledge of Carthage in general. The nature of such research is varied. Literary evidence still provides the best interpretative insight into the nature of Carthaginian activity abroad. A diverse range of ancient authors provides a variety of accounts or references to Carthage and its empire. Beyond this, archaeological evidence provides insight into most major areas and many settlements within the empire, and a number of others beyond it tracking settlement, trade, and influence. By employing all possible resources, distinctive Carthaginian patterns and policies become more apparent.

Carthage maintained a diverse policy when planning and controlling its empire and activity abroad. This activity manifested itself in a number of forms. Carthage governed and developed its empire according to its interests. These were initially based on trade and settlement, however, an increase in military conquest becomes apparent. Such a combination saw Carthage expand and maintain contact and control using these three major categories and a number of variations. Based on the evidence we possess, it becomes clear that Carthage maintained distinctive policies abroad. These policies and activities defined it as characteristically Carthaginian, separating it from any contemporary power. In turn, the nature of the Carthaginian Empire and its actions help define a proper sense of Carthaginian identity, which owing to surviving evidence and ancient opinion, has suffered throughout antiquity and into modern times.

I. THE PHOENICIANS

The abiding image of the Phoenicians in antiquity is their association with the sea. The Phoenicians' reputation as seafarers inspires both admiration for their maritime skill and vilification of their underhanded trading tactics. It was they who, according to Pliny, developed navigation and opened the shipping lanes of the Mediterranean and beyond in antiquity.¹ The Phoenicians were extraordinarily active in ancient shipping and oversaw the traffic of commodities and culture for centuries.

Before we can conclude anything about the Carthaginians, we must first look at their predecessors, the Phoenicians. As one might expect from a colony, Carthage continued the traditions of its metropolis, Tyre; in particular the latter's dependence on the sea. Trade, colonial activity, and conquest were all conducted on, and connected to the sea. In many ways the Phoenician legacy was to define Carthaginian society, its characteristics, and its activities

EARLY PHOENICIA — VASSALAGE, OPPORTUNITY, AND TRADE

Tyre, you used to say: I am a ship perfect in beauty. Your frontiers stretched far out to sea; those who built you made you perfect in beauty. Cypress from Senir they used for all your planking. They took cedar from Lebanon to make you a mast. From the tallest oaks of Bashan they made your oars. They built you a deck of cedar inlaid with ivory from the Kittim isles. Embroidered linen of Egypt was used for your sail and for your flag. Purple and scarlet from the Elishah islands formed your deck-tent. Men from Sidon and from Arvad were your oarsmen. Your sages, Tyre, were aboard serving as sailors. The elders and craftsmen of Gebal were there to caulk your seams.

(Ezekiel 27:3-9)

The bulk of the evidence for early Phoenician society revolves around the Phoenicians' activities as traders and seafarers. This is attested from an early period with evidence from the third millennium BC, which albeit scanty, suggests that the Phoenicians were operating as the traders and merchants of the powerful eastern empires. Such evidence attests early Byblite connections with the Egyptian Old

¹ Pliny *NH*. V.67.

Kingdom and Mesopotamia.² During stages of the second millennium the Phoenician cities often became vassal states both of the Hittites and of the Egyptians. Although these cities were reduced to subject status, they still flourished under what appears to be minimal Egyptian and Hittite interference. The Amarna letters of the fourteenth century suggest that the southern Phoenician city-states exercised a fair degree of autonomy under formal Egyptian overlordship while alluding to active trade between Phoenician cities and Egypt.³ During the eleventh century, an Egyptian official, Wenamon travelled to Byblos and was robbed of his funds to pay for a shipment of timber at Dor.⁴ His account demonstrates continuing seaborne mercantile activities between Byblos and Egypt.

It appears that in the North the Hittites instituted a similar, although somewhat tighter system of vassalage with several Phoenician city-states required to aid the former in times of war.⁵ The value of the Phoenicians to the larger states of Egypt and the Hittites is considerable. Although formally subject to these larger states, the Phoenicians' autonomy, to a certain extent, resulted from the aid they lent their overlords in terms of trade and mobility at sea.⁶

From the fourteenth century the Phoenicians began to expand their interests further abroad. This is best demonstrated by increasing evidence of contact with such cultures as Mycenaean Greece. By the twelfth century, the decline of the Egyptians and the destruction of Hittite civilisation left the Phoenician states with no major power to contend with in the East.⁷ In such a political climate, the Phoenician cities seem to have enjoyed two or three centuries of full independence when they flourished as traders and settlers. This is further represented by their activity both on the Levantine coast and elsewhere. A number of Biblical records describe the Phoenicians as the characteristic traders of Eastern Mediterranean. The best example survives from in the reign of Hiram of Tyre (ca. 970-940) who was allied to King

² Donald Harden, *The Phoenicians* (New York 1962) p.44.

³ EA. 139-152, 160, Aziru of Amurru provides eight ships along with a quantity of boxwood logs and large logs to Amenophis IV.

⁴ ARE. IV.563, 566.

⁵ These include Amurru, Ugarit, and Aleppo, *HDT.* 4, 5, 8, 9, 14, 16, 17.

⁶ Susan Frankenstein, "The Phoenicians in the Far West: A Function of Neo-Assyrian Imperialism", *Mesopotamia 7: Power and Propaganda a Symposium on Ancient Empires* (Copenhagen 1979) pp.263ff.

⁷ Invaders from the northwest had destroyed Mycenaean Greece. Although Philistine and Hebrew encroachments are evident on the Levantine coast, there was a distinct power vacuum. Although the Sea Peoples were defeated by the Egyptians under Ramses III (ARE. IV.52; also see under Merneptah, ARE. III.579), they still shattered Egyptian rule in the East.

Solomon of Israel. Hiram, on request, supplied cedars for the construction of Solomon's new temple.⁸ We also find Hiram supplying Solomon with experienced sailors (1 Kings 9:26) and the triennial shipment of ivory, wood, gold, silver, and baboons from Tarshish (possibly Tartessus in Spain, 10:22). From these few examples from the first book of Kings we can see how the Phoenicians were widespread and well-known travellers and traders by the tenth century.

This period of relative freedom ended in 876 with the arrival of the Assyrians under Assurnasirpal and his heirs who reduced the main Phoenician cities to tributary status once more.⁹ That the individual Phoenician sites often came into conflict with their Assyrian rulers suggests a tighter system of vassalage.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the Phoenicians remained active traders in spite of such conflict and control. In a number of Assyrian inscriptions standard Phoenician characteristics appear. On one occasion several Phoenician cities provided to the Assyrian King a tribute of silver, gold, lead, copper (including vessels), coloured woollen garments, linen garments, a great and a small *pagutu*, maple-wood, boxwood, ivory, and a dolphin.¹¹ There are several inscriptions which list similar tribute payments from Phoenician cities.¹²

By the end of the seventh century the Neo-Babylonian Empire had ousted Assyria as the dominant eastern power, and the Phoenician cities fell under Babylonian rule.¹³ The onset of Persian domination in Phoenicia saw a new method of tribute: namely military service. On a number of occasions we find Phoenicians comprising a considerable section of the Persian navy. Thucydides claims that the Persian navy active during the Pentecontaetia was composed of Phoenicians, Cilicians, and Cyprians.¹⁴ Herodotus mentions an earlier fleet also consisting of these three nationalities fighting for the Persians.¹⁵ The Persians were willing actively to employ the Phoenicians as sailors for their navy in accordance with their reputation as being some of the best seafarers of the period. Following the fall of Persia, the

⁸ 1 Kings 5:15-32.

⁹ Shalmaneser III (858-825), The gates of Balawat and the black obelisk illustrate Tyrian ships paying tribute to the Assyrian King (Harden pp.52-3). Under Tiglatpileser III (754-727) we find evidence of tribute from Amurru (ARAB. I.304).

¹⁰ Tyre in particular paid for its desire for independence enduring several length sieges, see Joseph. *Ap.* I.156; *AJ.* X.228.

¹¹ ARAB. I.479.

¹² ARAB. I.302, 803, 815, II.912.

¹³ Tyre, the last remaining enclave of resistance of the Levantine coast, was captured in 573/2 by Nebuchadnezzar following an eleven-year siege. This event proved a watershed in Phoenician history, especially for its activities in the West.

¹⁴ Thuc. I.112.

Macedonians and their successors, the Seleucids, were next to assume control of Phoenicia. This finally gave way to Roman domination during the first century BC.

A brief history of ancient Phoenicia gives the impression that the Phoenicians were constantly defeated and subjugated by more powerful nations. The Phoenician city-states however, managed to maintain their high levels of seaborne independence abroad despite their technical status as subject peoples. The division of Phoenicia into squabbling city-states belies the Phoenicians' common culture as seafarers. As divided states they were never considered a united threat to their respective masters. In fact they were valued as assets to the ruling powers, providing trade and mobility. Although the Phoenicians were often subjected by various powers, they maintained an ability to expand by means of the sea beyond the immediate control of their rulers.¹⁶ This is shown in their ability to trade and develop their own interests, which as we will see, evolved into a kind of 'empire' of their own.

In what follows we will often speak of 'the Phoenicians' out of necessity since we rarely hear which Phoenician city founded a specific settlement. All the same, this should not mislead into a belief that the Phoenician cities operated as a monolithic front which co-ordinated policies. Rather we should think of the cities and their many settlements and the various merchants in them as having many shared interests. These shared interests resulted in much informal co-operation along the trading routes, co-operation which frequently causes our sources to speak of 'Phoenician' settlements and 'Phoenician' activities rather than those of individual Phoenician cities.

PHOENICIAN EXPANSION

A sure method of gauging the Phoenicians' influence is their presence abroad. We have already witnessed some of their mercantile activities in the Near East. However, what truly defined their actions was their contact, influence, and general expansion throughout much of the Mediterranean. Phoenician trade saw them present throughout the East and even active in the Red Sea and the interior trade routes. There was, however, little opportunity for physical expansion owing to the presence of

¹⁵ Hdt. VI.6, VII.90.

¹⁶ For general accounts of the history of the Phoenician homeland see Harden, Chp. III; Sabatino Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, translated by Alastair Hamilton (London 1968) Chp. I.2.

established and powerful states in these areas.¹⁷ Despite near-constant domination in their homeland, the Phoenician city-states expanded abroad and exercised a high degree of autonomy beyond the reach of the dominant powers of the East. The Phoenician method of expansion differed markedly from other antique cultures. They were able to expand and to establish *emporia* and various settlements, and to maintain them successfully because of their own disinterest in orthodox conquest and domination of foreign territory and peoples.

A MODEL OF PHOENICIAN SETTLEMENT

Like the Greeks', the Phoenicians' expansion adhered to a reasonably standard model of settlement. However, it is important not to be misled into defining this phenomenon as an extension of the better-known models from Greece. We have already discussed the nature of both forms of settlement as generally working within the same standard model. Although there are a number of similarities which will become more evident, Phoenician settlement was distinctive from the basic Greek model. Primarily, the bulk of Phoenician settlement was not aimed at founding autonomous cities but at furthering trade. The Greek term *emporion*, or trading establishment best describes the majority of smaller Phoenician settlements and even the primary functions of the larger settlements. A smaller percentage was geared for permanent settled and civic function. Larger centres such as Gades, Utica, Lixus, and Motya did maintain proper infrastructure and a permanent population. These centres in turn usually dominated networks of smaller settlements. Smaller centres such as Toscanos (Spain) and Bithya (Sardinia) possessed permanent populations and presumably had limited localised governance. Finally, there were the smaller Phoenician trading ports. These remained superficial, relying on seasonal or temporary trade or passing traffic. Such centres were presumably numerous, but given their nature, often untraceable. Such a system of settlement allowed the Phoenicians to develop networked areas of commercial interests. Cyprus, North Africa, Southern Spain, Western Sicily, and Sardinia developed into coastal areas of Phoenician settlement and trade.

¹⁷ The same problem beset the later Greek city-states during the eighth century when attempting to colonise new territories. As a result we find most Greek colonies founded in undeveloped areas of the Mediterranean such as Sicily and Southern Italy and beyond in the Propontis and the Black Sea.

The typical Phoenician settlement also differed somewhat from the traditional Greek model in its topography. Owing to their mercantile purpose and maritime nature, the vast majority of settlements were coastal with access to the sea and therefore able to remain in contact with other Phoenician settlements and seaborne traffic. As a result, these settlements usually had a serviceable harbour, or a beach. These settlements are characteristically well-guarded. Many were notably settled on offshore islands (Motya, Gades, and Mogador) or defensible headlands or peninsulas. Such a trait suggests that the Phoenicians remained indifferent towards building territory in the interior. They rather preferred to keep their settlements small and manageable without concerning themselves with dominating native populations and large territories. This is emphasised by the Phoenician policy of building amicable relations with local peoples with which they came into contact. These peoples actually served as markets for selling commodities and a means of obtaining others for further production and export.

Phoenician settlement abroad was successful because it functioned in a mercantile sphere beyond the influence and competition of the developed powers of the East. By maintaining simple, but effective coastal networks of settlement fed by native and their own industrial bases, the Phoenicians were able to maintain a virtual *imperium sine terra*. Unlike Greek models where colonies established *chorai* as quickly as possible, Phoenician settlements preferred bases from which they could trade.

CYPRUS

Phoenician activity on Cyprus is problematic regarding its initial settlement. The island's proximity to Phoenicia as well as the constant trade between the two areas make it difficult to discern exact colonial boundaries. Nonetheless evidence suggests a possible initial Phoenician presence as early as the eleventh century BC.¹⁸ Several prominent Phoenician settlements are attested on Cyprus, dominating much of the eastern third of the island. These Phoenician colonies seem to have remained relatively independent until the reign of the Assyrian King Sargon II (721-705). Even

¹⁸ Excavations at Kition have dated the acropolis to the eleventh century, see E. Gjerstad *et al.* (eds.), *The Swedish Cyprus Expedition*, Vol. IV.2 (Stockholm 1948) p.436ff. There is debate over the date of

then they remained mostly autonomous. Moreover they retained their distinct Phoenician character despite near often vassal status under the Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans.

The extent of Phoenician settlement on Cyprus was limited by existing Eteocypriot and Greek settlements, such as Amathus and Paphos.¹⁹ Phoenician settlements and *emporia* were still able to develop and dominated a considerable portion of the island. The earliest Phoenician inscription we have from Cyprus is a funerary inscription from the ninth century.²⁰ This coincides with the first distinguishable type of Phoenician pottery, the 'Red Slip' ware. Although such a date could suggest the beginning of concerted Phoenician settlement in the area, there are traces of Syro-Palestinian pottery at Salamis dating from the eleventh century suggesting an earlier Phoenician presence on Cyprus.²¹ The travels of Wenamon saw him accidentally arrive on Cyprus (Alasa) ca. 1070, although it is unclear whether or not the settlement was Phoenician.²² Eleventh century colonisation of Cyprus is not inconceivable when we consider that the Phoenician settlements of Utica and Gades far to the west may have been established possibly as early as 1100 BC. Owing to the lack of concrete evidence, however, it would be advisable to leave open the question whether Phoenician contact with Cyprus in the eleventh century involved only trade or extended already to rudimentary settlement. It was not until the ninth or eighth century, however, that the Phoenicians fully utilised Cyprus by establishing permanent foundations and *emporia*.

Phoenician settlement on Cyprus due to the lack of evidence. Most archaeological and epigraphic evidence survives from the ninth and eighth centuries onward.

¹⁹ Traditionally Greek colonisation of Cyprus coincides with the fall of Troy (1184 BC). It is likely that this date is slightly exaggerated and actual colonisation took place later. Parker presents the tenth century as a more likely date for the arrival of the Greeks ("Zur Datierung der Dorischen Wanderung", *Mus. Helv.* LII, 1995, pp.130-154. Greek colonisation presumably predated the Phoenician presence on the island which has been possibly dated as early as the eleventh century, see Sir George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Vol. I (Cambridge 1972) Chp. V. Greek contact and settlement with Cyprus remains problematic owing to a lack of evidence, see F.G. Maier, "Kinyras & Agapenor", *Acts of the International Archaeological Symposium, Cyprus between Orient and Occident*, V. Karageorghis (ed.), (Nicosia 1986) pp.311-320.

²⁰ *KAI*. 30.

²¹ See Vassos Karageorghis, *Kition - Mycenaean and Phoenician Discoveries in Cyprus* (London 1976) p.95.

²² *ARE*. IV.591. Recent scholarship has pointed to the lack of Phoenician characteristics in his account as proof of no Phoenician presence in Cyprus at that time. Nevertheless, Wenamon may not have arrived in a Phoenician settlement. In any case, the presence of a bilingual member of the court suggests contact between Egypt and Cyprus - a possible result of trade, which during this period was becoming increasingly Phoenician.

The Phoenician settlements on Cyprus were certainly geared for trade. It is, however, difficult to categorise settlements as purely Phoenician, as Phoenician settlers may often have lived alongside Greek and native populations.²³ Only a handful of settlements can be safely identified as Phoenician. Most other towns on the island probably contained a strong Phoenician presence suggesting that the Phoenicians were also using them as trading centres. Coastal settlements such as Kition, Amathus, and Salamis were all coastal ports servicing the Levantine coast. Interior settlements such as Tamassos and Golgoi would have supplied the coast with commodities from workshops while interacting with native and Greek settlements.²⁴ Northern coastal towns such as Lapethos (a Greek town temporarily ruled by Phoenicians) and Ayia Irini would have been important ports for trade with the southern coasts of Anatolia and with Greece.²⁵ The situation of various Phoenician settlements on Cyprus is characteristic considering the influence of their mercantile nature. Although such settlements were not restricted to trade, their original function for trade-orientated expansion is apparent.

Kition, the primary Phoenician settlement on Cyprus was situated at the head of an inlet which reached the foot of its acropolis giving the settlement an enclosed harbour.²⁶ Excavations have revealed an ancient moat and city walls along with considerable remains of both Phoenician and Greek cultures.²⁷ From the topography

²³ Franz Georg Maier, "Factoids and Fifth-Century Cyprus: The Case of Fifth-Century Cyprus", *JHS* CV, 1985, pp.32-39, has categorised this problem well during the fifth century. It is difficult to distinguish certain Greek or Phoenician towns on the island even at such a late date.

²⁴ See A.T Reyes, *Archaic Cyprus* (Oxford 1994) Chp. VI. There is a great deal of archaeological evidence which demonstrates internal interaction between separate Phoenician states. Although they were often politically divided, Phoenician settlements show common artistic trends and diffusion patterns. Certain types of ceramics, sculpture, and glyptic groups show various trends of movement throughout Cyprus attesting established trade and contact routes.

²⁵ There is evidence of a Phoenician presence in Anatolia. The Karatepe inscription (*KAI*. 26) is an eighth century bilingual document in Hieroglyphic Luwian and Phoenician of King Azatiwatas describing various conquests of the King and the states subjected to tribute status. Greek interaction with Phoenician traders needs no explanation. A bilingual Greek and Phoenician inscription from Rhodes, albeit from the second century BC, is testament to a Phoenician presence on the island (*KAI*. 44). It is apparent that the Greek settlements on Cyprus were also in constant contact with their Phoenician neighbours. The Greek temple of Aphrodite (Astarte) at Paphos was an important Phoenician cult centre. Otherwise such Greek settlements would have been constantly trading with Phoenician merchants. There was an obvious understanding and familiarity of the Phoenicians in Greece as shown by their literary characterisation, see Irene J. Winter "Homer's Phoenicians: History, Ethnography, or Literary Trope? [A Perspective on Early Orientalism]", *The Ages of Homer*, Jane B. Carter and Sarah P. Morris (eds.), (Austin 1995) pp.247-271. For more specific evidence of Phoenician trade with the Greece and Rhodes see Glenn Markoe, *Phoenician Bronze and Silver Bowls from Cyprus and the Mediterranean* (Berkeley 1985) pp.117-127.

²⁶ Strabo XIV.6.3.

²⁷ See Karageorghis, *Kition, Mycenaean and Phoenician Discoveries in Cyprus* (London 1976) for a detailed account of both Greek and Phoenician remains at Kition.

of Kition it appears that the city developed around its primary feature: the harbour, and therefore the trade it generated. The Phoenicians however, developed the site fully with defences, temples and other civil buildings.

Amathus, on the southern coast reveals no direct evidence suggesting Phoenician settlement, however it shows Phoenician characteristics. Like a number of Cypriot towns it probably became a Phoenician settlement for a period.²⁸ Its topographic details are standard: an acropolis, harbour, and city walls. There is also evidence of the cult status of Heracles Malika (Melqart) in the town suggesting Phoenician presence and/or influence.²⁹

Tamassos, in central Cyprus was one of the ancient kingdoms of Cyprus. However there is evidence of a Phoenician presence there in the fourth century BC, when its king, Pasikypros sold his kingdom to Pumiathon, king of Kition.³⁰ This transaction is corroborated by two contemporary inscriptions naming Tamassos as being governed by Kition.³¹ The importance of this town revolves around its position in the copper producing area of Cyprus. The presence of such an important natural resource would certainly attract Phoenician interest.

Idalion, also in Central Cyprus seems to have a similar history to that of Tamassos. An ancient kingdom of Cyprus, it fell to Kition during the fifth century and was governed by the latter. There is also strong Phoenician cultural influence in the city with evidence of cults of Astarte, Reshef (assimilated as Apollo), and Anat (assimilated as Athena).³²

Finally we have evidence of a town named Carthage in Cyprus. The Phoenician term *Qart-Hadasat* simply means 'New Town'. When we consider Carthage in Libya and New Carthage in Spain, it becomes apparent that this was a standard colonial name in Phoenicio-Punic society.³³ In an inscription dated between 750-725 BC the governor of *Qart-Hadasat* refers to himself as the servant of Hiram, king of the Sidonians.³⁴ This refers to Hiram II of Tyre who in turn was a vassal ruler

²⁸ Steph. Byz. s.v. 'Αμαθοῦς.

²⁹ Hill, p.101.

³⁰ Duris of Samos, *F.Gr.Hist.* 76, F.4.

³¹ *KAI.* 32, 33, 41.

³² e.g. *CIS.* I.89, I.93; *KAI.* 38.

³³ A similar colonial name used was Soloeis. This was the name of one of the three original Phoenician towns in Sicily. It is also the name of one of the foundations established during the periplus of Hanno during the fifth century, see Chp. III, n.57 and text.

³⁴ *KAI.* 31. Although Hiram was king of Tyre, the position was often referred to as the King of the Sidonians, e.g. 1 Kings 16:31. The title of king and the identity of the Phoenician inhabitants of the

under Tiglatpileser III.³⁵ The site of *Qart-Hadasat* is still unknown.³⁶ Both Kition and Amathus have been suggested as candidates. The latter is certainly a possibility but not proved; whereas the former is unlikely when we take into account a fifth century inscription from Kition. This inscription names a man from Carthage and distinguishes him as a (Cypriot) Carthaginian and therefore not from Kition.³⁷

Although the Phoenician presence on Cyprus was initially based around a trade agenda, it becomes apparent that the new Phoenician settlements on the island soon mimicked their metropoleis as politically active and divided city-states. Kition is probably the best example of a politically active city on Cyprus. During the fifth century it incorporated Tamassos and Idalion into its kingdom. Otherwise evidence from Marium and Lapethos suggests some form of Phoenician rule.³⁸ Both cities were Greek foundations on the north coast of Cyprus. During Ptolemaic times we find Marium's king, Praxidemus son of Sesmai commissioning a bilingual inscription to Anat which was found at Lapethos.³⁹ This King in fact bore besides his Greek name Praxidemus a Phoenician one which is neither a transliteration nor a translation: בעלשלם, "Ba'al replaces". Such a document certainly attests to some Phoenician influence in the royal line of Marium.⁴⁰ Lapethos also attests such a Phoenician incursion into Northern Cyprus. Coins of the fifth century king, Demonicus were struck with Phoenician characters suggesting Phoenician sovereignty over the town.⁴¹ It seems apparent that despite vassal status under Assyrian, Egyptian, Persian, and Ptolemaic rule, the Phoenician towns of Cyprus remained relatively independent and politically active.⁴²

It appears that much like the majority of Greek colonies, the Phoenician settlements on Cyprus continued close contact with their respective metropoleis. We may assume that trade between the new settlements and their respective mother cities remained constant, evident in the similarity of style and influence of commodities. We

Levantine coast assumed several forms, see H.J. Katzenstein, *The History of Tyre* (Jerusalem 1997) p.82.

³⁵ "New City" on Cyprus is also attested later during the rule of the Assyrian King, Esarhaddon in the following century (*ANET*² 291b).

³⁶ For a discussion of several possible locations of the site see Katzenstein, pp.207ff.

³⁷ *KAI*, 37.

³⁸ Maier, p.35.

³⁹ *KAI*, 42.

⁴⁰ See Hill, p.99 n.6.

⁴¹ Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians* pp.105-6; Maier, "Factoids", p.35.

⁴² See *ARAB*, II.690, 876. Under Asarhaddon and Assurbanipal during the seventh century Phoenician towns such as Tamassos, Kurion, and *Qart-Hadasat* are named as separate states of vassalage.

have seen from one inscription how the Cypriot colony of *Qart-Hadasat* owed allegiance to Hiram of Tyre.⁴³ Whether this colony originated from Tyre or the latter had more recently gained power over the former is unclear. If Tyre was the metropolis of *Qart-Hadasat*, this inscription would suggest a connection between the two cities. A connection between Phoenician cities on the Levantine coast and those on Cyprus can be seen during the reign of the Assyrian King, Sennacherib (705-681) when he defeated the King of Tyre, Lule (Elulaeus). Three repetitive inscriptions claim Lule fled to Cyprus where he subsequently died.⁴⁴ This brief example implies that there was a connection between a metropolis and a subsequent settlement amongst the Phoenicians as existed among the Greek states.

Although Phoenician settlement on Cyprus is problematic, it is discernible. It remained a natural destination for Phoenician traders and settlers. It also provided an excellent base for offshore expansion while still in close contact with Phoenicia. Cyprus allowed the Phoenicians a number of basic commodities for trade including copper and timber. Phoenician presence in Cyprus would have facilitated contact with the Greeks on Cyprus and beyond into the Aegean. Although there is no direct evidence proving that Cyprus was the area of the earliest Phoenician expansion abroad, it is a likely point of initial contact and would have remained an integral part of rapidly developing Phoenician interests abroad.

NORTH AFRICA

In addition to Carthage, there were several attested Phoenician settlements in North Africa, which although not as illustrious as their neighbour, were still important foundations. The foundation date of Carthage by Elissa in 814 BC is based on literary tradition but is generally accepted. There is, however, evidence to suggest an earlier Phoenician presence in North Africa. It appears that the Phoenicians may have been actively trading and establishing settlements on the North African coast as early as 1100 BC.⁴⁵ Much like the Phoenician settlements on Cyprus, those in North Africa were founded with seaborne trade and contact with the interior in mind. As in the case

⁴³ *KAI*. 31.

⁴⁴ *ARAB*. II.239, 309, 326.

⁴⁵ According to Philistus, Zor and Carchedon originally settled the site in the late thirteenth century. Harden (p.66) dispels this earlier expedition as an eponymous myth with Zor being the Greek name for Tyre and Carchedon that for Carthage (*FGH*. I, 50 Eusebius *Chron*. 804, p.126; App. *Pun*. 1).

of Cyprus, the literary tradition does not match archaeological data in establishing a chronology of Phoenician settlement. Although Utica was supposedly settled around 1100 as the first Phoenician foundation in the area, so far no direct archaeological evidence has been discovered for a possible Phoenician presence in North Africa before the ninth or eighth centuries. It is likely that Phoenician presence in several supposed sites was superficial and left few lasting remains. This is compounded further by the redevelopment and expansion of several sites during the Punic period from the fifth century. As a result it is often difficult to discern a number of supposed Phoenician sites in North Africa stretching from Libya to the Pillars of Heracles.

From the identified Phoenician settlements we know, there are several common characteristics attesting their primary functions. Most Phoenician settlements in North Africa were semi-permanent or permanent bases revolving around trade between the west and north and Phoenicia to the east. Such settlements usually possessed good harbours and often dominated at least a small area of agricultural land. Although permanently settled, most Phoenician North African settlements did not extend their dominion into the hinterland, preferring to rely on seaborne trade. It was only Carthage that later extended its *chora* into the interior, forming a large empire on both land and sea. Often settlements were placed in relative proximity to each other in order that Phoenician ships could expect safe anchorage after each day of travelling, as Phoenician sailors were traditionally not fond of sailing at night. As a result we find a network of Phoenician settlements along the North African coast designed to facilitate trade and contact.

There is little doubt that dozens of Phoenician settlements of varying size and tenure dotted the North African coast acting as points of anchorage and trade for the busy Mediterranean trade routes. Few of these sites have survived or have been attested as original Phoenician settlements. Temporary settlements would have left no enduring traces on the landscape, while larger settlements are difficult to discern owing to constant cultural change during Punic and Roman times.

Utica was one of the oldest and most famous Phoenician foundations in North Africa. Founded on a promontory, it dominated a good port and a fertile alluvial plain.⁴⁶ Literary evidence suggests a foundation date of ca. 1100 by Tyre almost three

⁴⁶ App. Lib. 75.

centuries previous to Carthage.⁴⁷ Pliny writing in AD 77, claims that the cedars in the temple of Apollo (Reshef) had lasted for 1178 years and were put in place at the time of the foundation of the city (1101 BC).⁴⁸ According to Josephus, King Hiram of Tyre sent an expedition against Utica, which he claims was due to the colony's refusal to pay tribute, possibly attesting the existence of Utica in the tenth century.⁴⁹ Otherwise we have the account of Justin who claims that ambassadors from Utica welcomed Elissa and the colonists of Carthage as relatives suggesting Utica was well established by the late ninth century.⁵⁰ However the archaeological record of Utica suggests a later permanent establishment dating from the eighth century.⁵¹ Unfortunately the Phoenician history of Utica is mostly unknown, and the city is better attested during its Punic stage.⁵² Nonetheless its size and reputation suggest a flourishing city which became a major trading port. It still remained second only to Carthage in North Africa during the latter's dominance and maintained a degree of independence.⁵³

Leptis Magna rose to prominence as a Roman city but was initially founded by the Phoenicians and subsequently developed by the Carthaginians. The earliest evidence at the site dates from the seventh century, although it may have functioned earlier as a trading post.⁵⁴ According to Sallust, it was founded in a similar manner to Carthage.⁵⁵ A group of Tyrians, driven from their homeland by civil disturbances settled the site. Even in Sallust's day, he claims that despite intermarriage with the native population, the laws and civilisation were essentially Tyrian. The positioning of Leptis Magna is typical for a Phoenician settlement. Founded adjacent to a

⁴⁷ Vell. Pat. I.2.3.

⁴⁸ Pliny *NH.* XVI.216.

⁴⁹ *Ap.* I.119, see Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, p.97.

⁵⁰ Justin XVIII.5.

⁵¹ Alexandre Lézine, *Carthage – Utique, Études d'architecture et d'urbanisme* (Paris 1968) p.146.

⁵² e.g. Lézine, p.134.

⁵³ This is demonstrated by its special mention as separate to Carthage (along with Tyre) in the second Romano-Carthaginian treaty in ca. 306 BC (Polyb. III.24). Although this admission implies formal recognition of Utica's autonomy, it was probably more a Carthaginian recognition of the former's standing and antiquity. There is little evidence otherwise which supports Utica's autonomy from Carthaginian rule. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to classify Utica as ever being a totally Punic city. Carthage probably would not have assumed official control of the city and its activities until at least the fifth century. It probably retained remnants of its Phoenician character, although its continual contact with Carthage must have been influential. It even emphasised its older independence by siding with the Romans against Carthage during the Third Punic War. Appian (*Lib.* 75) claims that Utica, realising the plight of Carthage, welcomed Scipio Aemilianus claiming ancient animosity against the Carthaginians. As Appian's text suggests however, it was probably due more to necessity: Utica realised that Carthage was finished and any support would be foolish. As a result, Utica was deemed a free town in North Africa and once again became the major city in North Africa until the refoundation of Carthage by Caesar a century later, also see Chp. II, n.90.

⁵⁴ Markoe, p.182.

protective harbour, it bordered the oasis Wadi Lebda. The importance of the olive trade especially during Roman occupation was testament to its fertile hinterland.⁵⁶

Sabratha was in origin a mere Phoenician trading post founded as early as the eighth or seventh century probably by the Tyrians.⁵⁷ It appears originally to have been a seasonal trading post before becoming a permanent settlement during Punic times from the fifth century onwards. It was well located for trade along the North African coast and into the interior to the Ghadames oasis. Naturally, Sabratha was situated near a serviceable harbour and evidence of a pre-Roman circuit wall suggests that it had grown to a high level of prosperity from humble foundations.⁵⁸ From the few Pre-Roman remnants attested at Sabratha, Punic, Greek, and Egyptian remains suggest that the site was actively trading abroad and presumably with the interior.⁵⁹

Hadrumentum (Sousse) was permanently settled by the Phoenicians probably around the same time as Leptis Magna and Hippo during the eighth century or possibly slightly later.⁶⁰ Literary tradition claims that it was another Tyrian settlement.⁶¹ Like the other North African settlements we have seen, Hadrumentum was situated on a harbour which dominated a fertile area and accordingly benefited by both land and sea. Although the site became a renowned Roman centre, many Phoenicio-Punic artefacts still remain. There are remnants of a *topheth* dating from the sixth century as well as other material remains.⁶² It appears that Hadrumentum, like Utica, remained independent until Carthaginian expansion reduced its official status to that of a dependant.

Oea (modern Tripoli), another Phoenician foundation, lay between Sabratha and Leptis Magna and was also founded by the Tyrians. Silius Italicus claims that it was a mixed colony of Sicilians and Africans.⁶³ It was situated on a small yet functional harbour next to a fertile coastal oasis. It was possibly refounded by Aradus, Tyre, and Sidon during the mid-fifth century BC with each city-state establishing its

⁵⁵ *Iug.* LXXVII.1, XIX.1; *Sil. Pun.* III.256; *Pliny NH.* V.76

⁵⁶ Regarding the archaeological remains at Leptis Magna in both the Phoenician and Punic periods see, Theresa Howard Carter, "Western Phoenicians at Lepcis Magna", *AJA* LXIX.2, 1965, pp.123-132.

⁵⁷ *Sil. Pun.* III.256. It is possible that Silius Italicus uses Tyrians as an epithet for Phoenicians in general.

⁵⁸ Philip M. Kenrick *et al.* (eds.), *Excavations at Sabratha 1948-1951* (London 1986) p.8.

⁵⁹ MacKendrick, p.165; Kenneth D. Matthews Jr., Alfred W. Cook, *Cities in the Sand - Leptis Magna and Sabratha in Roman Africa* (Philadelphia 1957) p.48.

⁶⁰ Sallust (*Iug.* XIX.1) mentions all three together as a distinct group of Phoenician settlements in North Africa.

⁶¹ Solinus XXVII.9.

⁶² Louis Foucher, *Hadrumentum* (Paris 1964) pp.33ff.

own quarter in the city.⁶⁴ There is evidence of a third or second century necropolis at the site along with Punic pottery with imagery of Tanit.⁶⁵ Originally little more than a trading port, like other Phoenician settlements it was developed further by the Carthaginians and then later by the Romans.

There are several other Phoenician settlements on the northern coast of Africa. Auza, (not yet identified) according to the Tyrian archives, was apparently founded by Ittobaal in the ninth century.⁶⁶ Sallust also claims that the Phoenicians founded Hippo.⁶⁷ Unfortunately he does not mention whether this was Hippo Regius (Annaba) or Hippo Diarrhytus (Bizerte). Both are characteristic Phoenician sites but contain only evidence of Punic remains.

Similarly, the Phoenicians most likely spread west across the coast of North Africa as their presence in the region grew. Eventually the Phoenicians maintained forms of settlement at a number of coastal sites in Algeria and Morocco *en route* to the Far West.

Phoenician settlements along the coast of North Africa mimicked their respective metropoleis in that they remained independent and often divided city-states with a common culture and an inclination toward maritime trade. It was only the advent of Carthage that united these cities under a single political power. As we have seen however, some Phoenician cities retained their Phoenician identity and maintained aspects of this original heritage (as did Carthage itself). It appears from literary sources that Tyre was the main colonising state of Phoenicia. Other Phoenician states, however, probably founded settlements along the coast as well. The colonising cities presumably did not officially co-ordinate settlement policy, though in the nature of things a good deal of informal co-operation probably existed between various cities' settlements. Certainly such co-operation would have benefited the merchants who were present. The early centuries of the first millennium witnessed the development of such a Phoenician network of colonies operating on the North African coast. Primarily restricted to the coast, they would have greatly facilitated trade and contact between the Western Mediterranean and the East.

⁶³ Sil. *Pun.* III.257.

⁶⁴ *GGM.* I, Ps. Scylax 104, p.78 (ed. Müller).

⁶⁵ Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, p.121.

⁶⁶ Joseph. *AJ.* VIII.324.

⁶⁷ *Iug.* XIX.1

THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BEYOND

Expansion and settlement in the western areas of the Mediterranean is testament to the Phoenicians' skill in navigation and their attraction to trade and exploration. It seems as though the Phoenician cities employed a model similar to that which they used in other parts of the Mediterranean, one of contact through trade by means of the establishment of coastal *emporia*. It appears that permanent Phoenician contact extended along the eastern and southern coasts of Spain as well as Atlantic Africa.⁶⁸ Otherwise we have evidence of trade with the Balearic Islands, Tartessus (probably located in Baetica), the Atlantic coasts of Spain and France, and possibly Southern Britain. It appears that despite the great distance from the Levantine coast, the Phoenicians not only had early contact with this area but also were actively establishing settlements possibly by 1100 BC.

ATLANTIC NORTH AFRICA

According to some ancient sources, Atlantic North Africa was once well populated with Phoenician colonies.⁶⁹ These *emporia*, as Strabo describes them, had vanished by his time leaving only larger establishments, fewer in number.⁷⁰ The most illustrious and enduring of these sites was Lixus. According to Pliny, there was a shrine of Heracles at Lixus which was said to be older than that at Gades.⁷¹ Once again archaeological evidence is scant, only attesting Phoenician presence at the site as early as the seventh century with sporadic settlement.⁷² During his periplus in the fifth century, the Carthaginian Hanno describes the river Lixus in familiar terms as well as contact with the native Lixitae.⁷³ The constant use of the site of Lixus in antiquity has

⁶⁸ We will look primarily at known Phoenician settlements. Possibilities of contact with equatorial Africa, Atlantic France, and Britain are not clear but will be discussed in the Carthaginian era especially regarding the reported journeys of Hanno and Himilco.

⁶⁹ Strabo XVIII.8.2; Avienus *OM.* Ll.438-442.

⁷⁰ Both Strabo (XVIII.3.8) and Avienus (*OM.* L.439) claim these cities had vanished by their day.

⁷¹ Pliny *NH.* XIX.63.

⁷² Maria Eugenia Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West - Politics, Colonies and Trade*, translated by Mary Turton, (Cambridge 1987) p.247; M. Tarradell, *Marruecos Púnico* (Tetuan 1960) Chp. VI.

⁷³ *GGM.* I. 112, pp.92-93 (ed. Müller). The Lixitae must have had contact with the Phoenicians or Carthaginians as they provided the expedition with interpreters for the journey south.

left a relatively poor picture of Phoenicio-Punic settlement.⁷⁴ The site of Lixus, however, is the aspect which is of most interest when considering Phoenician colonial patterns. Strabo states that it lay among many other Phoenician settlements on a bay called Emporicus.⁷⁵ The bay itself was situated at the mouth of the Loukkos River which gave Lixus (and other supposed Phoenician colonies) a well-sheltered harbour at the entrance to a navigable river.⁷⁶ It appears that Phoenician traders at Lixus would have had access to resources of gold, ivory, copper, and lead. The site of Lixus had obvious benefits for Phoenician mercantile interests, and the characteristics of the site relate to this fact.⁷⁷

The other Phoenician colony we know of in the area is Mogador. Situated on a small coastal island like Lixus, evidence from the site shows that it was inhabited from the seventh century onwards. Potsherds attest contact with Phoenicia and Cyprus along with Greece demonstrating the eastern Phoenician trade routes operated as far as Atlantic Morocco. Otherwise the site has revealed fish and whalebone dumps which confirm that this was an important industry of the settlement.⁷⁸ Such evidence is reinforced by Pseudo-Aristotle who claims that the Phoenicians of Gades sailed past the Pillars of Hercules for four days to fish for tuna, possibly around Mogador.⁷⁹ Despite the southern location of Mogador, several of its attributes show Phoenician interest and activity.⁸⁰

SPAIN

Like North Africa, Spain saw an influx of Phoenician trade-based contact which developed into settlement. This contact was concentrated on the southern and eastern coasts and into the interior. Spain had several incentives for the Phoenicians' interest. Primarily it offered them silver. It appears that the silver trade developed early between the Levantine coast and Spain. It is possible that the Biblical kingdom of

⁷⁴ The subsequent history of Lixus saw it in constant use in antiquity. It became a centre influenced by Hellenistic culture before being rebuilt by the Mauritanian King Juba II and finally being annexed as part of the Roman province of Mauretania during the reign of Caligula.

⁷⁵ Strabo XVII.3.2.

⁷⁶ Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, p.248.

⁷⁷ For a full geographic description of the site of Lixus see Tarradell, pp.133-136.

⁷⁸ M. Fernand Benoit, *Mogador, comptoir Phénicien du Maroc Atlantique* (Tangier 1966) p.51.

⁷⁹ Ps. Aristotle *Mir. Ausc.* 136; Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, p.247, believes these could be the Canary-Saharan shoals.

⁸⁰ See Tarradell, pp.181ff.

Tarshish was in fact the western kingdom of Tartessus in Baetica.⁸¹ During the reign of Solomon, it is claimed that a fleet laden with gold, silver, ivory, apes, and baboons would return once every three years.⁸² There are a number of Biblical references to Tarshish and its connection to both Phoenicia and to the extraction of precious metals emphasising its importance to Phoenician trade.⁸³ It is quite conceivable that the silver (and other metals including gold and copper) extracted from Spain did pave the way for Phoenician expansion throughout the Mediterranean. Diodorus reports that the wealth extracted from Iberia enabled the Phoenicians to found colonies in Africa, Sardinia, and Spain.⁸⁴ The association of the Phoenicians with the silver trade is evident from both Biblical and archaeological examples.⁸⁵ It is possible that their ability to secure such obvious quantities of precious metals from the West may have been an underlying reason for such freedom from their masters in the East.

Again the chronology of Phoenician expansion in Spain is problematic. The primary Phoenician settlement was Gades, an island just off the southern coast. It was traditionally founded around the same time as Lixus and Utica ca. 1100 BC. If Gades was operating as the main Phoenician settlement during the reign of Solomon and his connection to Tarshish, this would date the city at least to the late tenth century. Archaeological evidence, however, only attests a presence from the eighth century.⁸⁶ It would appear that early Phoenician contact in Spain is possible, but like the other spheres of activity was probably basic trade from semipermanent or seasonal *emporion*. Concerted efforts at settlement would have begun later most likely during the eighth century as was the case in Cyprus and North Africa. Again, we should think, however, not so much of officially co-ordinated activity on the part of the various Phoenician cities, but rather of a good deal of co-operation.

⁸¹ 1 Kings 10:22; 2 Chronicles 9:21.

⁸² The length of such a journey would probably coincide with the vast distance of sailing from one end of the Mediterranean and back again. This is especially evident in the reported cargo of the fleet suggesting numerous stops. Gold could have originated from the west coast of Africa where Herodotus claims the Carthaginians (and probably the Phoenicians before them) bartered with the local peoples for gold (IV.196). Such luxury items as apes, baboons, and ivory probably had origins in Africa and may have been acquired from any Phoenician port in West or North Africa.

⁸³ Isaiah 23:1; Jeremiah 10:9.

⁸⁴ Diod. V.35.5.

⁸⁵ Ezekiel 27:12, 28:4. The abundance of Phoenician silver artefacts attested throughout the Mediterranean is testament to the prevalence of such a precious metal. Silver bowls are a characteristic type suggesting a constant supply of silver in the Phoenician world.

⁸⁶ Richard J. Harrison, *Spain at the Dawn of History - Iberians, Phoenicians and Greeks* (London 1988) p.41; Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, p.218; Hans Geog Niemeyer, "The Phoenician Settlement at Toscanos", in *The Phoenicians in Spain*, pp.34-35; Manuel Pellicer Catalán, "Phoenician and Punic Sexi", in *The Phoenicians in Spain*, p.53.

The primary Phoenician settlement in Spain was Gades (Gadir, modern Cádiz).⁸⁷ According to Velleius Paterculus and Strabo, the site was settled around 1100.⁸⁸ The topography of Gades suggests its main purpose as a city based around trade. Gades itself was a small archipelago which sheltered a bay at the mouth of the Guadalete River. It was located near the Guadalquivir Valley and had access to the rich deposits of silver, gold, tin, and copper in Huelva and the Sierra Morena.⁸⁹ There is evidence of a number of Phoenician temples and sanctuaries attributed to Phoenician Gades: the famous temple of Melqart,⁹⁰ another to Astarte,⁹¹ and a sanctuary to Ba'al-Hammon.⁹² Otherwise there is evidence of walls, a necropolis, and a later fortress. Archaeological evidence attests permanent settlement from the eighth century. This is echoed in the hinterland of Gades with evidence of imported Phoenician pottery in Tartessian and other native Spanish settlements from the mid-eighth century.⁹³ In addition to its location on an offshore island, it was situated so as to dominate trade originating in Southern Spain and monitoring all traffic passing through the Pillars of Heracles from the Atlantic. Its position enabled it to remain mostly separate from any potential troubles on the mainland while at the same time depending on it for its own existence. Owing to such factors, Gades remained an important settlement throughout antiquity.⁹⁴

Although the prominence of Gades established it as the primary Phoenician settlement in Spain, there is evidence of further Phoenician expansion and settlement elsewhere on the peninsula. Phoenician settlement on the southern and eastern coasts of Spain reveals a characteristic pattern. Small settlements, often only a few kilometres apart dotted the coastline establishing a coastal trading network being fed

⁸⁷ The name Gadir means 'fortress' (גָּדִיר : literally a walled in place) cf. Pliny *NH.* IV.120; Solinus XXIII.12.

⁸⁸ Velleius Paterculus (I.3) claims that this event was contemporary to the Dorian invasion of Attica during the reign of the last Athenian king, Codrus and the archonship of his son Medon. Strabo (III.5.5) claims that the Tyrians founded the colony by the order of an oracle and that it took three attempts to settle Gades.

⁸⁹ For a study into the region and the changing topography of Gades throughout antiquity see Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, pp.223-232.

⁹⁰ Diod. XXV.10.1, V.20.2; Strabo III.5.5; Arr. II.16.4.

⁹¹ Avienus *OM.* LI.267-273.

⁹² Strabo III.5.3; Pliny *NH.* IV.120.

⁹³ Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, p.230.

⁹⁴ The advantages of the site were not lost on later nations and it remained the primary Spanish stronghold of the Carthaginians until the foundation of *Carthago Nova* in 228 BC. It passed over to Roman rule and received Roman citizenship status under Caesar in 49 BC. It retained much of its Phoenician character by striking coins with Phoenician legends until the reign of Claudius and retained its Phoenicio-Punic language at least until the first century AD (Strabo I.3.2, III.2.13-14).

by the hinterland.⁹⁵ Phoenician settlements such as Toscanos, Malaga, and Abdera were established to service the Phoenician trade and communication network. Strabo briefly describes Phoenician settlement along the coast of Spain, claiming that Malaga (Malaca), Abdera (Adra) and Saxitani (Sexi) were all Phoenician settlements.⁹⁶ He claims that Malaga was a market for the tribes of the opposite coast (North Africa) and had stores of salt-fish. This would suggest that there was a trade route between Malaga and the Phoenician settlements on the North African coast. Presumably fishing vessels operating in the Atlantic would supply the stores of salt-fish at such settlements. Otherwise the area around Malaga possessed deposits of gold, silver, and copper. We can see two of the primary functions of a Spanish settlement like Malaga: to exploit the minerals of its hinterland and to facilitate Phoenician trade and contact in the area. Avienus describes the settlement patterns of the Phoenicians in Southern Spain, which are also attested by archaeological evidence. He claims that many cities stood in this area of Andalusia and many Phoenicians once held these lands.⁹⁷ Phoenician settlements on the south coast had at one stage reached saturation point, a fact that only archaeology is reaffirming.⁹⁸

One of the characteristics of the Southern Spanish settlements was their topography. Primarily, in true Phoenician style, all had good access to the sea. Just as important was their connection to the interior. As a result we find the majority of settlements founded on promontories or low hills at the mouths of rivers. This facilitated access to the interior and the silver, gold, and copper producing areas found there. As in the case of Cyprus and North Africa, the Phoenician ports in Spain were fed by local populations (in this case Tartessian and other Spanish settlements).⁹⁹

⁹⁵ See Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, p.252f. Malaga is only 4km. from Cerro del Villar, Toscanos is seven kilometres from Morro de Mezquitilla which itself lies only 800m. from Chorreras.

⁹⁶ III.4.2-3.

⁹⁷ *OM*. LI.440, 459-460.

⁹⁸ For an overview of Phoenician settlements in Southern Spain see Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, pp.249-272; Maria Eugenia Aubet Semmler, "Notes on the Economy of the Phoenician Settlements in Southern Spain", in *The Phoenicians in Spain*, pp.79-95; Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, pp.230-242.

⁹⁹ Such a system of raw minerals (or materials) exchanged for Phoenician commodities has precedent in Africa. Herodotus (IV.196) claims that the Carthaginians use a similar system with Libyans beyond the Pillars of Hercules. He claims the traders leave their goods on the beach and then retreat, upon which the local people leave a quantity of gold in exchange for this. Although the Tartessians were probably far more advanced culturally and socially, the idea of a straight exchange of precious metals for Phoenician luxury items is apparent, see J. M.^a Blazquez, *Tartessos y los orígenes de la colonización fenicia en occidente* (Salamanca 1968) *passim*. This is also echoed by the diffusion of Phoenician style artefacts into Southern Spain and non-Phoenician settlements. See Maria Eugenia

These populations would have been in contact with local Phoenician bases. It is certain that there were some Phoenician or mixed settlements of varying degree in the interior overseeing industry.¹⁰⁰ These settlements were connected to those on the coast and therefore the sea. The Phoenician settlements in Southern Spain usually possessed reasonable harbours for anchorage. As these sites were situated at the mouths of alluvial valleys, there was room for agriculture to support coastal populations. Sites also generally had distinctive necropoleis and there is evidence of fortification at several locations.¹⁰¹ Naturally, the abundance of archaeological evidence we have revolves around trade. This homogeneity of materials gives us a consistent chronological picture of Phoenician activity in the area from the eighth century. From the dating of necropoleis and potsherds it appears that concerted Phoenician settlement began during the first half of the eighth century before intensifying during the seventh.¹⁰² Phoenician domination of trade in coastal Spain did not last however, as by the mid-sixth century, many Phoenician settlements had been abandoned and those which survived were subsumed under Carthaginian rule within a century.

There are a number of underlying factors behind the decline of Phoenician activity in the Far West. First, the kingdom of Tartessus, the supplier of Phoenician silver and gold for centuries collapsed during the sixth century. Although it occupied a wealthy region and stood in constant contact with Phoenician traders to the south (as well as Greeks to the northeast¹⁰³), this once flourishing kingdom vanished from sight.¹⁰⁴ The demise of Tartessus more or less coincided with that of the Phoenicians'

Aubet Semmler, "The Phoenician Impact on Tartessos: Spheres of Interaction", in *The Phoenicians in Spain*, pp.225-240.

¹⁰⁰ Evidence of Phoenician presence in the southern Spanish hinterland revolves primarily around the extraction of minerals. Tejada la Vieja, although a Tartessian settlement, has an 'urban character' with stone-built warehouses and ore refining facilities, see Markoe, *The Phoenicians*, p.184. Rio Tinto in the mountains of Huelva was constantly mined in antiquity and there is evidence of a small Phoenician settlement which has a good deal of archaeological evidence characterising it as a centre for ore refinement. Similar to Cyprus and Sardinia, Phoenician interests in rich mineral producing hinterlands would have caused them to look inland for sites for potential settlements.

¹⁰¹ e.g. The site of Toscanos is positioned close to Alarcón which has been interpreted as a military outpost with rudimentary city walls (Niemeyer, "The Phoenician Settlement at Toscanos", pp.32-34).

¹⁰² See Hans Georg Niemeyer, *Das frühe Karthago und die phönizische Expansion im Mittelmeerraum* (Göttingen 1989) pp.23-33; also Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, pp.249-257.

¹⁰³ There are several references of Greek-Tartessian contact in the literary sources. Herodotus (IV.152) tells of the voyage of Colaeus, a Samian who was blown off course through the Pillars of Hercules and landed in Tartessus. Herodotus (I.163) also claims that the Phocaeans ventured to Tartessus and befriended King Arganthonius who donated a considerable sum of money so that a wall could be built around Phocaea against the Persian threat.

¹⁰⁴ The decline of Tartessus in the sixth century was apparently sudden and not reported by our literary sources, see Ju. B. Tsirkin, "The Downfall of Tartessos and the Carthaginian Establishment on the Iberian Peninsula", *RStudFen* XXIV.2, 1996, pp.141-152.

presence in the area. Eventually Punic control from Carthage replaced their influence. This displacement of Phoenicians by Carthaginians saw a number of social and cultural changes in the region. The transition heralded a restructuring of the more frequent Phoenician coastal settlements in Southern Spain in favour of fewer larger centres. A number of the smaller settlements were subsequently abandoned, and Southern Spain became an area of Carthaginian and Greek interests.¹⁰⁵

THE BALEARIC ISLANDS

The Balearic Islands also appear as early centres for Phoenician activity and settlement. Both major islands in the group attest typical forms of Phoenician settlement although Ibiza, and especially the main settlement of Ebusus, is the main focus.¹⁰⁶ Although the site of Carthage's first settlement in 654/3,¹⁰⁷ the island appears originally to have been an important Phoenician foundation *en route* from the eastern Phoenician settlements to Spain and the Atlantic. The major settlement on Ibiza was Ebusus, which is taken from the Phoenician *Ibshim* (יבשם) meaning 'Isle of Pines'.¹⁰⁸ Diodorus claims that it was populated with barbarians of many nationalities but predominantly by Phoenicians.¹⁰⁹ Silius Italicus names the city 'Phoenician Ebusus', suggesting that some form of Phoenician settlement predated the Carthaginian.¹¹⁰ Archaeological evidence is evident from the mid seventh century onward at Sa Caleta and Puig de Vila.¹¹¹ Quantities of pottery from the seventh century and a necropolis at Puig des Molins also attest the Phoenicians' presence.¹¹² Again it is likely that Phoenician settlement on the island was considerably later than initial activity. Even if Carthage officially settled Ebusus in the mid-seventh century, Carthage was still a Phoenician city. It is not until later that we see the development

¹⁰⁵ See Niemeyer, *Das frühe Karthago*, pp.24-26.

¹⁰⁶ Basic settlement remains on and around Ibiza document Phoenician settlements on offshore islands or dominating harbours from headlands. The settlement around Ebusus is the most obvious, but we find others on islands at Tagomago and Espalmador and coastal areas of S. Antoni and Sa Caleta. For Mallorca see Víctor M. Guerrero Ayuso, *Colonización púnica de Mallorca. La documentación arqueológica y el contexto histórico* (Palma 1997) pp.231-236.

¹⁰⁷ Diod. V.16.

¹⁰⁸ Diodorus names the island Pityussa (Πιτυουσσα) owing to the multitude of pines on the island.

¹⁰⁹ V.16.2-3.

¹¹⁰ *Pun.* III.362.

¹¹¹ Carlos Gómez Bellard *et al.*, *La colonización fenicia de la isla de Ibiza* (Madrid 1990) pp.173ff.

¹¹² Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, pp.272-3. For a more comprehensive archaeological record of Phoenician settlement on the island see Gómez Bellard *et al.*, *passim*.

of Punic culture on the island.¹¹³ The Balearic Islands would have been vital trading posts in the Western Mediterranean. It gave the trade routes from Spain and the Atlantic direct access to Sardinia and Sicily as an alternative to the North African coastal route.

The Phoenicians' presence in the Western Mediterranean was a vital aspect in the function of their entire 'empire'. Although they were active in Cyprus, North Africa, and the Central Mediterranean, their settlement network in the West brought them silver and gold in large quantities which funded their activities and placated their overlords in the East. The pattern of Phoenician settlement in the Western Mediterranean corresponds to that in other regions, with its networked settlements with good access to both sea-lanes and the interior. Despite the importance of the western supply of precious metals, the Phoenicians did diversify into other types of localised industry. The importance of fisheries in settlements such as Mogador, Gades, and Malaga is testament to this. Luxury items from Atlantic North Africa such as ivories and types of monkeys would also have been desirable, especially in the East. The western Phoenician settlements in Spain, Atlantic Africa, and the Balearic Islands were established by the eighth and seventh centuries, however, literary tradition has dated Phoenician contact with these regions as far back as 1100 BC. We have seen the Phoenician propensity to found seasonal trading ports which leave little or no trace today. It would seem feasible that Phoenician contact would have predated permanent settlement, however, its chronology can only be supposed.

THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

Phoenician contact with the islands in the Central Mediterranean presumably began early *en route* to the West. These islands became vital territories and ports for Phoenician trade and eventually settlement. Although often overshadowed by later Punic occupation and subsequent contact with other peoples, the Phoenicians established their presence on Sardinia, Sicily, and Malta to extend their influence throughout the area.

¹¹³ KAI. 72, this fifth century inscription to Tanit and Rasaf-Melqart suggests the arrival of Punic

SARDINIA

Phoenician contact and settlement on Sardinia appears to have begun at an early stage. In the foundation myth of Sardinia provided by Pausanias, we see an aetiological narrative according to which Sardinia was originally settled by sailors from Libya under Sardus, who settled alongside the native population. This was then followed by the Greeks under Aristaeus who failed to found a city. Pausanias then claims that Iberians under the command of Norax sailed to the island and founded Nora.¹¹⁴ Although this account is based on legend it does provide us with some useful information. Sardus' surname was Heracles who was assimilated as a major Phoenician divinity in the West, Melqart. Norax who gave his name to the settlement of Nora provides a link to the western sphere of Phoenician settlement in Spain. Solinus also suggests such a connection when he specifically states that Norax came from Tartessus, which as we have seen witnessed Phoenician contact and settlement.¹¹⁵ Otherwise, Pausanias makes an interesting comment regarding the Phoenicians and their amicable relationship with the native Sardinians. As we have seen previously, the Phoenician traders and settlers used native peoples to extract valuable resources from the interior and also traded with them.¹¹⁶ The most valuable literary source we possess, however, is the Nora inscription.¹¹⁷ Although brief, it has been dated to the ninth century BC and offers a number of valuable historical points: "Temple on the cape of *NGR* which lies in Sardinia. Praise to him. Praise to Tyre, the mother from Kition.... which *NGR* had built for *PMJ*". Although fragmentary, the inscription mentions Tyre as the likely metropolis of Nora attesting another western Tyrian foundation. The text also mentions Kition on Cyprus which suggests contact with Cyprus. This is also affirmed by the presence of imported Cypriot wares on the island.¹¹⁸ Finally there is the mention of the divinity Pumay (cf. Pygmalion). Evidence of this Cypriot male divinity has been found in both the West and the East, however,

culture; also see Gómez Bellard *et al.* pp.183-185.

¹¹⁴ Paus. X.17. For a more detailed discussion of this passage see Chp. V, ns.59-69 and text.

¹¹⁵ Solinus IV.1.

¹¹⁶ Sulcis and Monte Sirai were settled in a rich silver and lead producing area, while the pre-eminence of bronze artefacts is testament to the copper mines in the region. Later during the Punic period, the production of iron also increased. The policy of maintaining an amicable relationship with the native Sards was not adopted by the Carthaginians and the Romans. Both implemented a more rigorous rule over the local Sards and as a result the respective histories of both on the island were characterised by war and uprising.

¹¹⁷ KAI. 46, (1) בת רש ש (2) נגר ש (3) בשרדן ש (4) לס הא של (5) ס צר אס (6) לכח נרנך (7) ש בן נגר (8) לפמי

his connection to Cyprus seems to imply direct contact with Sardinia.¹¹⁹ Other archaeological evidence places a settled Phoenician presence on the island from the eighth century.¹²⁰

The Phoenicians' settlement of Sardinia seems to have been based according to their standard model. Original Phoenician settlement was specifically located on the southern and western coasts of the island. Between Caralis and Tharros there were dozens of small Phoenician *emporia* dominating coastal traffic and trade. In the subsequent centuries, Phoenicio-Punic contact with the Etruscans on mainland Italy also pushed their interests to the east.¹²¹ As we have seen in Spain, many of these Phoenician settlements were based around rivers and therefore contact with the interior. Tharros was situated on a promontory and dominated the Tirso River valley which offered rich agricultural lands. Most of the coastal Phoenician settlements in Sardinia were founded on promontories or offshore islands with access to the interior and often with access to agricultural land. The other obvious prerequisite for a Phoenician settlement was a serviceable harbour. Caralis had a harbour lagoon and, situated at the tip of the Campidano plain, was well placed for trade with the interior.¹²² Sulcis, with its artificial isthmus had two protected harbours much like the topography of Tyre. Tharros also had multiple harbours suitable for trade with the interior as well as abroad.¹²³

¹¹⁸ Ferruccio Barreca, *La civiltà fenicio-punica in Sardegna* (Sassari 1986) pp.139, 270f.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.151; Markoe, *The Phoenicians* pp.129, 177-8.

¹²⁰ It is often difficult to distinguish the pre-Punic Phoenician presence on Sardinia. Owing to the lack of early literary sources we are forced to rely on archaeological data. Often pre-Punic evidence is indistinguishable from the longer and better attested Carthaginian presence on the island. For analysis of Phoenicio-Punic archaeology on Sardinia see Barreca, *La civiltà fenicio-punica in Sardegna*; Piero Bartoloni, Sandro Filippo Bondi, Sabatino Moscati, *La penetrazione fenicia e punica in Sardegna* (Rome 1997); Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians* pp.211-228.

¹²¹ Phoenician interest in Etruria was based around its rich mineral potential and commercial potential with Etruscan ports. Rich deposits of iron, lead, and copper, much like those in Sardinia, would have attracted Phoenician traders. Phoenician contact with Etruria is evident from archaeological data and the orientalising influence on eighth century Etruscan art. Phoenician contact with Pithecussae is also evident during the late eighth century (see Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, App. IV, pp.314-6; Moscati, *Italia Punica* pp.343-346). It is possible that the Etruscans and Phoenicians had a clear understanding regarding territory as there is evidence suggesting an Etruscan presence on Corsica at least as early as the seventh or sixth century. Strong Phoenicio-Punic-Etruscan ties are evident in later centuries when the two combined against the Phocaeen settlement of Alalia on Corsica in 535 BC and Hieron at Cumae in 474 BC. Both matters will be discussed further during the Carthaginian period. For a brief overview of Phoenicio-Etruscan relations see Enrico Acquaro, "Phoenicians and Etruscans", *The Phoenicians*, Sabatino Moscati (ed.), (New York 1999) pp.611-617.

¹²² Markoe, *Phoenicians* p.178.

¹²³ See Barreca, *La civiltà fenicio-punica in Sardegna*, pp.15-30; Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, pp.208ff.

During the seventh and sixth centuries a second wave of Phoenician settlements appears in Sardinia. Foundations like Bithya and Bosa were settled on the Sardinian coast extending the reach of Phoenician influence. Such settlements were characteristically Phoenician: with access to trade courtesy of safe harbours and interior rivers. During this period, however, we find Phoenician settlements appearing in the interior. Sites such as Othoca, Monte Sirai, Nura, and Macopsisa were established to consolidate Phoenician trade and contact with the interior. Monte Sirai appears to have been established near Sulcis and was little more than a fortified hilltop settlement. It would have monitored movements around the Iglesiente region and Campidano Plain while upholding Phoenician interest in the silver bearing and agricultural region it dominated.¹²⁴ Its extensive doubled walls and towers, which dominated a narrow gate, suggest that the Phoenicians were eager to protect their interests in this region.¹²⁵ It also would have proved a useful outpost to ward off the potential Greek or Sardinian threat.

A number of the Phoenician sites contained several common attributes. The Phoenician habit of constructing harbours and wharves apparent in Tyre, Carthage and Motya is evident in Nora and Tharros. It also appears that most of the larger Phoenician settlements had fortification walls. We will see the defensive importance of such walls at Monte Sirai, however, there is also evidence of Phoenicio-Punic walls at Nora, Tharros, Sulcis, and Caralis.¹²⁶ There is extensive Phoenicio-Punic architecture evident in several of these sites. Phoenician temples similar to those found on Cyprus have been discovered at Tharros and Monte Sirai.¹²⁷ This is also emphasised with Phoenician religious iconography and evidence of *tophets* at a number of the sites.

The economic value of Sardinia to the Phoenicians cannot be underestimated. We have seen the pattern of Phoenician settlements dotting the coastlines and how important the island was for contact with Italy, Sicily, Spain, the Balearic Islands, and North Africa. The position, natural attributes, and nature of the Phoenician settlements, both coastal and interior, suggest that their presence on Sardinia revolved

¹²⁴ Markoe, *Phoenicians*, p.179.

¹²⁵ Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, p.213.

¹²⁶ Barreca, *La civiltà fenicio-punica in Sardegna*, pp.55ff.

¹²⁷ Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, p.214; For evidence of Phoenician temples on Sardinia see Barreca, *La civiltà fenicio-punica in Sardegna*, pp.107-185; Gennaro Pesce, *Sardegna Punica* (Nuoro 2000) pp.105-158.

around the coastal contact and trade network while looking toward the interior which produced an abundance of valuable minable ores. Through trade originating from the island and surrounding areas, Sardinia remained one of the most important areas of Phoenician settlement and economic activity.

SICILY

The Phoenicians' presence on Sicily was significant not only for their own seaborne empire, but also for its interaction with the Greeks. Early Phoenician settlement on Sicily is generally poorly attested, however, Thucydides offers insight into some Phoenician activity:

*There were also Phoenicians living all round Sicily, occupying the headlands and small islands off the coast using them as emporia with the Sicels. But when the Hellenes began to come by sea in great numbers, they abandoned most of their settlements and concentrated on the towns of Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus where they lived together in the neighbourhood of the Elymians, partly because they relied on their alliance with the Elymians, partly because from here the voyage from Sicily to Carthage is the shortest.*¹²⁸

Thucydides' account, although brief, offers us a valuable insight into the probable trading and settlement pattern of Phoenician Sicily. Regarding the chronology of the Phoenician presence on Sicily, it appears much the same as other areas in the Phoenician world: namely initial contact through trade before a concerted effort at establishing permanent foundations. It is conceivable that the Phoenicians were active in Sicily from ca. 1100. If present at Utica, Lixus, and Gades by this time, Sicily, lying *en route* to these western settlements is a natural port-of-call. This is affirmed by Thucydides, who claims that initial Phoenician settlement was restricted to offshore islands and promontories, which were abandoned at the arrival of Greek colonisation. The first Greek colonies on Sicily at Naxos, Syracuse, and Zancle were

¹²⁸ Thuc. VI.2.6, ὥκουν δὲ καὶ Φοίνικες περὶ πᾶσαν μὲν τὴν Σικελίαν ἄκρας τε ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσῃ ἀπολαμβάνοντες καὶ τὰ ἐπικείμενα νησίδια ἐμπορίας ἕνεκεν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Σικελούς. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ Ἕλληνες πολλοὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπεσέπλεον ἐκλιπόντες τὰ πλείω Μοτύην καὶ Σολόεντα καὶ

founded during the second half of the eighth century. This in itself suggests a Phoenician presence predating Greek colonisation and does not discount a possible Phoenician arrival date of 1100. Nonetheless, as we have seen in other known Phoenician settlements, the archaeological record does not extend further back than the eighth century. Most of our evidence regarding pre-Punic Phoenician settlement on Sicily comes from the small coastal island of Motya, which has revealed occupation from the later eighth century.¹²⁹ Unfortunately relatively little pre-Punic evidence has survived from both Panormus and Soloeis (Soluntum).¹³⁰ Thucydides' account seems to be accurate here also, as the archaeological data confirms that the Phoenicians settled these towns in Western Sicily around the same period as Greek colonisation in the east of the island: both coincide with the second half of the eighth century.¹³¹

The pattern of Phoenician settlement on Sicily resembles that in the other known Phoenician areas. Originally, as Thucydides claims, the Phoenicians were

Πάνορμον ἐγγὺς τῶν Ἑλύμων ξυνοικήσαντες ἐνέμοντο ξυμμαχία τε πίσυνοι τῇ τῶν Ἑλύμων καὶ ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν ἐλάχιστον πλοῦν Καρχηδὼν Σικελίας ἀπέχει.

¹²⁹ The importance of Motya was considerable in the Phoenicians' activity in Western Sicily. For the foundation of the site see Gioacchino Falsone, "The Bronze Age Occupation and Phoenician Foundation at Motya", *BIAL XXV*, 1988, pp.31-53; For some evidence of the archaeological record see B.S.J. Isserlin and Joan du Plat Taylor, *Motya, A Phoenician and Carthaginian City in Sicily* (Leiden 1974). There is evidence from the site which suggests it was a cosmopolitan trading centre during the Punic period and presumably the preceding Phoenician period. The later distribution of coinage shows a larger variety of sources at Motya than other contemporary settlements, see Giuseppina Mammina, "Le presenze monetarie", *Mozia, Gli scavi nella "Zona A" dell'abitato*, Maria Luisa Famà (ed.), (Bari 2002) pp.341-351. This is further testified by the considerable quantities of imported ceramics from Greece from the eighth century.

¹³⁰ For evidence, albeit mostly Punic see: for Panormus: *Palermo Punica*, Carmela Angela Di Stefano (dir.), (Palermo 1998) *passim*; Moscati, *Italia Punica*, pp.106-114; for Soloeis: Moscati, *Italia Punica*, pp.115-122; Caterina Greco, "La necropoli di Solunto: problemi e prospettive", *Archeologia e territorio* (Palermo 1997) pp.25-33.

¹³¹ It is relevant here to comment on a possible interaction between Greek and Phoenician colonial models. Although we have previously made admonitions about the common conception of describing Phoenician settlement in Greek colonial terms, on Sicily the two cultures were in close contact with each other. Cultural diffusion between Greeks and Phoenicians is well documented from Homeric times through the Orientalising period in the East and the later Phoenicio-Punic desire for a variety of Greek goods. Whether this extended into more mainstream social spheres as colonisation is not as clear. It is certain that both cultures were actively settling during this period. Comparisons between such basic activities as settlement are natural. It is likely that both Phoenicians and Greeks fed off each other's success and possibly mistakes. Although working within a similar system, as we have witnessed, the basic purpose of their respective settlements was different. Phoenician settlements appear more superficial and less official, and geared more for the main purpose of trade. They usually possessed little hinterland and relied on any number of similar settlements and seaborne traffic for communication and basic survival. The Greeks, as we well know, established new replicas of their mother cities in Greece, as independent and fully functioning civic entities. The distinction between the two later fades during the Punic period, when under Carthage, new settlements appear as almost a hybrid between the two systems. Although several comparisons can be drawn between the two, the Phoenician and Greek settlements, at this stage at least, remain distinctive and must be treated accordingly.

content to trade with the locals (the Sicels and Elymians) while establishing themselves on promontories or offshore islands.¹³² This would have been the case for Phoenician trading posts, most likely throughout Sicily. As we have also seen elsewhere, it was not until the eighth century that the Phoenicians began to establish themselves permanently on coastal sites. Thucydides claims it was the onset of Greek colonists that saw the Phoenicians' withdrawal to the west of the island. This is possibly true, however, the Phoenician withdrawal to Western Sicily may have had other motives. Thucydides claims that from their bases on the west coast of Sicily, the Phoenicians had the closest route to Carthage. This would certainly have been the case during the seventh century and beyond when Carthage was developing into a major economic power in the West. During the eighth century however, Carthage was still basically a trading settlement. Western Sicily was a strategic and lucrative base for Phoenician interests. The Phoenicians were concerned with the under-developed Western Mediterranean, and Western Sicily was a useful position from which to exploit this area. From here the Phoenician traders had direct access not only to North Africa, but also Italy and Etruria, Sardinia, Spain, and the other western Phoenician settlements.

The final aspect of Thucydides' account worth mentioning is the Phoenician relationship with the pre-existing Sicilians. Initially the Phoenicians traded with local peoples from their temporary bases. Thucydides makes specific reference to the Elymians, a native people who dwelt in Western Sicily. Thucydides claims that they lived together with the Phoenicians and shared an alliance. We have seen other Phoenicio-native relationships develop in Sardinia and Spain. It appears that the Phoenicians had a good rapport with the local population (probably based around mutual trading interests), which according to Thucydides resulted in an alliance. From other sources, it appears that Thucydides was not overstating their relationship. Archaeological evidence shows co-existence between the Elymians and the

¹³² The locations of these original trading posts are unknown although Markoe (*The Phoenicians*, pp.175-6) suggests the islet of Vindicari above Cape Pachynos, the island of Ortygia opposite mainland Syracuse and finally the site of Naxos which the Greeks colonised. T.J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* (London 1948) pp.326-7, believes Thermae, Mazara, and Minoa may also have been possible Phoenician outposts, which were deserted after the establishment of Greek colonies in their respective vicinities.

Phoenicians (and later Carthaginians).¹³³ Otherwise there is the account of Dorieus' attempt to found Heracleia at Eryx at the end of the sixth century. Herodotus claims that he was killed along with his followers by the Phoenicians (presumably the Carthaginians) and people from Segesta, the principal city of the Elymians.¹³⁴ It appears that Thucydides was correct in claiming that a formal alliance existed between the two parties, which contained some political and military clauses.¹³⁵

The three main attested Phoenician settlements in Western Sicily, Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus afford us the best detail of Phoenician activity in the area. Motya is the best attested of the three sites, settled on a small offshore island resembling the sites of Tyre and Gades. It had a natural harbour but its most prominent feature is a Punic *cothon* or manmade harbour similar to that at Carthage. Motya was a strategic trading port with access to all the vital areas of the Western Mediterranean. Further evidence shows that the small island (2 km. perimeter) was ringed with a wall dating from the sixth century. This wall was dotted with towers suggesting Motya was a highly prized and thus well-defended site.¹³⁶ This attitude is probably best highlighted by the role Motya must have played in thwarting the attempt of Pentathlus to found a colony at Lilybaeum ca. 580. Diodorus claims that Selinus and Segesta were at war. Pentathlus sided with the Greeks of Selinus. They were defeated and he was killed.¹³⁷ Pausanias claims that it was the Phoenicians and the Elymians who defeated and killed Pentathlus and destroyed his colony.¹³⁸ The Segestaeans were Elymians who were probably supported by the Phoenicio-Punic element at Motya.¹³⁹ The settlement developed into an important Punic site during the sixth and fifth centuries before Dionysius of Syracuse destroyed it in 397 BC.¹⁴⁰ The

¹³³ This relationship, which Carthage later enjoyed, seems to have existed from an early period. Elymian settlements such as Eryx, Segesta, and Monte Polizzo show early contact between the Phoenicians and the Elymians.

¹³⁴ Hdt. V.46.

¹³⁵ Although several centuries later, the treaty between Carthage and Dionysius of Syracuse of 405 (Diod. XIII.114) demonstrates a possibly legacy of this relationship. The Elymians and Sicani are named alongside the Carthaginians and their original colonists on the same side. Although the presence of the Elymians in this treaty has been questioned, it appears as though they were active allies of Carthage. This is a likely continuation of an earlier relationship between the Elymians and the Phoenicians.

¹³⁶ Isserlin and du Plat Taylor, pp.31ff, 81-89.

¹³⁷ Diod. V.9.

¹³⁸ Paus. X.11.3.

¹³⁹ Pentathlus' attempt to settle at Lilybaeum would have placed a Greek wedge in the Phoenicio-Punic territory of Sicily. Lilybaeum (Marsala) lies only 8 km. from Motya and would have been a rival to its trade franchise while giving the Greeks a foothold in Western Sicily.

¹⁴⁰ Diod. XIV.47-53.

site was not repopulated. Instead the Carthaginians founded Lilybaeum nearby on mainland Sicily shortly thereafter.

The site of Phoenician Soloeis has revealed relatively little detail.¹⁴¹ The main reason for this dearth of information was the town's destruction by Dionysius in the early fourth century and its subsequent relocation.¹⁴² Originally the town stood on the promontory of Solunto and the adjacent plateau. However, it was then transferred to Monte Catalfano and fortified.¹⁴³ Much like Motya, Soloeis was a trading city. It was probably a Phoenician foundation datable to the mid to late seventh century as Thucydides states. However, after its repopulation by the Greeks in a notably Hellenic style, it had a mixed Punic and Greek character evident in its material remains.¹⁴⁴ This would suggest that as at Motya, Greek and Phoenicio-Punic trade and influence was visible in Soloeis.

Panormus (Palermo)¹⁴⁵ was the final of the three Phoenician towns mentioned by Thucydides. We possess little literary evidence regarding the town before the wars against Dionysius. Originally the site was walled and stood atop a hill beside an inlet itself within a bay. Phoenician Panormus was designed for both defence and trade. From the archaeological evidence we possess, Thucydides' dating of the foundation of Panormus seems to be vindicated with a necropolis at the site dating to the seventh century.¹⁴⁶ What is of interest is the obvious connection Panormus had with the Greek colonies in Sicily. A great deal of Greek material has been discovered in the necropolis and throughout the site.¹⁴⁷ It seems that like Motya and Soloeis, Panormus, despite being ostensibly anti-Greek, had an active and prosperous connection with a number of Greek colonies. Again Phoenician evidence at the site is not a true indication of the Phoenicians' activity, although we may assume from the evidence we possess that Panormus was a prosperous town and an important port for Phoenician traders.

Although we have concentrated on the three Phoenician colonies as listed by Thucydides, this was not the limit of their contact and settlement in Western Sicily.

¹⁴¹ For an overview of Phoenician remains at Soloeis see *Archeologia e territorio*, pp.25-110.

¹⁴² Diod. XIV.48.5, 78.7.

¹⁴³ Markoe, *The Phoenicians*, p.176.

¹⁴⁴ Vincenzo Tusa, "Sicily", *The Phoenicians*, Sabatino Moscati (ed.), (New York 1999) p.239; Valeria Tardo, "Ceramica d'importazione e di tradizione greca", *Archeologia e territorio*, pp.75-94.

¹⁴⁵ The name Panormus is a common Greek name for a port town: πάνορμος lit. 'always fit for landing'.

¹⁴⁶ Ida Tamburello, "Rinvenimenti e storia degli scavi", in *Palermo Punica*, pp.107-118.

The Elymian centre of Eryx included an important Phoenician sanctuary of Astarte.¹⁴⁸ Although an Elymian town, its connection with the goddess and the Phoenicians' intimacy with the Elymians suggest that it was a major Phoenician area of activity. It is likely that the Phoenicians also operated with other native settlements in Sicily. Several examples of such interaction become more apparent during the Punic period, which probably originated with the Phoenicians. Presumably any number of Phoenician coastal trading ports and interior industry towns existed in parts of Sicily, operating in a similar fashion to other areas of their trade empire.

Characteristically, the Phoenicians on Sicily were originally content to trade with the local Sicilians from coastal or offshore bases. However, with the onset of Greek colonists, they adopted a more defensive approach by withdrawing to the western parts of Sicily. Despite Greek intrusion as a primary motive for the Phoenician withdrawal, we have also seen that new markets and trade routes in the Western Mediterranean may also have been a defining factor. It appears that despite Greek incursion in Sicily, the Phoenician settlements welcomed Greek commerce. There is considerable evidence at a number of sites suggesting lively trade between Phoenician and Greek merchants in Sicily. Although relegated to the west of the island, the Phoenicians were still able to maintain their economic activity and energetically settle as they did elsewhere.

MALTA, GOZO, AND PANTELLERIA

Phoenician activity saw them settle a number of smaller islands in the Mediterranean. Although Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria were limited in size with little hinterland and fewer resources, they were important strategic settlements in the Phoenician seaborne empire.¹⁴⁹

Malta appears to have been the most prominent of the three islands for Phoenician settlement. It appears that Phoenician settlement can be dated from at least the eighth century, although like other areas considered, initial contact may have begun earlier. Diodorus provides us with a useful account of Phoenician settlement on Malta:

¹⁴⁷ For an overview of material at Panormus see *Palermo Punica*, pp.267-438.

¹⁴⁸ Diod. IV.78; Dion. Hal. I.53.

*The first (island) is called Melite (Malta), which lies 800 stades from Syracuse and has many harbours and advantages for its inhabitants and its inhabitants are blessed in their possessions. It has craftsmen skilled in every type of trade, the most important of which is linen, which is very sheer and soft...The island is a colony of the Phoenicians, who extending their trade into the western ocean, used this safe refuge as it had harbours and lay in the open sea. This is the reason why the inhabitants, as they received assistance in many respects from merchants, grew quickly in this way of life and grew in renown.*¹⁵⁰

From this description we are able to assume a number of reasons as to why the Phoenicians settled Malta. Primarily their attraction revolved around its position midway between North Africa and Sicily. It contained several good harbours which we know attracted Phoenician settlement. Diodorus then comments on the prevalence of workshops on Malta, especially in the linen industry.¹⁵¹ Finally he mentions the growth of the population owing to the island's obvious importance as a port on the primary east-west Mediterranean trade route.

Phoenician settlement on Malta appears to have been primarily coastal. Nonetheless, there appears to have been a push into the interior with at least one city founded probably under the modern site of Rabat-Medina.¹⁵² Ptolemy lists four major Phoenician foundations on the island: Melite (Rabat-Medina), Chersonesus (possibly near Valleta), the shrine of Hera (Tas Silg) and the shrine of Heracles (Melqart).¹⁵³ Although these centres remain to a certain extent unknown, Phoenician settlement on Malta seems to have been similar to that on Cyprus. Initial coastal settlements, revolving around its natural harbours would have appeared first. These would have

¹⁴⁹ Malta has only two small alluvial plains resulting in limited agricultural development and possesses few mineral resources.

¹⁵⁰ Diod. V.12.2-3, καὶ πρώτη μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ προσαγορευομένη Μελίτη τῶν Συρακουσῶν ἀπέχουσα σταδίου ὡς ὀκτακοσίου καὶ λιμένας μὲν ἔχει πολλοὺς καὶ διαφόρους ταῖς εὐχρηστίαις τοὺς δὲ κατοικοῦντας ταῖς οὐσίαις εὐδαίμονας. τεχνίτας τε γὰρ ἔχει παντοδαποὺς ταῖς ἐργασίαις κρατίστους δὲ τοὺς ὀθόνια ποιοῦντας τῇ τε λεπτότητι καὶ τῇ μαλακότητι διαπρεπή...ἐστὶ δ' ἡ νῆσος αὕτη Φοινίκων ἄποικος οὗ ταῖς ἐμπορίαις διατείνοντες μέχρι τοῦ κατὰ τὴν δύσιν ὠκεανοῦ καταφυγὴν εἶχον ταύτην εὐλίμενον οὐσαν καὶ κειμένην πελαγίαν. δι' ἣν αἰτίαν οἱ κατοικοῦντες αὐτὴν εὐχρηστούμενοι κατὰ πολλὰ διὰ τοὺς ἐμποροὺς ταχὺ τοῖς τε βίοις ἀνέδραμον καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἠϋξήθησαν.

¹⁵¹ Cic. Verr. II.4.46. Cicero claims that Verres had turned the island into a factory for the weaving of women's dresses.

¹⁵² Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians* p.189.

¹⁵³ Ptol. IV.3. See Moscati, *Italia Punica*, pp.329ff, especially on Tas Silg and Valleta.

utilised seaborne trade, which was compelled to land on the island owing to its location. Phoenician extension into the hinterland certainly would have depended on industry. Malta was famous for its linen and there is also evidence of an olive industry. These interior settlements would have shifted their wares to the coast where it would have been exported.

Material remains from Phoenician Malta show evidence dating from the eighth century with considerable Phoenician, Greek, and Egyptian remains.¹⁵⁴ Such items demonstrate the importance of the island as a port on the main trading routes from the East. There is also a distinct intermingling of native and Phoenician wares. This would suggest that the Phoenicians, just as they had in their other settlements, maintained an amicable and prosperous relationship with the local population of Malta.¹⁵⁵ There is some evidence of the Phoenician religious legacy on the island. The sanctuary of Hera as mentioned by Ptolemy and later by Cicero during the Verrine orations has been identified with that of Tanit.¹⁵⁶ There is evidence of a cult of Melqart from the sanctuary mentioned by Ptolemy and a Greek-Phoenician bilingual inscription.¹⁵⁷

The growth of Phoenician Malta, as suggested by Diodorus, seems to have been considerable. Stephanus of Byzantium claims that the North African city of Acholla was in fact settled by the Maltese.¹⁵⁸ Moscati suggests that it may have been the Phoenicio-Maltese who settled Gozo and Pantelleria.¹⁵⁹ The possibility of secondary Phoenician foundations would imply that Malta prospered, buoyed by trade and the wealth generated by its own industries.¹⁶⁰

Malta's position and abundance of natural harbours certainly justify the interest it held for Phoenician settlers and merchants. Despite its lack of natural

¹⁵⁴ The Phoenician trade in eastern wares is apparent on both Malta and Gozo with considerable remains of Egyptian items. For a detailed record see Günther Hölbl, *Ägyptisches Kulturgut auf den Inseln Malta und Gozo in phönikischer und punischer Zeit* (Wien 1989).

¹⁵⁵ Markoe, *The Phoenicians*, p.180.

¹⁵⁶ Cic. *Verr.* II.4.46. Cicero describes Verres pilfering an ancient temple of Juno. He claims that it dated back to the days of the Punic Wars when the temple would have been dedicated to Tanit and/or Astarte and that Verres stole ivories with Punic inscriptions, which were given to Masinissa.

¹⁵⁷ KAI. 47. This inscription refers to "Our master Melqart, master from Tyre". This inscription, although dated to the second century BC, may imply that Tyre was also the metropolis of Phoenician Malta.

¹⁵⁸ Steph. Byz. s.v. "Αχολλα.

¹⁵⁹ Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, p.189.

¹⁶⁰ If Phoenician Malta founded subsequent colonies, its growth must have been meteoric. If we consider Carthage's rapid rise, it only spawned first colony of Ibiza in 654/3 about 160 years after it was settled.

resources, which highlighted other Phoenician areas of settlement, it offered a central trade station on the direct route from the east with direct access to Sicily, North Africa, and the Western Mediterranean.

The island of Gozo (Gaulos) to the northwest of Malta was another haven for Phoenician traders in the Central Mediterranean. Diodorus, in almost a footnote to his description of Phoenician Malta, offers this brief description:

*After this island there is another which has the name of Gaulos, lying in the sea with well situated harbours, a Phoenician colony.*¹⁶¹

Once more we find a small island in the middle of the sea with good harbours colonised by the Phoenicians. The name Gozo possibly is Phoenician in origin with reference to a maritime theme.¹⁶² Phoenician contact and settlement was probably contemporary to that of Malta although there is a paucity of literary and archaeological evidence.

The archaeological record of settlement on Gozo shows two major settlements, on the coast on the Bay of Mgarr and inland at modern Victoria. This is similar to the Phoenician model in Malta and Cyprus of coastal settlements being fed by inland centres of industry. Like Malta, Gozo shared similar primary industries of linen and olive oil production. Similar to Malta, the Phoenician remains on Gozo show a strong eastern influence.¹⁶³ The religious artefacts are also similar to those found on Malta.¹⁶⁴

Gozo was a small, but nonetheless important island which the Phoenicians utilised in their trade 'empire' at sea. It offered a safe haven and port to trade to merchants from both east and west. Although it always was secondary in importance to its larger neighbour Malta, the Phoenicians and later Carthaginians actively used it as a strategic port.

The final Phoenician settlement in this group, Pantelleria, is unfortunately one of the poorest attested. Most of the scant evidence we have comes from the island's

¹⁶¹ Diod. V.12.4, μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν νῆσόν ἐστιν ἑτέρα τὴν μὲν προσηγορίαν ἔχουσα Γαῦλος πελαγία δὲ καὶ λιμέσιν εὐκαίροις κεκοσμημένη Φοινίκων ἄποικος.

¹⁶² Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, p.174, believes it refers to a type of round mercantile ship (gōlah).

¹⁶³ Hölbl, *Ägyptisches Kulturgut auf den Inseln Malta und Gozo*, passim.

¹⁶⁴ Moscati, *Italia Punica*, pp.340-342.

Punic and Roman phases. At least one major settlement is attested, possibly Phoenician in origin, but definitely Punic at some stage with an acropolis on the hills of St. Teresa and St. Marco.¹⁶⁵ We are only able to assume a date of Phoenician contact and settlement of the island. Given its proximity to Utica, Carthage, and Malta and its position *en route* to the old Phoenician colonies in the Far West we can assume that if the Phoenicians followed their normal practice: contact with the island at the turn of the first millennium predating later possible settlement. Once again there is evidence of eastern influences, albeit from later stages.¹⁶⁶ Evidence suggests a pre-existing population would not have deterred Phoenician interests in the island and the latter probably would have utilised and incorporated them into their trading strategies.

Pantelleria was certainly a prime candidate for Phoenician activity. The island lay *en route* from the Phoenician settlements in Tunisia and those in West Sicily. It was a perfect way station for merchants on their journeys. Pseudo-Scylax claims that it lay only one day's sail from Lilybaeum.¹⁶⁷ It is a similar distance from the island to the shores of North Africa rendering it indispensable for a seafaring people reluctant to sail at night.

These islands of the Mid-Mediterranean demonstrate several similar attributes when we consider Phoenician interest and settlement patterns.¹⁶⁸ Their natural geography limited their exploitation but their strategic mid-sea locations in were utilised on major trade routes. This is proved by Diodorus' brief testimony describing their natural harbours as offering safe havens for Phoenician merchants. Although the Phoenician presence on Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria is likely to have been permanent, the nature of these islands as stopovers with no real mineral resources or abundance of native populations limited expansion and possible settlement. Also Malta and Gozo at least had specialised industries (linen and olive oil production), which supplemented and enhanced trade in the islands. Certainly the Phoenicians would have shown interest in these islands from an early stage as strategic ports

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p.136.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.* pp.137-138, this is particularly evident in its taste for Greek materials, especially pottery.

¹⁶⁷ *GGM.* I. 111, p.89 (ed. Müller).

¹⁶⁸ It is possible that the Phoenicians may have already utilised some of the islands which the Carthaginians later used in this way. Although they reveal little material evidence of the Phoenicians' presence, we should not rule them out as possible sites of Phoenician settlement. The Carthaginians lost the battle of the Aegates Islands at the end of the First Punic War. Presumably there was an established Carthaginian presence on the island. There are several other islands in the vicinity which may have seen early Phoenicio-Punic traffic based on trade routes. Ustica may have been utilised as a stop

between the rapidly developing areas of North Africa and Sicily on the one hand, and east to Cyprus and the Levantine coast on the other.

The Phoenicians deserved their title as the merchants of the ancient world. This description does not do them full justice, however, as they were also active settlers and explorers. This image is enhanced when we consider that their cities such as Tyre, Sidon, and Byblos were mostly dominated and besieged by foreign invaders from the second millennium BC onwards. Nonetheless the Phoenicians still practised their skill as navigators and traders and so generated wealth. It was this skill the Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians, and Persians all recognised and utilised. Thus the Phoenician cities were able to continue to trade freely abroad. Besides such an understanding, the Phoenicians were soon operating beyond the control of eastern overlords in the undeveloped areas of the Central and Western Mediterranean.

In all the areas of Phoenician settlement abroad, there was a distinctive system of settlement often lasting several centuries.¹⁶⁹ Phoenician exploration and trade predated permanent settlement. Often temporary or seasonal bases were established by the various cities for basic barter with native peoples. This system was probably established around 1100 BC and would explain the gap in traditional founding dates of Utica, Gades, and Lixus with their archaeological records beginning in the eighth century. These bases were often settled on promontories or offshore islands offering the Phoenicians both safe anchorage and defence. During the eighth century it appears that the Phoenicians became permanent settlers. Initially the Phoenician settlers established towns in coastal areas, usually with a good harbour and defensive site and, for the sake of trade, often dominating a river mouth or valley. This enabled them to further their interests both inland and to the sea. The Phoenicians settled areas which would specifically benefit their seaborne activities. As a result we find numerous settlements which are strategically placed on trade routes. Carthage was probably the best example of this, dominating the Central Mediterranean at its narrowest point.

between Sardinia and Sicily. The same may be said of Cercina to the south. Even the Lipari Islands north of Sicily have an island bearing a familiar name, Phoenicusa.

¹⁶⁹ This pattern, although lengthy, is not unusual if we were to consider the process of Greek colonisation beginning in the eighth century. The Greeks had a standard system of finding a suitable site (coastal with good harbours, defences, and resources). An oracle was approached and an *oikist* chosen. Once the colonists were chosen and their land allotted, then the colony would be settled as a replica of its metropolis with similar religious and political institutions and social and cultural characteristics.

Otherwise we see foundations such as Gades, Malta, Motya, and those on the Balearic Islands all located to attract trade. The coastal system of Phoenician settlements also echoes their dependency on seaborne traffic. In areas such as Spain, Sardinia, and North Africa we find a networked system of Phoenician settlements often only a day's journey apart (often less) to facilitate coastal shipping. After Phoenician settlers were established in a certain area and an amicable relationship with the native population obtained, the settlers' interests occasionally turned toward the interior. In Sardinia, Cyprus, Malta, and Sicily the Phoenician settlers established interior settlements. Often these towns were based on both local industry and trade. By utilising such bases, the Phoenician merchants would have been better equipped for trade with local populations and increased local production of commodities.

The Phoenicians were able to expand rapidly throughout the entire Mediterranean and beyond with their cities on the Levantine coast and their settlements abroad flourishing from trade. One of the key factors to such success was the wealth generated from the Phoenician monopoly of mineral extraction. Without the wealth from Spanish silver or Cypriot copper, the Phoenicians would certainly not have been able to bankroll their policy of expansion and widespread colonisation and trade. The Phoenicians quickly discovered the locations of important mineral areas throughout the Mediterranean. By extracting valuable minerals (often by utilising native labour) the Phoenician merchants made long sea journeys financially viable and could more easily afford the tribute imposed by foreign rulers in the east.

The Phoenicians' ability to expand, trade, and settle beyond the realms of their contemporaries enabled them to prosper as merchants while not reverting to aggressive military tactics to maintain dominance. They were able to trade freely (especially in the West) untouched until the gradual Greek encroachments beginning in the eighth century. Phoenician settlements often grew wealthy and powerful with their greatest legacy being their colony of Carthage, which was later to eclipse their influence and assume their function. Their model of expansion was a template for Carthage which followed in the footsteps of the Phoenicians in many ways. With such a legacy the Phoenicians gave Carthage a number of the successful methods with which it would build and maintain its empire.

II. CARTHAGE

The legend of the foundation of Carthage was a common tale in the ancient world. Elissa (or Dido according to Virgil) set out from Tyre ca. 814 BC and founded the colony of Carthage on a cape in the Gulf of Tunis in modern Tunisia. Although the subject of the foundation of Carthage has been dealt with extensively by modern, and to a certain degree, ancient authors, there are still various points of interest regarding the foundation and the initial years of the city's development. Unfortunately, there is no surviving literary evidence covering the period between the foundation of Carthage in 814 and the settlement of the colony of Ebusus on Ibiza in 654/3. The early stages of the development of Carthage, its empire and activities, and the Punic culture it spawned are somewhat mysterious. This period like several major Carthaginian social and cultural characteristics remain poorly understood. However, based on the scattered evidence we possess, it is possible to identify several major characteristics regarding Carthage which help place it at the centre of this discussion.

CARTHAGE: ITS FOUNDATION AND CONTEXT

The foundation story of Elissa fleeing from Tyre and her megalomaniac brother, Pygmalion has survived in some detail. Ironically, not because it told the story of the foundation of Carthage, but primarily because it was in essence a dramatic tale. Justin (abridging Pompeius Trogus) provides us with the best account detailing events leading up to, during, and after the foundation of Carthage.¹ In Tyre, Elissa married Acerbas (her uncle and the priest of Heracles i.e. Melqart), whom Pygmalion murdered on account of the former's reputed wealth. Elissa fooled Pygmalion and

¹ Justin XVIII.3-6. Justin wrote during the fourth century AD epitomising the accounts of Pompeius Trogus who had composed his history during the time of Augustus. There are several other accounts presumably evolving from a single original. The earliest allusion comes from Timaeus in the third century BC (*FHG*. I, F. 23 (ed. Müller)). Virgil gives a lyric description of the flight of Dido and her foundation of the Byrsa at the end of the first century BC (*Aen.* I.335-370). Silius Italicus (ca. 25-100AD) likewise retells the story of Elissa and the foundation of Carthage as well as several other Phoenician colonies in the Western Mediterranean (*Pun.* I.10ff., III.231, also see VIII.45f., VII.200f.). Appian also provides a solid narrative of the foundation of Carthage, ironically as a prologue to its destruction (*Pun.* 1). Solinus (ca. 200 AD) mentions Elissa and her foundation of Carthage (XXVII.9-10). Otherwise there are only brief allusions to the story of Elissa in e.g. Tertullian (*Ap.* 50.5).

departed from Tyre with a retinue of disaffected Tyrian nobles.² The party stopped briefly on Cyprus where they received favourable omens from the priest of Jupiter (Ba'al Hammon). There they seized 80 maidens (from the temple of Venus i.e. Astarte) as wives. They reached Africa where Elissa supposedly purchased the land known as the Byrsa by cutting an ox hide in long strips and encircling the citadel.³ Having settled Carthage, Elissa came under pressure to marry the king of the neighbouring Maxitani, Hiarbus, under the threat of war. Rather than remarrying or fighting a native war, she took her own life atop a funeral pyre. By doing so she removed herself as any symbol of animosity between Carthage and the neighbouring tribes thus ensuring the protection and survival of her new city.

On the surface it appears that the story of the flight of Elissa is little more than a foundation legend along the lines of the Greek model.⁴ Nonetheless, there are certain elements of the story which are germane to the Phoenician (and later Carthaginian) practice of colonisation. For instance, the saga of Pygmalion and Elissa was based in Tyre, which as we have seen was the dominant Phoenician colonising

² Justin XVIII.4. Elissa pretended to move into the house of Pygmalion. The latter was excited believing she would bring the reputed wealth of Acerbas with her. However, she had her attendants fill sandbags and tossed them into the sea as if they were filled with gold as an offering to her dead husband. She then escaped with the real treasure aboard.

³ The exact etymology of Byrsa is questionable. The name Byrsa has traditionally been interpreted as 'Bull's hide': βύρσα (Hdt. III.110), Lat. *Bursa*. The etymological connection between the foundation myth of Carthage and this interpretation needs no explanation. The other theory as mentioned by Søren *et al.*, suggests it may be a corrupted Greek form of the Phoenician word for fortress, David Søren, Aicha Ben Abed Ben Khader, and Hedi Slim, *Carthage, Uncovering the Mysteries and Splendours of Ancient Tunisia* (New York 1990) p.19. The Hebrew equivalent attests a root 'fortify', בחר (bhr, meaning "make inaccessible"). Unfortunately the name of the Byrsa in either Phoenician or later Punic remains unattested.

⁴ The story of Elissa draws in several aspects of a Greek foundation myth. We find Elissa, driven by compulsion from her homeland with a band of outcasts. Although she has no divine approval of her purpose (usually granted by an oracle), she obtains it along the way: first, in Cyprus, with the priest of Jupiter offering himself and his family to her which was considered a good omen for their journey (XVIII.5). Then when digging the foundations on the Byrsa the new Carthaginians found an ox's head which suggested they would be laborious but enslaved, they removed it and found a horse's head which meant they would be warlike and powerful (XVIII.5). The figure of Elissa as *oikist* is also important as we find her replicating the political system of Tyre (a monarchy) and becoming queen. According to Justin (XVIII.6), even after her death Elissa was worshipped as a goddess so long as Carthage remained unconquered. The concept of an *oikist* cult was common among many Greek colonies from the eighth until the fourth century. Even with regard to the division of *chora* (by the demarcation of the Byrsa) we can refer to Greek colonies with carefully divided personal and public (i.e. sacred) allotments of land. If Carthage was founded in 814 BC, it is only slightly older than the first identified Greek colony of Pithecussae (ca. 775) and therefore more or less contemporary with the greater movement in Greek society. For similar Greek foundation stories see the Theran colony of Cyrene under Battus est. 630 (Hdt. IV.148-159). Also for the foundation of a colony by a disaffected royal, see the two failed attempts by the Spartan prince, Dorieus to found colonies at Cinyphs in Libya and Heracleia in Western Sicily (ironically they were both destroyed by the Carthaginians) at the end of the sixth century (Hdt. V.42-48).

state, especially in the West.⁵ The party stopped in Cyprus, which by the ninth century was in contact with the Phoenicians, if not already containing some Phoenician colonies. From Cyprus, the foundation story gives no indication that the party stopped anywhere until it reached North Africa, although it must have been a journey lasting several months.⁶ When Elissa and her party arrived in North Africa they purchased a small precinct of land from the local tribes. The story of Hiarbus and the hostile tribe of the Maxitani is most likely legend (as is Elissa's subsequent death). Nonetheless, both anecdotes presuppose that the Phoenician colonists did interact with local peoples, as was the case in numerous other Phoenician colonies.

THE SITE OF CARTHAGE

The site of Carthage is characteristic of a Phoenician colony. Originally, as both the legend and the geographical position illustrate, the Byrsa was a citadel of rock dominating a strategic coastline with a natural harbour. The Phoenician settlers occupied this defensible headland with good access to the sea until, with the establishment of a settled population, they were able to expand their territory in the interior and along the coast. The concept of *chora* was present in Carthage already at the time of its foundation although it naturally increased over time. The establishment of the six *pagi*, or territories around Carthage, which most likely consisted of the later Roman province, reflected the core Carthaginian territory during its height.⁷ However, the Byrsa was the original territory of Carthage and thus the centre of the city and the

⁵ The situation leading to the flight of Elissa was probably not an unusual event in the proceedings of the Tyrian royal house. All accounts of Elissa/Dido portray her as a tragic heroine who lost her beloved husband and was forced from her home. It appears, however, that political intrigue and palace coups were common in the Tyrian and Israelite royal houses during the ninth century. Elissa's own great-aunt was the notorious Biblical figure Jezebel (2 Kings 9:30-37). When we look closely at the story, her journey appears to be a planned action when we consider that Elissa was escaping with a great deal of money and a number of Tyrian nobles in support. It may be that Elissa was not the tragic figure originally thought, but rather a displaced royal who had backed the wrong side in a palace coup. See Soren *et al.*, pp.23-25.

⁶ The Phoenicians had been sailing from the Levantine coast to the Western Mediterranean and beyond as early as 1100. It is fair to assume that Phoenician traders and explorers would have had an established network of friendly ports on the main east-west shipping lanes.

⁷ These territories are known as The Great Plains (the middle Medjerda Valley), Thusca (based west of Hadrumentum), Muxsi (the Upper Medjerda Valley around Utica), Zugei (to the southwest of Carthage), Cape Bon, and Byzacena (south of Hadrumentum). See J.A. Ilevbare, *Carthage, Rome, and the Berbers* (Ibadan 1980) p.21.

subsequent empire.⁸ This original *chora* was ironically mirrored during the city's last few decades when the stipulation of the peace treaty following the defeat of the Carthaginians after the Second Punic War dictated that they should hold no towns nor conduct military operations beyond 'the Phoenician trenches'.⁹ Even during his war against Carthage, the Numidian king, Masinissa claimed that Carthage had possessed too much territory in North Africa, referring to the original purchase of the Carthaginian *chora* of the Byrsa.¹⁰

The natural topography of Carthage would certainly have attracted both Phoenician and Greek colonists. From a strategic point of view, Carthage had the benefit of dominating the Gulf of Tunis and in doing so, a great deal of the trade flowing from the Western Mediterranean to the East. As we have already seen, there was a Phoenician presence as well as established trade routes in many areas of the Western Mediterranean by the ninth century. The nascent city of Carthage grew rapidly owing to the high volume of trade passing through the area from the Phoenician settlements in the West and from the Phoenicians, Greeks, and Egyptians in the East. To profit from this maritime nature, Carthage had an excellent harbour, which by later periods could in fact be closed from the sea for the purpose of defence.¹¹ Otherwise Carthage was later famous for its *cothon* or artificial harbour. The Phoenician practice of constructing such harbours was not limited to Carthage with several important cities constructing a *cothon* to increase their capability for

⁸ The image of the Byrsa as the original centre of Carthage is obvious at the time of its fall in 146. Appian (*Pun.* 130-132) narrates the final scene of Carthage with the walls breached, the population captured, and the remnants of Carthaginian resistance besieged atop the Byrsa in the temple of Asclepius (assimilated as Eshmoun in the Phoenicio-Punic pantheon). Its defensible attributes must have been impressive as Appian claims that the garrison commander, Hasdrubal along with 900 Roman deserters defended the temple with ease for a long time owing to the high and precipitous nature of its site (ὄθεν εὐμαρῶς αἰεὶ ἐμάχοντο καίπερ ὄντες ὀλίγοι διὰ τὸ ὕψος τοῦ τεμένους καὶ τὸ ἀπόκρημνον). Appian then adds that they were only defeated through exhaustion and hunger, further suggesting a long siege.

⁹ App. *Pun.* 32, 54, 59.

¹⁰ App. *Pun.* 67, Masinissa claimed that the Carthaginian territory had once belonged to himself (i.e. native Berbers). Livy (XXXIV.62) states Masinissa claimed the Carthaginians had no right to their territory in North Africa. Masinissa made much of the Carthaginians' being immigrants to the land and only legally purchasing the Byrsa. He also claimed that they expanded their territory by violence and without right. The land under question known as *Emporia* (coastal towns such as Lesser Syrtis and Leptis Magna) was often a point of dispute (according to Livy) between the Carthaginians and the Numidians. The idea of the Carthaginians occupying land Berber land which had been taken by conquest is emphasised by another of Masinissa's demands prior to the outbreak of the Third Punic War. He claimed the territory known as 'the big fields' and the country belonging to the fifty towns known as Tysca (App. *Pun.* 68). Presumably this was land in the interior which Carthage had captured along with a number of Berber towns. Regarding the nature of Carthaginian territory in North Africa with reference to Berber settlements see Chp. VII, ns.26-36 and text.

¹¹ App. *Pun.* 96.

seaborne traffic.¹² The *cothon* at Carthage was by far the biggest and best equipped. Appian claims that during the Third Punic War it housed shipyards and 220 ships.¹³

Although maritime trade was the mainstay of the Carthaginian economy, its climate was excellent for agriculture. With the later expansion in North Africa beginning in the sixth century, Carthage was able to develop a powerful agricultural base in its hinterland. From the scant literary evidence we possess, it appears that the Carthaginians developed a high and diverse level of agriculture. The best description is preserved by Diodorus describing the Carthaginian hinterland during the invasion of Agathocles in 310 BC:

*The intervening country, through which it was necessary for them to march, was divided into gardens and plantations of many types, since many streams of water were led in small channels and irrigated every part. There were also country houses one after another, constructed in luxurious fashion and covered with stucco, which represented the wealth of the people who possessed them. The farm buildings were filled with everything that was needed for enjoyment, seeing that the inhabitants in a long period of peace had amassed an abundant variety of products. Part of the land was planted with vines, and part grew olives and was also planted thickly with other varieties of fruit-bearing trees. On each side herds of cattle and flocks of sheep pastured on the plain, and the neighbouring meadows were filled with grazing horses. In general there was a diverse prosperity in the region, since the leading Carthaginians had established their private estates and had beautified them with their wealth for their enjoyment.*¹⁴

¹² Other prominent Phoenicio-Punic sites with a *cothon* include Tyre and Motya.

¹³ *Lib.* 96; Strabo also gives a description of the *cothon* although he claims it housed 120 decked ships during this period (XVII.3.14). Archaeological evidence has revealed it was shallow and paved suggesting a considerable feat of engineering. See *Excavations at Carthage: The British Mission*, Vol. II.1, H.R. Hurst *et al.* (eds.), (Oxford 1994) Chps. II-III.

¹⁴ XX.8.3-4, ἡ δ' ἀνὰ μέσον χώρα δι' ἧς ἦν ἀναγκαῖον πορευθῆναι διείληπτο κητείαις καὶ παντοίαις φυτουργίαις πολλῶν ὑδάτων διωχευμένων καὶ πάντα τόπον ἀρδευόντων. ἀγροικίαι τε συνεχεῖς ὑπῆρχον οἰκοδομαῖς πολυτελέσι καὶ κονιάμασι διαπεπονημένοι καὶ τὸν τῶν κεκτημένων αὐτὰς διασημαίνουσαι πλοῦτον. ἔγεμον δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαύλες πάντων τῶν πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν ὥς ἂν τῶν ἐγχωρίων ἐν εἰρήνῃ πολυχρονίῳ τεθησαυρικῶτων γεννημάτων ἀφθονίαν. ἡ δὲ χώρα ἡ μὲν ἦν ἀμπελόφυτος ἡ δὲ ἐλαιοφόρος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν καρπύμων δένδρων ἀνάπλεως, ἐπὶ θάτερα δὲ μέρη τὸ πεδίον ἐνέμοντο βοῶν ἀγέλαι καὶ ποιῖναι καὶ τὰ πλησίον ἔλη φορβάδων ἵππων ἔγεμε. καθόλου δὲ παντοία τις ἦν ἐν τοῖς τόποις εὐδαιμονία τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων Καρχηδονίων διειληφῶτων τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τοῖς πλούτοις πεφιλοκαληκῶτων πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν.

From such a description it is clear that by the end of the fourth century wealthy landholders who produced a variety of crops and pastured land were farming a considerable amount of land. Again this image struck a chord with later Roman writers wishing to develop a similar aristocratic system. Cato certainly agreed with such a system of land division and cultivation.¹⁵ Probably the best example of the developed nature of Carthaginian agriculture and its subsequent influence in Rome comes from the Carthaginian Mago who compiled a 28-book treatise on agriculture.¹⁶ The Roman senate apparently commissioned a translation of this work into Latin.¹⁷ Columella names him as *Mago rusticationis parens* and gives him pride of place among a number of other Punic writers on agriculture.¹⁸ Such an admission is further testament to the high level of Carthaginian agriculture, as such a literary genre could only exist in a rich and flourishing agricultural society. It is possible that such praise was due to the Roman development of several agricultural techniques which have similarities to Carthaginian models. One was the *latifundium*, or large slave-run estate, which began to appear in Rome from the third century BC.¹⁹ The agricultural

¹⁵ This is reminiscent of Cato's description of an ideal farm of one hundred iugera in Rome during the second century BC: "If you should ask me what the best kind of farm, I should say: a hundred iugera of land comprising all sorts of soils, and in a good situation; a vineyard comes first if it produces wine of a good quality in good supply; second, a watered garden; third, an osier-bed; fourth, an olive yard; fifth, a meadow; sixth, grain land; seventh, a wood lot; eighth, an arbustum; ninth, a mast grove", *Praedium quod primum siet, si me rogabis, sic dicam: de omnibus argris optimoque loco iugera agri centum, vinea est prima, si vino bono et multo est, secundo loco hortus inriguus, tertio salictum, quarto oletum, quinto pratum, sexto campus frumentarius, septimo silva caedua, octavo arbustum, nono glandaria silva*, Agr. I.7 (cf. Varro Rust. I.7).

¹⁶ Mago probably lived during the third century BC. His treatise was used by Columella during the first century AD and Varro during the first century BC.

¹⁷ Columella *De Re Rust.* I.1.13. He also states that this work was translated by Dionysius of Utica, I.1.10.

¹⁸ *De Re Rust.* I.1.13, I.1.6.

¹⁹ It appears as though the Carthaginians first introduced a system similar to the *latifundia* of Rome. There are several examples of large numbers of slaves in North Africa, presumably working on farms. Hanno attempted to rouse large numbers of slaves during his failed coup in ca. 342 (Justin XXI.4.6). A similar revolt in 396 also saw slaves liberated and bearing arms (Diod XIV.77.3). In 307 after the defeat of the remaining Greek forces once led by Agathocles, the Carthaginians rounded up the survivors, bound them, and forced them to redevelop the countryside they had ravaged (Diod. XX.69.5). During the Roman invasion led by Manlius and Regulus in 256 BC, the Romans supposedly freed a large number of slaves in the countryside who were Romans captured in previous encounters (Zonar. VIII.13). In the Second Punic War, Scipio and Masinissa freed a number of Roman prisoners who were working in the fields (App. Lib. 15). Even during the Third Punic War, the Carthaginian senate decreed that all slaves were to be freed and armed for the final defence of Carthage (App. Pun. 93). The Carthaginians' policy of capturing slaves for menial labour and the value they placed on such manpower is suggested elsewhere. After Agathocles had seized a Carthaginian camp in 310, the Greeks discovered some 20000 sets of manacles with which the Carthaginians, hopeful of victory, intended to enslave the Greeks, before presumably putting them to work (Diod. XX.13.2). After the end of the Second Punic War, one of the terms offered to Carthage was, among other items such as flocks and herds, was that the Carthaginians were permitted to keep their slaves (Polyb. XV.18.1). Such an admission suggests a considerable quantity of slaves in North Africa. From such examples it becomes

potential of Carthage was one of the primary reasons why it later became the capital for the Roman province of Africa.

Carthage was not founded owing to privation as the Elissa story would suggest. The site was carefully chosen along the Phoenician model of settlement. Its natural geography was perfect for the establishment of a maritime city. The Phoenicians knew about the site, especially when we consider that the neighbouring city of Utica was founded prior to Carthage. Even in the foundation story of Elissa the Uticans sent a delegation which welcomed the colonists as kin.²⁰ Carthage was also settled at a distance from Utica which suggests some forethought. At a distance of only 60 stades (11 km.), the two sites were only distanced by a single day's travel, which is a common Phoenician settlement model.²¹ As we have already seen in areas such as Spain and Sardinia, this method of networked coastal ports was a favoured system of Phoenician trade. Even around Carthage and Utica we find settlements such as Hadrumentum, Gabes, Sabratha, Leptis Magna, and Oea all within a relatively short distance from each other.

THE PHOENICIAN LEGACY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUNIC CARTHAGE

As with the Greek system of colonial expansion, we find the direct duplication of several cultural, social, and political systems between the Phoenician metropolis of Tyre and its colony Carthage. We have already looked at the process and nature of Phoenician settlement throughout the Mediterranean. Carthage, despite growing more powerful than any eastern or western Phoenician holding, was originally founded in a similar manner for the same purpose. The Phoenicians had, by the end of the ninth century, established an efficient settlement practice rivalling that of the Greeks. Testament to this system was the name of Carthage itself (*Qart-Hadasat*). As we have

clear that Carthage maintained a considerable number of slaves working its hinterland. As it is apparent that the Libyan farmers could not maintain a working population of slaves, it must have been the Carthaginians who utilised such labour. It is possible that the Romans were influenced by this system. Otherwise similar social circumstances saw them with a comparable manpower surplus, and the Romans developed a parallel agricultural system. It is natural that the Romans would turn to the Carthaginians for agricultural expertise as they had operated a similar system for some time.

²⁰ Justin XVIII.5, the Uticans gave Elissa and the Tyrians presents as relatives.

²¹ App. *Pun.* 75.

already seen, like the foundation on Cyprus bearing the same name,²² Carthage simply means 'new town' (much like Neapolis in Greek). The use of such a name on more than one occasion implies that Carthage too was designed as a systematised colonial foundation and named accordingly.

THE PHOENICIAN DECLINE AND THE RISE OF CARTHAGE

The full development of Carthage into the capital of an empire is usually dated to the fifth century. There has been some discussion as to the exact reason behind this shift. The motivating factor seems to be the decline of the Phoenician cities' presence in the West. It is possible that a long period of heavy-handed treatment at the hands of the Assyrians during the seventh century and increasing tribute damaged the Phoenicians' ability to operate freely. This was only a harbinger of worse to come under the Neo-Babylonians. A thirteen-year siege under Nebuchadnezzar from 585-573/2 saw Tyre reduced and its independence removed.²³ With this blow at least one large Phoenician city was now severed from its settlements, and Carthage was left as the largest surviving Phoenician centre in the West. The decline of the Phoenician cities' activity in the West may also have hastened the fall of Tartessus in Spain. Phoenicia lost one of the oldest and most lucrative trade relationships during the mid-sixth century. The exact nature of this collapse is unreported and is only suggested by the decline of well-established trading patterns in Southern Spain.²⁴ There are also reports of native Spanish uprisings during this period, which threatened Gades and led to the arrival of an official Carthaginian presence in Spain.²⁵ Nevertheless, the decline of the Phoenician cities' influence saw Carthage eventually supersede them as the major political and mercantile power in the West.

The expansion of Carthage during this period heralded a number of distinctive changes. We can associate changes in government, art, and religion which demonstrate a social and cultural development from the old Phoenician model to the new Punic society. The nature of Carthage as an autonomous state began early. This was marked by its foundation of Ebusus on Ibiza in 654/3.²⁶ Although mentioned in

²² See Chp. I, ns.33-37 and text.

²³ Joseph. *Ap.* I.156.

²⁴ Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, p.344.

²⁵ Justin XLIV.4; Polyb. II.1.5; Macrobian. *Sat.* I.20.12.

²⁶ Diod. V.16.2.

passing, and carried out under the supervision of Phoenicians, this event was a defining moment in the development of Carthage. It is an event from which we are able to discern Carthage ceasing to act as a standard settlement of Tyre, but more like a fully functioning and independent state. It then only was a short matter of time before Carthage began to introduce its own foreign policies. This is attested by the attempt to stop the founding of Massilia ca. 600²⁷ and then the victory over the Phocaeans off Alalia ca. 535. Following this Carthage embarked on numerous military campaigns aimed primarily at increasing its territory. Only a century later Carthage was the dominant and most aggressive state in the Western Mediterranean.

Initially, many aspects of Phoenician society would have continued as they did in the East. Carthage, however, grew quickly and eventually struck out on its own path. The early nature of Carthage is difficult to determine because of the dearth of both literary, and to a lesser extent, archaeological evidence. Nonetheless, several assumptions can be made on the evidence that remains so as to construct an early picture of the development of Carthage from the Phoenician colony we have witnessed into an independent and powerful Punic state.

THE SEA AND TRADE

The obvious Phoenician characteristic that was inherited by the Carthaginians was an affiliation with the sea. In accordance with its purpose as a Phoenician settlement, Carthage was primarily a maritime city even if it developed strong territorial, agricultural, and mercantile ties throughout North Africa and other provinces. Carthaginian maritime activities always closely resemble those of the Phoenicians even if Carthage's later political ambitions often cloud this. Although the Carthaginians superseded the Phoenicians in the Central and Western Mediterranean, little was altered. The busy *emporion* in Spain, Sardinia, Sicily, and North Africa still operated in a similar manner. Much like the Phoenicians before them, the Carthaginians remained interested in, and relied heavily on trade.

This connection is highlighted by the various literary accounts which exhibit the similar traits of Phoenician and Carthaginian maritime activities. Polybius, for instance claims that the Carthaginians forbade the Romans from sailing west of the

²⁷ Thuc. I.13.6.

‘Fair Promontory’ so that they would not become familiar with the prosperous Carthaginian *emporía* in the Western Mediterranean.²⁸ There was a distinctive attitude of exclusivity in several areas under Phoenicio-Punic control. Examples of this attitude were the destruction of the attempted colony of Pentathlus at Lilybaeum²⁹ and that of Dorieus at Cinyrs in Libya and then at Heracleia in Eryx in Western Sicily.³⁰ These tactics were also used with mixed success against other Greek states. At Alalia in ca. 535, a combined Carthaginian and Etruscan fleet forced the Phocaean settlement on Corsica to be abandoned.³¹ This was later followed by a defeat at the hands of Hieron in 474 at Cumae, when the two powers again attempted to maintain exclusive rights in the Tyrrhenian Sea.³² The tactics of the Carthaginians are echoed by the earlier descriptions of Phoenicians as pirates and brigands of the sea. Homer characterises the Phoenicians as untrustworthy rouges who profit by piracy and kidnapping at sea.³³ Herodotus also narrates the Phoenicians’ underhanded tactics at sea.³⁴ Although piracy was by no means uncommon in antiquity, the Phoenicians and Carthaginians were notorious for such activity, albeit mostly through loathing Greek and Roman eyes. The activities of the Carthaginians in the West were earlier foreshadowed by the Phoenicians who also would have wanted to protect the value of their western trade ‘empire’ by excluding others completely and therefore leaving them ignorant of the area and its wealth.³⁵

An unusual aspect regarding the Carthaginians’ trade, which they presumably inherited from the Phoenicians, was their lack of a standardised currency. The earliest Phoenician coinage was struck by Tyre in the middle of the fifth century, only after contact with Persia and more intense contact with the Greeks.³⁶ It appears that Carthage did not adopt coinage until the end of the fifth century. No non-Greek

²⁸ III.23. This is dated to 509/8 BC as part of the first treaty between Rome and Carthage. Polybius is not more specific regarding the exact location of the ‘Fair Promontory’, but it is either Cape Farina or Cape Bon, see Chp. VI, n.36.

²⁹ Diod. V.9; Paus. X.11.2, this attempt is dated to ca. 580.

³⁰ Hdt. V.42ff.

³¹ Hdt. I.163-167.

³² See Chp. VI, ns.29-32 and text.

³³ *Ody.* XIV.288f., XV.415, 455.

³⁴ Herodotus tells of the Phoenician capture of Io (I.1); the oracles in Ammon and Dodona were established by women captured and sold by Phoenicians (II.54-57).

³⁵ Strabo XVII.1.19, quotes Eratosthenes who claims that the Carthaginians drown any foreigners they catch sailing to Sardinia or the Pillars or Heracles. Other similar examples describe the Phoenicians and Carthaginians murdering any intruders to exclusive islands (Arist. *Mir. Ausc.* 84, 132). An interesting comparison survives in Cicero (*De Rep.* II.9) claiming that the Phoenicians and Etruscans were seafaring peoples but the former was interested in trade while the latter was concerned with piracy.

³⁶ See Harden, pp.166-167.

western settlement had struck coins previously, and Carthage only adopted currency to cope with contact from the East, in particular with the western Greeks. Before this system was established the Phoenicians and Carthaginians relied on barter as the main method of trade in what was a massive and apparently efficient trade empire. Herodotus gives a description of Carthaginian bartering in Atlantic North Africa. He claims that the Carthaginian traders would leave their goods on the shore so that the natives would leave quantities of gold in exchange. It seems that quite often the process would take several attempts before both parties were satisfied that the trade was fair.³⁷ Although this example deals with trade with one specific group of people, the basic system of barter is present. From the accounts of Pseudo-Scylax it appears that the Phoenicians practised a similar method of barter with a group of West African people whom he calls Ethiopians.³⁸ Surely this method of trade was established by the Phoenicians and simply adopted and continued by the Carthaginians.

GOVERNMENT

The basic form of the Carthaginian government and social order has survived through a variety of ancient sources³⁹ (although mostly through the description of Aristotle⁴⁰). Originally Carthage would most likely have possessed the social and political system of Tyre. Tyre was a monarchy from an early period. There is some suggestion, however, that it did possess an aristocracy.⁴¹ A similar system seems to have been

³⁷ Hdt. IV.196.

³⁸ *GGM*. I. 112, p.93 (ed. Müller)

³⁹ There are still major gaps in our knowledge of the Carthaginian constitution which even comparatively generous sources such as Aristotle and Polybius omit. Certain aspects of the Carthaginian system of government will be touched upon during this discussion, which does not, however, intend to be an exhaustive study. For material regarding the Carthaginian constitution see Gsell, *HAAN* II, Part II, Chp. I; Werner Huss, *Geschichte der Karthager*, Chp. XXX; Huss, "Probleme der karthagischen Verfassung", in *Karthago*, Huss (ed.), pp.239-261; Warmington, pp.118-124; Gilbert and Colette Charles-Picard, *Daily Life in Carthage*, pp.59-102. For related military aspects see Walter Ameling, *Karthago*, Chps. II-III.

⁴⁰ *Pol.* II.8, 1272b-1273b.

⁴¹ There is considerable evidence suggesting the presence of an aristocracy in Tyre. The idea of priesthoods as quasi-political offices is an obvious allusion. In the Elissa story we see that Pygmalion was king, and the important priesthood of Melqart went to his uncle, Acerbas (Justin XVIII.4). Elissa meanwhile left with supporters who were, according to Justin's latinised account, senators in Tyre. The nature of the political scene on the Levantine coast with several city-states intermarrying at the royal and presumably the aristocratic level. The idea of aristocrats ruling Tyre is less obvious during the early period. We do see however, the institution of local judges governing the city under Neo-Babylonian rule during the sixth century (Joseph. *Ap.* I.157).

established in Carthage. Elissa (if there is any truth in her story) became queen.⁴² Aristotle in fact claims that Carthage once possessed a monarchy ('tyranny' is the actual word he uses) which was replaced by an aristocracy.⁴³ At any rate, any putative monarchy in Carthage did not last.⁴⁴ It is possible that the displaced senators from Tyre and the elite merchant class assumed the role of the aristocracy and therefore the senate in Carthage. If Tyrian nobles did not emigrate, presumably wealthy merchants would have quickly assumed the role of aristocrats in Carthage. Aristotle also suggests such a possibility when he claims that unlike other states, Carthage did not forbid its 'magistrates' from conducting business.⁴⁵ It is probable that the Tyrian aristocracy's wealth was based on trade and was the likely basis of wealth for the Carthaginian aristocracy. Although there is evidence to suggest that aristocratic wealth diversified into such areas as agriculture and industry, trade remained the main income of Carthage and therefore determined its optimacy. It is possible that Carthage initially adopted a similar constitution to that of Tyre before, as we will see, developing its own systems of government. This is understandable, as Carthage was not a breakaway foundation of Tyre, but developed under its supervision and maintained close ties with its metropolis.

The development of a distinctive Carthaginian government becomes evident during the fifth century. The major source regarding the Carthaginian process of government is Aristotle who wrote during the fourth century.⁴⁶ Aristotle claims that the Carthaginians are very successful at managing their political affairs and possess good institutions indicating a well-constructed constitution comparable to that of Sparta and Crete.⁴⁷ In the fifth century we see for the first time two elected consular positions called *suffetes*.⁴⁸ It appears that this office functioned similarly to the Roman consulship. Unlike Roman consuls, however, the *suffetes* did not possess automatic *imperium*, but separate Carthaginian generals were appointed for non-defined periods

⁴² Duris of Samos, *F.Gr.Hist.* 76, F.4, tells of the King of Kition, Pumiathon during the fourth century BC. As we know, Kition was a Tyrian colony, and as we should expect retained the monarchical system of its mother city.

⁴³ *Pol.* V.10.3, 1316a.

⁴⁴ Often foreign reporters took the leading individual of state for a king. Herodotus (VII.165) for example claims that Hamilcar was king of Carthage when he was defeated at Himera. For arguments that such a view was indeed justified (after a fashion) see Ameling, *Karthago*, pp. 67-71, who argues that the 'kingship' in Carthage was eventually limited to military (and sacral) functions.

⁴⁵ *Pol.* V.10.4, 1316b.

⁴⁶ *Pol.* II.8, 1272b-1273b.

⁴⁷ *Pol.* II.8.1, 1272b, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει παρ' αὐτοῖς καλῶς. This is echoed by Eratosthenes whom Strabo quotes as saying: Καρχηδονίους οὕτω θαυμαστῶς πολιτευομένους, I.4.9.

depending on circumstance.⁴⁹ There was an executive body identifiable with the Roman senate, which was most likely based on a qualification of wealth. Although later reform attempted to distribute political power more evenly, the Carthaginian constitution remained plutocratic in nature. Aristotle reaffirms this by stating that the Carthaginians chose their rulers from not only the best but also the wealthiest men.⁵⁰ Aristotle compares many of Carthage's institutions to those of Sparta. He attempts to demonstrate that the Carthaginian system was a mixed constitution in the manner Polybius later describes that of the Romans.⁵¹ Gschnitzer more recently has been able to demonstrate several connections between prominent aspects of the Carthaginian government and that of Rome, Sparta, and Athens.⁵² Unfortunately the majority of sources regarding the Carthaginian constitution stems from Greek and Roman authors who attempted to rationalise it to their readers. By doing so they define it in Greek and Roman political terms and do not express the Carthaginians' view of their own constitution and political institutions.

The expansion of Carthaginian territory in North Africa and abroad during the sixth and fifth centuries saw a marked change in the wealth base of the Carthaginian aristocracy and was partly responsible for the change of political climate. The Carthaginian aristocracy was hitherto based on trade, but with more land available, the aristocrats developed agricultural and industrial estates. By the fifth century, revenue flowing into the treasury, like the aristocracy, was mixed: trade still dominated the Carthaginian economy but agriculture and other industry was rapidly developing into a prosperous and lucrative income.

Probably the best indication of a new political ideology in Carthage during the fifth century was the beginning of more aggressive expansion. The later sixth and fifth centuries heralded the first major foreign interventions in which Carthage expressed a more active and aggressive character. Although many aspects remained relatively unchanged there was a decisive increase in active Carthaginian policy abroad. This is

⁴⁸ Aristotle refers to the *suffetes* as kings comparing them to the Spartan kings.

⁴⁹ The best example of this is Hannibal's possession of what would equate to *imperium* for many years during the Second Punic War. It appears that Carthaginian generals were appointed from the ranks of the aristocracy but for specific campaigns. Unlike Roman consuls, they were not bound by office.

⁵⁰ *Pol.* II.8.6, 1273a.

⁵¹ Polyb. VI.11-18.

⁵² Fritz Gschnitzer, "Phoinikisch-kartagisches Verfassungsdenken", *Anfänge politischen Denkens in der Antike* (Munich 1993) pp.187-198.

evident in both diplomatic and military actions, which would largely distinguish the nature of Carthage from their Phoenician predecessors.

RELIGION

A major social influence brought from Tyre to Carthage was religion. In Greek society, transporting fire from the hearth of the primary temple of the metropolis symbolically represented a colony's cultural origins. The duplication of religious cults between metropolis and colony in a Phoenician context appears to have been carried out in a similar fashion. The main divinity worshipped in Tyre was Melqart. Owing to this association, Carthage also kept a strong connection with this deity. The Carthaginians produced a tithe to the temple of Melqart in Tyre for several centuries after the foundation of the city.⁵³ It was only halted during the fourth century when Diodorus states that the Carthaginians were becoming so prosperous that the tithe was becoming too expensive.⁵⁴ Nonetheless, Melqart and his cult retained its importance in Carthage as elsewhere in the West for several centuries in Punic society as it had done in Phoenician society.⁵⁵

The other primary divinity adopted by the Carthaginians from Tyre was Ba'al Hammon. Assimilated as Cronos in Greek religion, he was the primary divinity of the Phoenician pantheon. He retained this status in Carthage at least until the fifth century when the female deity Tanit eclipsed his primary cult status. Nevertheless the figure of Ba'al Hammon retained his importance in Carthage despite his relegation to secondary status. There are numerous inscriptions from Carthage and other Punic territories which attest his continued importance.⁵⁶ Otherwise his imagery is prevalent

⁵³ Polyb. XXXI.12.12.

⁵⁴ Diod. XX.14.1-2.

⁵⁵ There are several epigraphic texts which attest the presence of Melqart in Carthage between the fourth and second centuries BC, e.g. *KAI.* 86; Ibiza in the fifth century e.g. *KAI.* 72; and Malta in the second century e.g. *KAI.* 47. The main cult of Melqart in the West was at Gades, see Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, pp.257ff.

⁵⁶ A number of these inscriptions (especially after the fifth century) are dedicated primarily to Tanit but name Ba'al Hammon directly after suggesting only a slightly inferior, but nonetheless secondary status, *KAI.* 79, לריבה לחנה פן בעל ולאדון לבעל חמן, "To the Lady Tanit, face of Ba'al and to the Lord Ba'al Hammon". Other examples attest the worship of Ba'al Hammon under Punic influence in Malta (*KAI.* 61); on Sicily (*KAI.* 63); on Sardinia (*KAI.* 64); and even a Punic cult in Phocaeen Massilia. There are also the accounts of Hamilcar in 480 sacrificing victims for favourable omens during the Battle of Himera, presumably to Ba'al Hammon. He then flung himself on the flames when his army was defeated as a type of symbolic sacrificial victim according to Herodotus (VII.167) – though for a different interpretation see Ameling, *Karthago*, p.60. This is echoed in 406 by Himilcar on Sicily when

on funerary stelae from the *topheth* in Carthage before the spread of the cult of Tanit.⁵⁷ Because of the Greek and Roman assimilation of Ba'al Hammon as their own figures of Cronos and Saturn respectively, there are numerous literary examples of his worship in Carthage. Coupled with this was his role of benefactor from the Phoenician and Carthaginian practice of *molech*, or ritual child sacrifice, which was universally abhorred by Greeks and Romans alike.⁵⁸ Despite the eventual prominence of the cult of Tanit, the importance of Ba'al Hammon remained strong as a Phoenician and Punic deity throughout the history of Carthage.

It appears that several other Phoenician cults were also transported to Carthage and established in the new settlement. The prominence of Astarte in the East certainly would have seen her cult status observed throughout the Phoenician and therefore Punic world. There is evidence of her worship alongside Tanit in the third century in Carthage.⁵⁹ The cult centre of Eryx in Western Sicily is also evidence of her continued worship during Punic times. The sanctuary, although attached to an Elymian settlement, was both Phoenician and Punic before a Roman cult centre following the First Punic War.⁶⁰ Eshmoun also probably had some prominence in Carthage considering the location of his temple on the Byrsa. Appian claims that this is where the last Carthaginian resistance took place. The temple was elevated and presumably of considerable size.⁶¹ Appian also notes that it was the richest and most renowned on the Byrsa, which is striking when we consider it probably stood alongside similar temples to more prominent deities such as Tanit and Ba'al Hammon.⁶² Deities such as

he sacrificed a young boy to Cronos (Diod. XIII.86.3); and, from Canaan, by the Moabite king Mesha's sacrifice of his own son in order to obtain divine help in a desperate moment during a war (2 Kings 3:27).

⁵⁷ Shelby Brown, *Late Carthaginian Child Sacrifice* (Sheffield 1991) Chp. IV.

⁵⁸ The best example of this practice to honour Ba'al Hammon is described by Diodorus (XX.14.4-7). The Carthaginians blamed their bad fortune of 310 BC at the hands of Agathocles to irreverence committed against Ba'al Hammon through lack of sacrifice. They atoned for their previous religious negligence by sacrificing 200 noble children to a brazen effigy of the god in Carthage. Otherwise we see Greek authors such as Cleitarchus (*Schol. Plato Rep.* 337a), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (I.38), and Plutarch (*De Super.* 171 c-d) all mention the human sacrifice to Cronos. Several Roman authors also criticise this practice of sacrificing humans to Saturn: e.g. Augustine (*De civ. D.* VII.4) and Quintus Ennius (F. 4).

⁵⁹ *KAI.* 81.

⁶⁰ Polyb. I.55.6-7. The Romans captured and occupied Eryx and the sanctuary of Venus (Astarte) in 248, before losing it to Hamilcar Barca. However, it fell to them again with the rest of Western Sicily. Diodorus gives an insightful description of the cult of Eryx, its use, and importance to Elymians, Phoenicians, Carthaginians, and finally Romans (IV.83).

⁶¹ *Pun.* 130. The cult of Eshmoun was present in the Punic pantheon and throughout the Punic world. See P. Xella, "Aspects du culte d'Eshmoun a Carthage", *Histoire et archéologie de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris 1990) Vol. I, pp.131-139.

⁶² *Pun.* 130, τὸδε γὰρ ἦν τὸ ἱερόν ἐν ἀκροπόλει μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιφανὲς καὶ πλούσιον.

Resef and Anat, which were prominent in Phoenicia, are so far unattested but may have been a part of the original Phoenician pantheon at Carthage.⁶³ Otherwise a deity identified in Greek sources as Poseidon appears in a number of texts as important to both Phoenicians and Carthaginians.⁶⁴

The best indication of the Carthaginians' adopting the ways of Tyre, and indeed of the Phoenicians as a whole, was their continuation of Phoenician religious practices: namely human sacrifice. This practice earned the Carthaginians as much animosity from the Greeks and Romans as it had once the Phoenicians. In the East several Biblical citations criticise the Phoenicians' practice of sacrificing humans, in particular children to Ba'al.⁶⁵ The Carthaginians continued this grisly rite to Ba'al Hammon, Tanit, and Melqart.⁶⁶

It is interesting that Phoenician religious practice was a fundamental characteristic of Carthage, but was also to act as an indicator of a shift from original Phoenician culture to distinctive Punic culture. This change was heralded by the introduction and eventual dominance of the female deity, Tanit. By the fifth century, the figure of Tanit had assumed the role of primary divinity in the Punic West. She did not represent the entire Phoenicio-Punic pantheon however, but evolved to become the primary divinity as the consort of Ba'al Hammon. It appears her creation and meteoric rise in Carthage was due to the changing nature of Carthaginian society. The once Phoenician Carthage had developed into an ethnically diverse centre, subject to influence from, and intermarriage with native North African cultures, and through trade with Greeks, Etruscans, and other Western Mediterranean peoples. The figure of Tanit seems to be a hybrid of a fertility deity and 'mother goddess'. Her name is possibly Libyan in origin⁶⁷ and would explain her syncretic adoption by Punic Carthage as a new state deity common to all.⁶⁸

⁶³ For a brief overview of Phoenician divinities see Harden, Chp. VII; Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, Chp. III.

⁶⁴ There appears to be a connection between the worship of Poseidon and North Africa. It seems logical that such a seafaring people would adopt a maritime divinity. A good example of this occurs in 406, when Hamilcar drowned cattle in honour of Poseidon (Diod. XIII.86.3). Another is the so-called temple of Poseidon established by Hanno during his periplus (GGM. I. 4, p.3 (ed. Müller). See Mh. Fantar, *Le dieu de la mer chez les Phéniciens et les Puniques* (Rome 1977) pp.27-42.

⁶⁵ e.g. Jer. 18:4; 1 Kings 18:16-40; 2 Kings 10:18-27, 16:3, 17:16-17.

⁶⁶ Plut. *De superst.* 171C-D; Pliny *NH.* XXXVI.39.

⁶⁷ Gilbert and Colette Charles Picard, *Carthage – A survey of Punic history and culture from its birth to its final tragedy*, pp.151-154. The Picards offer several possible hypotheses on the origins of Tanit. One possibility is that she was based on the eastern goddess Asherat, but the Carthaginian Tanit was distinguished from any in the East. There is some evidence to suggest that the figure of Tanit existed in

There are various explanations as to why Tanit assumed the role of primary divinity in the Punic world. Her possible Libyan nature appears to link her strongly to the native Berbers, who had mingled with the original Phoenician settlers and traders to help create Punic culture. By the fifth century, Punic settlements in such places as Western Sicily and Sardinia had been in regular contact with the Greek settlements of Sicily and Italy. The fertility association of Tanit to certain aspects of Demeter is a possible hint that Tanit was a hybrid of diverse theological creation. This is emphasised by the fact that cults of Demeter and Core were present in Carthage especially after the fifth century when there was constant contact with Greek Sicily.⁶⁹ This type of divinity seems a popular choice in Punic society. Another idea, which may explain the adoption of the goddess in Carthage, is that it was a more socio-politically motivated than theological shift. Changes in Carthage's political structure may have triggered such a major theological shift.⁷⁰

The adoption of Tanit as the primary Punic divinity was widespread. To make her figure identifiable to the new Punic empire she was modelled and worshiped in the traditional Phoenician manner. This is best demonstrated by her role as the primary recipient of *molech* sacrifices. Her imagery dominates *topheth* stelae and inscriptions in Carthage from the fifth century. Her association with child sacrifice is

Phoenicia, however, her role was not as prominent as it was in Punic Carthage and the examples of her presence there postdate those in the West, Robert R. Stieglitz, "Die Göttin Tanit im Orient", *Antike Welt* XXI.2, 1990, pp.106-109.

⁶⁸ The adoption of Tanit as the primary deity in Carthage was probably a result of a steady growth of her popularity throughout Carthage and its territory. There is the possibility that her prominence was encouraged as a policy of social cohesion. The concept of a state-deity was well understood in the Greek system of colonisation. Often a colony would consist of several distinct ethnic groups with different social and cultural practices. This could lead to division and stasis among rival factions in a new colony. One of the best examples of such civil strife among colonists was Gela, which was settled by Cretans and Rhodians ca. 690. Civil discord was only diffused by the introduction of Demeter as a common cult figure (Hdt. VII.153). In Thurii, a mixed colony of mostly Athenians and Peloponnesians, stasis erupted regarding who was the actual founder of the city. It was only resolved when a delegation sent to Delphi returned claiming that Apollo himself was the founder (Diod. XII.35.3). In Amphipolis, another Athenian colony with a mixture of settlers, the *oikist* Hagnon tried to unite all under a common cultic identity by returning the supposed bones of the Homeric hero Rhessus (Polyaenus VI.53). Also in Heracleia Trachinia, a Spartan colony with a mixed population, there appears to have been an effort for establishing Heracles as a common cult figure to all.

⁶⁹ María José Pena, "El culto a Deméter y Core en Cartago. Aspectos iconográficos", *Faventia* 18.1, 1996, pp.39-55. There is evidence of the Carthaginians worshipping the two deities as early as the first part of the fourth century (Diod. XIV.77.5).

⁷⁰ Such a radical move to implement a new divinity for political gain and consolidation is unusual but not unheard of in the ancient world. The Egyptian divinity Serapis was used by Augustus to help implement Roman rule in Ptolemaic Egypt. Some may say the same regarding Constantine and his adoption of Christianity in the fourth century AD.

not limited to Carthage, but has appeared in several other areas of Phoenicio-Punic settlement.⁷¹

The adoption of Tanit in the Punic world is difficult to describe in detail, as her evolution went hand in hand with the greater social and political developments of the sixth and fifth centuries. Her role is important as it signified that there was a distinct difference between the old Phoenician and new Punic culture. Her exact ancestry is difficult to trace owing to several possible influences and motives toward her creation and implementation. What seems likely is that Tanit was worshipped as a Phoenician-type divinity, but possessed several aspects both influenced by and endearing her to the ethnic diversity of Carthage and its empire. Tanit was a creation of the development of Punic culture and in turn part of its development. Her presence in the Punic world heralded the change from the long-standing Phoenician culture to the new Punic culture of the West.

THE PEOPLE OF CARTHAGE

One common aspect of Phoenician colonies was their connection and often amicable interaction with the native populations. Nowhere is this more evident and dynamic than in Carthage. In the case of Carthage, the Phoenician settlers under Libyan and other influence formed a distinct Punic culture and society. Although we are constantly hindered by a scarcity of written evidence, the new Punic identity of Carthage quickly evolved from the original Phoenician culture.

It appears that a Carthaginian identity quickly developed in Carthage and eventually its surrounding territories. This becomes evident in 654/3, when Diodorus reports the Carthaginians founded Ebusus on Ibiza. He reports that although the islands are filled with barbarians, the Phoenicians preponderate.⁷² It is interesting that Diodorus, certainly copying Timaeus, distinguishes the Phoenicians and

⁷¹ Although the figure of Tanit would primarily have been identified as Carthaginian, it is also present in areas of North Africa. Herodian (V.6.4) claims that the statue of Caelestis in Carthage was held in high regard throughout North Africa. There is also evidence of her presence on Malta (Moscato, *World of the Phoenicians*, pp.193-4) and Sardinia (Barreca, *La civiltà fenicio-punica in Sardegna*, Chp. IV, *passim*).

⁷² V.16.3, κατοικοῦσι δ' αὐτὴν βάρβαροι πανδαποί πλείστοι δὲ Φοίνικες.

Carthaginians as two separate ethnic groups only 160 years after Carthage was founded.⁷³

It may appear that a Punic and therefore Carthaginian people was developing as a homogenous group, but this was not the case. The Carthaginians were a distinctive majority in the city but not the surrounding areas. By the mid-fifth century, one's identity as a Carthaginian rather than a Phoenician or in fact a Libyphoenician was more recognisable. This shift is best attested by Dio Chrysostom who claims "and the Carthaginians Hanno (son of Hamilcar) made Libyans instead of Tyrians and forced them to live in Libya instead of in Phoenicia".⁷⁴ Citizens of Carthage, like the Romans in Central Italy, dominated subsidiary peoples and were the dominant group in immediate civic centres. This cosmopolitan environment naturally increased with Carthaginian expansion. Evidence of ethnic diversity of Carthage includes the social conflicts throughout its history. By the fifth century, Carthage and its growing hinterland were a mix of different nationalities. In the city and its surrounding agricultural regions there was a large slave population most likely of mixed origins.⁷⁵ During the mid-fourth century, Hanno the Great attempted a revolution by enrolling the support of these urban slaves as well as African subjects and a Mauritanian chieftain.⁷⁶ Hanno's attempt at installing himself as tyrant failed and he was executed. Although he failed, Hanno obviously had an insight into the size and diversity of the slave population in Carthage. Evidently he misread their loyalties, but the attempt itself suggests a large ethnic slave population in the city.⁷⁷

Another distinct class in Carthage at various times was mercenaries. Carthage was famous for its reliance on and constant financial ability to afford foreign

⁷³ During the mid-seventh century there was probably very little which could distinguish Carthaginian from Phoenician. Although Carthage is named as the founder of Ebusus, it was still a Phoenician city. There were likely developments underway but at this stage Carthage was still recognisably Phoenician. Unfortunately this early period of Carthaginian history is not covered well by Timaeus and he offers few points of comparison. He distinguishes the Phoenicians and the Carthaginians when discussing a mysterious island in the Atlantic probably during the sixth or fifth century (V.20.3-4). The next chronological event in his account is the invasion of Sicily in 480. This takes place in Book XI when Diodorus shifts in sources from Timaeus to Ephorus. There is generally marked difference between the identification of Carthaginians and Phoenicians during his accounts thereafter.

⁷⁴ *Or.* XXV.7, Καρχηδονίους δὲ μὲν Ἄννων μὲν ἀντὶ Τυρίων ἐποίησε Λίβυας καὶ Λιβύην κατοικεῖν ἀντὶ Φοινίκης.

⁷⁵ See n.19. As in the case of Rome, these were not only presumably purchased, but also captured during campaigns in a number of areas throughout the Mediterranean.

⁷⁶ Justin (XXI.4) claims that this was his second attempt at seizing power in the state, the first time he attempted to poison the entire senate during a banquet; *Arist. Pol.* V.6.2, 1307a.

⁷⁷ This is later echoed in 149 BC when the Carthaginian senate enrolled the slaves of the city to bolster the defence of Carthage (App. *Pun.* 93).

mercenaries. A passage reported by Diodorus at the end of the fifth century provides a picture of the variety and prevalence of mercenaries in Carthage.⁷⁸ Before the invasion of Sicily, the Carthaginians enrolled Iberians, Balearians, Libyans, Phoenicians, Maurusians, Numidians, unknown peoples from the area of Cyrene, and Campanians.⁷⁹ Although this example was exceptional, it does hint at the diversity and potential size of mercenary armies in Carthaginian North Africa. This Carthaginian policy demonstrated its shortcomings in 240 when the Mercenary War erupted.⁸⁰ This brutal and drawn-out conflict nearly destroyed Carthage shortly after its defeat during the First Punic War.

The real agrarian ethnic minority was the Libyan farmers. Along with the wealth stimulated by trade, tribute and the food produced by these farmers ensured the survival and prosperity of Carthage. Evidence suggests that these farmers lived very poorly and had no political rights in Carthage, reducing them to levels of effective serfdom.⁸¹ It is little wonder that there is evidence for a major revolt against Carthage involving elements of the Libyan farmers during the early fourth century.⁸² Presumably the motives behind such revolts were common. At the outbreak of the Mercenary War in 240, Polybius touches upon some of these grievances against Carthage.⁸³ He claims that during the First Punic War the Carthaginians had exacted heavy tribute from the Libyan peasants, including half the crops of farmers and the unconditional doubling of taxation of those lived in the towns. Apparently this was made worse by the unscrupulous nature of a number of Carthaginian administrators (presumably in charge of tax collection), who were praised for their actions in

⁷⁸ Diod. XIII.80.

⁷⁹ Diodorus (XIII.80.5) cites both Timaeus and Ephorus for this account. He follows the former's figure of men while the latter claims an improbable 300000 men. This Carthaginian army is earlier described as comprising of 100000 men by Timaeus and 200000 men by Ephorus (Diod. XIII.54.5). The figure of 120000 can be seen during the siege of Himera when Hannibal left 40000 men encamped, while he took 80000 (60000 of his own and 20000 Siceli and Sicanians) to attack the city (Diod. XIII.59.6-60.3).

⁸⁰ Polyb. I.65ff. The Carthaginian practice of hiring mercenaries has drawn a great deal of ancient and modern criticism. All the same, by the third century the use of mercenaries was a well-established practice in the Hellenic world. The emphasis placed upon the Carthaginian dependence on mercenaries is excessive. Carthage still placed military levies on its own citizens, in Carthage and presumably throughout the empire in addition to levies from such groups as Libyan farmers, see Chp. VII, n.78. Otherwise during times of great need the Carthaginians could muster large citizen armies such as the 30000 who rallied to the defence of Carthage in 146. The Phocians during the Sacred War in the mid-fourth century and the Persians also employed foreign mercenaries *en masse*. It was natural for an affluent state both to protect its own citizen body and to enhance its military by hiring mercenaries; Carthage was no different. See G.T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Groningen 1968) pp.207-234.

⁸¹ Picard, *Daily Life in Carthage*, p.122f.

⁸² Diod. XIV.77.3.

Carthage. From such an account, although based on wartime taxation, it is apparent how the Carthaginians treated their Libyan subjects and is little wonder why they felt such a degree of resentment and revolted on a number of occasions. It is likely that the generic description of the Libyan farmer class included a variety of peoples. The expansion of Carthage throughout North Africa saw it subdue a number of native peoples. Carthage forced pastoral and semi-nomadic peoples to settle into subsistence agriculture in areas which remained under Carthaginian rule until the rise of Numidia under Masinissa during the second century.⁸⁴

It is also likely that at any given time in Carthage there was a constant temporary population of visitors. The position and nature of Carthage and especially its economy would suggest large numbers of merchants, sailors, farmers, and visitors from throughout the Punic world, the Levantine coast, and other trading nations. Although Carthage maintained a guarded attitude to its territory, Carthage was not likely a consideration. The quantities of Greek, Egyptian, and Etruscan material at Carthage and a number of its North African settlements suggest trade was flowing freely in both directions. The first two treaties between Rome and Carthage in 509/8 and ca. 306, suggest the open nature of activity in both Western Sicily and the area of North Africa around Carthage.⁸⁵

The growth and development of Carthage until the fifth century saw it grow into a cosmopolitan centre of the West. The Phoenician system was replaced by a Punic system but retained control of state and trade and agriculture. Despite the egalitarian allusions a united Punic people may conjure up, it was a tightly controlled class system. Large ethnic minorities remained politically disenfranchised. Ethnic and class diversity played a major part in the history and civil strife of Carthage. The city of Carthage suffered several ethnic-based revolts during the fourth century, which had their origins in earlier Carthaginian expansion. Carthage always remained an ethnically diverse centre, with a constant mix of Phoenicio-Punic, North African, and foreign elements.

⁸³ Polyb. I.72.1-5.

⁸⁴ Ilevbare, pp.53ff. There is evidence of pastoralism in North Africa predating the arrival of the Phoenicians, Gsell, *HAANI*, pp.236ff. Herodotus in his catalogue of North African tribes claims that the tribes west of Lake Triton practised settled agriculture while those to the east were pastoral nomads (IV.191, 187).

⁸⁵ Polyb. III.22-24.

TERRITORY

Gaining strength they (the Carthaginians) ruled Libya and much of the sea, from home they conducted war in Sicily and Sardinia and the other islands in the sea and also in Spain and sent out many colonies.

Appian Pun. 2

The most notable physical development of Punic Carthage was its expansion both by land and sea. Its growth coincided with the power vacuum left by the decline of Phoenician activity in the West. The ambitious Carthaginians quickly assumed control of government over the western Phoenician settlements in addition to their own colonies and settlements.

Evidence suggests that the territory of Carthage did not expand until the second half of the sixth century. It occupied a small headland and relied heavily on contact with the sea. The one solid example of the foundation of Ebusus does not alter this. Although founding a settlement is usually the action of an active established city-state, Ebusus was an island settlement made possible by access and familiarity with the sea within the Phoenician 'Empire'. The expansion of Carthaginian power along the coast of North Africa is more identifiable. Carthage controlled much of the coastline through a networked system of *emporia* stretching from Leptis Magna in the east, to and beyond the Pillars of Heracles. The only border Carthage encountered in North Africa was that of Cyrene to the east and Berber tribes to the south.⁸⁶ The major check on North African expansion remained natural geographic and climatic boundaries. Even though the Carthaginians subjugated much of their immediate hinterland, their North African territory was still dominated by the sea. There was little point in expanding further into Africa when their empire and trade interests were mostly seaborne. As a result we find Carthage initially satisfied by maintaining a

⁸⁶ Strabo, XVII.3.20; Sall. *Iug.* LXXIX. There is a legendary story regarding the boundary between Punic territory and that of Cyrene in the east. After a dispute (with possible conflict) the two powers sent out representatives from Cyrene and Leptis Magna on the understanding that the place where the two parties met would designate the border. The Carthaginians sent two brothers, the Philaeni, who moved quickly compared to the leisurely pace set by the Cyrenaean delegation. The two parties met and the Cyrenaicans, realising they had been tricked, demanded that the ordeal be replayed or the brothers could be buried alive on the spot instead. The Philaeni agreed to be buried alive for their country. It is then claimed thereafter that the Carthaginians dedicated altars to the brothers on the same spot acting as an official boundary marker.

North African hinterland and preferring to use the more remote interior reaches of North Africa only for trade.⁸⁷

From the evidence we possess it seems as though Carthage governed its North African territory as a tributary province. From fragmentary information, it appears that Carthage and its North African subjects were accustomed to predetermined boundaries.⁸⁸ The rich agricultural lands, farmed by mainly ethnic Libyan peasants, were taxed in order to finance the ever-increasing needs of the capital. As with Roman Italy, the farms of the North African hinterland were used as a means to provide income and food for the growing population of Carthage.⁸⁹

The once independent Phoenician settlements along the coast were also controlled by Carthaginian rule. As Carthage was the most prominent and prosperous Phoenician city in the West, it was likely that a transition from Phoenician to Punic society would also develop in these settlements. The North African cities were subject to the same influences as Carthage and most likely developed contemporaneously along similar lines. Scanty literary evidence suggests that they retained their political systems on a local level, but it is likely that Carthage governed any foreign policy.⁹⁰ This system was similar to that employed by Rome with its Italian allies beginning in the fourth century. For these North African cities, aspects of Carthaginian influence

⁸⁷ For aspects of the Trans-Saharan trade routes see Chp. VI.

⁸⁸ See Chap. IV, ns.145-152 and text.

⁸⁹ The early population of Carthage is unattested and even the figure during the final centuries is difficult to gauge. Strabo claims the urban population reached the unlikely figure of 700000 (XVII.3.15). Only brief allusions to the actual urban population are ever suggested. During the final siege of Carthage in 149, the walls were defended by 30000 men including the slave population which had been mobilised (App. *Pun.* 93). Presumably Carthage maintained a reasonably large population of at least 200000 people during its height.

⁹⁰ Several Phoenicio-Punic cities retained aspects of their political and social identity. Allegiance of older Phoenician cities to Carthage was probably based more on common kinship and culture stemming from a common Phoenician origin. Such cities retained some independence or were duly recognised as original foundations. In the second treaty between Carthage and Rome (Polyb. III.24), Utica is specifically named alongside Tyre as being included by the Carthaginians. However, this was probably more of a ceremonial recognition describing certain aspects of local government. In the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V, Utica is named alongside others as a Carthaginian subject state (Polyb. VII.9.7). Sallust claims that Leptis Magna was still Tyrian in nature even during the first century BC (*Iug.* LXXIX.1). A number of sizeable Punic cities appear to possess a senate (named by Greek and Roman sources), or the Punic equivalent of an executive body. These are particularly evident during the Neo-Punic period in Numidian towns once under the control of Carthage. We see Vaga described as possessing *principes civitatis* during the Jugurthine War (Sall. *Iug.* LXVI.2). This site is also attested as having a βουλή during the same period (App. *Num.* F. 3). Similar offices can be seen in other North African towns. Livy (XXX.12.8) describes the *principes Cirtensium* demonstrating that Cirta had similar institutions in the third century. Otherwise we find Diodorus (XXIV.10.2) describe the πρεσβύτεροι of Hecatompylus (Theveste) also during the third century. These examples suggest that coastal and provincial towns maintained local political bodies. These would most certainly have been

would not have been a great transition from that of the Phoenicians. Trade was still a primary purpose. Although their attention was drawn more toward Carthage than the East, their function would not have changed a great deal.

From the fifth century onwards, other Phoenician settlements in the West would also have gradually developed into Punic centres. Like the North African centres, settlements elsewhere would not have undergone a rapid redevelopment under the Carthaginians. The assimilation of Phoenician settlements under Carthaginian influence was a natural process. By the fifth century many Phoenician cities in Spain, Sardinia, Malta, and Sicily were already under varying degrees of Carthaginian influence. There is little obvious evidence to suggest that Carthage needed to force its domination on the majority of its Phoenician settlements. By accepting the dominion of Carthage these settlements were simply moving from the old Phoenician trade network controlled in the East to a new but similar system based in Carthage. Very little would have changed in the function of Phoenician cities in the West by becoming Carthaginian.⁹¹ The new Punic settlements of the West would have continued to govern themselves at a local level with foreign and economic policies administered by Carthage. The Phoenician centres Carthage inherited were to act as the basis of its new empire, which would see it develop into a major power in the Central and Western Mediterranean.

The rapid development of Carthage from a mere Phoenician port during the late ninth century to the capital of the Punic world by the fifth century is usually attributed to the city's ability to trade and conquer. However, its ability to reach such a level initially was dependent on several other factors from the time of its foundation.

The Phoenician legacy to Carthage cannot be underestimated. Ultimately it provided Carthage with a prefabricated empire in the West with an advanced trading network which monopolised trade throughout the Western Mediterranean. The large number of coastal ports stretching from Spain, North Africa, Sardinia, and Western

developed on Carthaginian models and probably operated under their control. We will look further at such examples in relation to Carthaginian influence at a later time.

⁹¹ Several areas in the old Phoenician 'Empire', especially Spain, underwent what could be termed a redevelopment or streamlining following this period of transition. It is understandable that with the fall of Tartessus and the subsequent decline of a centralised Phoenician trading network in the area, that the closely packed trading settlements along the Southern Spanish coast would suffer. Several appear to have been permanently abandoned during the sixth century, see Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, pp.273-276.

Sicily poured trade-based wealth into the port of Carthage. Following the collapse of Phoenician influence in the West, Carthage assumed the role of cultural and economic leader in its stead and with it control of the Phoenician holdings in the West. The primary Phoenician legacy to Carthage was the basic nature of its society and culture. It was the Phoenicians who created the Carthaginian political, social, and religious systems and most importantly their connection with the sea especially based around trade.

What distinguished Carthage from the other Phoenician states in the West was its own development. Although it was content trading for the first phase of its history, by the sixth century we find that Carthage had developed into an independent state with its own policies abroad. The notion of 'Carthaginian' as distinct from Phoenician is first reported at the time of Carthage's first colonial establishment of Ebusus in Ibiza. This process rapidly developed until by the dawn of the fifth century, Carthage had matured as a Punic state. The evolution of Punic culture is difficult to trace owing to its mixed nature and the lack of a preserved Carthaginian literary tradition. The increase of contact with a number of foreign influences fostered the growth of Punic culture in Carthage and was to have a continual influence on its development and activities.

The culmination of the Punic culture in Carthage during the fifth century saw a marked change from the previous Phoenician-based culture that existed before it. Changes are evident in theology, political life, the nature of expansion and activities abroad, and Carthaginian demography and society. Its society and culture were distinct and its power abroad was constantly developing with a largely unchallenged monopoly in most of the Western Mediterranean. Carthage commanded a large population and from its mercantile nature it controlled a strong economic base. Carthage's beginnings as a small Phoenician colony disguised its potential: it grew rapidly, assuming the vast western 'empire' of the Phoenicians and becoming the capital of its own empire and the Punic world.

III. THE CARTHAGINIAN COLONIES

The Phoenicians transferred a number of their traditions to their Carthaginian successors in the West. Seafaring and trade were important to Carthage, as they had been for Tyre and the other Phoenician cities in the East. Appian describes the situation appropriately by stating, “(The Carthaginians,) acting like Phoenicians, conducted business on the sea with their ships.”¹ Carthage adopted and developed pre-existing Phoenician policies. It is natural that upon inheriting the legacy of a colonising state that Carthage should also demonstrate similar tendencies. Similar to Greek colonies such as Corcyra and Massilia, Carthage continued the traditions of its metropolis and actively colonised on its own. Although there are several definite Carthaginian settlements attested, we are hindered by the paucity of literary and archaeological detail. Carthaginian settlements are often unidentified or indistinguishable from earlier Phoenician foundations. From the information we do possess, it is possible to reconstruct several of these original Carthaginian colonies and to deduce certain others. Like the Phoenicians before them, the Carthaginians embarked on an active and expansive colonial policy. The Carthaginian system of settlement and colonisation developed its own characteristics over time to better suit its needs abroad and the development of its empire.

THE PROBLEMS OF CARTHAGINIAN COLONISATION

The major problem regarding Carthaginian colonisation is the difficulty in distinguishing original Carthaginian foundations from those of the Phoenicians with any certainty. When we consider such North African settlements as Oea, Hadrumetum, and Leptis Magna, it is nearly impossible to separate their colonial identities. The Phoenicians established these three centres permanently during the eighth or seventh century. They subsequently developed into Punic centres and their remains exhibit considerably more Punic material. Such evidence suggests that these sites were small coastal Phoenician port towns until the Carthaginians established more permanent centres. The Phoenician presence, however, is attested by centuries of activity in the area based around trade and settlement. The Phoenicians were

¹ *Pun.* 2, ναυσί τε χρώμενοι καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν οἷα Φοίνικες ἐργαζόμενοι.

known for their temporary, seasonal, or even superficial settlement of sites orientated toward trade. It is therefore likely that such settlements, not only along the North African coast, but also in Sardinia, and Spain which were later considered Carthaginian, were in fact originally (and therefore essentially) Phoenician and were either redeveloped or later populated by Carthaginians.

This confusion is due to the rapid rise of Carthage and its inheritance of extensive pre-existing networks of Phoenician settlements. With the decline of Tartessus and the waning presence of the Phoenicians from the sixth century, Carthage assumed sovereignty over the old Phoenician 'Empire' in the West. As a result, Carthage was not obliged to found further settlements within pre-established areas. This is possibly one of the reasons why there are a remarkably small number of original Carthaginian settlements attested for such a powerful and active state.

The other predominate factor in attempting to distinguish Carthaginian settlements from Phoenician is before the fifth century there is often little major distinction or division between the two identities. Punic society was rapidly developing, but still primarily Phoenician. This change is not well documented by contemporary sources. Often in later sources there is an indistinct line drawn between Phoenician and Carthaginian, especially when discussing the origin of settlements. Considering such factors, we turn to the few distinctive Carthaginian colonies attested.

THE EARLY STAGES OF CARTHAGINIAN COLONISATION

Much like the traditional literary date of the foundation of Carthage in 814 BC, the year 654/3 BC holds a similar tradition as being the year in which Carthage sent out its first colony to Ibiza. Thanks to Diodorus we receive a reasonably firm date and some brief information regarding this colony. This is the only evidence we have for Carthaginian colonial policy before the fifth century. With this expedition, it can be argued that Carthage became a fully developed (if still Phoenician) political entity. The dating of the colony of Ebusus is not too early when we consider the rapid growth of Carthage. Several Greek colonies were also able to establish subsequent colonies

within a short period of their own foundation.² Carthage is comparable to such sites, and it is possible that it could establish a colony only 160 years after its own foundation.

EBUSUS

The Carthaginian colony of Ebusus on Ibiza ushered in Carthage as a developing but potentially powerful state in the Western Mediterranean. The account of its foundation is preserved in Diodorus:

After those which have been mentioned, there is an island named Pityussa, named so from the large number of pine trees which grow there. It lies in the sea, three days' and nights' sail from the Pillars of Heracles; one night's and one day's from Libya; and one day's from Iberia. It is as large as Corcyra. It is reasonably fertile possessing limited land for growing vineyards, but has olives which are grafted upon the wild olives. Of the products there, they say the softness of the wool is the best. It is broken up by notable plains and hills and has a city named Eresus, a colony of the Carthaginians. It has fine harbours, large constructed walls, and many well-built houses. The inhabitants are barbarians of every nationality, but Phoenicians preponderate. Its settlement took place 160 years after the establishment of Carthage.³

The first Carthaginian colonial foundation of Ebusus⁴ on the modern island of Ibiza provides useful insight into the contemporary Phoenicio-Punic system of colonisation. Normally sending out a colony was a dangerous undertaking especially

² Cyrene, probably founded in 630, colonised Barca in ca. 560. Corcyra, traditionally founded in 664, colonised Epidamnus (albeit with Corinth) in 625. Massilia founded in ca. 600, colonised numerous sites down the coasts of Southern Liguria and Eastern Spain within a century.

³ V.16, μετὰ γὰρ τὰς προειρημένους νῆσός ἐστι ὀνομαζένη μὲν Πιτυοῦσσα τὴν δὲ προσηγορίαν ἔχουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν κατ' αὐτὴν φυομένων πιτύων. πελαγία δ' οὐσα διέσθηκεν ἀπὸ μὲν Ἑρακλέους στηλῶν πλοῦν ἡμερῶν τριῶν καὶ τῶν ἴσων νυκτῶν ἀπὸ δὲ Λιβύης ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτός, ἀπὸ δ' Ἰβηρίας μιᾶς ἡμέρας. κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος παραπλήσιός ἐστι Κορκύρα. κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐσα μετρία τὴν μὲν ἀμπελόφυτον χώραν ὀλίγην ἔχει τὰς δ' ἐλαίας ἐμπεφυτευμένας ἐν τοῖς κοτίνοις. τῶν δὲ φυομένων ἐν αὐτῇ καλλιστευεῖν φασὶ τὴν μαλακότητα τῶν ἐρίων. διελημμένη δὲ πεδίοις ἀξιολόγοις καὶ γεωλόφοις πόλιν ἔχει τὴν ὀνομαζομένην Ἑρεσον ἄποικον Καρχηδονίων. ἔχει δὲ καὶ λιμένας ἀξιολόγους καὶ τειχῶν κατασκευὰς εὐμεγέθεις καὶ οἰκιῶν πλῆθος εὖ κατασκευασμένων. κατοικοῦσι δ' αὐτὴν βάρβαροι παντοδαποὶ πλείστοι δὲ Φοίνικες. ὁ δ' ἀποικισμὸς αὐτῆς γέγονεν ὕστερον ἔτεσιν ἑκατὸν ἐξήκοντα τῆς κατὰ τὴν Καρχηδόνα κτίσεως.

for a new metropolis. However, the Phoenician presence in the Western Mediterranean and in the Balearic Islands certainly facilitated Carthage's establishment of Ebusus. The colony itself seems more like an apprenticeship as Diodorus claims, for the Phoenicians were the largest group on the island and it is possible that the Phoenicians were active in the foundation itself.⁵

From the description of Ebusus we can assume several common characteristics which identify it as a typical colony. Primary to Phoenicio-Punic colonisation was a good harbour, and Ebusus was no exception. Beyond this the settlement of Ebusus lay on the exclusive trade routes between the Atlantic and Spain on the one hand, and the major Phoenicio-Punic ports in North Africa, Sardinia, and Sicily on the other. Ebusus, like so many other Phoenician colonies in the West, was designed as a trading port, which would benefit from such prosperous and established routes.

The island of Pityussa offered more to Carthage as a colonial site than a mere trading depot. From its very name: *πίτυς*, and Diodorus' description, the relevance of pine trees to the island is evident.⁶ This commodity would certainly have been attractive to the Carthaginians as a sea-faring people. The natural resources certainly would have been a secondary benefit from establishing Ebusus as the major port on the island. Diodorus informs us of the production of high-grade wool and also of an active olive industry. Other sources such as Pliny tell of abundant supplies of fish in the waters around Ibiza.⁷ The general fertility of the island's soil would have encouraged agriculture, especially since it was apparently a haven from noxious pests such as snakes and rabbits, which beset the other Balearic Islands.⁸ The island of Ibiza, along with Mallorca also possessed resources of silver and lead. Given the Phoenicio-Punic proclivity for exploiting such natural resources, this may also have been a motive behind the settlement of the island. As with several other earlier Phoenician settlements, the location of Ebusus was based primarily on strategic trade

⁴ There is a distinct divergence in the ancient sources over the exact spelling of Ebusus, interpreted as Eresus by some authors.

⁵ There is Greek precedent for metropolis and colony co-founding a subsequent colony: Corinth and Corcyra cooperated in the founding of Epidamnus (Thuc. I.24.1) and Cyme and Chalcis founding Naxos in Sicily (Strabo VI.2.2). The Phoenicians' presence on the island before the arrival of the Carthaginians and the former's probable dominance implies that they may have provided the Carthaginians with the site of Ebusus and initial protection from the notorious native barbarians.

⁶ There are two islands in this group: Ibiza and Formentera. Ibiza is by far the larger of the two covering 570 km² compared to Formentera's 83 km².

⁷ *NH.* IX.32, III.79.

⁸ Strabo III.5.1,2; Pliny *NH.* III.V, VIII.83.

routes. Similarly it possessed several local industries which could supply the main population and compliment its mercantile nature.⁹

Material remains from Ibiza emphasise its role as a strategic and busy trading port. There are remains demonstrating heavy Phoenicio-Punic trade with Southern Spain as well as North Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia. There is also considerable evidence of trade of foreign commodities originating from Greek centres and Etruria.¹⁰ The variety of materials suggests Ibiza was a popular trading port servicing several Phoenicio-Punic territories in the vicinity.

An aspect fundamental to larger Phoenicio-Punic settlements was their defensive capabilities. Tyre, Carthage, Motya, and Gades were all typically fortified harbour towns capable of repelling or enduring prolonged sieges, and Ebusus was no exception. Diodorus describes the walls of the site (certainly from the description of Timaeus) as εὐμεγέθεις. The Carthaginians, in the Phoenician manner, took strategy and fortification seriously even for what appears to be a trading port in an area already dominated exclusively by Phoenician activity. There are several later accounts which demonstrate the defensive character of Ebusus. During the Second Punic War, the Roman fleet under Scipio failed to capture Ebusus until it later sued for peace.¹¹ Later during the Roman period, Pompey in 46 BC captured the Balearic Islands with ease except for Ebusus which he finally took with some degree of difficulty.¹²

The general position of Ebusus as a strategic naval and mercantile base *en route* to both Spain and the Pillars of Heracles from the Phoenicio-Punic settlements to the east certainly explains its foundation. The original Phoenician practice of founding strategic mercantile bases was simply transferred to the Carthaginians. Such a characteristic is evident in early Carthaginian history. Later as Carthaginian foreign policy grew more aggressive, the role of Ebusus as a strategic base for the Carthaginian Empire developed accordingly. The best evidence of this role comes during the Second Punic War when Mago landed there with the fleet in 206. Livy states that Carthaginians inhabited the island, and therefore the fleet was well received and refitted.¹³ The island offered the Carthaginians a strategic base from which they

⁹ For a basic geographical and topographic description of Ibiza see Carlos Gómez Bellard, "The first colonisation of Ibiza and Formentera (Balearic Islands, Spain): some more islands out of the stream?" *World Archaeology* 26.3, 1995, pp.442-457.

¹⁰ Gómez Bellard *et al.*, *La colonización fenicia de la isla de Ibiza*, pp.123ff.

¹¹ Livy XXII.20.6-9.

¹² Cass. Dio XLIII.29.

¹³ XXVIII.37.3-5.

could monitor, and if necessary dominate the eastern Spanish coast. With a strong and permanent base on Ibiza, the Carthaginians were also able to exploit the Balearics' other main material: manpower, in particular slingers. The reputed fierceness and skill of Balearic slingers in addition to the Carthaginian proclivity towards hiring mercenaries worked well for the Carthaginian imperial machine. On several occasions we see the Carthaginians employing Balearic slingers in their armies.¹⁴

The role of Carthaginian Ebusus developed like its metropolis, primarily relying on mercantile activity, but in time assuming a more expansive and aggressive appearance. Originally Carthage was in no position to form its own foreign policy, and with the Phoenicians present, it had no need. Ebusus functioned as an intermediary port between its metropolis and other allied territories in the West. It retained such an important function throughout the period of Carthaginian control. With the onset of a more concerted and aggressive Carthaginian foreign policy, Ebusus became a strategic port functioning as a link between trading ports in the Western Mediterranean. Although Ebusus remains the only original Carthaginian settlement during this period, it demonstrates several Phoenician characteristics and later Carthaginian motives behind colonisation, trade, and expansion.

CARTHAGINIAN COLONISATION IN THE FIFTH AND FOURTH CENTURIES

Traditionally the fifth and fourth centuries BC are considered the period in which Carthage matured as a major power and became more politically active and aggressive abroad. This period coincides with Carthage becoming regularly entangled in the affairs of the western Greeks and thus receives more coverage courtesy of Greek and Latin authors. As a result there is more information concerning the Carthaginians' colonial policies. In addition to this Carthage was now firmly established in the West and entered into an epoch of more intensive expansive activity abroad. Its policies developed accordingly, with several attested Carthaginian settlements and colonial enterprises dated to these two centuries.

¹⁴ e.g. Strabo III.5.1; Livy XXVIII.37.5; Polyb. I.67, III.113.

LILYBAEUM

The most successful Carthaginian colony of this period was Lilybaeum on the west coast of Sicily. Its foundation date is placed firmly in 396 BC as it replaced the older island-colony of Motya which had been destroyed by Dionysius of Syracuse the year previous. The interesting aspect of Lilybaeum as a Carthaginian colony is that had not Motya (a Phoenician colony under Carthaginian control) been destroyed, Lilybaeum would never have been founded owing to the short distance between the two sites (8 km.). Under normal circumstances, a colony founded from the ruins of another would consist of the survivors. In the case of Motya, Diodorus is quite specific in stating that the population was partly killed during the siege and the rest sold off by Dionysius,¹⁵ although he later claims that Lilybaeum was founded with the remnants of Motya.¹⁶ Pausanias offers a similar opinion, claiming that after the fall of Motya, the Libyans and Phoenicians combined in a Carthaginian expedition of colonisation.¹⁷ Although it is likely that a certain number of Motyans would have settled in Lilybaeum, there would certainly have been a strong Carthaginian contingent and as Pausanias claims, the colony was officially Carthaginian. The population and therefore the nature of Lilybaeum must be assumed as primarily Carthaginian.¹⁸

The geography of Lilybaeum was predisposed to the Phoenicio-Punic model of settlement. Even though Motya as a traditional Phoenician island-colony was destroyed, the Carthaginians adopted another preferred geographical configuration of founding a colony on a headland. Situated on Cape Boeo, Lilybaeum possessed several natural attributes which aided Carthaginian interests. Primarily it possessed a

¹⁵ XIV.53.4.

¹⁶ XXII.10.4.

¹⁷ Paus. V.25.5-6.

¹⁸ The idea of a mixed population of colonists in Lilybaeum is similar to several Greek examples. Often Greek colonies with mixed populations broke down and fell into *stasis*. Colonies such as Gela (Hdt. VII.153), Amphipolis (Polyaenus VI.53), Heracleia Trachinia (Diod. XII.59.4; Livy, XXXVI.30.3; Soph. *Trachiniae*, Ll.1252-1278) and Thurii (Diod. XII.35) all experienced civil unrest owing to a mixed ethnic background. However, the relationship and kinship between the Phoenicians and Carthaginians has shown itself as superseding such division in colonial, political, and social spheres. Although originally Phoenicio-Punic, the population of Lilybaeum, owing to its position in Sicily would probably have developed into a cosmopolitan centre. It was located in Elymian territory with which both Phoenicians and Carthaginians maintained amicable relations. The Carthaginians often employed mixed settlers when founding a colony. It is possible that this phenomenon was a result of Greek influence. It is possible a sizeable Greek population resided in Lilybaeum especially after 250. Before being besieged by the Romans, the Carthaginians, after razing Selinus to the ground, moved the remaining population and resettled it in Lilybaeum (Diod. XXIV.1.1).

good harbour.¹⁹ The best account of this harbour comes from Polybius when describing the protracted Roman siege during the Second Punic War. The Carthaginians were able to run the Roman blockade of the harbour almost at will owing to its large size and depth.²⁰ The size of this harbour made it useful for large volumes of traffic at any given time.²¹ The position of Lilybaeum was also naturally advantageous for the prevailing winds. Ancient authors remarked on the geographical position of Lilybaeum and its gentle westerly wind.²² Such a favourable wind certainly would have been an incentive for the Carthaginians' settlement at Lilybaeum regarding their seafaring activities. The position of Lilybaeum also provided the new colony with some natural defensive attributes. Even before the Carthaginians embarked on fortifying the town with extensive walls and a moat, Lilybaeum was well defended. Polybius informs us of lagoons, which protected the harbour from the seaward side.²³ These lagoons restricted any land-based attempt at molesting traffic in the harbour. The landward side also offered Lilybaeum natural defence. Much like other Phoenician colonies (including Carthage) founded on a headland, Lilybaeum was mostly surrounded by the sea, and therefore land access was limited.

The geographical and strategic position of Lilybaeum was paramount in the considerations of the Carthaginians who certainly would have been looking at re-establishing a stronghold in Western Sicily. Cape Boeo had probably been under Phoenician and then Carthaginian dominance since the eighth century and was not permanently settled. Lilybaeum possessed the natural attributes which would attract Phoenicio-Punic settlement, however, there was no need to settle the site with the island stronghold of Motya dominating the west coast of Sicily until 397.²⁴ The importance of the area to the Carthaginians' interests is demonstrated by their rapid

¹⁹ For a detailed description of Lilybaeum's harbour and its general topography see G. Schmiedt, "Contributo della fotografia aerea alla ricostruzione della topografia antica di Lilibeo" *Kokalos* 9, 1963, pp.49-73.

²⁰ I.44, I.46

²¹ As mentioned previously, the Carthaginians used Lilybaeum as a staging point for invasion and a harbour for their large military fleets.

²² *GGM*. II Dionys. Per. LI.469-470, pp.131-132 (ed. Müller), ἄχρα δέ οἱ Πάχυνός τε Πελωρίς τε Αἰλύβη τε ἄλλ' ἤτοι Αἰλύβη μὲν ἐπὶ ῥιπὴν ξεφύροιο; Ovid *Met.* XIII.726, *mollibus expositum Zephyris Lilybaeon*. Polybius also mentions the favourable westerly wind, which by all accounts would blow ships into the harbour at Lilybaeum. Hannibal when reinforcing the besieged garrison, waited for the contrary wind to blow his fleet past the Roman blockade and directly into the harbour at Lilybaeum (I.44).

²³ I.42.7.

²⁴ There is some evidence, which although scanty, suggests the site of Lilybaeum was inhabited in prehistoric times, however, there appears to be no permanent settlement there until 396.

response in founding Lilybaeum only a year after the destruction of Motya. The continued threat of Dionysius would suggest that the Carthaginians were eager to re-establish their influence in Western Sicily. The immediate settlement of the adjacent headland clearly shows the importance of dominating the region and traffic around Cape Boeo. It also implies that the Carthaginians were aware of this potential new site previous to the destruction of Motya, and especially its military and mercantile potential.²⁵

The position of Lilybaeum *en route* from Carthage to Sicily and beyond was vital to Carthaginian interests in the area. Lilybaeum was able to monitor traffic and potential threats in Western Sicily. Although anecdotal, there is the story of a man named Strabo (lit. the squint-eyed), who was able to see ships leave Carthage from a watchtower in Lilybaeum.²⁶ Strabo (the geographer) gives the distance at 1500 stadia, some 275 km. Although this account is exaggerated, the position of Lilybaeum in relation to Carthage is of interest. There was an obvious established sea-lane between Lilybaeum and Carthage. Ironically the best evidence we have for this is when the colony and then the metropolis fell under Roman rule. During the Second and Third Punic Wars the Romans utilised Lilybaeum as an important intermediary base of operations against Carthage,²⁷ wintering their fleet there²⁸ and even holding 300 Carthaginian nobles there during the Third Punic War.²⁹ In light of such examples we are not only able to discern the importance of Lilybaeum to Carthage, but also the existence of a recognised route between the two sites.

The Carthaginians held Lilybaeum until the close of the Second Punic War. During that time, although largely neglected in our sources, it grew extremely important to the Carthaginians and their developing empire. It appears that Lilybaeum became the most important Punic city in Sicily during this period. The Greek wars in Sicily saw Lilybaeum used as a staging point for military operations. The Carthaginian invasion against Timoleon in 341 landed there and naturally, after the Battle of Crimisus, the remnants fled there.³⁰ The fortifications that confronted

²⁵ A precedent of this strategy and Carthaginian knowledge of the site is apparent in 409 when Hannibal landed his invasion of Sicily there (Diod. XIII.54). This is interesting as Motya and Panormus were not used as they had been on other occasions.

²⁶ Strabo VI.266; Val. Max. II.8 ext. 14; Pliny *NH.* VII.85; Cic. *Acad.* II.81; Ael. *Var. Hist.* XI.13

²⁷ Polyb. III.41, 61, 68, 96; Diod. XXXII.6.

²⁸ Polyb. III.106.

²⁹ XXXVI.6.

³⁰ Plut. *Tim.* XXV.1; Diod. XVI.80.2.

Pyrrhus in 276 would presumably have taken some years to complete. Considering the fate of Motya at the hands of Dionysius, the Carthaginians would have been eager to construct expansive fortifications as soon as possible.³¹

The mettle of Lilybaeum and its image as a πόλις ἀπόρθητος³² were first tested properly when Pyrrhus besieged the settlement in 276.³³ It was the only Carthaginian town which resisted his invasion despite his best efforts. During the First Punic War the Romans fared little better against Lilybaeum. According to Polybius the Romans desired the site of Lilybaeum as it was a perfect base for waging war in North Africa: ὅτι κρατήσαντες ταύτης ῥαδίως μεταβιβάσουσι τὸν πόλεμον εἰς τὴν Λιβύην.³⁴ The Roman siege of Lilybaeum began in 250, and despite several attempts, the Carthaginian stronghold only became a Roman possession as a result of the peace treaty sworn in 241. Following this in 218 the Carthaginians were unsuccessful in their attempts to recapture Lilybaeum from Rome.³⁵ It is ironic that under Roman control, Lilybaeum grew to a high level of prosperity and importance based on the qualities which saw it prosper as a Carthaginian colony.³⁶

Lilybaeum was a product of the new expansive nature in Carthaginian settlements abroad. Although it resembled and functioned as a Phoenician-type settlement of old, its foundation mirrored the growing and changing political climate of its metropolis. The eagerness of Carthage to possess an unassailable stronghold to

³¹ The fortifications of Lilybaeum included great walls with towers in place, natural lagoons protecting the harbour from land and a massive moat some 30 m. wide and 20 m. deep. See Diod. XXII.10.5, XXIV.1.2; Polyb. I.42; Moscati, *Italia Punica*, pp.93f.

³² Diod. XXXVI.5.3.

³³ Diod. XXII.10ff.

³⁴ I.41.4.

³⁵ Polyb. XXI.49-50.

³⁶ Like so many areas of Carthaginian settlement, our literary, and to an extent archaeological record improves vastly during the Roman period, and Lilybaeum is no exception. The position of Lilybaeum became vital to the Romans when waging war against Carthage. Furthermore its position certainly would have been of use when Rome annexed the territory of Carthage as part of *Africa Proconsularis*. Beyond such an application, Lilybaeum became the chief city of Western Sicily and second only to Syracuse on the island. The seat of the second quaestor of Sicily was based in Lilybaeum after its submission to Rome. It was a *civitas decumana* from at least the early first century BC, as an important civil and administrative centre (Cicero was present in 75 BC during the governorship of Sex. Peducaeus (*Verr.* II.V.10). Lilybaeum evolved during the empire into a *municipium* during the reign of Augustus (*CIL.* X.7223) and then a *colonia* under Pertinax or Septimius Severus (*CIL.* X.7205, 7228). Lilybaeum retained its reputation as a wealthy city under Roman rule and remained an important trading port. Cicero described it as *splendidissima civitas* when staying there in 76 BC (*Verr.* V.10) and became embroiled in the infamous Verrine scandal thereafter (*Verr.* II.63, III.38, V.10, 69, 140, 141). Archaeological evidence from the later Roman period suggests an opulent and flourishing society. For basic indications of wealth based on material remains see Babette Bechtold, *La necropoli di Lilybaeum* (Palermo 1999) pp.214ff. For the earlier Punic period see A.M. Bisi, "La cultura artistica di Lilibeo nel periodo Punico", *Oriens Antiquus* 7, 1968, pp.95-115.

dominate Western Sicily after the fall of Motya is obvious. The immediate reaction of sending out a colony in what can only be described as a volatile climate expresses Carthaginian interests in Western Sicily. The very nature of Lilybaeum as a strategic provincial capital and as an important trade port is obvious in both Punic and Roman times. From Lilybaeum, the Carthaginians were able to oversee their activities in Sicily while monitoring those of their allies and enemies. The massive fortifications, which thwarted both Pyrrhus and the Romans, emphasise the importance of Lilybaeum to Carthage and its primary purpose. Lilybaeum developed into the centre of Punic interests in Sicily, both mercantile and military.

THE PERIPLUS OF HANNO

One of the most celebrated and discussed accounts of Carthaginian history is the account of the periplus of Hanno ca. 480-450 BC.³⁷ His account was apparently inscribed on a tablet and stored in the temple of Cronos (presumably in Carthage).³⁸ Although the text has been preserved only in Greek, it is an invaluable insight into contemporary Carthaginian territory, expansion, and colonial plans. The account describes the voyage of Hanno, which was primarily aimed at founding colonies and exploration. However, it also details the geography of the journey along the west coast of Africa.³⁹

Ι. ἔδοξε Καρχηδονίοις Ἀνῶνα πλεῖν ἔξω Στηλῶν Ἡρακλείων καὶ πόλεις κτίζειν Λιβυφοινίκων. καὶ ἔπλευσε πεντηκοντόρους ἐξήκοντα ἄγων καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν εἰς ἀριθμὸν μυριάδων τριῶν καὶ σῖτα καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευήν.

³⁷ *GGM*, I, pp.1-14 (ed. Müller).

³⁸ The authenticity and date of the text has been questioned in modern scholarship. For some discussions see R. Rebuffat, "Les penteconteres d'Hannon", *Karthago* 23, 1995, pp.20-30; Gilbert Picard, "Le Périphe d'Hannon", in *Phönizier im Westen*, pp.175-180; G. Germain, "Qu'est ce que le Périphe d'Hannon? Document, amplification littéraire ou faux intégral?", *Hespéris* 44, 1957, pp.205-248.

³⁹ There have been several discussions regarding the text and what geographical facts can be drawn from the description of the periplus. Hanno notes geographical descriptions of islands, mountains, rivers, and even volcanoes while also describing wildlife and native inhabitants. As a result there have been various attempts to connect such detail with modern geography. The possible terminus of the journey has been suggested between such regions as Guinea to as far south and east as Cameroon. Given the literary tradition of Phoenicians and Carthaginians circumnavigating Africa, it is often difficult to distinguish any possible fact from possible literary exaggeration. Even Pliny claims that Hanno was ordered to explore the circuit of Africa (*NH*, V.8, also see *Hdt*, IV.42-43). It is possible that Phoenician and Carthaginian ships sailed to equatorial Africa based on the account of Hanno and the

The Carthaginians commissioned Hanno to sail past the Pillars of Heracles and found cities of the Libyphoenicians. He sailed out with sixty ships of 50 oars and a multitude of men and women 30000 in number, provisions, and other equipment.

It is obvious that the voyage of Hanno was a full-scale mission of colonisation. If accurate, sixty penteconters carrying 30000 colonists certainly surpasses any contemporary Greek colonial expedition.⁴⁰ This figure suggests a large number of organised Carthaginian (and possibly allied) settlers. The selection process for settlers for this expedition and indeed other Carthaginian settlements may be attested by Aristotle. He claims that Carthaginian citizens were chosen to populate their cities so that Carthage would not become plutocratic.⁴¹ This idea of sending out specific groups of the community as settlers has examples in Greek colonisation.⁴² The mission of colonisation was to begin beyond the Pillars of Heracles and, judging by Hanno's subsequent route, then to head south. Hanno's mission to found several colonies on the West African coast suggests an interesting conclusion. There was already some form of Phoenician presence in the area at least at Lixus and Mogador. By their standards however, the Phoenicians had not fully exploited the area as they had in areas of North Africa and Southern Spain. It is quite possible therefore that the Carthaginians wished to increase their presence in the area and create a trade network along the coast in a Phoenician manner. Some aspects of Hanno's journey seem to imply that such a system of colonisation was being put in place:⁴³

II. ὥς δ' ἀναχθέντες τὰς Στήλας παρημείσαμεν καὶ ἔξω πλοῦν δυοῖν ἡμερῶν ἐπλεύσαμεν ἐκτίσαμεν πρώτην πόλιν ἥντινα ὠνομάσαμεν Θυματήριον. πεδίον δ' αὐτῇ μέγα ὑπῆν.

possibility of an interior trade route linking the two areas by land, see Chp. VI, regarding Trans-Saharan trade.

⁴⁰ Most contemporary Greek colonies are reported to have had settler populations between 1000 and 10000.

⁴¹ *Pol.* II.8.9, 1273b, ὀλιγαρχικῆς δ' οὐσῆς τῆς πολιτείας ἄριστα ἐκφεύγουσι τῷ πλουτεῖν ἀέτι τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκπέμποντες ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις

⁴² The Athenians chose the colonists for Brea (est. ca. 445) from the two lower citizen classes, the Thetes and the Zeugitai (*IG*². I. 45). This has an earlier precedent in Greek colonisation when the settlers of Cyrene were chosen according to lot in order to relieve Cyrene of over-population (Hdt. IV.151.1; *IG*. IX.1. 867).

⁴³ Only passages including relevant information to the colonial aspect of the voyage have been included. As a result, several other descriptive passages have been omitted.

Having put out and sailing past the Pillars for two days we founded the first city which we named Thymiaterion. At its feet there was a large plain.

III. κᾶπειτα πρὸς ἐσπέραν ἀναχθέντες ἐπὶ Σολόεντα Λιβυκὸν ἀκρωτήριον λάσιον δένδρεσι συνήλθομεν. IV. ἔνθα Ποσειδῶνος ἱερὸν ἰδρυσάμενοι...

Sailing west we came to Soloeis, a Libyan promontory covered with trees. We founded a temple to Poseidon there...

V. τὴν τε λίμνην παραλλάξαντες ὅσον ἡμέρας πλοῦν κατῳκίσσαμεν πόλεις πρὸς τῇ θαλάττῃ καλουμένας Καρικὸν τε τεῖχος καὶ Γύττην καὶ Ἀκραν καὶ Μέλιτταν καὶ Ἀραμβυν.

Crossing back across the lake as much as a day's travelling by sea we founded cities on the coast called Karikon Teichos, Gytte, Akra, Melitta, and Arambys.

VI. κάκειθεν δ' ἀναχθέντες ἦλθομεν ἐπὶ μέγαν ποταμὸν Λίξον ἀπὸ τῆς Λιβύης ῥέοντα. Παρὰ δ' αὐτὸν νομάδες ἄνθρωποι Λιξίται βοσκήματ' ἔνεμον παρ' οἷς ἐμείναμεν ἄχρι τινὸς φίλοι γενόμενοι.

Moving on from there we came to the large river, Lixus, flowing from Libya, beside which the nomads called Lixitae grazed their flocks. We stayed some time with them and became friends.

VIII. λαβόντες δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν ἑρμηνέας παρεπλέομεν τὴν ἐρήμην πρὸς μεσημβρίαν δύο ἡμέρας. ἐκεῖθεν δὲ πάλιν πρὸς ἥλιον ἀνίσχοντα ἡμέρας δρόμον. ἔνθα εὔρομεν ἐν μυχῷ τινος κόλπου νῆσον μικρὰν κύκλον ἔχουσιν σταδίων πέντε. ἦν κατῳκίσσαμεν Κέρνην ὀνομάσαντες. ἐτεκμαιρόμεθα δ' αὐτὴν ἐκ τοῦ περίπλου κατ' εὐθὺ κεῖσθαι Καρχηδόνας. ἐφκει γάρ δ' πλοῦς ἔκ τε Καρχηδόνας ἐπὶ Στήλας κάκειθεν ἐπὶ Κέρνην.

Taking interpreters (from the Lixitae) we sailed south along the desert shore for two days, then for one day eastward and found a small island, 5 stades in circumference

in a bay of a gulf. We made a settlement there and called it Cerne. We believed from our periplus that it was directly opposite Carthage, for the voyage from Carthage to the Pillars and from there to Cerne seemed alike.

Hanno's own account admits to founding seven settlements and one temple. It appears that the Carthaginians were attempting to create another area of *emporia* along the west coast of Africa much like those in North Africa, Southern Spain, and Sardinia. The voyage of Hanno is unique in a Carthaginian context and is unlike other examples of their colonisation. Normally Carthage sent out well-planned individual colonies to dominate a specific area or shipping lane. Usually this was conducted within its own spheres of influence or contact within the boundaries of the old Phoenician 'Empire'. At this stage however, Western Africa had only a limited Phoenician presence concentrated around Lixus and Mogador (that we know of) on the west coast. There was no existing network of settlements in this area. Carthage was therefore colonising a pristine area and did not have the luxury of establishing a major settlement in the area without an extensive pre-existing infrastructure. Hanno's expedition therefore was to explore and then to settle a new network of coastal towns based on the Phoenician model.

The west coast of Africa had several obvious attractions for Carthaginian interests, especially mercantile. The large expanse of coast offered access to various commodities and even more through penetration of the hinterland. The general area specified in Hanno's journey contains several navigable rivers, which certainly would have kindled Carthaginian trading interests with the hinterland.⁴⁴ We know already from Herodotus that the Carthaginians were bartering for gold with an unspecified people in Libya beyond the Pillars of Heracles.⁴⁵ The large area settled by Hanno coupled with the difficulty of identifying specific settlements leaves us with little evidence as to what commodities particularly attracted the Carthaginians. Certainly timber would have been an incentive to them along with some deposits of limestone and sandstone, which were mined in antiquity. Ample supplies of fish are known in various areas along the coast in addition to sections of arable land for agriculture and pastoral grazing. There were also supplies of carbuncles in the interior, which the

⁴⁴ Within the probable area of Hanno's settlement there are several navigable rivers north of Mogador including the Oued Oum er-Riba and the Oued Tensitt.

⁴⁵ Hdt. IV.196.

Carthaginians also accessed through their Trans-Saharan trade routes.⁴⁶ Otherwise the capture of exotic animals (such as the apes and baboons which the Phoenicians had earlier brought back from the West⁴⁷) and slaves are possibilities. Besides the account of Herodotus we are unable to state with any certainty which resources primarily attracted the Carthaginians. Nonetheless the large expanse of coast and its connecting hinterland possessed several natural resources, which we know captured Carthaginian interest elsewhere.

The eight foundations (seven colonial, one religious) of Hanno enable us to discern a number of typical Phoenicio-Punic patterns of settlement.⁴⁸ The main pattern of settlement is already obvious: a chain of coastal ports to facilitate movement and trade. The first settlement is named as Thymiaterion and was supposedly only two days' sailing past the Pillars of Heracles. Although not proven, it is possible that this settlement may in fact be Tingis (modern Tangiers).⁴⁹ This is a likely site for a Carthaginian settlement especially on this journey placing it relatively close to Lixus to the south and Gades to the north.⁵⁰

The next settlement was the temple of Poseidon on Cape Soloeis. Although not stated, this temple may have been another coastal establishment in the network Hanno was attempting to create.

The next grouping of settlements emphasises the Phoenician practice of settlement which Hanno appears to be using. After establishing the Temple of Poseidon, the text states that he founded the five settlements of Karikon Teichos, Gytte, Akra, Melitta, and Arambys. The text states they were all settled between Cape Soloeis and the Lixus River and the Phoenician settlement of Lixus, which although not explicitly mentioned, was already well established. Five Punic settlements within

⁴⁶ See Chp. VI, n.192.

⁴⁷ 1 Kings 10:22.

⁴⁸ It is difficult to connect the settlements mentioned in Hanno's account to the remains of attested Punic settlements. Several attempts have been made, but remain questionable. For an insightful listing of Punic settlements in modern Morocco (of which several show possible resemblance to those in the periplus) see Michel Ponsich, "Territoires utiles du Maroc punique", in *Phönizier im Westen*, pp.429-445.

⁴⁹ The uncertainty behind such a claim is primarily because of a lack of evidence. Pliny (*NH.* V.2) and Mela (I.5) claim Antaeus founded the site. Neither provides a satisfactory account. The area of western coastal Mauretania in question was in constant contact with and technically under Phoenician and Carthaginian control during this period suggesting a possible motive behind settlement. The first Punic evidence from the site is dated to the fifth century although there is no physical evidence Carthage actually settled the site itself.

⁵⁰ Michel Ponsich, *Recherches archéologiques à Tanger et dans sa région* (Paris 1970) p.169. The short distance to Lixus is attested by Pseudo-Scylax (*GGM.* I. 112, p.93 (ed. Müller) who names Thymiaterion as the next settlement north of Lixus. He attests it as a Phoenician settlement.

a geographical coastline of about 70 km. is an obvious attempt to create a coastal network much like the earlier examples of the Phoenicians.⁵¹

Presumably the Carthaginians used the permanent Phoenicio-Punic site of Lixus from which they could settle and further explore. It is obvious that Hanno and the remnants of his fleet disembarked at Lixus and were well received by its inhabitants. The text states that the Carthaginians remained there for some time and befriended the Lixitae (Berbers). If we consider the standard Phoenician policy of maintaining amicable relationships with local inhabitants bordering their settlements this is understood. If the residing inhabitants of Lixus maintained a good relationship with the surrounding Lixitae, it is reasonable to assume that Hanno and his entourage would also. The extent of Lixitan territory is unknown, and it is possible that Hanno used their local knowledge for a considerable distance south of Lixus itself. Finally, departing from Lixus, Hanno took Lixitae as interpreters south with him.

Hanno finally settled a small island named Cerne supposedly three days' travel south and east. This final settlement is possibly connected with the old Phoenician settlement of Mogador. The island (around one km. in circumference) is possibly that of Mogador. The island in question is similar in size to the one described by Hanno and has produced archaeological evidence showing sporadic settlement since the seventh century including both a Phoenician and Punic presence.⁵² This island is also attested by Pseudo-Scylax as lying twelve days' sail past the Pillars of Heracles.⁵³ He also claims that from this island, the Phoenicians traded with the Ethiopians on the mainland.⁵⁴ It is possible that the Carthaginians were attempting to

⁵¹ It is possible that Phoenicians once dwelt in the area, possibly on a seasonal basis. Strabo claims that there were many Phoenician settlements in a bay called Emporicus near Lixus (XVII.3.2, 3.8). He also states slightly later that Artemidorus censured Eratosthenes for claiming that many Phoenician cities in the area were destroyed by the Pharusii and the Nigritae and of which there is no trace (XVII.3.3). It appears that there was some form of Phoenician presence along the West African coast north of Lixus. Whether these *emporion* were present during the time of Hanno's periplus is unknown. If these sites were destroyed as Eratosthenes claims, it is possible that part of Hanno's mission was to restore a network of settlements in this region. As we will see, the text specifically states that Hanno founded five settlements between Cape Soloeis and Lixus, the exact area in question. There is no evidence for any existence of a network of settlements in this area.

⁵² André Jodin, *Mogador comptoir Phénicien du Maroc Atlantique* (Tangier 1966) pp.3ff, 47-52. Jodin provides an in-depth archaeological and topographic description of Mogador and the surrounding area. There is evidence of Phoenician, Cypriot, Greek, and Punic remains in Mogador attesting constant and varied contact with various areas of the Mediterranean.

⁵³ *GGM*. I. 112, p.93 (ed. Müller).

⁵⁴ He claims that the Phoenicians traded Attic pottery, Egyptian stone, and perfume. Palaiphatos (F. 31) claims that those on Cerne were very wealthy and built a golden statue of Athena (assimilated as Anat). This certainly connects Cerne with the more developed Mediterranean world and is reminiscent of Herodotus' story of the Carthaginians trading with an unknown group in the area for gold.

settle a more permanent base there or to re-establish the old Phoenician port on the mainland. The text comments on the distance from Carthage to the Pillars of Heracles and from the latter to Cerne as about the same based on the time of the voyage.⁵⁵

Although several of these sites remain unknown, a number of standard colonial Phoenicio-Punic topographic features become evident. The first example is that of Thymiaterion (possibly Tingis). The text specifically states that below the site was a large plain (πεδῖον δ' αὐτῇ μέγα ὑπῆν). This suggests the settlement was atop an elevated position: a promontory, hill, or plateau. If we assume this was Tingis, the site was originally settled on a plateau, elevated around sixty meters above the bay. Tingis also possessed a reasonable harbour based in a wide bay. Two such factors are prerequisites for permanent Phoenicio-Punic settlement.⁵⁶

The next foundation is that of the Temple of Poseidon on Cape Soloeis. Although this is not a standard colony, it probably did possess a permanent population. According to the text it was founded on a wooded promontory (Λιβυκὸν ἀκρατήριον λάσιον δένδρεσι). Promontories were favourite geographical options for both Phoenicians and Carthaginians when settling an area. This site shares the name of Soloeis with one of the three original Phoenicio-Punic settlements on Sicily. It is possible, like a number of other examples, that this was a common name for a new settlement.⁵⁷ Otherwise the presence of large numbers of trees in the immediate region also would have attracted the attention of a sea-faring people such as the Carthaginians.

⁵⁵ It is difficult to assume where these settlements lay through distancing them by estimating a day's sailing. It is likely that the text's division of distances is arbitrary as it is difficult to place on a geographical map. Mogador is far enough from the Pillars of Heracles to make it appear a similar distance from Carthage to latter, although it is considerably further than three days' sailing from Lixus. This is difficult to gauge owing to factors including prevailing winds and sea currents. The distance between settlements also depends on a similar flawed system. It is therefore more profitable assuming a settlement's position on the order of its mention while using the time of sailing as more a basic supplementary guide. Ponsich, "Territoires utiles du Maroc punique", pp.420ff., gives a good indication of the distances between the attested Phoenicio-Punic settlements in the region. Often, like in other areas of Phoenicio-Punic settlement, they are often only twenty kilometres (a day's sailing) apart. Although the modern settlements remain largely irreconcilable with those settled by Hanno, both networks are remarkably similar and typical to Phoenicio-Punic patterns of coastal foundations.

⁵⁶ See Ponsich, *Recherches archéologiques a Tanger et dans sa region*, Chp. V. There is early Phoenicio-Punic evidence from Tingis dating from the seventh century. Hanno's foundation may have been the first permanent settlement of the site or a possible resettlement of an earlier foundation.

⁵⁷ Thuc. VI.2.6. This is probably from the Phoenician סֵלַע (sing. sela) or סֵלַעִים (plur. sela'im) literally meaning rock or cliff. Such a name further emphasises the Phoenicio-Punic practice of founding standard settlements on defensible sites. For several Phoenician and Punic examples see Müller, *GGM*. I. p.3, n.3. Ps. Scylax (*GGM*. I. 112, p.93) also attests this headland along from Phoenician Thymiaterion.

Although we do not know the exact position of the next group of settlements, the etymology of their respective names offers possible reference to their character and topography. Karikon Teichos (Καρικόν τεῖχος) translates simply as Carian walls. The presence of the word walls may hint at some form of defence either based on its natural geography or actual manufactured city walls. Gytte (Γύττη, גי) is based on a Phoenician word basically meaning 'town', although it is normally distinguished by a suffix. It may seem unusual to name a settlement 'town', but when we consider Carthage in Cyprus and in Libya and New Carthage in Spain simply mean 'New Town', and the use of the name Soloeis, it is possible that Gytte may have been a foundation along similar lines, i.e. part of a settlement plan of replicating the metropolis in the new settlement. The next settlement Akra (Ἀκρά) is simply translated as hill or point. This suggests the site was similar to that of Thymiaterion: namely dominating a defensible high ground close to the coast. Melitta (Μέλιττα) is probably from the Phoenician word for mortar or cement (מלט). This also appears to contain some defensive connotation. It is possible that the name Melitta is based on Melita (Malta), an earlier Phoenician colony. Either possibility or both together identify Melitta as a Phoenicio-Punic settlement. Arambys (Ἀραμβύς) is the final example in the group. It is also based on two possible Phoenician terms הר ענבין (*har-anbin*), 'the mountain of grapes' or the more likely הר ענב (*har-anbi*), 'the cluster of mountains'.⁵⁸ Either translation includes a mountain, or at least raised ground of some description, which was a preferred location for a Phoenicio-Punic colony.

Finally there is the island settlement of Cerne (Κέρνη). Like several other western foundations, such as Motya and Gades, Cerne was settled closely adjacent to the mainland. If in fact it was the small island associated with Mogador, it would certainly have been founded as a defendable off-shore base for the mainland. If it lay in between Mogador and any other Phoenicio-Punic settlement, its distance from the mainland would certainly have attracted Hanno as a safe offshore foothold from which to trade with and to expand into the mainland.

The description of Cerne in the text is important in attempting to understand Hanno's journey in its entirety. It receives brief, but in the context, detailed geographic description. The text describes three other separate islands in a lake as

⁵⁸ Müller, *GGM*. I. p.5, n.5.

being bigger than Cerne (IX. εἶχε νήσους λίμνη τρεῖς μείζους τῆς Κέρνης).⁵⁹ From this brief description, it appears Cerne was proposed to be a Carthaginian port, which was recognisable to the rest of the empire. An admission in the text claims: “We believed from our periplus that it was directly opposite Carthage, for the voyage from Carthage to the Pillars of Heracles and from there to Cerne seemed alike” (VIII). This appears to be a statement detailing the basic geographical position of Cerne and indicating it as the final Carthaginian settlement on the West African coast. If Hanno’s periplus was primarily aimed at founding settlements, Cerne was both the terminus and the completion of this primary objective. From the remaining text we find Hanno exploring the region surrounding Cerne and using it as a base of operations (X. ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν ἀποστρέψαντες εἰς Κέρνην ἐπανήλθομεν). The first action of exploring the Chretes River, a lake, and an anonymous river, before returning to Cerne seems rather cautious. It appears that Hanno only sailed for one or two days from Cerne and was careful to retreat when confronted with hostile native peoples (IX. μεστὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγρίων δέρματα θήρεια ἐνημμένων οἱ πέτροις βάλλοντες ἀπήραξαν ἡμᾶς κωλύοντες ἐκβῆναι). This would suggest that Cerne was not only the limit of Carthaginian settlement, but also that of Carthaginian geographical knowledge. The emphasis placed on the foundation of Cerne and its position implies that beyond it lay *terra incognita* to the Carthaginians, and presumably the Phoenicians before them.

With the foundation of Cerne, it is logical that the vast majority of the 30000 supposed colonists who departed from Carthage were already settled along the West African coast. The absence of a large and cumbersome civilian contingent and cargo enabled Hanno to embark on his second objective: exploration. The text up to this point is rather a dry narrative, concentrating primarily on naming settlements. Geographical description is basic or non-existent, making exact identification nearly impossible. Cerne is afforded a slightly better description, probably because it was the terminus of Carthaginian settlement. The text continues, however, in a completely different vein to coincide with the change of Hanno’s voyage from colonisation to

⁵⁹ Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, p.183, believes the three larger islands correspond to those in the mouth of the Senegal River near St. Louis. Hanno’s description of Cerne and its surrounding islands has an obvious resemblance. However, the mouth of the Senegal is several hundred kilometres south of Mogador. It is possible a Carthaginian settlement was established here considering the expedition probably travelled past this point, although no other Phoenicio-Punic ports are mentioned suggesting it was isolated. The other possibility is that Cerne linked with an interior land route. This is a possibility, however, it is likely that Cerne was Mogador or at least a site well to the north of Senegal.

exploration. It becomes more descriptive, including geographical descriptions of lakes, volcanoes, mountains, and forests. We also find descriptions of ‘savage’ natives, gorillas, crocodiles, and hippopotami. The narrative reads like an explorer’s journal intended to enlighten others at home (i.e. Carthage). It is obvious Hanno had no idea what to expect on this leg of the voyage. From the account it appears that Hanno was extremely cautious and somewhat nervous during this expedition, relying on interpreters and soothsayers. The trepidation, which the Carthaginians experienced adventuring into the unknown, is a constant theme on this leg of the journey (XIV. φόβος οὖν ἔλαβεν ἡμᾶς καὶ οἱ μάντις ἐκέλευον ἐκλείπειν τὴν νῆσον; XV, ταχύ δ’ ἐκπλεύσαντες; XVI. ταχὺ οὖν κάκειθεν φοβηθέντες ἀπεπλεύσαμεν).

Probably the best known aspect of Hanno’s voyage is his crew’s encounter with ‘gorillas’ (Γορίλλας). The text is ambiguous regarding the exact genus of these simian creatures. What is interesting however, is the fact that Hanno and his crew captured three females, who while the crew carried them off, bit and tore at them. As a result they were slaughtered and skinned with their hides being brought back to Carthage (XVIII. πολὺ δὲ πλείους ἦσαν γυναῖκες δασεῖαι τοῖς σώμασιν. ἃς οἱ ἑρμηνέες ἐκάλουν Γορίλλας. διώκοντες δὲ ἄνδρας μὲν συλλαβεῖν οὐκ ἠδυνήθημεν ἀλλὰ πάντες (μὲν) ἐξέφυγον κρημνοβάται ὄντες καὶ τοῖς πέτροις ἀμυνόμενοι γυναῖκας δὲ τρεῖς αἱ δάκνουσαί τε καὶ σπαράττουσαι τοὺς ἄγοντας οὐκ ἤθελον ἔπεσθαι. ἀποκτείναντες μέντοι αὐτάς ἐξεδείραμεν καὶ τὰς δορὰς ἐκομίσσαμεν εἰς Καρχηδόνα). The notion of capturing unknown creatures alive and attempting to carry them off as specimens, and when failing to do so, taking their hides back to Carthage, suggests that this was also a mission of quasi-scientific exploration. Unfortunately the text finishes after this encounter as with the supplies running low, Hanno and his remaining ships returned (presumably stopping at the new settlements *en route*) to Carthage.

The final leg of exploration poses the question as to why Hanno and Carthage in general were interested in the unknown lands to the south of Mogador and/or Cerne. It is possible that Hanno had specific orders to explore further south to ascertain the viability of further Carthaginian expansion in regard to both trade and settlement. The cautious yet curious nature of Hanno and his expedition implies that they were attempting to gain a thorough picture of the area, including geography, topography, native flora and fauna, and of course potential natural resources. The hostile country and inhabitants described in the text coupled with no surviving

evidence of settlement south of Cerne suggests that Carthage left its expansion southwards there and may not have pursued it further.

The periplus of Hanno is a unique text in the classical world. The magnitude of the journey in both size and distance surpasses any reported contemporary voyage of exploration or colonisation. Hanno's voyage took place during a heightened period of Carthaginian activity ca. 480-450 and in many ways embodies its new and aggressive attitude toward expansion which is noticeable in several areas of Carthaginian foreign policy including settlement.

LATER CARTHAGINIAN COLONISATION

The final phase of Carthaginian colonisation coincides with the city's most tumultuous period starting in the third century and lasted until its destruction in 146. The dominating factor during this period was war with Rome. Despite its horrendous cost to the Carthaginian coffers, Carthage still managed to continue its policy of colonisation. Brief periods of peace allowed Carthage to settle abroad. Although very few Carthaginian colonies are attested or even suggested from this period, some exist, and afford us insight into contemporary Carthaginian policy and interest abroad.

CARTHAGO NOVA (NEW CARTHAGE)

New Carthage (modern Cartagena) was to emulate its metropolis in the West. Situated on the south-eastern coast of the Spanish peninsula, it was to ensure Carthaginian interests and hegemony on both the Atlantic sea-lanes and interior Spain. As its name suggests New Carthage was intended to be what Carthage had once been for Tyre: a new capital in the West. Founded in 228 by Hasdrubal Barca, it was a testament to the Carthaginian ability to recover from defeat during the First Punic War and to repay Roman war indemnities.⁶⁰ Its rapid rise and importance (especially leading up to and during the Second Punic War) is relatively well documented in both literary and archaeological form. Polybius emphasises the importance of New Carthage when

⁶⁰ New Carthage was, to a certain extent, a personal foundation of the eminent Barcid dynasty which dominated Carthaginian politics following the First Punic War. Although Hamilcar Barca, his son-in-law Hasdrubal, and son Hannibal treated the Spanish peninsula as their own private theatre of operations, they still answered and looked to Carthage as the capital. It is therefore more prudent to consider New Carthage as a Carthaginian and not simply a Barcid foundation.

outlining the major causes of the Second Punic War. His third reason for the outbreak of war was the success of the Carthaginian enterprise in Spain.⁶¹ New Carthage continued the Carthaginian trend of frugal colonisation, i.e. sending out very few colonies compared to the Phoenicians. However, in committing to a foundation, Carthage spared no expense, and New Carthage was an excellent choice of location. Unfortunately for the Carthaginians, they were unable to secure their colony for any length of time, losing it to Scipio Africanus and the Romans in 209.

Like other Carthaginian colonies, the real value of New Carthage lay in its geographic position and its natural topography. Strabo gives a brief yet good summary of the site and its obvious attraction to the Carthaginians:

*It is by far the most powerful city of the country, decked out with formidable fortifications with well-built walls, harbours, and a lake, besides the aforementioned silver mines. Areas in the vicinity have an abundance of salted fish, and it is a great emporion of the sea merchandise for the interior and likewise for the merchandise from the interior for exportation.*⁶²

This basic description of the site, and indeed how the Carthaginians developed New Carthage, provides us with an array of primary reasons for founding any colony. Certainly all would have attracted Carthaginian attention, but naturally, some did more so than others.

The geographic position of New Carthage afforded the Carthaginians with a strategic stronghold on the Mediterranean side of the Southern Spanish coast. Although Phoenicio-Punic influence still dominated both sides of the entrance to the Pillars of Heracles, Carthage still desired a strong base to entrench its interests in the area. The foundation of New Carthage offered a myriad of strategic and economic possibilities. As usual the best evidence for the primary motive for founding a colony is its immediate historical application; New Carthage is no exception. Diodorus provides a basic introduction to events in Southern Spain under the command of

⁶¹ III.10. Polybius claims that the Carthaginian prosperity in Spain filled them with confidence and strength. It is more likely that the strength was based on the volume of Spanish silver being used to raise an invasion force.

⁶² III.4.6, κρατίστη πολὺ τῶν ταύτῃ πόλεων. καὶ γὰρ ἐρυμνότητι καὶ τείχει κατεσκευασμένη καλῶς καὶ λιμέσι καὶ λίμνῃ κεκόσμηται καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἀργυρίων μετάλλοις περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν. κἀνταῦθα δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλησίον τόποις πολλὴ ἡ ταριχεία. καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο μείζον ἐμπόριον τῶν μὲν ἐκ θαλάττης τοῖς ἐν τῇ μεσογαίᾳ τῶν δ' ἐκεῖθεν τοῖς ἔξω πάσιν.

Hamilcar and then Hasdrubal.⁶³ After the death of the former, his son-in-law proceeded to defeat any Spanish resistance. Hasdrubal defeated the king of the Orissi, captured the twelve cities of Iberia and married the daughter of an Iberian prince. Once this was settled, he then founded New Carthage in 228. In this aspect we can see the role of New Carthage as a provincial capital. Hasdrubal had captured the main centres of Southern Spain and married into royal blood. With the establishment of New Carthage, his immediate plan (and certainly that of Hamilcar before him) was to establish a settled and quasi-legal reign in Spain based in a new capital. New Carthage offered Carthage a provincial capital overseeing the territory of Southern Spain and the vital revenue it produced.

With the subjugation of the Spanish tribes we can see a more aggressive form of Carthaginian colonialism. Previously the Phoenicians and, to an increasingly lesser degree, Carthaginians established and maintained amicable relationships with native populations. The removal of native populations to found New Carthage was a complete departure from Phoenician precedent. The Carthaginians were becoming increasingly hostile toward troublesome native peoples, but in the case of the Barcids in Southern Spain we have an insight into the escalation of this policy. The Carthaginians waged war on a presumably allied neighbour for the sole purpose of dominating a strategic territory and its mineral wealth. There is no evidence to suggest the Spanish tribes invited conflict in an area in which we know of no other hostile encounter between the two groups since the end of the sixth century.

Once Carthaginian dominion was secure in Southern Spain, New Carthage assumed its more notable role as a strategic base for military operations. Hasdrubal and then Hannibal used their secure base at New Carthage to push northwards and to extend their dominion south of the River Ebro. It is interesting that we can identify New Carthage rather than Carthage as the more obvious launching pad for Hannibal's invasion in 218. Carthage seems a distant influence and almost detached from relevant affairs for several years. The use of New Carthage as a base for invasion appears as one of its primary military functions. There are several examples of forces rallied or wintering there in both the Carthaginian and Roman periods.⁶⁴ It appears that this role of New Carthage became standard for any campaign in the region.

⁶³ e.g. Diod. XXV.12.

⁶⁴ Polyb. III.13, III.76, XI.31.

Probably the most strategic motive behind the establishment of New Carthage was its ability to dominate the rich silver producing areas of Baetica and Andalusia. Although Phoenician and subsequently Carthaginian influence in the region saw large quantities of bullion extracted from the region, the Carthaginians had shaken off the earlier Phoenician reluctance of dominating localised peoples for economic gain. Carthage was able to extract large quantities of wealth from the area, rebuilding its economy and paying off Roman war indemnities. The value of these mines became vital to both Carthage and Rome as valuable sources of income to finance their common appetite for expansion.

If we were to take a basic look at the Carthaginian Empire abroad following its defeat in the First Punic War it would appear in decline. Carthage had lost Sardinia and Sicily, two regions of vital importance to its power and trading network. The loss of Sicily must have hurt the Carthaginian Empire. They had been forced from the strategic island on which they had fought to maintain and increase their presence since the late sixth century. As a result Carthage no longer dominated the important straits between North Africa and Sicily. It is therefore logical that Carthage should turn to Spain and found New Carthage in the manner they had founded Lilybaeum in Sicily at the beginning of the fourth century. Phoenicio-Punic influence held sway over a relatively underdeveloped and potentially valuable territory. Carthage needed to reverse the trend of losing provinces of its empire by incorporating a new and extensive area of control. New Carthage and the territory it dominated offered Carthage an exclusive area of operations, which at least temporarily was beyond the interests of the Greeks and Romans.

The general position of New Carthage also emphasises a greater potential which mostly went unfulfilled under Carthaginian control. The rapid growth and importance of New Carthage within a few years of its foundation is reminiscent of other Carthaginian sites such as Ebusus and Lilybaeum. Its strategic position, good harbour, and formidable defences characterised it as a standard Carthaginian-style foundation. The position of New Carthage, dominating the northern coastal entrance to the Pillars of Heracles indicates a new network of Carthaginian, or at least Carthaginian controlled strongholds in the area. The Phoenician colonial network (especially in Southern Spain) had never become fully entrenched with an attached hinterland. Carthage now sought permanent foundations, which would dominate both

coast and interior. With New Carthage established, a line of coastal settlements was complete. From Gades, possibly to Tingis, to Malaca, to New Carthage, and finally Ebusus, there was a distinct line of Carthaginian power. The importance of New Carthage to its surrounding strongholds is evident in our sources. After the loss of New Carthage to the Romans, Mago attempted to recapture it. He set out from Gades and moved along the coast (i.e. past Malaca).⁶⁵ He returned there after failing, and upon being shut out from Gades, he proceeded to the island of Pityussa and presumably the settlement of Ebusus.⁶⁶ Sertorius attempted a similar journey during the Roman period in the first century BC. Plutarch claims that he attempted to capture New Carthage, and upon being repulsed, he attacked Pityussa. He failed in that also and retreated past the Pillars of Heracles to Gades.⁶⁷ Pompey, during his campaign in the West also attacked Ebusus before moving on to New Carthage.⁶⁸ This network of strong coastal foundations seems to have outlived its purpose under Carthaginian control.⁶⁹

The topography of New Carthage bears witness to its purpose as a Carthaginian colony and strategic base in Southern Spain. Although looking at its geographical position in a broad context hints at its strategic value and application, the foundation itself and its surrounding topography demonstrates several of its purposes.

Like any Phoenician or Carthaginian settlement, a site needed a serviceable harbour. New Carthage possessed one of the best harbours in antiquity. Several ancient commentators remark on the layout of the harbour and its benefits in antiquity. Polybius and Livy describe the harbour itself as a broad gulf (κόλπος) which is protected from the open sea by an island resulting in a large and calm harbour almost landlocked.⁷⁰ Naturally, during his account of the Second Punic War, Polybius tells of its military application as it could accommodate an entire fleet.⁷¹ Both the Carthaginians and Romans employed the harbour of New Carthage as a naval base for various operations, but in particular as an invasion point for Spain.

⁶⁵ Livy XXVIII.36-38.

⁶⁶ Livy (XXVIII.37.3) claims that at this time the Carthaginians (i.e. not Phoenicians as earlier described) populated the island.

⁶⁷ Plut. *Ser.* VII-VIII.

⁶⁸ Cass. Dio XLIII.29-30.

⁶⁹ It appears that the Romans also used the Carthaginian method of networked coastal bases. This becomes obvious in their occupation of the territory around the Ebro to the north of New Carthage and their foundation of Tarraco by the Scipiones. It is interesting that Pliny claims Tarraco was founded by the Scipiones in the same manner that New Carthage was by the Carthaginians (III.21).

⁷⁰ Polyb. XI.10; Livy XXVI.42

Strabo writes of the harbour of New Carthage and its other important use of trade. Although brief, he emphasises the role of New Carthage as a centre for the *emporion*⁷² in both importing produce from the sea and foreign goods into the interior and likewise exporting goods from the interior abroad. Naturally this system was based largely on maritime traffic and therefore needed a functional harbour, which New Carthage certainly possessed. Much like the old Phoenician colonies, New Carthage assumed the role of an intermediary coastal trading establishment which interacted between the Carthaginian controlled coast (and beyond) and the native populations and industries of the interior. Although only existing as a Carthaginian settlement for less than twenty years, New Carthage and its harbour assumed their dual mercantile and military role in accordance with Carthaginian policy.

The basic position of New Carthage on land is testament to its importance as a Carthaginian provincial capital and defensive stronghold. Naturally it stood on a promontory, which was a Phoenicio-Punic norm. The town itself was flanked by several hills and an extensive lagoon.⁷³ This lagoon protected the western approach and bounded the northern side of the city as the sea did the east and south. There were several high hills, which guarded the entrance to the city and gave it the impression of impregnability.⁷⁴ In true Phoenicio-Punic fashion, the Carthaginians were quick to augment the defences of New Carthage by constructing perimeter walls. These walls were high and particularly difficult to breach.⁷⁵ The natural terrain and man-made defences of New Carthage made it a formidable target for attack. Its rapid capitulation to Scipio in 209 belies its defensive strength. It was rather Scipio's military ingenuity mixed with Carthaginian lethargy which saw New Carthage fall into Roman hands so rapidly.

The site of New Carthage was the paragon of Carthaginian expansive colonisation. It was positioned to augment the Carthaginian chain of strategic seaports

⁷¹ X.8.

⁷² This term is generically applied to the network of mostly Phoenician sea-ports along the coast of North Africa (Polyb. III.23). During this period however, the networked coastal ports along the southern coast of Spain were remarkably similar in configuration and purpose.

⁷³ Polybius gives a detailed account of its topography having visited the site some time in the second half of the second century. (X.10).

⁷⁴ Polybius (X.10) names the hills: Asclepius was the largest and protected the eastern side of the city (it also had a temple to the god on its summit); on the western side stood the *Arx Hasdrubalis* which contained the Punic palace (and was the last pocket of resistance against Scipio in 209); there were three smaller, but rugged hills to the north named Hephastion, Aletes, and Cronos. The only level approach to New Carthage was from the south (i.e. from the harbour).

⁷⁵ X.13; Livy XXVI.45.

in the area. It could link with its metropolis easily with other Carthaginian towns and had access to the interior. New Carthage retained a Phoenician character by possessing a good harbour and defences while dominating a strategic headland. In Phoenician times this would have been normal but with a purely mercantile purpose. By the later stages of the third century, Carthaginian colonisation still sought potential trade, but was also geared for dominance at sea and on land. New Carthage is testament to this change exercising its role as a strategic base for invasion and expansion.⁷⁶

The final aspect of New Carthage of obvious importance is its natural resources. In the case of New Carthage it is a special circumstance that (unlike the majority of other Phoenician and Carthaginian colonies) it commanded vast resources of silver and to a lesser extent other metals such as gold and copper. Polybius once again provides the best account of the scale of the silver production around New Carthage claiming that the silver veins lay just over 3.5 km. from the town and occupied a circuit of some 73.5 km. He claims 40000 men worked the mines, which yielded 25000 drachmae per day during the Roman period.⁷⁷ Polybius is certainly providing numbers from the Roman period when he visited the site. The only evidence of the amount of bullion extracted during Punic times is the amount of booty Scipio captured at New Carthage in 209. If we were to calculate the surviving figures of precious metals from our sources we begin to grasp the potential wealth of New Carthage. Polybius reckons 276 gold platters and over 8318 kg. of silver. The silver extracted (based on the figures of the Roman period) was about 108 kg. per day. Scipio's hoard of 8318 kg. would have required about 77 days' labour to extract.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ The image of New Carthage as a base of operations is shown after its capture by Scipio. Both Livy (XXVI.47) and Polybius (X.19.2) remark on the tremendous amounts of booty seized from the captured town. Livy lists this as 120 heavy catapults, 281 lighter catapults, 75 ballistae, a large quantity of scorpions, and large amounts of ammunition. He also claims that 276 gold platters and 8318 kg. of silver (in various form) was taken. Finally 400000 measures of wheat, 270000 measures of barley as well as 63 merchantmen with full cargoes of grain, arms, rope, bronze, iron, and sail-cloth. This captured booty, whether accurate or not, is interesting as it also shows New Carthage as a possible storehouse for invasion. The majority of heavy weaponry attested is for siege warfare, by that stage vital in any offensive land campaign. The large quantities of foodstuffs identify New Carthage as a clearinghouse to keep Carthaginian armies supplied. The vast amounts of moveable bullion present in New Carthage shows its importance to the Carthaginian economy and that of the silver mines it dominated, but also its function as a type of depository. The wealth resting there had not been exported back to Carthage. This suggests that it was earmarked to finance the war effort especially when we consider the Carthaginian and indeed Hannibal's reliance on mercenaries.

⁷⁷ Polyb. XXXIV.9; Strabo III.147.

⁷⁸ The figures provided by Polybius are based on unleaded silver. He provides a description of the filtering process required to remove lead in order to create pure silver. The ore is broken up and sieved

Although we have no definite figures during the Punic period, the amount of moveable wealth sitting in the treasury of New Carthage coupled with the Carthaginian ability to pay the Roman war indemnity and start a full-scale invasion implies that they were ruthlessly mining the surrounding territories.⁷⁹

Phoenicio-Punic interest in the rich silver and gold producing areas of Southern Spain was established from an early period. The Phoenicians were probably trading with Tartessus and the rich areas around the Guadalquivir River from Gades since pre-classical times. Although they grew extremely wealthy from such trade, it never presumed anything more. The growth of an expansive nature in Carthaginian society and colonisation took the process a step further to include settlement, expansion inland, and domination of every aspect of production: from extraction to export.

Besides the obvious attraction of gold and silver-rich territories, New Carthage possessed other natural resources useful to its economy. The area surrounding the town abounded in esparto grass.⁸⁰ Among its many uses as bedding, fuel, clothing, and fodder, it was woven into rope. This was a useful commodity to a primarily seafaring people. In its raw form, Pliny claims the grass was too expensive to export, probably to North Africa, which he previously states had very sparse supplies. It is possible however, that New Carthage was exporting woven rope abroad to Carthaginian and foreign states alike. Scipio's captured booty from New Carthage includes 63 merchant ships, which had at least some cargoes of esparto for rope-making.⁸¹ It is possible that the purpose of this captured fleet was trade and the presence of esparto grass suggests it was an exportable commodity.

Another natural resource, which New Carthage could, and most certainly did exploit, was its natural fisheries. Although typical of a number of settlements (both

through water three times before it was finally melted and the lead poured off. This process would have required a great deal of labour as Polybius states. The quantities of silver produced in Roman and Carthaginian periods respectively must have required huge workforces. This may also help explain the enormous quantities of foodstuffs in New Carthage. If these mines produced state funds they certainly would have been worked by state labour and/or slaves, which would have been fed from state-owned reserves.

⁷⁹ Much like the hinterland surrounding Gades, that adjoining New Carthage was rich in deposits of silver. It also had various deposits of lead, tin, copper, and iron. The whole south-eastern portion of the Spanish peninsula, especially Baetica and Andalusia, abounds in alluvial deposits of silver brought down from the Pyrenees (see Diod. V.35.4-5). For an overview of Phoenician silver extraction in the region see Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, pp.236-241, 249-266.

⁸⁰ Pliny *NH.* XIX.26-27, claims that the mountainsides around New Carthage were covered in a strip around 160 km. long by 48 km. wide, also see Livy XXII.20.6.

⁸¹ Livy XXVI.47.

Phoenicio-Punic and Greek), New Carthage and its ready supply of salt-pans enabled it to create a prosperous fish-curing industry. Strabo remarks on the importance and abundance of the salted fish industry.⁸² The production of *garum* (fish oil) was facilitated, and New Carthage became noted as a major centre of export.⁸³

The benefits of the site of New Carthage and the natural resources it oversaw were certainly an incentive for Carthaginian settlement. Even if we were to subtract the wealth produced from its silver trade, New Carthage had an industrial and mercantile potential from its other resources, which it possessed in abundance.

The Carthaginian foundation of New Carthage was the greatest of all its colonies. Although not even lasting twenty years under Carthaginian control, it had the potential to rival Carthage as a capital in the West. The rapid eminence of the settlement emphasises this claim. If the Carthaginians had realised its true potential perhaps they would have taken greater care to defend it.

Although New Carthage stands as the only well-documented Carthaginian colony during this period, it characterises the shift in Carthaginian foreign policy. New Carthage was settled to dominate. This is shown in its initial foundation after the subjugation of native Spanish tribes. The site was then organised to maintain Carthaginian dominance in Southern Spain while actively reaping the mineral wealth from its surrounding areas. Unlike other Phoenician settlements, New Carthage came with an established hinterland, which had been cleared in advance. New Carthage was nearly a complete departure from the older standard Phoenician model of settlement – though topography and an innate mercantile nature still show strong connections to older traditions. Otherwise it shows a new style of Carthaginian colony, settled and maintained in an aggressive manner. Later Carthaginian colonialism had, like other aspects of society, become distinctive from earlier precedent and was now discernable as characteristically Carthaginian.

OTHER CARTHAGINIAN COLONIES

One curious aspect of Carthaginian colonisation is the small number of identifiable Carthaginian colonies. Although we have several solid examples, when we compare

⁸² III.4.6.

⁸³ Pliny *NH.* XXXI.94. During Pliny's time the best and most expensive *garum* was made from the scomber (mackerel) in New Carthage.

the expansive and mercantile nature of Carthage to similar states such as Corinth, Miletus, and Phocaea, the number of its known colonies pales by comparison. In addition to this, if we look at Carthaginian attempts at colonisation with examples such as Lilybaeum, New Carthage, and Hanno's periplus, it appears that Carthage was a highly developed and experienced colonising state. There is some scanty evidence, however, suggesting Carthage did found a number of its own colonies or settlements in addition to those better attested. Unfortunately such evidence is often hearsay, passing reference, or otherwise dubious, providing extremely limited information. As a result, the position, nature, and even date of these foundations are often unknown. At least such examples suggest that the extent of Carthaginian colonisation was possibly larger than previously thought.

The first type of Carthaginian colonies mentioned are those, which although remain unclear, offer us insight into one form of Carthaginian colonisation, or perhaps better, recolonisation. According to Claudian, the Southern Sardinian stronghold of Sulcis was founded by Carthage (*pars adit antiqua ductos Karthagine Sulcos*).⁸⁴ We know with a degree of certainty that the Phoenicians originally founded Sulcis. Claudian's claim may seem incorrect, but evidence from the site suggests that it was later heavily influenced by the Carthaginians owing to the latter's longstanding occupation of the site. Both Pausanias and Strabo make the same mistake and claim that the site (along with neighbouring Caralis) was populated (and presumably founded) by Carthaginians.⁸⁵ A similar example survives in Stephanus of Byzantium regarding the island of Melita (Malta). He states that the city on the island was colonised by the Carthaginians (Μελίτη, ἔστι καὶ πόλις ἄποικος Καρχηδονίων).⁸⁶ Although the city on Malta is not specifically named, we know that the island was colonised by the Phoenicians in several locations and was once identified as a Phoenician island.⁸⁷ Once again we have direct conflict in our literary and archaeological sources. It is possible that both Sulcis and the unknown settlement on Malta were in fact original Phoenician colonies, which appear as being resettled by the Carthaginians or had developed into Punic centres. As we will see, the Carthaginians often preferred more unorthodox methods of settlement including re-establishing older sites. With this in mind, it is easy to forgive our sources for

⁸⁴ XV.518.

⁸⁵ Paus. X.17.5; Strabo V.2.7. Pausanias states that both cities were in fact on Corsica.

⁸⁶ Steph. Byz. s.v. Μελίτη.

attributing such foundations to the Carthaginians, whereas they were actually original Phoenician settlements.

There are other examples of possible Carthaginian settlements courtesy of brief accounts in Diodorus and Stephanus of Byzantium. Unfortunately both authors provide only a brief account of the supposed settlements leaving us scant information with which to identify them. Stephanus provides two such examples. The first is the town of Akkabikon Teichos (s.v. Ἀκκαβικὸν τεῖχος) which was apparently near the Pillars of Heracles and in the vicinity of Salmuka (s.v. Σαλμύκα, possibly identified with Salduba in Baetica). Both Phoenician and Carthaginian activity is well known in the region. It is possible that Carthage may have established a settlement in the area or refounded an existing Phoenician site. The other possible settlement attested by Stephanus is that of Charmis (s.v. Χάρμις) in Sardinia. He simply states κτίσμα Καρχηδονίων, giving us no further information. Once again we are aware of the strong Phoenician and Carthaginian presence on the island and it is conceivable a Carthaginian colony was founded there or an older Phoenician settlement was redefined as a Carthaginian settlement. Diodorus provides even less information in his account of Carthaginian colonies in Spain. He states that Hamilcar Barca founded Acra Leucê (Ἀκρά Λευκή) or modern Alicante.⁸⁷ Although the site is described as a large city, the site was Phoenician in origin dating from as early as the ninth century.⁸⁸ Its new application as a military base rather than a trading port certainly altered the nature of the site and goes some way in explaining Diodorus' source's oversight. Continuing, Diodorus then claims that Hasdrubal Barca, after founding New Carthage, founded another city wishing to outdo his father-in-law Hamilcar (ὅθεν ἔκτισε παραθαλασσίαν πόλιν ἣν προσηγόρευσε Νέαν Καρχηδόνα καὶ ἑτέραν πόλιν ὕστερον θέλων τὴν Ἀμίλκα δύναμιν ὑπερβῆναι).⁸⁹ Unfortunately that is all the information regarding this settlement. Although completely unknown otherwise, it is possible a second, certainly minor colony or settlement was founded near New Carthage. The Carthaginians were certainly active in this area of Spain and their contemporary aggression coupled with their interest in the area may have encouraged them to settle an additional site to assert their new dominance.

⁸⁷ Diod. V.12.2-3, and Chp. I, n.149-160 and text.

⁸⁸ XXV.10.3.

⁸⁹ Maria Eugenia Aubet Semmler, "Phoenician trade in the West: Balance and Perspectives", in *The Phoenicians in Spain*, p.106.

⁹⁰ Diod. XXV.12.

It is possible that the Carthaginians founded numerous other colonies and settlements. If we look at the voyage of Himilco along the North Atlantic coastline as a voyage of exploration and trade, it is possible that he may have founded, visited, or paved the way for one or several Carthaginian coastal settlements. This becomes a distinct possibility when we consider the periplus of Hanno earlier in the same century and possible trade with Southern Britain and Europe, which would require ports *en route*. Also within the Mediterranean there is ample scope for additional Carthaginian settlements. A prime example is that of the Aegates Islands off the west coast of Sicily. Valerius Maximus claims that during the final stages of the First Punic War, Q. Fulvius Flaccus ravaged the wealthy Aegates Islands in full view of Carthage (*nam ab altaribus patr<i>s profectus Egadas opulentissimas in conspectu Carthaginiis populatus est*).⁹¹ Whatever stood on the Aegates Islands must have been worth a great deal to affect the Carthaginians. Although little is directly stated, the Carthaginian presence in the area coupled with this reference suggests the possibility of some form of Carthaginian settlement there.⁹² A similar scenario can be applied to Lipara to the north of Sicily. The Carthaginians occupied the site some time around 288 and were finally expelled by the Romans in 252.⁹³ The Carthaginians occupied the island for over thirty-five years. Presumably they maintained some form of settlement, most likely military.⁹⁴ The potential of any number of unknown Carthaginian settlements existing, like Phoenician settlements before them, must remain a possibility, although with the evidence we have, little more.

The possibility of original Carthaginian colonies being founded is definitely worth mention. Unfortunately, like so many other aspects of Carthage, we are hindered by a lack of solid evidence. Basic literary allusion hints at possible

⁹¹ I.3.2. Valerius Maximus is probably referring to either the Carthaginian fleet, Drepana, or Lilybaeum on mainland Sicily.

⁹² Carthaginian settlement, or at least activity is possible on other smaller islands in the area, Chp. I, n.168. We find further literary evidence of possible Carthaginian activity on the Aegates Islands. During the First Punic War, Polybius (I.44) claims that a fleet under Hannibal were anchored off the island of Aegusae, which lie between Lilybaeum and Carthage. Presumably the island (which can only be the one of the Aegates Islands) had some form of Carthaginian presence deterring Roman interference. A further possible example is that the Aegates Islands were abandoned by Carthage in accordance with the peace terms following the First Punic War. The peace terms simply state that Carthage was to evacuate all islands between Sicily and North Africa, presumably the Aegates Islands were understood as part of this arrangement (Polyb. I.63).

⁹³ Diod. XXIII.20; Polyb. I.21, I.39; Zonar. VIII.12.

⁹⁴ An anecdote surviving in Diodorus (V.11) tells of an island named Osteodes ('Ὀστεώδης) to the west of Lipara which gained its name ('Bony') owing to the large number of Carthaginian mercenaries abandoned there who perished. Although fanciful, it does connect the Carthaginian activity with such islands.

settlements but offers little further information, especially if the sites are otherwise unidentified. Whether the examples discussed were Carthaginian settlements or not is difficult to decide with any degree of certainty. Probably the strongest evidence in their favour is the other, better-attested colonial activities of Carthage, which show it as an active colonising state over a long period of time. Otherwise the examples we have seen are all geographically consistent with Carthaginian territory and activity. There is a strong likelihood that these colonial foundations and a number of other original Carthaginian settlements were established but are not attested by our sources and thus remain unknown.

The original nature of Carthaginian colonisation was certainly developed from the Phoenicians. The Phoenicians settled an array of sites both temporary and permanent to facilitate trade. The earlier Carthaginian colonies were obviously influenced by this and continued to function in a typically Phoenician manner. As Carthage developed its own nature and foreign policies, we find obvious departures from the original Phoenician model. As a result we find Carthaginians settling sites in order to fulfil different functions. As a result, the Carthaginians settled various types of foundations, which cannot be categorised as strict colonies or *emporia*. Sites such as New Carthage and Lilybaeum were settled primarily as strategic capitals in important provinces. The founding of Ebusus reflects the nascent expansionist state of Carthage settling abroad under the protection of the Phoenicians. The extravagant periplus of Hanno reflects the contemporary confident mood of Carthage to expand its trade and settlement patterns in an undeveloped area.

Carthage was fortunate to inherit much of the old Phoenician 'Empire' in the West, enabling it to use colonisation as an important but periodic tool for expansion abroad. With territory dominating much of the Western Mediterranean's coastlines and shipping lanes, it possessed an empire based on extensive coastal networks. As a result, the expansive nature of Carthage was continually looking for further foreign territory both for trade and to dominate. With little opportunity within the Mediterranean proper, Carthage sent out such expeditions by Hanno and later Himilco to colonise, trade, and explore.

With considerable areas under its control, Carthage was able to choose its settlements carefully. Carthage founded few original large settlements, but when it did

so, they were highly strategic and well executed. This is a contributing factor to the small number of original Carthaginian colonies attested. Such a policy is demonstrated by the cities of Lilybaeum and New Carthage, which were situated on excellent sites with good harbours and were well defended. Often the Carthaginians would settle an area to increase their influence and either create or maintain a strong coastal network. The *periplus* of Hanno is a perfect example of such a policy. If the figures are accurate, he embarked with 30000 settlers on sixty ships, which would have cost a fortune and taken years to organise. Within more congested areas of the Mediterranean, Carthage often capitalised on opportunities to settle and increase their influence in a given area. This can be seen after the destruction of Motya and the subsequent settlement of Lilybaeum.

Although we have looked at three specific periods, taken as a whole, Carthage settled abroad for over four centuries. Unlike the separate Greek states, which colonised for shorter periods, Carthage used forms of settlement as a specific tool of foreign policy, along with expansion and trade. Only employing colonisation when it suited them, the Carthaginians were able to send out carefully selected expeditions over sustained periods. With only several properly attested settlements over its entire history, it emphasises the careful and deliberate nature of the Carthaginians in regard to colonisation and settlement abroad.

IV. CARTHAGINIAN DEVELOPMENT: POPULATION, SETTLEMENT, AND TERRITORY

One of the unique and perhaps underestimated aspects of the Carthaginians' foreign policy was their habit of developing settlements and areas under their control. The Phoenician system of settlement comprising large coastal networks of varied centres was designed to dominate local and seaborne trade and worked well for the Phoenicians in the West where they could operate exclusively. The absence of Phoenician interest in conquering territory coupled with the lack of any competitive state in many areas facilitated this system for several centuries. The advent of Carthage and its annexation of this old Phoenician-style empire in the sixth and fifth centuries coincided with several defining factors in the Western Mediterranean.

Carthage was under increasing pressure to defend its new empire against the interests of foreign rivals such as the Greeks and to a lesser extent the Etruscans and Romans.¹ Attempting to drive off rivals by acts of random piracy such as capturing ships and drowning foreign sailors as the Phoenicians had once done was no longer going to deter foreign powers. Within the boundaries of the old Phoenician Empire, but without the steadying influence and traffic of the Phoenicians, areas with once prosperous and lucrative trade routes were becoming decrepit and obsolete. Carthage needed to assert itself in areas such as North Africa, Sardinia, and Southern Spain to secure its influence. Probably the most influential factor was the growing Carthaginian desire for a more 'orthodox' empire. Although owing much to their Phoenician origins and culture, they were not content to continue a settled mercantile empire. They departed from the Phoenician precedent and were willing to employ various methods to dominate foreign territory and to create a more conventional empire based on conquest and subjugation. Trade was still paramount to the Carthaginians' interests and they remained, like the Phoenicians before them, eager to expand their mercantile interests abroad and the subsequent income it accrued. The Carthaginians, however, rightly supposed that a strong military presence rather than more *laissez faire* tactics would facilitate such trade and influence.

¹ Carthage fought several campaigns to halt the spread of Greek expansion into the Far West. The Etruscans were steady allies and trading partners with Carthage, although the Carthaginians were alert to their own interests. Polybius (III.22-23) discusses the treaty sworn with Rome in 509/8 BC which

Carthage was now forced to adopt varied methods of foreign policy to deal with the changing social and political climate in the West in order to maintain its influence. Major factors such as trade, conquest, and settlement all became standard staples of Carthaginian policy abroad. More specifically, depending on circumstance, the Carthaginians pursued active policies of redeveloping older settlements, streamlining or reorganising entire coastal networks, and relocating entire populations to suit their needs. Often these activities coincided with internal or external pressure forcing the Carthaginians to adopt methods not standard to most Greek contemporaries. Naturally, factors such as economic pressure, conflict, and expansion often dictate such movements. Like other aspects of Carthaginian foreign policy, these activities were sporadic and often appear over broad chronological periods suggesting that they were solutions for temporary events rather than a standard or universal trend. Unlike the Greeks or Romans for instance who colonised profusely according to standard models, the Carthaginians employed such unconventional tactics in addition to more standard colonial and military activities.

POPULATION MOVEMENT

One of the more unusual activities of the Carthaginians was their tendency to remove and resettle entire populations from one established town or city to another, usually under their own control. This is not entirely unprecedented in Greek society with such examples including the removal of the population of Attica to Troezen, and also to Aegina and Salamis in the face of the oncoming Persians in 480.² However, we also see Hieron's resettling of Catana as Aetna with the original population of the former and his moving of Naxos to Leontini.³ Meanwhile the Sicel King Ducetius moved the population of Menai to Palice in 453.⁴ These examples, however, were more the exception than the rule with only the Syracusan tyrants regularly using such a tactic.⁵ There are several surviving instances in our sources detailing the Carthaginians' removing entire (or partial) populations to suit their needs. Like the Greek examples,

forbids the Romans to pass the Fair Promontory (see Chp. VI, n.36). It is likely that this clause was consistent with that which Carthage had sworn previously with the Etruscans.

² Hdt. VIII.41.2.

³ Diod. XI.49.

⁴ Diod. XI.88.6.

⁵ e.g. In 476 Hieron, after removing the local populations from Naxos and Catana, settled the site of Aetna with ten thousand chosen colonists (Diod. XI.49).

such an action was usually employed during times of war or upheaval. This method of population movement became particularly favoured during the Punic Wars when troublesome, defeated, or even allied towns could be monitored, neutralised or protected accordingly. Although these accounts are often brief they do allow insight into a distinctive Carthaginian tactic.

The earliest example of Carthage literally relocating a population is that of the evacuation of the civilian population of Tyre in 332. Carthage came to the aid of its besieged metropolis and evacuated an undisclosed number of women and children.⁶ Diodorus initially claims that only part of the population was removed to safety but later contradicts himself by stating the majority had been removed to Carthage and presumably resettled.⁷ This instance is an exception compared with other examples of Carthaginian population resettlement. Normally Carthage was the aggressive state deliberately choosing to relocate a subject or defeated city. In the case of Tyre, however, Carthage was fulfilling filial ties with its metropolis and saving a portion of its population from the army of Alexander.

The first and more typical examples of the Carthaginians relocating entire populations date from the First Punic War. Preceding the protracted Roman siege of Lilybaeum in 250, the Carthaginians sought to abandon non-essential or unpractical military sites and maintain and fortify a few enclaves in Western Sicily. The first example was the resettling of the population of the old Megarian colony of Selinus to Lilybaeum.⁸ After the defeat of Hasdrubal at Panormus and the arrival of a large Roman fleet,⁹ the Carthaginians retreated from Selinus, took its population to Lilybaeum, and then razed the old city to the ground.¹⁰ Selinus was traditionally a well-fortified city possessing a good harbour, however, its fortifications and power had waned since 409 when it had been defeated by Carthage. The Carthaginians deemed it more strategic to remove the allied population to safety in Lilybaeum and to leave nothing for the oncoming Roman forces.

⁶ Diod. XVII.41.1; Justin XI.10.14; Curtius IV.3.20.

⁷ XVII.46.4.

⁸ Diod. XXIV.1.1, τὴν δὲ Σελινουντίων πόλιν Καρχηδόνιοι κατασκάψαντες μετόπισαν εἰς τὸ Λιλύβατον.

⁹ Polyb. I.40-41.

¹⁰ Selinus and Carthage had a long and often changeable relationship. Originally Selinus was allied to Carthage and supported it prior to the Battle of Himera in 480. Despite Hannibal's destruction of the city in 409 (Diod. XIII.54), it was repopulated and remained a relatively peaceful ally of Carthage. After its destruction in 250 it remained uninhabited during antiquity.

The Carthaginian evacuation of non-essential civilian sites continued in Western Sicily. Preceding the Roman naval defeat at Drepana in 249,¹¹ Diodorus claims that the Carthaginians removed the population of Eryx, replaced it in Drepana, and destroyed the former site except for the Temple of Venus and its surrounds.¹² The Romans proceeded to occupy the abandoned site, installing a garrison. Although an important sanctuary of Astarte, the Carthaginians were forced to sacrifice the site in the face of Roman land and naval forces. The fortification of Drepana proved successful, as it remained the only free Carthaginian port in Sicily along with Lilybaeum.

The two examples of resettling the respective populations of Selinus and Eryx during the First Punic War demonstrate an intentional Carthaginian tactic. The fact that in both cases the population was removed and the site destroyed shows the Carthaginians were right to fortify a few specific sites in Western Sicily to suit their strategy, on the assumption that it would be easier to concentrate their forces instead of spreading them over large areas of operation. Another point of interest is that neither site was strictly Carthaginian. Selinus was a long-time ally of Carthage but remained Greek; Eryx was an important Punic sanctuary, but remained an Elymian site. Although the Carthaginians were protecting themselves and their allies, ultimately they were not surrendering their own foundations. Carthage was eventually defeated in the First Punic War, however, neither Drepana nor Lilybaeum were captured by siege despite constant Roman interest, partly justifying this Carthaginian tactic.

Despite the defeat in the First Punic War, the relative success of employing population movement and resettlement as a defensive tactic encouraged the Carthaginians to continue it during the Second Punic War. Hannibal found himself confronted with several fickle Greek states in Southern Italy in 215. The two states of Locri and Croton were eventually convinced to accept to similar peace terms. Hannibal decided to evacuate the population of the well-defended site of Croton to Locri.¹³ The removal of the threat of Croton offered a number of benefits to Hannibal. By removing a possible threat and combining it with a similar town such as Locri, the threat of possible insurrection was lessened. Also, gaining the site of Croton appeased

¹¹ Polyb. I.49-52.

¹² XXIII.9.4, τὸ δὲ Δρέπανον τειχίσας καὶ πόλιν καταστήσας μετόκισε τοὺς Ἐρυκίνους καὶ τὸν Ἐρυκα κατέσκαψε πλὴν τοῦ περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τόπου.

Hannibal's Bruttian allies. This not only pleased them but handed Hannibal a safe allied base of operations. Locri proved to be a defensible site for Hannibal just a few years after when it was besieged by Lucius Cincius in 208.¹⁴ Although it was nearly taken during this siege, it proved to be a solid and strategic fortified town for the Carthaginians in Bruttium.¹⁵

Hannibal employed a similar tactic in Herdonea in 210. Confronted by the proconsul Gaius Fulvius, Hannibal defeated the Roman army. The neighbouring town of Herdonea, which had been an ally of Carthage, was allegedly prepared to change to the Roman side if the Carthaginians had left Lucania. Hannibal promptly burnt the town to the ground and resettled the population in Thurii and Metapontum.¹⁶ The motive behind such an action is obvious, as it was in Croton five years previous. Hannibal was removing the population of a potentially perfidious ally and relocating it to a more secure site. Like the examples during the First Punic War, the site was razed so as to prevent it from being utilised by the Romans.¹⁷ The destination of the exiled population of Herdonea was Thurii and Metapontum, two Carthaginian allies, which would serve as virtual internment camps to monitor any possible uprising.

In the later stages of Hannibal's Italian campaign there is evidence to suggest that he continued the Carthaginian policy of actively removing and resettling entire populations to suit his strategies. By 204, Scipio Africanus had crossed into North Africa and was threatening Carthage itself. In Italy, Hannibal was struggling to control several towns and tribes in revolt. Hannibal had besieged the town of Petelia for several months in 215 and when it was captured, Hannibal gave it to the Bruttians to occupy.¹⁸ Appian claims that the Petelians had been expelled after the siege but gives no further hint as to where.¹⁹ It is possible that Carthaginians installed the defeated Petelians in another allied town so as to ensure no further disruption on their part. Appian describes Petelia as one example of several cities in open stasis against the Carthaginians which Hannibal visited in turn and suppressed. He makes specific

¹³ Polyb. XXIV.4.

¹⁴ Livy XXVII.28.

¹⁵ Livy states that the Romans had constructed siege-works and artillery and were on the brink of capturing Locri. Hannibal became aware of the danger and dispatched his Numidian cavalry against the besiegers who were caught unawares and fled abandoning the siege.

¹⁶ XXVII.1.

¹⁷ There is also the aspect of revenge for which Hannibal was renowned. In a similar example he burnt the wife and child of Dasius of Arpi in Danuia for abandoning the Carthaginians and changing sides to Rome (App. *Hann.* 31).

¹⁸ Livy XXIII.30.

mention of Thurii, which although is not made explicit, also seems to have revolted. Hannibal apparently took 3000 trusted citizens and 500 others from the countryside and resettled them at Croton.²⁰ Hannibal left a strong garrison in Thurii and from then on most likely stopped considering it a safe ally as he had once done. The choice of Croton becomes obvious as Appian claims that Hannibal considered it well situated and a good base for military operations against the other towns.²¹ The 3500 Carthaginian allies were physically resettled in the new Carthaginian command centre at Croton. By removing them from the remainder of the anti-Carthaginian element in Thurii, Hannibal ensured their safety and continued support while re-establishing authority by replacing them with a strong garrison.

From this brief account and the greater events occurring in the war, we are able to discern a familiar motive behind population resettlement in Hannibal's campaign. The example of Thurii and possibly other towns in Southern Italy is reminiscent of the examples of Selinus and Eryx during the First Punic War. Carthage was on the back foot on both occasions and decided on defending a few well-chosen and strategic bases rather than spreading its forces over a wide area. By relocating allies, Carthage both ensured their continued support and that they would not be captured or subverted by the Romans. Whether this tactic would prove successful is unknown as Hannibal, Mago, and the remaining Carthaginian forces withdrew to North Africa the following year to face Scipio.

The Carthaginians pursued an obvious policy of forced population resettlement during the First and Second Punic Wars. Much like their policy regarding colonisation, they only exercised such an activity under certain circumstances. From the examples we have seen, resettlement usually occurred during periods of heightened military activity. The Carthaginians used population resettlement as a standard practice during the third century. For various reasons they moved large bodies of sedentary peoples to suit their own needs. If the strategic or demographic configuration of an area did not suit them, they altered it accordingly. Although unorthodox in a classical sense, the Carthaginians pursued this policy with some success enabling them better to manipulate and to extend their influence.

¹⁹ *Hann.* 57.

²⁰ *op. cit.* Θουρίων δὲ τρισχιλίους Καρχηδονίους μάλιστα εὐνοὺς ἐξελόμενος καὶ πεντακοσίους ἄλλους ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγρῶν τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ στρατιᾷ διαρπάζειν ἔδωκεν.

²¹ *op. cit.* τὴν πόλιν εὐκαιρὸν ἡγούμενος εἶναι καὶ ταμιεῖον αὐτὴν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὀρμητήριον ἐπὶ τὰς ἄλλας τιθέμενος.

REDEVELOPMENT AND RESETTLEMENT

Carthage maintained and extended its influence by various means. One of its more traditional methods was colonisation. However, vast existing networks of Phoenician trading ports and colonies left Carthage with little opportunity or in fact need to embark on full-scale missions of colonisation within the Mediterranean. Traditional views such as Warmington's place Carthaginian colonisation of *emporia* as similar to that of the Phoenicians, i.e. massed networks of small trading ports.²² It is possible that Carthage founded numerous original sites, which are now lost. However, it is also likely that any number of these simply took the place of existing Phoenician sites.²³ With the collapse of a structured Phoenician presence in the West, and the decay of several of these coastal networks, Carthage assumed control over such areas and sought to rebuild them under its own control. One of the ways Carthage sought to achieve this was by simply moving into older Phoenician settlements and resettling them itself. On most occasions there was no need to expel pre-existing populations as over time they often developed into Punic subjects. These were not standard missions of colonisation, but more like a simple transference of control, culture, and population in some cases. Often this was inadvertently achieved by constant Carthaginian influence and activity. It is probable that such foundations did not occur immediately, but more likely, a slow transfusion of Punic culture and the impact of Carthaginian control simply displaced the old Phoenician identity of many of these sites.

Like so many aspects of Phoenicio-Punic history, especially in the West, the lack of solid literary evidence and varied archaeological data makes any effort at interpretation difficult. The nature of Phoenician settlement was often temporary or superficial leaving few physical and no literary remains, whereas Carthaginian settlement was more permanent and pervasive providing more material. Whether or not many Punic sites were older Phoenician settlements becomes pure guesswork. As a result it is difficult to discern whether a site was originally Phoenician or Carthaginian.

²² *Carthage*, p.55.

²³ Naturally the Phoenicians before them did not have such a luxury although they settled several known pre-existing or shared sites in North Africa and Sardinia. The extent to which the Carthaginians resettled pre-existing sites was a new departure.

Before discussing possible examples of Carthaginian resettlement, it is useful to view such a process in light of contemporary comparison. Both the Greeks and Romans often resettled pre-existing sites superimposing their own society and culture over that of the previous inhabitants. One of the better examples was the colonisation of Thurii on the old site of Sybaris. The supposed Panhellenic colony of Periclean Athens simply resettled the old and strategic site of Sybaris in 443 after the latter had been worn down by Croton over several decades.²⁴ Camarina, on the south coast of Italy was founded and refounded three times. Originally settled by Syracuse ca. 598, it revolted, was evacuated and then resettled by Hippocrates of Gela. After its inhabitants were again driven out, Gelon settled it once more.²⁵ This tactic of the Sicilian tyrants continued during the fifth century when Gelon removed the people of Naxos and Catana and resettled the site of the latter as Aetna.²⁶ Although these Greek examples were mostly imperial projects, they do offer some good examples of a state actively resettling an older or still-occupied site for its own benefit. Probably the best and most ironic example of resettling an older site during the Roman period is that of Carthage itself. Despite cursing the site as the source of so much historical turmoil for Rome, the Romans themselves could not pass over such a strategic vacant site. Within only a few decades of Carthage's destruction, Gaius Gracchus had attempted to resettle the site unsuccessfully, and within a century Caesar and later Augustus permanently resettled it.

NORTH AFRICA

Demarcating original Phoenician and later Carthaginian foundations is probably most difficult in North Africa than anywhere else in the West. This area evolved into the core of Punic civilisation from that of Phoenician origin mingling with native Libyan culture and foreign influences. The relative speed of this transformation of culture (literally over a couple of centuries) makes for an often-indistinct historical or chronological narrative.

²⁴ Originally Sybaris was an Achaean colony which grew to a great size and prosperity (Strabo (VI.1.13). In 510, the Sybarites were defeated by the Crotoniates (Diod. X.23, XII.9). Some fifty-eight years after this defeat the remaining Sybarites gathered and founded the city anew between the Sybaris and Crathis rivers (XI. 90 3-4). Shortly thereafter the Crotoniates drove them out again (XII.10).

²⁵ Thuc. VI.5; Hdt. VII.156.

²⁶ Diod. XI.49.1.

Several sites in North Africa demonstrate obvious signs of Carthaginian redevelopment. Utica, the oldest Phoenician foundation in the region retained some form of independence after the growth of Carthage. Although it most likely retained a degree of Phoenician character, its propinquity to Carthage would suggest it developed along with it. This is reinforced by the remains of its Punic legacy, which are naturally more prominent than the pre-existing Phoenician.²⁷ The prominent site of Leptis Magna also presents a similar problem. Sallust claims that it was founded (by the Tyrians) in a manner similar to Carthage and that even in the first century BC its laws and culture were like that of Tyre.²⁸ The archaeological record, however, attests a strong Punic culture, assuming that there was a concerted shift and redevelopment of the site.²⁹ Likewise Hadrumentum was permanently settled by the Phoenicians around the eighth century but probably remained fully independent until the sixth century. The Carthaginian expansion throughout North Africa seems to have brought Hadrumentum under Carthaginian influence to a large degree dominating the cultural and political history of the site.³⁰ Such sites as Utica, Leptis Magna, and Hadrumentum are good examples of the uncertain nature of the Phoenicio-Punic presence in North Africa. Literary accounts hint at a Phoenician settlement, whereas archaeological evidence mainly shows a strong Punic presence. With Utica, Leptis Magna, and Hadrumentum it is probable that these sites remained Phoenician colonies, but were dominated politically and culturally by Carthage and thus inadvertently developed into Punic settlements.

Other Phoenician cities leave less doubt that they were physically and culturally redeveloped by Carthage. Sabratha was originally a mere Tyrian trading outpost that evolved into a permanent Punic city during the fifth and fourth centuries. Again Punic evidence dominates the pre-Roman period of Sabratha. The fact that the Phoenicians employed the site as a temporary trading post suggests that the Punic redevelopment of the site into a permanent municipality was wide reaching.³¹ Oea probably developed along similar lines to Sabratha. Although there is evidence

²⁷ See Lézine, pp.134ff; see Chp. I, ns.46-53 and text.

²⁸ *Iug.* LXXVII.1, XIX.1.

²⁹ Carter, pp.126ff.

³⁰ This is evident in the epigraphic remains at the site. There are several inscriptions detailing religious connections to Tanit alongside Ba'al Hammon in addition to a number of Punic style names, see *KAI.* 97-99. Also see Foucher, pp.78-96.

³¹ It appears that Sabratha maintained a Punic-style government as even during Roman period it retained its two *suffetes* until the second century AD. See Chp. I, ns.57-59 and text.

suggesting that it was founded by the Tyrians, Punic remains preponderate.³² Coupled with this was its position between Leptis Magna and Sabratha, both of which underwent a high degree of Punic redevelopment. Unlike the older and more established Phoenician foundations east of Carthage, these two were not well established or firmly settled as other Phoenician centres. Carthage probably assumed control of such basic settlements and developed them further itself.

The possible examples of similar North African settlements to the west of Carthage are not as well established or attested as the other examples. The Phoenicians had previously settled the area to the east of Carthage more heavily than the west. Although not as heavily settled, this did not hinder the progress of Punic expansion in the area including redeveloping or settling existing settlements.

Although evidence is often unclear, it appears that Thugga was heavily influenced and redeveloped by Carthage. Originally a Berber and/or Phoenician trading settlement, there is a quantity of Punic remains at the site including religious iconography.³³ During the invasion of Agathocles in 310, a town called Tocai was apparently occupied by Carthage.³⁴ The geographical position and similarity of the name to that of Thugga implies that they were the same site.³⁵ Diodorus specifically states that Carthage had occupied the town, and therefore was not originally their settlement. Evidence suggests it was annexed and redeveloped almost as a Punic town and was ruled by Carthage for a considerable period.³⁶ Hippo Diarrhytus (Bizerte) seems to have been utilised from early times and maintained a Phoenician-style layout. Although the matter is slightly ambiguous, it is likely that this Hippo is the town Sallust refers to as being settled by the Phoenicians.³⁷ This claim is feasible although there is no Phoenician evidence at the site - only Punic remains attesting Carthaginian presence. The exact origin of Hippo Regius even is less certain. It is possible that this seaport was first visited by Phoenicians. Its position along the North African coastal route coupled with its nature makes it a prime candidate for

³² See Chp. I, ns.63-65 and text.

³³ There is a surviving inscription from Carthage detailing a votive to Tanit and Ba'al Hammon originating from a Libyan town called Thubursicu (*CIS*. I.309). Gsell, *HAAN* II, pp.110-111 has identified this site as Thugga suggesting a close religious connection with Carthage.

³⁴ Diod. XX.57.4.

³⁵ Gsell, *HAAN* II, p.95.

³⁶ Beyond archaeological remains there are two Neo-Punic and Numidian bilingual inscriptions at the site from the time of Micipsa. These demonstrate a strong Punic presence at Thugga both linguistically and demographically again suggesting intense Carthaginian influence.

³⁷ *Iug.* XIX.1.

Phoenician settlement. There is a certain Punic presence at the site before the Romans developed the town further. Hippo Regius is probably most like Sabratha and Oea to the east: a temporary or seasonal Phoenician port resettled permanently by Carthage.

There are a number of settlements to the immediate west of Carthage or in the interior which attest some form of Carthaginian resettlement or refoundation. It appears that a number of sites in the vicinity of Carthage were not original Carthaginian foundations but previously occupied by the Phoenicians or Berbers. Several sites such as Theveste³⁸ and Sicca in the interior and Thapsus, Chullu, Ruscidae, and Saldae on the coast were most likely settled before the arrival of the Carthaginians. This Carthaginian influence is proved by the existence of Punic *suffetes* in several of these towns including Thugga, Cirta, Mactar, and Calama.³⁹ It appears that the native towns in this area were either under direct control from Carthage and were heavily influenced by their neighbour.⁴⁰

Further west between Oued el Kebir and the Pillars of Heracles there is only scanty evidence of Phoenician and Carthaginian ports along the coast. It is likely Phoenician and Carthaginian settlement along this coastline was not as intense as in other areas. The natural geography did not accommodate permanent settlement with an attached hinterland. It is more likely that the Phoenicio-Punic presence along the northern coast of Algeria and Morocco remained mercantile. Sites such as Cartennae, Siga, Russaddir, Portus Magnus, and Tamuda were probable original Phoenician foundations. However, we later find characteristic Punic material remains at these sites especially in tombs.⁴¹ Like similar examples of redevelopment in North Africa, it appears that these sites, linking a long trading route, were original Phoenician ports which were redeveloped as Punic sites as a result of Carthaginian expansion. Carthaginian resettlement of Phoenician and local sites in North Africa is paradoxically both the most believed and least demonstrable in detail in the west. The growth of Carthage presumed that its surrounding hinterland was the first area to fall under its influence. Older and well established towns such as Utica and Hadrumentum

³⁸ Picard suggests the native town described as Hecatompylus by Diodorus (XXIV.10.2) and Polybius (I.73.1) was Theveste. Its council of elders suggests that it maintained some degree of local autonomy during the third century, see Chp. II, n.90.

³⁹ Ilevbare, p.23.

⁴⁰ For a basic overview of Carthaginian presence in this area see Gsell, *HAAN* II, pp.146-154.

⁴¹ Tarradell, pp.38ff. Several sites along the coast west of Tunisia reveal typical Punic remains including ceramics, some basic architectural elements, and metals. This suggests habitation at a number of smaller sites, which were smaller permanent trading ports. Also see Gsell, *HAAN* II, pp.162-169.

maintained some form of their respective identities and basic autonomy but gradually assumed a more Punic-style culture. It is unknown whether or not such sites were officially resettled by Carthage. It was more a cultural and political eclipse of older social and municipal identities. Other less well established sites such as Hippo Regius, Sabratha, and possibly Tingis were simply made permanent by Carthage and thus the superficial Phoenician occupation of these sites was replaced. There appear to be varying degrees of Carthaginian intrusion into pre-existing sites in North Africa. Primarily Carthage annexed them rendering them officially powerless and removing, or perhaps better, super-imposing older cultural, social, and political characteristics.

SICILY, MALTA, GOZO, AND PANTELLERIA

Sicily, Malta, and the surrounding islands, like North Africa, were in early contact with the Phoenicians and Carthaginians. Unlike other regions of Phoenicio-Punic dominance, Sicily was continually divided amongst Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, and to a lesser extent the existing Sicilian peoples. As a result neither the Phoenicians nor Carthaginians had the luxury of settling sites unopposed as they did elsewhere. Their sites were fewer and more prominent than in other regions of settlement. Within some of these settlements a distinct redevelopment of old Phoenician colonies by Punic settlements stemming from Carthage is evident. The smaller surrounding islands such as Malta and to a lesser extent Gozo and Pantelleria also exhibit a distinctive change in character from Phoenician to Punic nature, which suggests a change in social and cultural association. These smaller islands remained exclusively Phoenicio-Punic and it is often difficult to make such a distinction based on little evidence. However, their propinquity to Carthage coupled with their importance to the surrounding Mediterranean trade routes made them essential to Carthaginian interests in the area.

Sicily contained several sites which were redeveloped as Carthage centres. We can discern several sites that were founded by the Phoenicians as well as some that were possibly founded by the Greeks and Elymians. Phoenicio-Punic involvement on the island was rarely static, and it thus displays a mutable settlement pattern. Carthaginian interest in Sicily developed following the collapse of the Phoenician Empire and can first be identified in the early stages of the fifth century. Carthage

assumed control over the old Phoenician territory and was able to gradually acculturate once Phoenician settlements by various means of influence.

According to Thucydides there were three main Phoenician settlements in Western Sicily: Motya, Panormus, and Soloeis.⁴² These three coastal ports enabled the Phoenicians to dominate trade along the northwest and west coasts of Sicily as well as to interact with the Elymian and Greek settlements in the area. It appears from the scant archaeological evidence that these sites were permanently settled during the eighth or seventh century, in agreement with the account of Thucydides. Although originally Phoenician, these sites reveal evidence that there was a concerted phase of Punic influence which implies a form of Carthaginian redevelopment.

Although Lilybaeum is an attested Carthaginian colony, in many respects it was a re-establishment of the older site of Motya. The presence of an unknown quantity of Motyans present in the original colonists of Lilybaeum suggests a continuing legacy of settlement.⁴³ Another relevant factor is that Lilybaeum was founded only one year after the destruction of Motya only 8km. away. Previous to the destruction of Motya, there already appears to have been a developing Punic influence eclipsing its original Phoenician nature. The first Carthaginian treaty with Rome in 509/8 shows Western Sicily as an open Carthaginian territory.⁴⁴ It is likely that the onset of Carthaginian interests in Sicily saw its influence grow at Motya. There are several phases of destruction and rebuilding of various parts of Motya prior to 397. An official Carthaginian presence may have been there during the later stages of the sixth century or at least by the first half of the fifth century, although a more concerted presence developed thereafter.⁴⁵ At least by the time of its destruction it was most likely considered, in many respects a Carthaginian settlement.⁴⁶

Soloeis was probably destroyed by Dionysius in 396 and was re-established shortly thereafter by the remainder of its inhabitants.⁴⁷ The original Phoenician Soloeis most likely stood on Cannita Hill and, like Lilybaeum, the replacement Carthaginian site was founded a slight distance away. Although the destruction of

⁴² VI.2.

⁴³ Diod. XXII.10.4; Paus. V.25.5-6.

⁴⁴ Polyb. III.22.

⁴⁵ Archaeological evidence from Motya is often problematic. There are several possible historical events which may have ushered in the Carthaginian period. This is emphasised by evidence of several phases of destruction. For such evidence see Isserlin and du Plat Taylor, Chps. VII-XI.

⁴⁶ Diod. XIV.47.4-5. Diodorus specifically calls Motya a Carthaginian colony, distinguishing it from what he calls the Phoenician presence over the Greeks in Sicily.

Soloeis is not explicitly documented, it appears from the account of Diodorus that it was a less significant site than Motya and Panormus. What is interesting is that like Motya it was refounded immediately after with remnants of its original population. Soloeis was probably a developing Punic settlement by this stage, and the new site on Monte Catalfano is also distinctly Punic. There is evidence of Punic necropoleis dating from as early as the mid-sixth century with an increase in the fifth century.⁴⁸ Much like Motya, the Phoenician nature of the original Soloeis was subsumed when Carthage resettled the remnants of the town.⁴⁹

Panormus is the final town of the original trio of Phoenician settlements in Western Sicily as mentioned by Thucydides. Although originally Phoenician, it also appears to have undergone a Punic redevelopment. Its importance to Carthage as a strategic base is well documented. This is best attested during the First Punic War when Polybius describes it as the strongest Carthaginian site in Sicily.⁵⁰ Panormus shows a distinctive Punic character in both literary and archaeological sources. Carthage was forced to defend its strategic harbour town from Dionysius, Hermocrates, and Pyrrhus before finally losing the site during the First Punic War. There are several accounts consistent in showing Panormus as a strategic Carthaginian base used for staging invasion and managing retreat. Much like Soloeis, Panormus demonstrates a distinctive mix of Greco-Punic culture from an early period. There appear to be several occupied Punic sites around Panormus especially in the immediate interior suggesting Panormus developed into a coastal site with access to its hinterland.⁵¹ Panormus appears to have enjoyed a major period of growth from the sixth century, possibly coinciding with the establishment of Carthaginian influence.⁵² The importance of the site to Carthage for both trade and strategic purposes implies that it would certainly have developed into a Punic settlement under Carthaginian control.

⁴⁷ Diod. XIV.48.5, 78.7.

⁴⁸ Caterina Greco, "Anfore puniche", in *Archeologia e territorio*, pp.57-69.

⁴⁹ It is appropriate to mention the later nature of Soloeis, or Soluntum as it became. After its refoundation the site became remarkably cosmopolitan with obvious naturalised Punic and Greek elements. Evidence of both cultures' coexistence is apparent from bilingual coinage, religious iconography, pottery fragments, and grave goods. Soloeis became one of the most obvious examples of Greco-Punic interaction in Sicily over a considerable period of time.

⁵⁰ I.38. This is interesting considering the presence of Lilybaeum and Eryx to the west.

⁵¹ Carmela Angela Di Stefano, "Presenze archeologiche nell'area della Conca d'oro tra il VI e III sec a. C.", in *Palermo Punica*, pp.56-61. Interior sites such as Monte D'Oro, Cozzo Papparina, and Castellaccio di Sagana were inhabited from the sixth century and appear to show an intensive period of activity.

There is evidence to suggest Carthage also redeveloped some Greek and Elymian towns in Western Sicily. The Greek presence was the defining factor in limiting Phoenicio-Punic expansion in Sicily. A number of Greek colonies fell under Carthaginian control for various periods of time from the fifth century onward. Selinus was probably the most affected by Carthaginian influence. Lying close to Carthaginian territory, Selinus was often the object of Carthaginian interest especially in regards to its traditional enmity with Segesta. It is implausible to claim that Selinus was ever officially refounded as a Carthaginian settlement; however, it was re-established after its destruction in 409 as a Greek centre under Carthaginian rule and was subject to tribute.⁵³ Previous to this event, Selinus had maintained a lengthy and often amicable relationship with Carthage dating to the Battle of Himera. It is likely that Selinus displayed both Punic and Greek influence based on such a relationship as well as on its position at the border of Greek and Carthaginian territory. We can assume that after the site of Selinus was resettled by some of its inhabitants, that a greater Carthaginian influence was not entirely foreign. After this period and until the evacuation of the site during the First Punic War, there is a distinctive Punic element in the character of the town. After the refoundation of Selinus, several characteristic Punic architectural types appear coupled with larger quantities of Punic remains.⁵⁴ It is unusual to see such a prominent Greek colony exhibit so much Carthaginian material influence.⁵⁵ The final aspect advocating Punic redevelopment is that Carthage removed the population to Lilybaeum in 250.⁵⁶ If Carthage considered Selinus a normal Greek city, it probably would have been abandoned to the Romans. Instead the Carthaginians took great care removing the population to safety and razing the site. This implies that Selinus was closely connected to Carthage during this period. It is likely that Selinus had become an important settlement along the southern coast of Sicily. It had direct access to Carthage and maintained an internal trade route to sites such as Colle Madore and Thermae to the north, and Acragas to the east. Although traditionally considered a Greek colony, Selinus seems to have stood under Carthaginian dominance until its final evacuation and destruction.

⁵² Rossana De Simone and Gioacchino Falsone, "Ceramica Punica", in *Palermo Punica*, pp.306-309.

⁵³ Diod. XIII.59.3.

⁵⁴ Moscati, *Italia Punica*, pp.123-129.

⁵⁵ This is more obvious in the East during this period when the Phoenicians captured several Greek towns on Cyprus, see Chp. I, ns.38-42 and text.

⁵⁶ Diod. XXIV.1.1.

Another Greek colony seems to have been officially re-established by Carthage during this period. Himera, after its destruction at the hands of the vengeful Carthaginian army led by Hannibal in 409, was refounded as *Thermae*.⁵⁷ Apparently it was settled with Carthaginian citizens and other inhabitants of Sicily nearby the older remains of Himera, although it is suggested that the older Greek element made up a considerable part of the new citizenry.⁵⁸ Its subsequent history still assumes a Greek character as do its remains, but like Selinus, it often remained on amicable terms with Carthage. Himera was an integral part of Carthaginian plans on the island, especially in light of the destruction of the Carthaginian army there in 480. Its destruction and resettlement as a Carthaginian stronghold would hopefully ensure its loyalty.⁵⁹ Himera is named as one of the Carthaginian tribute states along with Selinus and Acragas at the end of Hannibal's campaign.⁶⁰ It is presumably referring to *Thermae* its old, familiar Greek name. Although the Greeks in *Thermae* did not necessarily consider itself loyal to Carthage,⁶¹ at least the Carthaginian population remained faithful. In 396, Himilco was on good terms with the *Himeraeans* and presumably used it as a base of operations.⁶² It was lost to Carthage after Dionysius liberated the site, but by 317 had once again become part of Carthaginian territory.⁶³ The mixed reception of the Carthaginians suggests that *Thermae* was not as receptive as other Greek centres. Naturally the site was an important trading port and maintained a link to other Greek and Carthaginian ports as well as with the interior.⁶⁴ Himera, like Selinus to the south, was supposed to be an important settlement for the Carthaginians in Western Sicily. Although officially resettled by Carthage, it remained a Greek settlement with an obvious Carthaginian element.

⁵⁷ Diod. XIII.79.8; Cic. *Verr.* II.2.35.

⁵⁸ Cic. *Verr.* II.35. It was later the birthplace of Agathocles.

⁵⁹ For the strategic importance of Himera to the Carthaginians see Chp. VII, ns.38-40 and text.

⁶⁰ Diod. XIII.114.1.

⁶¹ Diodorus XIV.47.6, claims the *Himeraeans*, along with other Greek cities which detested Phoenician (Carthaginian) rule sent levies to aid Dionysius outside Motya.

⁶² Diod. XIV.56.2.

⁶³ Diod. XIX.2.2.

⁶⁴ There are far fewer Punic remains in *Thermae* compared with *Soloeis* which lay only 20 km. to the west and also experienced heavy Punic and Greek settlement and trade. Himera often changed hands in the numerous conflicts between the Sicilian Greeks and the Carthaginians especially during the fourth century. Presumably Carthage used its influence at Himera as at Acragas, which also demonstrates evidence of a considerable Carthaginian presence. Himera also probably acted as an important port for trade with the interior, linking sites such as Colle Madore. This site has revealed influence from Himera before and after its destruction and also some Punic remains, see Tardo, pp.75-94; Constanza Polizzi, "Anfore da trasporto", in *Colle Madore*, pp.221-232.

Further evidence suggests that the Carthaginians also redeveloped a number of interior sites in Western Sicily.⁶⁵ The main group of people influenced by this Carthaginian expansion in Sicily was the local Elymians.⁶⁶ As was the case in several western territories, the Phoenicians established a long and amicable relationship with the local population, which was continued by the Carthaginians. As a result of protracted contact between Phoenicio-Punic and Elymian cultures we find a high level of interaction in various settlements. The Elymian capital of Segesta attests this well with a distinctive mix of Elymian, Punic, and Greek cultures over several centuries. Probably the site of most interest to us is the old sanctuary of Eryx. This site and the neighbouring town was originally Elymian but was soon utilised by Phoenicians and Carthaginians as the primary cult of Astarte in the West.⁶⁷ Although originally Elymian, the site was soon redeveloped into a Phoenician sanctuary and then a Carthaginian base. Punic influence in Eryx is widespread and dates from the mid-sixth century to the mid-third century. The persistent evidence of Punic habitation and culture implies that Eryx was, in many respects, a Punic settlement. Eryx's importance to Carthaginian interests, and in this case culture, certainly assumes much of the site's identity as Punic, which was gradually superimposed over the existing settlement. Like Selinus, the Elymian foundation was abandoned and razed during the First Punic War.⁶⁸ The fact that the population was removed to Drepana further suggests that Eryx was no longer an Elymian town and that the inhabitants were mainly Phoenicio-Punic. The Romans captured the site in 249, before Hamilcar Barca liberated it for a few years in 244.⁶⁹ Although a tactical move on Hamilcar's part, it does demonstrate continued Carthaginian interest in the site both as a strategic base and as an important Punic cultural centre. Unlike other examples of sites populated by local peoples, which temporarily came under Carthaginian influence, Elymian Eryx demonstrates a considerable Punic influence. This resettlement as a Carthaginian site would most likely have been amicable and prolonged based on the sheer weight of Carthaginian interest in the area.

⁶⁵ This aspect of specific Carthaginian influence on local Sicilian peoples will be discussed in further detail Chp. V.

⁶⁶ It is unknown whether or not the Elymians were indigenous to Sicily. Thucydides claims that they were Trojan refugees (VI.2). Whether this claim is true or not, the Elymians, like the Sicels and Sicanians, possibly migrated to Sicily some time before Greek contact with the area. Often all three groups are described as native or indigenous Sicilians which is possibly incorrect.

⁶⁷ Diod. IV.78; Dion. Hal. I.53.1.

⁶⁸ Diod. XXIII.9.4.

Beyond the main areas of control, Carthaginian influence and possible forms of settlement appear probable. We have seen the importance of Colle Madore acting as a centre of trade. Presumably several waves of Punic invasions saw the site often become part of Carthaginian territory. The same may be said for the Punic settlement on Monte Adranone near Selinus, which shows Punic settlement during the fourth century.⁷⁰ Monte Castellazzo demonstrates similar changes, but like Segesta remains heavily influenced by Greek culture.⁷¹ This coincides with the general reorganisation of settlement patterns in Western Sicily during this period and the appearance of more Punic hilltop forts. The exact nature and extent of Carthaginian settlement in the interior remains largely unknown. However, the general increase of Carthaginian interest in Sicily during the fifth century implies that Carthage came into contact with many similar settlements. Whether or not several Elymian and possibly other Sicilian towns were resettled officially is unclear, however, it seems that a number fell under Carthaginian influence during this period and demonstrate signs of redevelopment.

Carthaginian resettlement on Sicily presented a different social and political pattern than in other areas. Carthage expanded and assumed sites of Phoenician, Greek, and Sicilian origins. Its absorption and redevelopment of the old Phoenician sites of Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus is obvious and was certainly aided by the destruction of the two former sites, enabling it to re-establish the sites anew as Punic settlements. We also find Greek settlements such as Selinus and Himera destroyed and then resettled supposedly by the remnants of their original populations. Otherwise several native settlements reacted to regular Phoenicio-Punic contact developing obvious Punic characteristics. Carthaginian resettlement and refoundation took several forms in Western Sicily. The unstable political climate and the Carthaginian inability to conquer the island often forced Carthage to redirect its interests and often forms an inconsistent narrative of events. Nonetheless there is some evidence demonstrating Carthage moving into pre-established sites and influencing, if not altering their respective social and political characters.

The islands lying between Sicily and North Africa are testament to some of the earlier stages of Carthaginian expansion and Punic influence. Although smaller and more isolated, there is evidence of certain sites being redeveloped by Carthage.

⁶⁹ Polyb. I.56ff.

⁷⁰ Moscati, *Italia Punica*, pp.132-135.

⁷¹ See Rosa Maria Albanese Procelli, *Sicani, Siculi, Elimi* (Milan 2003) pp.209, 240.

These islands were established as important intermediary ports in Phoenician trading strategies. They continued such a role in Carthaginian mercantile and imperial policies. The location of islands such as Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria exposed them to regular contact and influence from Carthage.

The largest of these islands, Malta (Melita) was the most significant and strategic to Phoenicio-Punic activity. Although originally settled by the Phoenicians as a trading outpost, Carthage rapidly assumed sovereignty and influence over the island probably during the late sixth century. Diodorus describes the island as a Phoenician colony possessing safe harbours and a number of local commodities and industries.⁷² Initially the Phoenicians operated Malta as a strategic trading outpost between North Africa and Sicily. The rise of Carthage during the sixth century saw various marked changes in the role and nature of Phoenician Malta. The small island was ultimately resettled as a Punic territory under the direct control of Carthage. A good indication of this transformation is the aforementioned citation from Stephanus of Byzantium claiming that Melita was colonised by the Carthaginians.⁷³ Whether an official Carthaginian resettlement occurred or not is debatable, as is Stephanus' claim. However, it is interesting that the island, although known as a Phoenician settlement, was later considered and accepted as Carthaginian in origin. There is an obvious change in opinion regarding the origin of Phoenicio-Punic settlement on the island, which must be based on observable fact. Stephanus' misinterpretation is also supported to a certain degree by archaeological evidence, which suggests an obvious shift in nature Phoenician to Carthaginian. First, the position of the primary harbours on Malta implies an obvious shift in purpose for the island within the Carthaginian Empire. Originally the primary harbour was located on Marsascirocco Bay in the south so as to service traffic originating from the east and North Africa. By the third century however, Carthage and its constant interaction with Sicily and Southern Italy saw the development of the so-called Grand Harbour on the north-eastern coast of Malta. This development illustrates a changing emphasis on Malta from the older Phoenician trading routes to those established by Carthage for trade and expansion.⁷⁴

⁷² V.12.2-3.

⁷³ Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Μελίτη ἔστι καὶ πόλις ἄποικος Καρχηδονίων.

⁷⁴ Quantities of Egyptian remains have been discovered on both Malta and Gozo. It appears that earlier remains dating from the Phoenician period resemble types in the East from areas such as the Levantine coast, Cyprus, and Rhodes. Later remains from the Punic period track a distinctive shift in trade routes with similar Egyptian items found in North Africa, Sardinia, Spain, and the Balearic Islands. These

Looking further at the physical remains on Malta there is a natural shift from Phoenician to Punic influence in the forms of common wares, buildings, and religious practice and iconography.⁷⁵ Coinage is evidently Punic further emphasising economic connections with Carthage.⁷⁶ It appears that in one sense at least Stephanus' statement was correct. It is unlikely that Carthage would have officially resettled Malta. More likely it was a process of initial political influence during the sixth century triggering a longer process of social and cultural absorption of Punic culture under Carthaginian influence.

The island of Gozo (Gaulos) lies only a short distance to the northwest of Malta and in many ways is distinguishable as a satellite to the main island. This becomes more obvious when considering its history during both the Phoenician and Punic periods. Like Malta, Diodorus describes Gozo as a Phoenician colony situated mid-sea with serviceable harbours.⁷⁷ It is likely that the historical narrative of Gozo is similar to that of Malta. The sixth century seems to have ushered the arrival of Punic influence on the island. Again there is a later testament to an obvious shift in the character of Gozo, this time in Pseudo-Scylax who claims both Malta and Gozo as Carthaginian.⁷⁸ If we were to apply a similar formula to Gozo as to Malta, there appears to have been a Punic redevelopment of the pre-existing Phoenician settlement on the island. The main site at Ras-il-Wardija demonstrates a similar pattern of Carthaginian influence as seen on Malta, although on a smaller scale. Epigraphic evidence also suggests Gozo possessed a cult to Astarte and Ba'al and *suffetes*.⁷⁹ There is also distinctive Punic numismatic evidence from Gozo from the first century BC. Although no longer a Carthaginian settlement, the image of Astarte still features on coinage recognising an obvious past influence.⁸⁰ Although small, Gozo seems to have figured as an important centre for Carthaginian interests.

The final island of consideration is Pantelleria (Cossura). This small island is placed *en route* between Carthage and the west coast of Sicily. It is possible that the Phoenicians settled there in a manner similar to that on Malta and Gozo.

remains are mostly dated to after 600 BC. See Günther Höbl, *Ägyptisches Kulturgut auf den Inseln Malta und Gozo*, pp.42ff.

⁷⁵ Moscati, *Italia Punica*, pp.333-339.

⁷⁶ *HN*² p.883. Coin legends are Punic while iconography is also influenced with Egyptian images and also Heracles.

⁷⁷ V.12.4.

⁷⁸ *GGM*. I. 111, p.89 (ed. Müller).

⁷⁹ *KAI*. 62.

Unfortunately it is not well attested by ancient authors with only small consideration afforded by Pseudo-Scylax who claims that the island was one day's sail from Lilybaeum.⁸¹ It is interesting that Lilybaeum is mentioned in connection to the island being an original Carthaginian colony. Pseudo-Scylax may have been applying Carthaginian distances to the island based on the latter's sea routes. Coupled with this was the island's position close to Carthage and therefore obviously prone to its political and cultural influence.⁸² The Romans briefly captured the island during the First Punic War in 254 before Carthage re-established its authority there.⁸³ Pantelleria was finally lost to Carthage in 217 when Gnaeus Servilius captured the island.⁸⁴ It appears as though Carthage assumed control over this small island as a strategic base between the Sicilian settlements and itself.

The islands between Sicily and North Africa offer a useful insight into the spread of Carthaginian power and Punic influence. Positioned relatively near to Carthage, and being relatively small and isolated, Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria demonstrate obvious signs of Carthaginian redevelopment. From literary and archaeological evidence it appears as though these islands became subject to Carthage during the sixth century and then over the immediate centuries developed more obvious Punic societies. Carthage had need for such mid-sea ports, as did their Phoenician predecessors. Strategic expansion in Sicily saw these islands employed as useful ports-of-call *en route* to the southern and western coasts of Sicily. With the redefinition of their political and mercantile roles, these islands' respective cultures developed with constant interaction with Punic culture. The near-complete transformation from Phoenician to Punic is well attested on these islands and is evidence of the ability of Carthage to influence existing settlements.

SARDINIA

The Phoenician presence on Sardinia is identifiable from the ninth century BC originating directly from Phoenicia or possibly from Phoenician Cyprus. As usual the

⁸⁰ *HN*² p.883.

⁸¹ *GGM*. I. 111, p.89 (ed. Müller).

⁸² Moscati, *Italia Punica*, pp.136-138, there are several obvious Punic influences on the island including a necropolis and a variety of material remains.

⁸³ Zonar. VIII.14.

⁸⁴ Polyb. III.96.13.

Phoenicians developed and maintained good relations with the native population to promote trade.⁸⁵ Their standard pattern of settlement saw numerous coastal *emporia* dotted along the southern and western coasts of the island around larger coastal centres. Carthaginian influence spread to Sardinia in the sixth century, rapidly overshadowing the earlier Phoenician presence. The importance of the island to Carthaginian foreign policy is obvious, forming a northern boundary to the empire excluding Greeks and possibly Etruscans and Romans, while connecting the northern east-west trade route between the Balearic Islands and Western Sicily. The major Phoenician settlements on Sardinia demonstrate a marked change in political and cultural identity during the sixth century to a Carthaginian dominated society.

There is an amount of literary evidence attesting a determined Carthaginian effort to annex and dominate Sardinia. Justin claims that during the sixth century Malchus and then the sons of Mago, Hasdrubal and Hamilcar led expeditions to the island against the native Sard population.⁸⁶ Although these invasions met with failure, Carthaginian supremacy in at least the south and west of the island is obvious by the time of the first treaty with Rome in 509/8.⁸⁷ The Carthaginian's influence spread inland until they controlled much of the south and west of the island by the fifth century. It would seem logical that by the end of the sixth century, the Carthaginians had already gained control over the Phoenician coastal cities and were confident to subjugate part of the native population. Diodorus claims that the Carthaginians never subdued these people owing to the rugged and mountainous terrain of the interior.⁸⁸ This statement is later confirmed by the evidence of a chain of interior Carthaginian fortifications designed to protect Carthaginian territory in the west and south of the island.⁸⁹ This conquest never appears complete, however, as Diodorus states that the Libyans and Sardinians revolted against the Carthaginians in 379 after plague had ravaged the latter's army outside Syracuse.⁹⁰ Although never subduing the island as a

⁸⁵ This is best attested by the fact that several Phoenician settlements on Sardinia were original nuraghe settlements. Some examples include the major centres of Caralis, Sulcis, and Tharros.

⁸⁶ XVIII.7.1-2; XIX.1.3. These defeats are also implied by Diodorus (IV.29.6).

⁸⁷ Sardinia is mentioned alongside Libya as areas of exclusive Carthaginian economic activity (Polyb. III.22). Although the references are chronologically unclear, both Diodorus (IV.29.6) and Strabo (V.2.7) claim that Carthage either fought for or was master of Sardinia.

⁸⁸ V.15.4-5.

⁸⁹ Ferruccio Barreca, "Le fortificazioni fenicio-puniche in Sardegna", *Orientalis Antiqui Collectio XIII*, 1978, pp.115-127; Robert J. Rowland, "Beyond the Frontier in Punic Sardinia", *AJAH VII*, 1982, pp.20-39.

⁹⁰ XV.24.

whole, at least Carthage managed to gain control over the older Phoenician network of settlement, which remained the basis of its own settlement on the island.

It is difficult to presume exact histories for separate Phoenicio-Punic settlements on Sardinia as there is only a limited literary tradition attesting their presence on the island. However, from the scant literary, and archaeological evidence we possess, we are able to discern several centres of Carthaginian redevelopment.

Caralis (Cagliari), the most prominent ancient settlement on Sardinia, was probably the capital of the Phoenician settlements on the island.⁹¹ Its original Phoenician legacy is distinguishable from that of the later Punic period with varying material remains often including distinguishable Phoenician, Sicilian, and Cypriot items.⁹² This is understandable, as it was the easternmost major Phoenician settlement on Sardinia and maintained direct links to Carthage, Sicily, and the East. The earliest Phoenician evidence at Caralis are the necropoleis datable to the seventh century. As is the case in other areas of Phoenician influence or settlement, it is likely that permanent settlement was not established for a considerable period of time after using temporary or seasonal facilities. The ninth century, as based on the dating of the Nora inscription, is most likely applicable to some Phoenician settlement, or at least a presumed presence at Caralis. It seems likely that Caralis would have been one of the first, if not the original Phoenician settlement on Sardinia annexed by Carthage and would show signs of redevelopment. Punic penetration in Caralis appears widespread, with varied remains including walls, housing, iconography of Tanit, and a *topheth*.⁹³ Remains of a number of tombs and religious structures are decidedly Carthaginian.⁹⁴ Caralis assumes the role of the main Carthaginian settlement on the island. It remained one of the primary ports on the island, which became particularly strategic to Carthage for both war and trade, especially in regard to the export of commodities from its surrounding territory and the interior.⁹⁵ It seems likely that the local

⁹¹ Along with Sulcis, it is named as the main settlement on the island in antiquity (Paus. X.17.9; Strabo V.2.7).

⁹² Enrico Acquaro, "Sardinia", in *The Phoenicians*, Sabatino Moscati (ed.), p.264.

⁹³ For some examples see Serena Maria Cecchini, *I ritrovamenti fenici e punici in Sardegna* (Rome 1969) pp.33-38; Ferruccio Barreca, *La Sardegna fenici e punica*, pp.200-203; Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, pp.211-228. Cecchini has provided a useful overview as well as a bibliography of many Sardinian sites and their Phoenicio-Punic remains.

⁹⁴ Ferruccio Barreca, *La Sardegna fenici e punica* (Sassari 1974) pp.153-155.

⁹⁵ There are reports of grain being exported from Sardinia to Sicily in times of need. In 480, Hamilcar dispatched part of his fleet there to fetch grain (Diod. XI.20.4); and in 396 Sardinian supplies aided the Carthaginian troops besieging Syracuse (Diod. XIV.77.6). Hamilcar was based at Panormus on the north coast of Sicily and therefore the closest Carthaginian base in Sardinia was Caralis. Although not

government at Caralis was modelled on the Carthaginian system. A Punic inscription from Caralis mentions the presence of two *suffetes* in the third century.⁹⁶ The presence of such a characteristically Carthaginian government, coupled with the archaeological remains and fragmentary literary tradition suggests that Caralis was quickly developed into a Punic centre on Sardinia.

The second major Phoenicio-Punic settlement on Sardinia was Sulcis, located on the south-western coast. The archaeological record attests Phoenician settlement at Sulcis to the ninth century when the site with its twin harbours attracted merchants and settlers with a strategic harbour and defensible topography. Positioned on a small island connected to the mainland by a partially artificial isthmus, Sulcis offered the Phoenicians the luxury of seaborne traffic and also monitored connections with the mainland. The slightly later foundation of Monte Sirai in the hinterland as a trading post and industrial settlement connected with the native population attests the role of Sulcis as a major port for the export of natural resources especially lead and silver. The strategic value of Sulcis can be demonstrated by its subsequent annexation by Carthage and the Punic redevelopment thereafter. Much like the other major centres on Sardinia, Carthaginian influence is datable to the sixth century. Again, Carthaginian resettlement of Sulcis is suggested, this time by an error in Claudian, who claims that the site was originally founded by Carthage.⁹⁷ As in the case of Malta, a later ancient author believed that an original Phoenician settlement was actually Carthaginian. This is an important distinction as Sulcis is one of the two major centres on Sardinia along with Caralis and was well recognised by several authors in antiquity. The Punic remains at Sulcis attest some of its main functions. Carthaginian roads near Sulcis granted easy access to large volumes of traffic and were possibly useful for trade movement and even troop deployment when necessary.⁹⁸ There are several examples of a strong Punic culture evident in Sulcis, which helps corroborate Claudian's suggestion of a Carthaginian settlement. Fortunately there is a relevant abundance of surviving evidence at the site showing various types of Punic temples, tombs, and a well-preserved *topheth*. Coupled with these aspects are the Punic stelae

stated, it seems logical that the supplies were coming from Caralis when we take into account both geographic and historical considerations.

⁹⁶ KAI. 65.

⁹⁷ XV.518, *pars adit antiqua ductos Karthagine Sulcos*.

⁹⁸ The latter is suggested by Moscati, *The Phoenicians*, p.213. Such a use is likely considering the Carthaginian invasions during the sixth century and later uprisings, which would have required strong coastal bases with good access to the interior.

and other distinctive religious iconography.⁹⁹ On a more basic level, we find everyday items such as Punic lamps, statues, and building fragments. It appears that Sulcis was literally transformed from a Phoenician settlement into a fully-fledged Punic site under the influence of Carthage.

The elevated settlement of Monte Sirai is closely located and connected to Sulcis and is important as a different type of Phoenicio-Punic settlement. Originally settled in the seventh century by the Phoenicians, Monte Sirai is a good example of an interior settlement geared at interacting with local peoples for both industry and trade. The concept is not unique, with similar Phoenician operations discernible in Cyprus, Sicily, Spain, and North Africa. What makes Monte Sirai different is its appearance and function as a fortified trading settlement. Original Phoenician interests would certainly have recognised the defensible potential of the site especially in relation to Sulcis on the coast. However, it was not until the Punic period that it was fully developed and fortified.¹⁰⁰ The importance of the site attracted a Carthaginian garrison in order to protect Carthaginian influence in the area and the interior trade routes from the indomitable Sards.¹⁰¹ The development of Monte Sirai is typical of Carthaginian policy throughout Sardinia at the time by establishing a frontier of fortified positions to enhance and protect their influence and activities in the area. Despite Monte Sirai's bellicose nature, we must not forget its purpose as an intermediary station to Sulcis, with a thriving industrial base and importance to trade. There is evidence of workshops in Monte Sirai producing various wares including sculptors, goldsmiths, and potters. The site also possessed a thriving Punic culture similar to that at Sulcis. Remains of several temples, tombs, and a *topheth* suggest it was more than just a Carthaginian garrison or industrial town but in fact a developed and self-contained Punic settlement.¹⁰²

Nora is one of the most significant Phoenician sites in Sardinia. Settled as early as the ninth century on the south coast of Sardinia it is attested both mythologically and epigraphically as the oldest settlement on Sardinia. It also attests a

⁹⁹ *KAI*. 172, a dedication to 'the goddess': presumably Tanit. On the site itself, see Cecchini, pp.93-98.

¹⁰⁰ Barreca, "Le fortificazioni fenicio-puniche in Sardegna", pp.120-121.

¹⁰¹ The amicable relationship between the Phoenicians and the native people as deduced from analogical examples and as implied by Pausanias (X.17) seems to have eroded by the time Carthage annexed the old Phoenician areas of settlement. Several invasions and revolts attest the new style of Carthaginian expansion preferring domination rather than association. Trade and industry between the two parties would certainly have continued, but presumably under different forms of control.

¹⁰² Barreca, *La Sardegna fenicia e punica*, pp.199ff.

wide variety of influence with evidence of contact with Spain, North Africa, Cyprus, and Etruria.¹⁰³ Like many other Phoenician sites on Sardinia, Nora fell under the dominion and influence of Punic Carthage during the later sixth century. This is best attested by the fortification of the site during the sixth and fifth centuries.¹⁰⁴ The changing role of Nora as a protected port is not only attested by developments at the site but also by the new expansive and aggressive policies of Carthage. Punic influence seems to have eclipsed the original Phoenician culture of Nora. There is a prevalence of Punic religious iconography from the site with distinctive depictions of Tanit. Otherwise tombs, architecture, and evidence of a *topheth* suggest the prevalence of Punic culture. Despite being attested as the oldest centre of Phoenician settlement on Sardinia, Nora fell under Carthaginian influence. Although evidence of its varied and unique culture during the Phoenician period remains, Punic ascendancy soon ushered in the end of the original Phoenician control and nature of the site.

Another Phoenician settlement, Tharros was probably founded during the eighth century on the northern cape of the Gulf of Oristano on the west coast of Sardinia. The site was well positioned for access to Tyrrhenian trade routes from Italy and Corsica. Originally a basic Phoenician trade enclave, Tharros was drastically redeveloped during the later sixth century with the onset of Carthaginian dominance in the area. It is natural that Carthage would take such an interest in Tharros during this period, not only to continue trade with Etruscan and then Roman Italy but also with the Phocaeans based in Massilia and along the coasts of Southern France and Eastern Spain. Evidence suggests that Tharros grew rapidly into a substantial Carthaginian port and in several aspects a redeveloped colony. During the sixth century there were major developments made in the site including fortifications, a water supply, and monumental temples.¹⁰⁵ The remains of the site are mostly Punic with two distinctive necropoleis and evidence of a *topheth*.¹⁰⁶ Evidence of a complete overhaul of the site during the sixth century coinciding with Carthaginian expansion

¹⁰³ Cecchini, pp.60-68; Aubet, *The Phoenicians and The West*, pp.241-242; Barreca, *La Sardegna fenicia e punica*, pp.134f., 171f., 237ff.

¹⁰⁴ Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, p.313. This possibly coincides with the fortification of Motya in Sicily.

¹⁰⁵ Acquaro, "Sardinia", pp.271-276.

¹⁰⁶ *KAI*. 67.

in Sardinia implies that Tharros was annexed by Carthage and redeveloped as a Punic settlement.¹⁰⁷

A final Phoenicio-Punic site of consideration on Sardinia is Bithya, situated on the south coast just down the eastern shore of the Chia Basin from Nora. The ancient site dominated the mouth of the Chia River and two natural inlets. Originally founded during the eighth century, the site was developed during the seventh and sixth centuries.¹⁰⁸ As to be expected, the settlement fell under the influence of Carthage thereafter and rapidly developed into a Punic settlement. Evidence suggests that Bithya was a major producer and exporter of votive statues with large caches discovered at the site.¹⁰⁹ There is obvious Punic influence at the site with the usual necropolis and *topheth* present. Otherwise there is an inscription from the second century AD which refers to the existence of *suffetes*.¹¹⁰ Although there had been Roman control over Sardinia for several centuries, it is possible that they left the local Punic government in place and that *suffetes* had presumably been used during the Punic period. The location of the settlement in the midst of several important Carthaginian settlements and its access to the hinterland would have made Bithya a useful site for Carthaginian interests in Sardinia.

Carthaginian expansion and influence into areas of Sardinia seems to have been considerable. Although we have looked at several separate examples of Phoenician settlements becoming Punic, in many respects, Sardinia seems to have been resettled as a whole. Sardinia appears to have been a single Carthaginian province and was governed in such a manner. In every major centre discussed, there is graphic evidence of Punic culture and society eclipsing the existing Phoenician model. The Carthaginians' economic interests saw the coastal ports, industries, and trade routes all being incorporated and redirected for their own benefit.¹¹¹ This would have benefited from a unified political system in Sardinia. It is likely that most major centres possessed a local government based on the Carthaginian system of *suffetes*, which were answerable to a capital (i.e. Caralis) or directly to Carthage itself. The fortification of many sites and the establishment of a line of interior forts protecting

¹⁰⁷ Barreca, "Le fortificazioni fenicio-puniche in Sardegna", pp.117-118; *La Sardegna fenicia e punica*, *passim*; Cecchini, pp.102-108.

¹⁰⁸ Cecchini, pp.26-31.

¹⁰⁹ Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, pp.222-223.

¹¹⁰ *KAI*. 173.

¹¹¹ This is best attested by the large amount of Punic coinage evident by the fourth century in Sardinia suggesting a strong local economy, see Acquaro, "Sardinia", p.277.

the coastal settlements and the trading routes also implies that Sardinia was being operated as a province and not just as a conglomeration of independent settlements as the Phoenicians had once done. Sardinia underwent a full-scale redevelopment from the late sixth century. Carthaginian rule saw the old Phoenician settlements evolve into Punic dependencies with a new culture, society, and political institutions.

SPAIN

The arrival of Carthaginian power in Southern Spain is heralded by marked change in several older Phoenician sites. Much like the process in Sardinia, Carthage assumed the older Phoenician sites, often redeveloping them, and later pushed into the interior. Like other areas of Carthaginian expansion, Spain seems to have been annexed officially or at least influenced by the sixth and fifth centuries although most sites demonstrate obvious Punic changes in the fourth century. Carthage saw great financial and strategic value in Spain as the Phoenicians had done before. Control in the area meant control of its lucrative trade routes and territory. The result of this was a distinctive change in the original Phoenician settlements of Southern Spain into Punic centres subordinate to Carthage.

Gades was the most prominent Phoenician settlement in the area. The site became renowned for several reasons including trade, fishing, and its general prosperity. The Phoenician foundation of Gades was based on economic motives. This specifically revolved around the extraction of silver from its hinterland and trade with Tartessus. The silver, which later funded both the Carthaginians and Romans, was originally used by the Phoenicians to build their 'empire'.¹¹² Although archaeological records only attest Phoenician presence in Gades from the eighth century, it demonstrates contact with Etruria, Tartessus, Greece, and naturally continued contact with the East.¹¹³ The collapse of both Phoenician and Tartessian power during the first half of the sixth century saw a rapid decline in Gades from its former prominence owing to the breakdown of the settled infrastructure. This period also coincides with Phocaeen expansion down the eastern coast of Spain. The

¹¹² Diodorus claims that the foundation of Phoenician colonies in the West was funded by the export of Tartessian silver. He also emphasises the importance of this by claiming that Phoenician merchants would replace their lead anchors with silver ones for the return journey to utilise their ship's capacity (V.35.4-5).

¹¹³ For the function and evidence of Phoenician Gades see Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, pp.257-291.

recession ended later during the sixth century with the arrival of Carthage. As it had done in settlements in both Sicily and Sardinia, Carthage actively assumed control over Gades, its territory, and its trade routes.¹¹⁴ The first hint at a possible Carthaginian redevelopment of Gades comes from its own name. According to Solinus and Pliny the Carthaginians named the site Gadir (*Gdr*, גדר) meaning redoubt or fence.¹¹⁵ Whether this claim is true or not, it demonstrates that there had been obvious Punic infiltration in Gades to the point that two later authors made an obvious connection between Carthage and Gades post-dating Phoenician presence. Evidence of subsequent Carthaginian control of Gades is obvious from the late sixth century until the fall of the site to the Romans in 206 BC, although like other prominent Phoenician centres, it maintained a degree of local autonomy.¹¹⁶ Carthaginian occupation of Gades may have begun shortly after the withdrawal of traditional Phoenician and Tartessian influence. Justin reports that the Carthaginians arrived in Spain for the first time at the request of the Gaditani, who were under attack from neighbouring peoples.¹¹⁷ The timing of such attacks following the collapse of Phoenician power and the Tartessian monarchy is a possibility. The invitation of the Gaditani to the Carthaginians as kindred suggests that Carthage faced no Phoenician protest to its arrival. This smooth transition is later contested by Vitruvius who discusses the Carthaginian siege and presumable capture of Gades.¹¹⁸ However that may be, the result remains the same: Carthage took control of the site and its territory thereafter. Following the Carthaginian takeover we find the gradual increase of Punic necropoleis and religious connections.¹¹⁹ A general shift in remains to specific Punic types also shows a cultural development.¹²⁰ The Carthaginian possession of Gades did

¹¹⁴ Gades controlled the hinterland adjacent to the island including the original Tartessian settlement of Dona Blanca and possibly other settlements in the Guadalquivir Valley, Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, p.230.

¹¹⁵ Pliny *NH.* IV.120; Solinus XXIII.12. The later more common form Gades most likely originates from the Greek rendering of the name (see Hdt. IV.8).

¹¹⁶ This is demonstrated in 205 BC when Mago was barred entry from the city and was forced to appeal the resident *suffetes* to enter (Livy XXVIII.38.1).

¹¹⁷ XLIV.5, *Post regna deinde Hispaniae primi Karthaginienses imperium provinciae occupavere. Nam cum Gaditani a Tyro, unde et Karthaginiensibus origo est, sacra Herculis per quietem iussi in Hispanium transtulissent urbemque ibi condidissent, invidentibus incrementis novae urbis finitimis Hispaniae populis ac propterea Gaditanos bello lacessentibus auxilium consanguineis Karthaginienses misere. Ibi felici expeditione et Gaditanos ab iniuria vindicaverunt et maiore iniuria partem provinciae imperio suo adiecerunt.*

¹¹⁸ *De Arch.* X.13.1-2; Athenaeus Poliorcetus 9, see Chp. VII, n.16.

¹¹⁹ KAI. 71; Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, p.241.

¹²⁰ Diego Ruiz Mata, "The Ancient Phoenicians in the Bay of Cádiz", in *The Phoenicians in Spain*, pp.192-196.

not affect the mercantile nature of the site as it remained active and wealthy during the Punic period. Gades became vital to Carthaginian revenue collection and Atlantic trade especially from the fifth century onward with constant interest and activity in the area as attested by the journeys of Hanno and Himilco. Evidence of distinctive Punic coinage at Gades suggests that the settlement was both prosperous and later able to strike its own coinage to assist trade.¹²¹ The resilience of the Phoenicians in Gades is difficult to guess. The supposed antiquity of the site as a Phoenician colony, the continuation of the temple of Melqart, and several later references to Gades identifying it as Phoenician, all give the impression that, like Utica, Gades remained in several ways a Phoenician settlement. By the time of the Carthaginian arrival, Gades had long been a Phoenician capital with well established relations with the interior, its own sphere of influence, and considerable prosperity. The fact that Carthage simply assumed control of the site politically and eventually culturally does not imply that the previous Phoenician legacy was simply erased. We should consider, for example, the continued use and importance of the temple of Melqart on the island. It remained a Phoenicio-Punic cult until the Roman period.¹²² Although Melqart was an important divinity in the Punic pantheon, the continued use of the temple in a similar manner remains a direct link to the Phoenician settlement and nature of the site. The origin of Gades as a Phoenician settlement was not in doubt in antiquity. Both Strabo and Velleius Paterculus state specifically that Phoenicians founded the site.¹²³ It appears that despite constant Punic influence from the sixth century onwards and cultural changes, Gades remained an identifiably Phoenician settlement.

East of Gades lies a network of several closely placed Phoenician coastal settlements. From Malaca to Abdera there is a clear pattern of settlement. Although these settlements appear as independent trading centres, it is difficult to separate them owing to their proximity to each other. It is interesting that these sites reveal common settlement topography in that they are all situated on coastal promontories usually at the mouths of rivers.¹²⁴ Several better attested colonies survive in this small area and

¹²¹ *HN*² p.3, such depictions include Heracles and tunny fish. It is interesting that their coinage standard was later the same as Emporion and Rhoda suggesting a strong trading link with the Greeks to the north.

¹²² Diod. XXV.10.1; *Sil. Ital. Pun.* III.1; *App. Hisp.* 65.

¹²³ *Vel. Pat. Hist. Rom.* I.2.3; Strabo III.5.5.

¹²⁴ Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, p.251ff.

run, from west to east: Malaca, Toscanos, Sexi, and Abdera.¹²⁵ These settlements, among others, remained important centres of trade during the Punic period and exhibit evidence that they were redeveloped after the arrival of Carthage.

The first of these settlements, Malaca (Malaga) is a good example of Punic redevelopment of a site. Literary evidence suggests that the Carthaginians founded the site during the fifth century. Traditionally the residents of Malaca were recognised as Libyphoenicians and therefore identified as colonists from Africa.¹²⁶ However, Strabo claims that the site was typically Phoenician in configuration and Avienus adds that the Phoenicians once frequented the area.¹²⁷ Archaeological evidence also shows Phoenician settlement in Malaca with evidence of an early necropolis dating from the eighth century.¹²⁸ Punic involvement saw a redevelopment of the site with emphasis on urbanisation. Punic coinage was struck and the general nature of archaeological evidence alters significantly. There is a difference in opinion regarding the origins of Malaca. The mixture of literary and archaeological evidence suggests that it was originally a Phoenician site which was then redeveloped during a distinctive Punic phase. The Phoenicians may have only used Malaca as an *emporion* whereas the advent of Carthage brought a more settled and permanent presence at the site. As a result of this redevelopment, Malaca became the most prominent Punic site in the area. If this is the case, it demonstrates Carthage's ability to assume control of an existing site and redevelop it to suit its needs.

Only a few kilometres east of Malaca is the site of Toscanos. Recent and extensive archaeological excavations have revealed nearly the entire history of the site.¹²⁹ Phoenician settlement began ca. 750-720. The site grew considerably incorporating a market, an industrial area, and a warehouse facility. Toscanos also dominated a hinterland suitable for grazing and agriculture. The Phoenician period of Toscanos can be tracked until the mid sixth century when, like several other Phoenician sites in the region it was abandoned. The Punic redevelopment of Toscanos was not considerable enough to consider it a replacement of the former site. There is evidence of early Carthaginian influence in a necropolis nearby at Jardín

¹²⁵ There are also several smaller Phoenician settlements in this area which deserve mention. These include Guadalhorce, Cerro del Villar, and Chorreras.

¹²⁶ Avienus *OM*. L.421.

¹²⁷ Strabo III.4.2; Avienus *OM*. Ll.440, 459-460.

¹²⁸ Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, pp.307-314, 326-330.

¹²⁹ Aubet, *The Phoenicians in the West*, pp.257-264; Hans Geog Niemeyer, "Die phöenizische Niederlassung Toscanos: eine Zwischenbilanz", in *Phönizier im Westen*, pp.185-206.

suggesting the site was starting to show some forms of influence.¹³⁰ However, the hill of Toscanos remained uninhabited until the Roman period. The Punic restructuring of Toscanos is evident: after the Phoenician evacuation of the site and the Carthaginian annexation, Toscanos remained little more than a Punic coastal area of low standing owing to a Carthaginian policy of preferring new urbanisation rather than the older tactic of settling networked trade centres.

Heading east, the next settlement for consideration is Sexi (Almuñécar). Strabo claims that along with Malaca and Abdera, Sexi was founded by the Phoenicians and can be dated to the eighth century.¹³¹ Sexi was most likely important not only as a trading port but also for its fisheries.¹³² Quantities of murex shells at the site attest such activity. Evidence from the area shows distinctive connections with eastern influences, especially Egyptian.¹³³ Remains also show that Sexi produced and exported/imported high quality products suggesting a surprising degree of wealth. Painted ostrich eggs originally imported from Africa have been revealed in the Punic necropolis in Sexi demonstrating a continuation of refinement in local taste and a certain amount of prosperity. Like other settlements in the area during the sixth century, however, Phoenician presence in the site waned and was eventually replaced by Carthaginian. Sexi was obviously still in existence after Punic influence spread to Southern Spain as it is named alongside Malaca and Abdera as a Phoenician settlement in the region.¹³⁴ Further Punic remains from the site are not abundant but show a distinctive change originating in the late sixth century to the full development of a Punic society during the fourth century.¹³⁵ Additional evidence shows Sexi struck coinage during the Punic period. This is likely a connection with the ore producing areas of the interior.

Abdera (Adra), mentioned by Strabo as a Phoenician foundation, is similarly dated to its surrounding settlements in the eighth century and is positioned in a corresponding topographical manner. Phoenician Abdera most likely enjoyed trade as

¹³⁰ C.R. Whittaker, "The Carthaginians in Ancient Spain – from Administrative Trade to Territorial Annexation", *Studia Phoenicia* X, 1989, p.150; Aubet, *The Phoenicians in the West*, p.345. These examples survive from the mid-sixth century, presumably shortly before the site was abandoned.

¹³¹ III.4.2.

¹³² Strabo (III.4.2) and Mela (II.94) claim that the Phoenician settlements in this area were noted for the production of salted fish.

¹³³ Aubet, *The Phoenicians in the West*, p.270; Pellicer Catalán, pp.65f.

¹³⁴ Strabo III.4.2; Mela II.94.

¹³⁵ *HN*² p.3.

well as the benefits of the salt-fish industry, which was widespread in the area.¹³⁶ The Carthaginian intrusion into the area saw certain marked changes in the nature of Abdera. Naturally the salt-fish industry and connections with the interior, which saw such sites grow wealthy, remained during the Punic period. Other changes were characteristic for sites in Southern Spain: Punic necropoleis and economic alterations such as the locally produced coinage.¹³⁷ Influence from Carthage only saw the nature of Abdera change but not its purpose. It remained an active and moderately important port among the other *emporía* in Southern Spain. It was redeveloped by Carthage into more of a Punic centre rather than a Phoenician trading port allowing it to prosper beyond the sixth century when several similar towns were financially ruined and subsequently abandoned.

Beyond the close-knit grouping of Phoenician colonies between Malaca and Abdera lies Baria (Villaricos) positioned just to the southwest of the site of New Carthage. Originally a Phoenician settlement of the eighth century, it grew to some prominence owing to its access to the rich silver-producing mines of Herrerías. The importance of Carthaginian control at the site is evident in a considerable growth in population after the Phoenician decline in the sixth century.¹³⁸ Evidence of intense Punic development at Baria (especially during the fourth century) suggests its importance to Carthage's interests (especially economic) in the area. Large quantities of Punic material are evident at the site. Remains of a *topheth* with accompanying Punic stelae show that Punic culture, and in particular religion, had become entrenched at the site. Like Sexi, there are also remains of decorated ostrich eggs in tombs demonstrating a reasonable level of wealth in the citizenry. There is also evidence of coinage struck at the site showing its importance and connection to the ore producing areas in its hinterland.¹³⁹ Baria remained an important Punic site until it was eclipsed by the foundation of New Carthage in the third century. Like Malaca, Baria was heavily affected by the arrival of Punic culture on the back of Carthaginian power in Spain. Carthage moved into a floundering Phoenician settlement and redeveloped it as a Punic foundation under the influence of Carthage.

Another site of notable Carthaginian redevelopment was the site of New

¹³⁶ Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, pp.314-316.

¹³⁷ *HN*² p.3.

¹³⁸ Aubet, "Spain", in *The Phoenicians*, Sabatino Moscati (ed.), p.297. This is attested by a steep increase in Punic inhumations at the site after the sixth century.

¹³⁹ Barcelo, pp.34-37.

Carthage itself. Although we have discussed it some detail as an original Carthaginian foundation, which essentially it was, the site was occupied previous to the arrival of the Barcids in 228. After subjugating the Orissi and capturing the twelve cities of Iberia, Hasdrubal settled New Carthage on the old capital of the Masieni, Mastia.¹⁴⁰ Hasdrubal recognised the potential of the site and instead of troubling himself with founding an entire new settlement, he simply redeveloped an existing site. It is possible a similar process took place at Acra Leucê.¹⁴¹ The site is described as a large city, but may have been Phoenician in origin dating from as early as the ninth century.¹⁴² By the third century the political picture was vastly different from that of the sixth. Carthage was more powerful and aggressive in its settlement patterns.

Evidence of early Carthaginian involvement in Spain is poorly attested. This was often due to the nature of Phoenician settlement (especially along the southern coast) as a close-knit network of settlements which left little opportunity for original Carthaginian settlement before the third century. More often than not, Carthage simply assumed sovereignty over sites such as Malaga, Sexi, and Abdera, and redeveloped them as Punic settlements. Despite some opinion suggesting that Carthaginian expansion in Spain was slight before the Barcids, evidence shows that this area was little different from North Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia in accepting Carthaginian dominance. The older Phoenician system of independently linked settlements gave way to a new Carthaginian provincial system. Carthage resettled and redeveloped sites to suit its own interests in Spain and especially with regard to the revenue it could draw from the region.

Evidence for suggesting a Carthaginian policy of resettlement and redevelopment throughout its empire is considerable. Throughout several regions there is obvious change in settlement structure and character following the arrival of Carthaginian control and the introduction of Punic culture. This phenomenon was by no means homogeneous, often displaying several marked differences in specific areas. Nor was this process entirely deliberate with single settlements and entire regions

¹⁴⁰ Diod. XXV.10.4. Mastia is presumably the site mentioned by Polybius in the second Carthaginian treaty with Rome (III.24).

¹⁴¹ Diod. XXV.10.3.

¹⁴² What Phoenician presence existed at the site in the third century is negligible. As we have discussed before, it is probably best to categorise this site as a new Carthaginian foundation, see Chp. III regarding the Carthaginian foundation of the site.

experiencing marked social and cultural change owing to nothing more than periods of Carthaginian control and trade with Carthage and its territories. This resulted in Punic-type settlements, which, although retaining some autonomy, maintained overall allegiance to Carthage. By controlling old Phoenician or indigenous settlements on a political level, Carthage was able to assert its dominance and influence and develop its subject states. This process was often dictated by the changing nature of the Carthaginian Empire. Carthaginian resettlement and redevelopment is evident in isolated settlements and entire regions. The transformation of pre-existing sites into Punic centres under Carthaginian control assumes several different appearances. It is further testament to the adaptability of Carthaginian expansion. The collapse of Phoenician power in the West gave Carthage the opportunity to build an empire of its own. Although a lengthy process, Carthage was able to assume this established base of power, and by redeveloping it and eventually adding to it, was able to establish its own distinctive empire.

CARTHAGINIAN PROVINCIAL REORGANISATION

Carthaginian expansion into various areas of the Western Mediterranean was carried out in several ways. Their proclivity for altering demographic and social structures of single settlements and entire regions is relatively well documented. The real skill by which Carthage pursued such methods was its ability to adapt to different circumstances. From this approach, the Carthaginians did not pursue a general policy of colonial or provincial expansion, but rather acted according to separate situations. This is easily seen in another facet of Carthaginian expansion: a tendency to reorganise the settlement of entire regions to better suit Carthage's specific strategies. This policy is obvious in several provinces during the Punic period. Depending on factors such as trade, mineral extraction, defence, and sea-routes, Carthage would quite often streamline existing settlements or reorganise entire districts to suit its needs better.

NORTH AFRICA

North Africa was the first region to fall under Carthaginian influence. As in other areas, Carthage expanded by assuming control over pre-existing towns and

settlements along with their connected hinterlands. Carthaginian North Africa had previously been composed of a mix of native Berber and Phoenician settlements.¹⁴³ The expansion of Carthage did not differentiate between such ethnic divisions and conglomerations. Carthage, like any expansive metropolis needed a solid hinterland to provide for its foreign policy and the capital itself. By the sixth and fifth centuries when Carthage expanded into its North African hinterland, the region was distinguished by networked coastal settlements founded by the Phoenicians and numerous interior sites of varied origin. The long relationship between the Phoenicians and native Berbers had effectively produced a mixed Libyphoenician ethnicity. Carthage underwent a similar process also evolving into a type of Libyphoenician city which helped developed its distinctive Punic culture.

The advent of Carthaginian power in North Africa brought considerable changes to the region, or perhaps more appropriately, it turned it into a united political, and in varying degrees, cultural region. The natural order of events saw the rise of Carthage subordinate the other North African towns. Old and distinguished settlements such as Utica and Leptis Magna were mostly stripped of their respective independence and answered officially to Carthage.¹⁴⁴ The capital needed to oversee the running of its hinterland and primary territory in order to assure a constant supply of food, manpower, and income to operate the city and its increasing empire. Therefore Carthage needed to redesign this area into a provincial territory which it could govern efficiently.

Probably the most sweeping change effected by Carthage was to divide its hinterland and possibly the entirety of its North African territory into districts. This division was probably made during the fifth century, however, most of our evidence dates from later periods. During the third century we find distinctive Punic coins

¹⁴³ There are several major ethnic Berber groups situated along the North African coast and the interior. There are also a number of smaller groups located throughout this area. Situated around Carthage the main group was the Massylii. To the west dwelt the Gaetuli, the Massaesylii, and the Mauri. To the east and south of Carthage dwelt the Arzuges and Garamantes. Several of these larger groups, along with a number of the smaller groups were influenced by or had some contact with Carthage. See Gsell, *HAAN I, passim*; J.A. Ilevbare, Chp. I.

¹⁴⁴ Certain settlements retained limited autonomy although likely at a local level. Utica is specifically mentioned by Polybius as a separate entity in the second treaty with Rome in 306 (III.24). However, its true status is probably that stated in the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V where Utica is named alongside Carthage but included among other states controlled by Carthage, Polyb. VII.9.7, σφζόμενοι καὶ φυλαττόμενοι ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων τῶν συστρατευομένων καὶ ὑπὸ Ἰτυκαίων καὶ ὑπὸ πασῶν πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν ὅσα ἐστὶ Καρχηδονίοις ὑπήκοα. Other settlements are attested as retaining local governing bodies usually under the Punic system of *suffetes*, e.g. in Thugga, *KAI*. 101.

struck with the legend: בארצה, “in [the] lands/districts”.¹⁴⁵ Although these coins were Sicilian in origin, it is possible that they were for exclusive use in North Africa.¹⁴⁶ This legend may define a recognised area of Carthaginian control and a formal Carthaginian territory characterised by a division into districts. We have already seen the evidence of the six distinct geographical *pagi*, which covered Carthage’s hinterland as far south as Sufetula and as far west as the modern Algerian/Tunisian border.¹⁴⁷ Beyond this immediate area, Carthaginian territorial control extended further to at least Cirta and naturally considerably further along the coast to the west and the southeast. There are basic literary allusions to these *pagi*,¹⁴⁸ although there is scant evidence for how this system actually functioned. It is likely that Carthage divided its territory further into arbitrary districts¹⁴⁹ and established a number of towns and fortified outposts.¹⁵⁰ There is a surviving Neo-Punic inscription from the reign of Micipsa.¹⁵¹ Although fragmentary it details a ‘land overseer’ (על ארצת השכעת), literally “[the one] over the lands/districts”) and a non-specific measurement of ‘200’ between a marker and a boundary. It is interesting that a similar Punic phrase is used to define this position as is used on the coins defining territory in North Africa. Although this inscription was written some twenty years after the fall of Carthage, the Numidian kingdom was heavily reliant on Punic influence. Strabo claims that Masinissa and his heirs advanced Numidian society by introducing settled agriculture and rule; however, it was based on the Carthaginian system.¹⁵² It seems likely that Micipsa simply continued the Carthaginian model of district division. Although information regarding both Phoenician and Punic territory and regions in North Africa is scant, it appears to have held some distinction and importance.

During the encroachments of Masinissa, which precipitated the outbreak of the Third Punic War, the former mentions the existence of ‘the Phoenician trenches’ and

¹⁴⁵ Hans Roland Baldus, “Unerkannte Reflexe der römischen Nordafrika-Expedition von 256/255 v. Chr. in der karthagischen Münzprägung”, *Chiron* XII, 1982, p.178.

¹⁴⁶ Baldus, p.178, Ameling, *Karthago*, p.110.

¹⁴⁷ See Chp. II, n.7: The Great Plains, Thusca, Muxsi, Zugei, Cape Bon, and Byzacena.

¹⁴⁸ *CIL*. VII.14445; App. *Lib*. 68.

¹⁴⁹ There is a possible reference to Carthaginian districts based on tax collection. Polybius, during his account of the outbreak of the Mercenary War, describes Carthaginian administrators in North Africa as στρατηγοί (I.72.3). It is possible that these individuals had specific areas of jurisdiction within Carthaginian territory in North Africa.

¹⁵⁰ Picard, *The Life and Death of Carthage*, pp.89-90, has suggested a number of these towns were developed accordingly such as Leptis Minor and Hippo Regius.

¹⁵¹ *KAI*. 141.

¹⁵² XVII.3.15.

‘the big fields’ and the country of Tysca.¹⁵³ These unknown geographical entities and their importance in this context suggest either a district or the original border of Phoenicio-Punic Carthage. The original site of Carthage on the Byrsa also emphasises the importance of *chora* and exact borders in the area.¹⁵⁴ There is the legendary story behind the *Arae Philaeni* which describes the foundation of a border marker between the territory of Carthage and that of Cyrene.¹⁵⁵ In the dramatic narrative of the tale there is an allusion to a standard border suggesting Carthage’s North African territory was well defined.¹⁵⁶ This evidence coupled with that of the six *pagi* and other examples suggests Carthage had divided its territory in North Africa into several distinctive administered areas.

A subdivided and mapped province offered Carthage benefits which were not previously obtainable in North Africa. The most considerable of these was a stable base of economic administration. Carthage was able to glean better income from its hinterland in an organised manner. Carthage rapidly developed into a powerful provincial capital relegating all other settlements to subsidiary feeder states. The development and exploitation of the Libyan farmers and the development of large slave-run agricultural estates are prime examples. From the sixth century onwards, Carthage, much like Rome only a few centuries later, was able to marginalise and tax the Libyan farmers into near serfdom. This is most evident on the eve of the Mercenary War when heavy-handed Carthaginian tax officials (probably regional administrators) were named as the Libyan farmers’ main grievance.¹⁵⁷ As we have witnessed previously, the Libyan farmers were considerable in number and resented the strict domination of Carthage. The growth of large slave populations in Carthaginian North Africa probably developed from this period when Carthage began to subdue territories and their populations.¹⁵⁸ The urbanisation and development of Carthage saw a polarisation between the city and the rural society of North Africa.

¹⁵³ App. *Pun.* 32, 54, 59, 68, see Chp. II, n.10.

¹⁵⁴ The growth and nature of Carthage is hinted at by Diodorus when reporting the invasion of Agathocles in 308 (XX.44.1). He states that the new city of Carthage was separate from Old Carthage. Presumably the growth of Carthage precipitated the expansion of the city which brings into question the exact territory. Justin states that the reason behind the conflict between the Carthaginians and the Africans during the fifth century was to regain money paid to the latter for the previous purchase of the land on which Carthage stood (XIX.1-2). Presumably this tribute covered the Byrsa and the original site of Carthage.

¹⁵⁵ Strabo XVII.3.20; Sall. *Iug.* LXXIX.

¹⁵⁶ See Chp. II, n.83.

¹⁵⁷ Polyb. I.72.1-5, see Chp. II. n.83 and text.

With an organised region, Carthage was able to extract tax more easily and efficiently. One surviving inscription from as early as the fourth century gives detailed tariffs placed on temple sacrifices in Carthage.¹⁵⁹ Although it was the temple taxing separate individuals, the nature of the decree, which describes a body, or council of thirty men, is likely an official decree legislated by the state.¹⁶⁰ Such an example in addition to more standard taxation and tariffs suggests that Carthage was aware of the benefits attached to such an administrative model and was willing to extract as much as it could from its subjects.

The spread of Carthage throughout North Africa saw marked changes in the pre-existing settlement patterns in the area. Carthage united the entire region into a province subordinate under a capital. Other settlements were disenfranchised and assumed the role of secondary allied and tribute states to Carthage. Older ethnic distinctions remained but were subject to Carthaginian control and Punic influence. The obvious physical development in the region was the integration of demarcated borders of the province and of interior districts. By accurately dividing this province, Carthage could manage and utilise its resources much more effectively. Although often considered an extension of the city, the territory in North Africa, which Carthage ruled, existed as a carefully governed province. It developed considerably from the sixth century onwards from a once divided conglomeration of ethnic settlements, into a prosperous and organised region.

SICILY

When discussing Carthaginian territory in Sicily we must first look at the Phoenicians as a precedent. It was Thucydides who stated that the Phoenicians once dominated the entire island before the arrival of the Greeks. The advent of the latter saw the Phoenician traders withdraw from the promontories and small coastal islands and retreat to the west to settle primarily in Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus. He also mentions that originally the Phoenicians traded with the Sicels, the predominate group

¹⁵⁸ This population is evident working the large slave-run estates in the Carthaginian countryside, see Chp. II, n.19.

¹⁵⁹ *KAI*. 74.

¹⁶⁰ This decree is comparable to the more detailed Punic inscription found in Massilia (*KAI*. 69). This inscription, dated by eponymous *suffetes* also describes temple tariffs and mentions a similar body of 'thirty men'. It appears that at least in this instance, Carthaginian taxation policies were possibly standardised throughout the empire.

on Sicily during this period, and that the Phoenicians settled in the west of Sicily because of an existing alliance with the Elymians. The aggressive arrival of the Greek settlers forced the Phoenicians to make a tactical withdrawal to the west of the island alongside the Elymians. Thucydides also adds the other reason for the choice of Western Sicily, as it lay closest to Carthage. During the eighth century Carthage would still have been a Phoenician settlement and therefore part of the Phoenician trading network. This retreat to Western Sicily certainly shows the Phoenicians had some forethought in the abandonment of the larger part of the island. This is possible when considering why the Phoenicians did not attempt to ward off the Greeks especially with aid their Sicilian allies.

We have looked at some basic examples of the Carthaginians reorganising settlement on Sicily to suit their needs. In some respects, the Phoenician retreat is a precedent for later Carthaginian actions. There are several examples of Carthage, either through its own initiation or because of invasion, was forced to resettle a number of their sites. Motya, Soloeis, Himera, and Selinus were all resettled in such a manner. The First Punic War saw a further shift in Carthaginian settlement plans in Western Sicily much like those which confronted the Phoenicians during the eighth century. The advance of the Romans saw Carthage redefine its settlement pattern in the island, abandoning several of its possessions in favour of fewer well-defended sites. We have seen the significance of the abandonment of Selinus with its population relocated to Lilybaeum in 250.¹⁶¹ In addition to this there is the similar example of the population of Eryx relocated to Drepana in 249.¹⁶² In both situations, the Phoenicians and Carthaginians thought it better in the face of a presumably more powerful enemy to abandon current settlements and retreat to areas which were more suited to their strategies. Although the Carthaginian example is not so clear as the earlier Phoenician, the concentration of Carthaginian forces in two strongholds in expectation of a siege, show obvious parallels. In some respects the Carthaginian withdrawal on Sicily is similar to that of the Phoenician: a tactical manoeuvre based on defensive and strategic considerations.

The changing Carthaginian presence on Sicily also influenced basic settlement patterns. Naturally their contact with the local Sicilian settlements had a profound effect. We have seen the Carthaginians establishing further sites especially around

¹⁶¹ Diod. XXIV.1.

settlements such as Panormus and Soloeis. A number of smaller settlements, either orientated for trade, industry, or for military purposes suggests that the Carthaginian presence in Western Sicily could be maintained more efficiently. Despite the fluctuating nature of Carthaginian territory from the fifth century, it appears that Carthage may have recognised its territory on Sicily as a separate area. The Romano-Carthaginian treaties of 509/8 and 306 twice refer to Carthaginian territory on Sicily with the term ἡς ἐπάρχουσιν Καρχηδόνιοι '[what] the Carthaginians rule over.'¹⁶³ From the repetition we can discern a Carthaginian *terminus technicus* for what they considered their territory on Sicily. The term itself seems to follow other formulaic Punic titles. We have already discussed a similar phrase when looking at the 'land overseer' in Carthage during the reign of Micipsa: על ארצת השכעה, "[the one] over the lands".¹⁶⁴ In both cases the designation is not so much a title as a brief phrase to describe the official concept involved. The formula itself has obvious precedents in the East, especially Biblical.¹⁶⁵ From this *terminus technicus* we can probably conclude that Carthage had specific terminology for defining its territory, and therefore that a specific demarcated territory existed.

On Sicily, Carthage physically redesigned settlement patterns in specific areas for different reasons. The examples from Sicily show how both the Phoenicians and Carthaginians on separate occasions remodelled their settlements by retreating and resettling rather than risking conflict. Phoenician Sicily was based entirely on trade and so settlement patterns (both before and after the eighth century) were geared accordingly. Owing to the populated and changing nature of Sicily during this period, Carthage was often forced to use several techniques to establish either a physical presence or influence in foreign towns. We also know that like North Africa, Carthage had established specific territory on the island and likely used this as a basis of administration. The advent of Carthage and their annexation of Phoenician Sicily saw them remodel and develop certain aspects of settlement to better suit their own trade and expansive strategies.

¹⁶² XXIII.9.4

¹⁶³ Polyb. III.22.10, III.24.11. Linda-Marie Hans, Chp. V, has provided a comprehensive overview of the idea of Carthaginian territory on Sicily including the significance of these passages in Polybius.

¹⁶⁴ For discussion of these 'lands/districts' see ns.145, 151.

¹⁶⁵ There are a number of Biblical references which employ a similar formulaic construction – see for example the list of King Solomon's high officials, 1 Kings 4:1-6: e.g. the על-המס, '[the one] over the forced labour'.

SARDINIA

Pre-existing Phoenician settlement patterns in Sardinia saw a close-knit network of connected coastal, and to a lesser extent, interior settlements all geared for trade and industry. Such a system developed well in a peaceful climate between Phoenician traders and the Sards exploiting commodities such as silver and lead.

The advent of Carthage on Sardinia brought a new political and aggressive situation. The Phoenician settlements were developed into Punic centres under the political dominion of Carthage. The obvious change in settlement in Punic Sardinia was precipitated by the breakdown of an amicable relationship with the Sards of the interior. This is first demonstrated by the arrival of Carthage on the island, which came in the form of successive invasions during the sixth century.¹⁶⁶ Despite fierce resistance from the Sards, Carthage captured much of the southern and western areas on the island. Evidence of later upheavals caused by the rebellious Sards shows that the Carthaginians did not enjoy or attempt to maintain a friendly relationship as the Phoenicians had once done.¹⁶⁷ The relationship is best reported by Diodorus who states the Carthaginians never subdued the entire island despite repeated attempts with sizeable armies.¹⁶⁸ It is ironic that when the island was captured by Rome in 238 BC, the new invaders had just as much trouble with the rebellious Sards, finally suppressing them in the early empire.¹⁶⁹

The Carthaginians' reaction to a number of failed attempts to quell the Sards in the interior and to protect themselves and their settlements from their intrusions was to construct an interior network of Punic fortifications in addition to fortifying existing sites. Recent archaeological excavations have revealed a number of Punic sites in the interior dating from the fifth century.¹⁷⁰ These sites act like an interior wall beginning in the southeast of the island near the Flumendosa River (Muravera) and continuing along a general northwest line to the La Nurra in the Gulf of Asinara

¹⁶⁶ Justin XVIII.7.1-2, XIX.1.3.

¹⁶⁷ The Sards revolted in 379 against the Carthaginians when the latter was beset by plague outside Syracuse (Diod. XV.24).

¹⁶⁸ V.15.5, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων πολλάκις ἀξιολόγοις δυνάμεσι στρατευσάντων ἐπ' αὐτούς.

¹⁶⁹ The Romans disliked the Sards and treated the island as a conquered territory. Festus (p. 428 L.) describes them as *Sardi uenales: alius alio nequior*. Several revolts broke out on Sardinia until 114 BC and open brigandry continued before finally being suppressed during the first century AD (Tac. *Ann.* II.85).

(Bonorva or possibly Bosa). The presence of over a dozen strategic interior forts stretching in a relatively straight line suggests an obvious border of demarcation between the Carthaginian settlements to the south and west and the interior Sards. It appears that the Carthaginians' reaction to the constant trouble caused by the Sards was simply to exclude them from their territory. By creating this fortified line across the island, Carthage could protect its coastal network and its interior industries and infrastructure. The line itself is heavily dominant on terrain, which is rugged in the interior of the island, governed by rivers and mountains. Evidence from several of these forts is scant but distinctly Punic with pottery, coinage, and jewellery suggesting that these sites were permanently inhabited.¹⁷¹

The line of interior forts certainly helps us define Carthaginian territory on Sardinia.¹⁷² We have already witnessed obvious examples of Carthage defining and developing provinces in North Africa and Sicily. In many respects, this action of literally excluding the northeast of the island defines the province of Carthaginian Sardinia. Carthage was obviously aware of this division and went to great lengths to maintain it.

The Carthaginians were faced with an obvious dilemma in Sardinia. They were not willing to continue good relations with the Sards, preferring to conquer and to subdue them rather than to coexist. Unfortunately for the Carthaginians, they were unable to achieve this. Therefore rather than continuing to attempt to conquer the island by force, which they had failed to do so on several occasions, they devised a strategy to defend their settlements and their valuable trade routes by simply excluding the Sards in the manner reminiscent of Hadrian's Wall. Although this network of garrisoned forts was both protection from and a deterrent to the Sards from invading or rebelling, it was not an impregnable barrier, which is proven by revolts still on the island from time to time, although most likely more rarely.

The construction of a line of interior forts in Sardinia is another example of

¹⁷⁰ See Barreca, "Le fortificazioni fenicio-puniche in Sardegna", pp.115-128; Rowland, pp.20-39. Barreca has identified a series of interior sites which were either fortified or established with an emphasis on defence.

¹⁷¹ Rowland, pp.24-26.

¹⁷² The Sardinian line of defence did not entirely separate the southern and western areas of the island from Carthaginian activity settlement. A few Phoenicio-Punic settlements existed along the northern and eastern coasts of the island. The best example of this is Olbia. This Phoenician settlement was near the northern tip of Sardinia on the eastern coast. It is located in a gulf and dominates two river mouths and access to the interior. This settlement proved a vital link to the Tyrrhenian Sea, Corsica, and Italy.

Carthage actively redeveloping settlements in one of its provinces. Initially Carthage wanted to conquer the entire island and to establish exclusive rights to its natural resources. When this policy was met with stiff resistance, Carthage reassessed the situation on the island and saw it better to exclude the Sardis by constructing an interior and fortified border. This new settlement policy saw Carthage benefit by a more stable and therefore prosperous province acting as a lucrative mercantile and industrial base and a strategic possession abroad.

SPAIN

Carthaginian expansion into Spain was precipitated by the downfall of centralised power in the area with the collapse of Tartessian and Phoenician dominance. The arrival of the Carthaginians later in the sixth century enabled them to fill the void left by the Phoenicians and to continue the exploitation of the valuable resources in the hinterland. Although Carthage assumed power over a faltering coastal network, it redeveloped the area into a viable and prosperous region.

The settlement pattern that faced Carthage when it began to expand into Spain was not functioning well. A number of the original Phoenician sites had been abandoned, the capital at Gades was possibly being harassed by the native Spaniards, and the remaining settlements were generally in decline. Carthaginian intervention and settlement patterns departed from that previously employed by the Phoenicians. Instead of repopulating lagging or abandoned settlements, they chose a few major sites and urbanised them further. The nature of Phoenician settlement saw a number of coastal settlements abandoned. Carthage selected certain sites, leaving smaller intermediary sites such as Toscanos and Chorreras mostly abandoned.¹⁷³ Carthaginian bases stretched from Gades, in the west through, Malaca, Sexi, Abdera, and Baria to the east. Gades was already a well established urban centre and therefore was not affected in this manner. However, several other centres displayed marked changes with the arrival of Carthage. As we have seen Strabo names Malaca, Sexi, and Abdera along the central southern coast as Phoenician cities worth mention.¹⁷⁴ These sites were preserved and protected by Carthage for several centuries enabling them to

Although beyond the main concentrations of Carthaginian settlement, it remained an important strategic port which flourished as a Punic settlement, see Cecchini, pp.70-73; *KAI*. 68.

¹⁷³ Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, pp.317-321.

remain settled and prosperous until Strabo described them in his day.

Originally it appears that the Carthaginian system remained similar to that of the Phoenicians in the maintenance of an exclusive coastal presence in Spain, content with trade and exploiting the lucrative metal industry. Although basic evidence of a Carthaginian presence is evident from the sixth century, this is not well attested until the fourth century when we finally see greater evidence of Carthaginian goods in Spain and likewise Spanish goods in Carthage.¹⁷⁵ Following this period we find an increase in Carthaginian interest in Southern Spain. The construction of several forts and defensive towers some time between the fifth and third centuries in eastern Andalusia known as the 'Towers of Hannibal' suggests that the Carthaginians were willing to increase their influence in the area and to protect the lucrative mines.¹⁷⁶ The Barcid invasion of the third century suggests that prior to this the Carthaginians had not (or possibly attempted) extended their territory far into the interior of Spain.

Carthaginian policy in Southern Spain witnessed several changes in the settlement patterns of old. Although it can be argued that the Phoenician system was no longer existent, its closely linked coastal *emporia* were still evident during the Punic period. Carthage often left sites vacant, preferring instead to choose a handful of settlements to develop to and urbanise as Carthaginian provincial towns. Punic Spain developed into a major area of income for Carthage and by redesigning its settlement patterns, it was able to benefit further from its interests in the Far West.

Carthaginian settlement patterns within the provinces of the empire were neither standardised nor consistent. Carthaginian foreign policy can be witnessed in this regard as quite flexible and adaptable. Separate regions often required diverse settlement and operational strategies. The Phoenicians had no need for provincial organisation as they contented themselves with a seaborne empire with relatively little territory. The expansion of Carthaginian interests into these areas and beyond precipitated the need for change and especially to develop the mechanisms to deal with it. North Africa was essentially the hinterland and therefore the base of power for

¹⁷⁴ III.4.2-3.

¹⁷⁵ C.G. Wagner, "The Carthaginians in Ancient Spain from Administrative Trade to Territorial Annexation", *Studia Phoenicia* X, 1989, pp.150-151. Even sites such as Baria, which experienced considerable Carthaginian activity from an early period, did not show signs of a more intensive Carthaginian presence until the fourth century.

¹⁷⁶ Blázquez, pp.77-78.

Carthage and its empire. Carthaginian policy saw the region developed into an organised area divided into types of districts from which revenue could be gleaned more easily and funneled to the capital. Naturally the once independent towns were disenfranchised and became Punic feeder-states to the capital. Patterns in Sicily were altered somewhat differently. The Carthaginians, like the Phoenicians had before, limited the number of functional settlements in the area. By consolidating power and defining a core territory in the west of the island, they could better protect their interests and influence in the island while maintaining important trade routes. Sardinia presented a different scenario to Carthage. With its powerbases located in the south and west of the island opposed to the troublesome Sardis of the interior, Carthage needed to protect its coastal dominance and its settled trade. From the fifth century onwards, Carthage built a border of interior fortifications practically excluding the unconquered northeast of the island from its own territory. Settlement in Spain was organised into fewer sites, abandoning a number of smaller settlements. The Carthaginians resolved to develop and urbanise only selected sites from which they could still operate the coastal routes and ensure the extraction of metals in the interior. From such examples it appears that Carthage applied different solutions to develop its provinces and maintain them in a changing, but distinctly Carthaginian manner.

V. DIFFUSION OF CULTURE

One of the enduring legacies of Carthage was its impact on a number of peoples with which it came into contact. The effect of Punic culture and Carthaginian rule can also be discerned in certain areas bordering their territory. The geography of the Carthaginian Empire in the West saw it dominate areas largely unaffected by other developed cultures. More often than not those groups bordering Carthaginian territory were less developed peoples and scattered tribes rather than, for example concentrated settlements of Greeks or Romans.¹ There are several areas demonstrating an obvious diffusion of Punic culture or social influence on surrounding peoples. There is copious archaeological evidence demonstrating trade between Carthaginian centres and those beyond their control. This is a natural phenomenon, which is further heightened by the gap between the developed Carthaginian centres and the less developed surrounding peoples. There is also evidence suggesting that Punic culture survived in areas once governed or occupied by the Carthaginians. Carthage often supplied a constant and steadying influence in several areas of its empire. Its removal often had little immediate effect with evidence of continued aspects of culture and social and political developments. There is other evidence which implies that Carthaginian influence on certain surrounding areas was more than simply culturally cosmetic. This often demonstrated sweeping social and political changes emphasising intense contact with or even reliance on Punic Carthage.

NORTH AFRICA

The group most prevalent in North Africa and that most directly affected by the rise of Carthage were a number of the native Libyan tribes or Berbers. Although the growth of Carthage into the North African hinterland saw many incorporated as subjects, those groups located in areas beyond the direct control of Carthage also were subject to obvious Carthaginian influence. Original Berber territory in the vicinity of Carthage and further settlements such as Cirta and Thugga fell under Carthaginian

¹ There are a number of examples where Carthaginian territory technically bordered developed areas. Sicily is an obvious example. The major Greek cities in the area of Selinus and Himera lay in the western half of the island in relative proximity to known Carthaginian settlements. In Southern Spain,

control and were influenced by Punic culture.² The problem with identifying Punic culture is its rapid spread and acceptance by several known towns in this region forcing us to assume Carthaginian sovereignty. It was natural for a less developed and settled society such as the Berbers willingly to accept the profits and to a certain degree, the culture of Phoenicio-Punic Carthage.³

We can (paradoxically) discern the influence of Punic culture after the demise of Carthage during the Punic Wars. Precisely this period saw a dramatic revival of Numidian power under individuals such as Syphax, Masinissa, and later Micipsa, a revival in which there is an obvious influence from Phoenicio-Punic culture.⁴ Syphax, king of the Massaesylii, became an ally of Carthage after his marriage to the Punic woman Sophonisba. Although notably influenced by Hellenism and demonstrating Carthaginian tendencies, Syphax is identified as a Numidian King. His capital of Cirta (or Constantine)⁵ was heavily influenced by Punic culture and Punic was the official language of court.⁶

Masinissa, King of the Massylii became a fully developed Punic-Numidian monarch. As one who grew up in Carthage and was presumably educated in such a manner, he emerged from the Second Punic War as King of Numidia.⁷ It was he who was instrumental in redesigning Numidian society by making nomads into farmers and creating a settled state.⁸ Masinissa also was known to hire Punic artisans who helped develop the basic Berber settlements into permanent and functional foundations.⁹ Despite the waning power of Carthage, Masinissa developed Numidia

Phocaeen encroachments along the east coast saw Greek and Carthaginian settlements in close proximity.

² See Chp. IV, ns.33-40 and text, regarding the original conception of Carthaginian and Numidian territory in North Africa. Masinissa used Carthaginian occupation of original Numidian settlements as a reason for war. (App. *Pun.* 67-70; Livy XXXIV.62).

³ This is best demonstrated in the story of Elissa in Justin (XVIII.6). Here we find Elissa spurning the advances of a number of local chieftains. Hiarbus, King of the Maxitani supposedly asked for Phoenician teachers to instruct his tribe how to live in a more civilised manner: Justin XVIII.6.2-3, *nuntiantes regem aliquem poscere qui cultiores victus eum Afrosque perdoceat sed quem inveniri posse, qui ad barbaros et ferarum more viventes transire a consanguineis velit?* Whether this story is factual or not, it does demonstrate a possible allegory explaining Numidian acceptance of Carthaginian culture.

⁴ For further reading on the Berber kings around this period see François Decret and Mhamed Fantar, *L'Afrique du Nord dans l'antiquité – des origines au Ve siècle* (Paris 1981) Chps. III-IV.

⁵ Livy XXX.12.

⁶ *KAI.* 102-116, there are remains of hundreds of Punic stelae from Cirta dating from the third to the first centuries BC.

⁷ App. *Pun.* 10.

⁸ Strabo XVII.3.15.

⁹ One inscription describes a Carthaginian overseer supervising Numidian workers in Thugga during the second century BC (*KAI.* 100).

into a developed sovereign state based on the Carthaginian model with which he was most familiar. Ironically, like Carthage before him, he then set about claiming the North African hinterland as annexed territory. Masinissa never witnessed the fall of Carthage, his social and cultural model and great foe, since he died in the first year of the Roman siege aged 91.

Finally, under Micipsa (148-118 BC), the Numidians reclaimed their lost territory in North Africa. Even without the steady influence of Carthage as the seat of Punic society, its culture remained obvious in the Neo-Punic period down until the first century BC.¹⁰ According to Strabo, Micipsa also used Cirta as a royal residence, even going so far as to settle Greeks there presumably to boost his cultural image further.¹¹ It is during the reign of Micipsa we can see the best example of Punic culture surviving among independent Numidians not only in the period before the advent of Rome, but well into the empire.

During the Neo-Punic period, there are several indications that the Numidian Kings modelled a number of political and official positions and organisation on the Carthaginian precedent. Numidian coinage from the second century BC onward shows a good deal of similarity to that of the Carthaginians suggesting not only economic interaction, but also influence.¹² A number of Neo-Punic inscriptions have survived testifying that Punic remained the official Numidian language of court for some time. These examples enable us to witness the continuation of various Punic social patterns under the Numidians. We have already looked at the fragmentary inscription describing a 'land overseer' and detailing a precise measurement of land.¹³ Such an official inscription describing land ownership is characteristic of a relatively advanced and settled society. The language and purpose of this document appears adopted from the Carthaginian period and points toward the Numidians simply continuing established and proven administrative practice. The inscription also shows that aspects of Carthaginian policies continued into the Neo-Punic period. The detailed land division in Carthaginian North Africa with the existence of six *pagi*

¹⁰ After Micipsa the advent of Roman interests in the area saw a distinctive change to a Roman influenced society culminating during the reign of Jugurtha. Despite this trend, some aspects of Punic culture continued. Probably the best example was during the reign of Juba II who allegedly possessed a Punic library: *hoc adfirmant Punici libri: hoc Iubam regem accipimus tradidisse*, Solinus XXXII.2. Although aspects of Punic culture continued in the region, it was gradually marginalised under Roman influence.

¹¹ XVII.3.13.

¹² Hans R. Baldus, "Die Münzprägung der numidischen Königreiche", in *Die Numider*, pp.187-208.

probably continued in some form under Numidian control. With the official arrival of Roman power, the six *pagi* were used as the basis of Roman provincial control.¹⁴ A political position which survived demonstrating the continuation of Carthaginian political influence was that of the *suffet*. On several occasions during the Neo-Punic period this position is mentioned in a number of towns. One such honorary inscription from Leptis Magna reads: *Flamen, Sufes, Praef(ectus) sacr(orum)*.¹⁵ It is interesting we find the position of *suffet* named alongside other Roman positions. Otherwise we still find eponymous *suffet* dating elsewhere testifying its continued importance in Numidian centres.¹⁶ It is hardly surprising that the Numidians maintained a number of political practices once used by Carthage. We have already looked at native towns in North Africa possessing executive political bodies. These are described in familiar terms in our Greek and Roman sources.¹⁷ It is likely that any number of these towns maintained their local governing bodies under the Numidian Kings as they had once done under Carthaginian control. Although the Numidians were governed by a succession of kings, there is evidence to suggest that aspects of the Carthaginian political and administrative system remained in a number of Numidian centres.

We already know that several aspects of Punic religion continued well into the Roman period with a number of divinities converted to a Latin form. From several inscriptions during the Neo-Punic period we find Punic divinities honoured in the same manner as previously in Carthage. Naturally the primary divinities at Carthage such as Tanit and Ba'al Hammon maintain their precedence and appear as primary divinities of the Numidians.¹⁸ Even during the period of Romanisation following the first century BC, we find the Romans adopting and encouraging worship of Ba'al Hammon as Saturn and Tanit as Ceres.¹⁹

If we look at other epigraphic evidence we can see aspects of the continuation and diffusion of Punic culture. Naturally Punic-type names continue well after the fall of Carthage. A number of inscriptions show typical Punic names in official positions

¹³ *KAI*. 141.

¹⁴ Ilevbare, p.22.

¹⁵ *KAI*. 121.

¹⁶ e.g. *KAI*. 101.

¹⁷ For examples of several North African settlements possessing such political bodies under the control of Carthage see Chp. II, n.90.

¹⁸ *KAI*. 137, 159, 162, 167.

¹⁹ See J.B. Rives, *Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage from Augustus to Constantine* (Oxford 1995) pp.153-169.

or of obvious wealth dating to the Roman period.²⁰ Such evidence is testament to the resilience of Neo-Punic as an important language to the people of North Africa. It is also attested during the Roman period as we find Roman officials named in several Neo-Punic inscriptions.²¹ Finally we see the slow decay of the importance of Neo-Punic during the Roman period with the growth of bi-lingual inscriptions in Neo-Punic and Latin, and then finally the total adoption of Latin as the official language of state.²² This demise was not felt amongst the local populations of North Africa. Saint Augustine, writing during the fourth century AD, comments on the survival of Punic, and mentions on several occasions that the Punic language was still in use.²³ Such statements suggest that Punic was deeply set among the remnants of Carthaginian and Numidian peoples on a large scale and was in common use outside official spheres.

Those directly subject to Carthage seem to have accepted its social and cultural dominance as well as its political techniques over time and adopted much of them as their own. This is reflected in the growth of the kingdom of Numidia under its tribal kings and then united under one crown. The literary evidence we possess shows various aspects of Carthaginian society continuing after 146. From archaeological remains it appears that the Numidians were dependent on the Phoenicians and then the Carthaginians for material goods and influence. Naturally this continued and developed after the fall of Carthage. North Africa, and in particular the native Numidians, were exposed to Punic culture the longest and most intensely. After the fall of Carthage, and with it their cultural centre, the Numidians created, or perhaps better, reclaimed their own kingdom based on the culture of their old teachers.

SICILY

The Phoenicio-Punic influence on the pre-existing Sicilian populations was noticeable in the west of the island. Centuries of settled activity on Sicily saw regular contact with various ethnic groups. The Elymians were the group most influenced by the

²⁰ *KAI*. 145, 128, 135, 159.

²¹ *KAI*. 120, 126, 142. For examples of the survival of Punic during the Roman period see Wolfgang Röllig, "Das Punische im Römischen Reich", *Die Sprachen im Römischen Reich der Kaiserzeit* (Bonn 1980) pp.291-295. This continuation can be compared with the Phoenician east where Fergus Millar has tracked the survival of Phoenician on the Levantine coast during the Roman period, *The Roman Near East 31 BC – AD 337* (Cambridge 1994) Chp. VIII.

²² *KAI*. 152, 160, 165.

²³ e.g. *Ep.* 66.2, 209.2, 17.2; *Serm.* 167.4; *Quaest. hept.* 7.16.

Phoenician and particularly the Carthaginian presence, positioned in the west of the island alongside the Sicels and Sicanians.²⁴

Little is known of the Elymians during the archaic and classical periods outside of their two main settlements of Segesta and Eryx. The relationship between the Phoenicians and then Carthaginians on the one hand, and the Elymians on the other is relatively well documented. Although closely connected, the two parties remained, at least officially, independent of each other. We have already discussed Thucydides' statement allying the Phoenicians and Elymians during the eighth century and the later coalition between the Phoenicians and then the Carthaginians and the Elymians in destroying two attempted settlements by Pentathlus and Dorieus.²⁵ The relationship between the two appears to have remained for a considerable period. This contact transcended simple foreign policy however, as evidence from both Segesta and Eryx suggests that the Elymians were receptive to influence from more developed neighbouring states.²⁶

The sanctuary of Eryx and its township is testament to the influence of Punic culture on a less developed people. We have witnessed certain historical events placing Eryx as an important strategic and cultural centre in the Carthaginian Empire. A certain degree of control is implied by the importance of the site to Carthage and with it the maintenance of the cult of Astarte. An example of this at the site and its Punic legacy is after the fall of Sicily to the Romans. Eryx provides the best evidence of continuation of Punic Sicily into the Roman period. The cult remained a popular centre of the worship of Venus down at least until the first century AD.²⁷ The walls at the site bear Phoenician mason marks and are themselves distinctively Phoenicio-Punic.²⁸ It appears that the site was redeveloped during this later period following

²⁴ There is evidence to suggest that Carthage also maintained a relationship with the Sicels and the Sicanians. According to Thucydides, the Phoenicians originally traded with the Sicels in Sicily before the arrival of the Greeks (VI.2). Although the Phoenicians retreated, it is possible that they and the Carthaginians still maintained trade links with certain Sicel settlements. The Phoenicio-Punic settlements of Panormus and Soloeis bordered the territory of the Sicanians. A number of Carthaginian offensives show the Carthaginians allied to the Elymians, Sicels, and Sicanians. During the siege of Himera in 409, Hannibal enlisted the support of both the Sicels and Sicanians (Diod. XIII.59.6). Following the peace treaty of 405, the Sicanians and Elymians are noted as allies of Carthage (Diod. XIII.114.1).

²⁵ Diod. V.9; Hdt. V.42-48.

²⁶ There were a number of other smaller Elymian sites in the vicinity which almost certainly would have fallen under Carthaginian influence, such as Entella, Monte Iato, and Monte Castellazzo (Poggioreale).

²⁷ See Diod. IV.83; R.J.A. Wilson, *Sicily Under the Roman Empire – The Archaeology of a Roman Province, 36BC – AD535* (Warminster 1990) pp.282-284.

²⁸ Linda-Marie Hans, pp.19-20.

which there appear far greater amounts of Phoenicio-Punic material remains. Numismatic evidence shows that there was a mint at Eryx producing standardised Greek coinage but with Phoenicio-Punic imagery and legends.²⁹ Interestingly, Elymian religious imagery suggests a co-habitation with Phoenicians and Carthaginians with coins from the site depicting such local forms as the River Crimisis as a dog.³⁰

The largest city of the Elymians, Segesta offers us an interesting comparison when discussing the effect of Punic society on its neighbours. There was an obvious element of Phoenicio-Punic influence in the city, but essentially the major influence was Hellenic. Although an inland settlement, Segesta was in regular contact with Phoenicians, Carthaginians, and Greeks. The best examples of a Hellenised Segesta are the striking remains of a Greek theatre and an unfinished Greek columned temple. It is interesting that the Segestaeans actually identified themselves with Hellenic culture claiming to possess a common ancestry with the Trojans and Phocaeans.³¹ Coupled with this was Segesta's longstanding enmity with the Greek colony of Selinus. This relationship conjures up imagery of two Greek city-states jostling for control of a common territory.³² Although an Elymian town, Segesta developed into a Greek-style city.

Despite the overall Hellenisation of Segesta, the site still maintained a close relationship with the neighbouring Phoenicians and Carthaginians. There is evidence that suggests at least some elements of Punic culture became established in Segesta. Like other areas in Elymian Sicily, Segesta produced Greek-style coinage with a Phoenicio-Punic legend.³³ Presumably with such contact based on the proximity of Segesta with several Carthaginian sites, further influence is likely.

There are grounds for suggesting that the Carthaginians influenced the Sicanians and to a lesser extent the Sicels. The Carthaginians' expansion eastward saw them gain control of Greek settlements such as Selinus, Himera, and Acragas for often considerable periods. This control of major coastal ports and the interior

²⁹ R. Ross Holloway, *The Archaeology of Ancient Sicily* (London 1991) pp.136-138; *BMC, Sicily*, pp.62-63.

³⁰ *HN*² p.164. There are also similar examples from Panormus and Segesta.

³¹ Thuc. VI.2. This legend was later played upon by Virgil who has Aeneas pass through Sicily and establish the temple of Venus at Eryx (V.24, 759).

³² There are countless examples of such encounters between separate Greek states. Chalcis and Eretria fighting over the Lelantine plain is an obvious example. A better instance between two Greek colonies is that between Sybaris and Croton in the sixth century.

territory and its settlements placed them deep in Sicanian territory. The Sicanian settlement of Mt. Adranone near Sambuca di Sicilia seems to have fallen under Punic influence around the time of the fall of Selinus in the late fifth century. There are remnants of a Punic temple (with possibly connections to Demeter and Core) and fortifications suggesting that Punic influence and presence at the site was considerable.³⁴ The Sicels further to the east display less interaction with the Carthaginians, although the nature of trade on the island and the attested contact between the two groups certainly makes this possible.

Unlike North Africa, the presence of Punic culture rapidly gave way to Rome. There is little archaeological evidence showing the continuation of a Punic population or influence. It is possible that some aspects of Punic culture lingered amongst older Punic and Sicilian settlements. Apuleius describes Sicily during the second century AD as *trilingues*, referring to Latin, Greek, and what can only be Punic.³⁵ It is quite possible that in certain enclaves, presumably in the west of the island, the Punic language survived as the unofficial language, as it had done in areas of North Africa.³⁶ This may have been facilitated by the continuation of several Punic religious cults in Sicily such as that of Astarte at Eryx and Tanit. Overall the Punic legacy was officially short with only a few residual traces evident following the downfall of Carthage.

The Phoenicio-Punic presence in Western Sicily had a profound effect on the Elymians, Sicanians, and possibly Sicels. It appears that the Elymians readily accepted the more developed Phoenicio-Punic and Hellenic cultures. The long period during which Phoenicians and Carthaginians enjoyed a settled presence in Western Sicily and the relationship with the Elymians and then the Sicanians suggests that all often lived amicably with one another. Evidence from Eryx, to a lesser extent Segesta, Monte Adranone, and other settlements in the area demonstrates a Punic influence in a number of Sicilian settlements. Although these peoples remained, at least officially free and independent, they relied heavily on their more developed neighbours and were naturally influenced.

³³ *HN*² p.138.

³⁴ Moscati, *Italia Punica* pp.130-133. The relevance of this cult to Carthage is considerable. Its origins in the Carthaginian pantheon seem to appear in Sicily but spread to other areas, especially North Africa, see Pena, "El culto a Deméter y Core en Cartago. Aspectos iconográficos", pp.39-55.

³⁵ *Met.* XI.5.

³⁶ For the survival of some Punic aspects in Sicily see Wilson, pp.282ff., 316-317.

SPAIN

Traces of Phoenicio-Punic culture in Southern Spain are, as in North Africa and Sardinia, more discernible as Carthage enjoyed exclusive rights there for several centuries. The protracted period of almost exclusive Phoenicio-Punic contact with peoples in mainland Spain resulted in social and cultural diffusion. Areas surrounding Phoenician settlements such as those in the Guadalquivir Valley have produced evidence of an influence in material culture from at least the eighth century.³⁷ Similar examples can be traced along the southern coastline of Spain and the interior.³⁸ The diffusion of material goods between Phoenicio-Punic settlements, Tartessus, and other Spanish settlements is archaeologically attested. What is of interest to this discussion is the natural impact of such interaction on the native Spaniards.

If we turn from the archaeological record of Phoenicio-Punic Spain and piece together fragments of the literary evidence, we are able to discern Phoenicio-Punic culture existing and surviving in areas beyond their direct control. One such example regarding Southern Spain survives in Strabo who claims that even in his day, the cities of Turdetania (Andalusia) were still populated by Phoenicians.³⁹ This is considerable, as by this time Rome had officially controlled Southern Spain for over a century. If the inhabitants of Turdetania were still being characterised as Phoenician (or most likely Punic), it appears that even after the loss of Spain during the Second Punic War, elements of Phoenicio-Punic culture and society remained for some time. It is difficult to define what criteria Strabo is using to identify the inhabitants as Phoenician. Whether they still lived in the Phoenicio-Punic manner or spoke the language is unclear.⁴⁰ The latter is quite possible, since we have witnessed the Punic language was in use often several hundred years after the removal of Carthaginian

³⁷ Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West*, pp.241-247.

³⁸ This process is evident from initial contact between Phoenician and Tartessian settlements. For the basic mechanisms of this process see Aubet, "The Phoenician Impact on Tartessos: Spheres of Interaction", in *The Phoenicians in Spain*, pp.225-240. The trade between the two intensified in the eighth century through to the sixth. With the decline of both powers there was a natural deterioration in trade and interaction, which only began to show signs of recovering again between native Spanish settlements and the Carthaginians from the fifth century onward.

³⁹ III.2.13, οὗτοι γὰρ Φοῖνιξιν οὕτως ἐγένοντο σφόδρα ὑποχείριοι ὥστε τὰς πλείους τῶν ἐν τῇ Τουρδητανίᾳ πόλεων καὶ τῶν πλησίον τόπων ὑπ' ἐκείνων νῦν οἰκεῖσθαι.

⁴⁰ There is one Punic inscription surviving from Gades dated to the second half of the second century BC (KAI. 71). It would seem likely that Phoenician remained the main language there especially concerning the temple of Melqart.

control in North Africa and possibly Sicily. Strabo provides another interesting piece of information regarding the linguistic development of local peoples in Southern Spain. He later claims that the Turdentai who dwelt in the Guadalquivir Valley (presumably by his time) had so accepted the Roman way of life and language that they had forgotten their own.⁴¹ By the first century, the Turdentai had only been free of official Phoenicio-Punic control for about a century and a half. It seems fair to assume that the Romans still did not remove every trace of Phoenicio-Punic culture immediately. If Strabo is correct, it is possible that the Turdentai had forgotten their own language so quickly was because they had in fact abandoned it earlier, possibly preferring that of their Phoenicio-Punic neighbours. Although this scenario is a possibility, without further evidence it remains unsubstantiated.

It appears that Phoenicio-Punic had a longstanding effect on a number of Spanish tribes during the second century BC. According to Appian, there are several examples of supposed Spanish communities redefining their civic identity in times of need or opportunity by joining several tribes or communities into one larger entity. What makes this of particular interest is that a reasonable level of political development seems necessary to achieve such a goal. We must therefore turn to outside influence. Considering the nature and position of these examples, the only feasible source is Phoenicio-Punic. The phenomenon of *synoikismos* is best characterised in Greek terms by the formation of Megalopolis in Arcadia during the 360's which comprised around forty villages.⁴² It is also attested, at least partially, in Carthaginian history. We have already witnessed related examples from the Second Punic War including Selinus and Eryx. Although not essentially *synoikismos*, the concerted effort of relocating of entire populations is obvious. Probably more germane to this mechanism was the foundation of New Carthage by Hasdrubal Barca.⁴³ He defeated the king of the Orissi and then captured the twelve cities of Iberia. He then founded New Carthage in 228 as the provincial capital. It is quite possible he accepted at least some of the displaced Iberian refugees into New Carthage.⁴⁴ Whether he did or did not is irrelevant, the overriding image we are left with is one of forced *synoikismos*: twelve smaller settlements removed and replaced

⁴¹ III.2.15.

⁴² Paus. VIII.27.3-4.

⁴³ Diod. XXV.12.

⁴⁴ Hasdrubal was perceptive by marrying an Iberian princess before founding New Carthage. By doing so his actions and rule would appear more legitimate.

by one large one. This practice in Spain is possibly demonstrated by the Carthaginian policy of preferring to combine and urbanise settlements as opposed to maintain many small centres as the Phoenicians had once done. The settlement pattern in Spain was obvious following the Carthaginian expansion into the area following the withdrawal of the Phoenicians.

According to Appian, a number of Spanish tribes including the Lusones, for want of land, revolted from Roman rule in ca. 180 BC. Although they were defeated by Fulvius Flaccus and dispersed, several groups formed together to found a new city, Complega.⁴⁵ This site was developed and fortified accordingly. This action is similar to Elis which following the Persian Wars was synoecised into one city from a number of small settlements.⁴⁶ Later, however, Tiberius Gracchus defeated the people of Complega after his troops were attacked. He then apparently established a more equitable class system in Complega and apportioned land accordingly. The formation of a citizen body from what Appian describes as tribes of wanderers is quite uncharacteristic. Complega was formed and fortified as an independent political centre. The following settlement is described as allotting land and giving a place in the community to the poorer classes. The allotment of land is self-explanatory, being both the reason for the civil unrest and a Roman gift to ensure allegiance. The giving of a place in the community and land to the poorer classes possibly requires further explanation.⁴⁷ It is possible that there was a basic existing wealth-based class structure present in Complega. This, however, would probably not extend to the relatively high level of social structure that Complega had achieved.⁴⁸ The Romans had not been active in the area nearly long enough to influence these tribes. Once again the only reasonable choice is Carthage and its territory in Spain.⁴⁹

Although situated along the Ebro and therefore at the limit of Punic influence, the tribes which settled Complega certainly would have been familiar with the Punic period which had only officially ended twenty years previous. This scenario becomes

⁴⁵ *Ib.* 42, ὅσοι δὲ μάλιστα γῆς ἠπόρουν καὶ ἐξ ἄλλης ἐβίότευον ἐς Κομπλέγαν πόλιν συνέφυγον ἢ νεόκτιστός τε ἦν καὶ ὄχυρά καὶ ἠύξετο ταχέως.

⁴⁶ Diod. XI.54.1.

⁴⁷ *Ib.* 43, τοὺς δὲ ἀπόρους συνώκιζε καὶ γῆν αὐτοῖς διέμετρε.

⁴⁸ According to Appian, Gracchus was assailed by a force of 20000, of which an undetermined number were killed. It is possible that if this number (presumably all those of military age) was removed, the Romans would have been able to enfranchise the poorer classes to fill vacancies in the social order.

⁴⁹ Similar to the account on Complega, Appian (*Ib.* 44) discusses the later *sympolitea* of the Celtiberian Belli and the Titthi into the city of Segeda ca. 15 BC. Apparently the Belli persuaded and forced

even more feasible when we look at a later account of Appian describing events in 155 BC.⁵⁰ He claims that the Lusitanians under Punicus laid siege to the Blastophoenicians (Βλαστοφοίνικας). Appian claims that although they were Roman subjects, their settlement had been founded by Hannibal when he settled African colonists alongside the local people. Luisitania is in the west of the peninsula considerably distant to Complega in the east. This small section in Appian shows the Luisitanians being led by a Punic or Punic-styled ruler attacking a neighbouring tribe of quasi-Punic Spaniards. It appears that Punic culture may have survived the official fall of the Carthaginian Empire and remained a strong influence lasting into the Roman period.

There are then some suggestions of contact with Spanish peoples beyond the immediate sphere of Carthaginian control. Trade was probably the most important form of interaction between Carthage and its neighbours. The role of conquest also played a considerable part, although the regions in question saw little Carthaginian impact until the third century, and even then it was brief. It is possible that a number of Spanish tribes became accustomed with Carthaginian society through the use of trade and possibly mercenaries. We have already witnessed the Carthaginian proclivity to use large quantities of mercenary soldiers. These quite often involved Celtiberian troops.⁵¹ The *synoikismoι* of Complega and later Segeda were in Celtiberian territory. It is possible that the use of mercenaries or possible trade with Celtiberians and other native Spanish peoples is attested by a number of Carthaginian coin hoards in the region dating from around 200 BC. These have been discovered in the hinterland of Cape Nao and to the northwest.⁵² It is possible that these hoards demonstrate not only the limit of Carthaginian trade or mercenary use, but also how far Carthaginian influence reached.

It seems that Phoenicio-Punic influence survived in Spain for a considerable period. It is interesting that we have evidence of this from both southern and central regions of the peninsula. Despite only physically present in a number of locations in the interior for a limited period during the third century, there is obvious evidence of

smaller tribes along with the Titthi to join them. The formation of Segeda caused some consternation in the Roman senate suggesting that Segeda was prospering and had acquired some prominence.

⁵⁰ *Ib.* 56.

⁵¹ Both Carthaginians and Romans employed Celtiberian troops on a regular basis: e.g. Livy XXIV.49.7-8, XXXIV.17.4.

⁵² Robert Knapp, "Celtiberian Conflict with Rome: Policy and Coinage", *Actas del il coloquio sobre lenguas y culturas prerromanas da la Peninsula Iberica* (Tübingen, 17-19 Junio 1976) pp.469-471.

an enduring Carthaginian legacy. It appears that some Spaniards were often eager to introduce aspects of the more developed Punic society. Although lasting only for a short period until the Romans assumed control, it appears that several quite detailed social processes were accepted by the local towns and in particular tribes of Spain. By the later stages of the Carthaginian Empire, any number of original local settlements had become heavily influenced by Phoenicio-Punic society. The result of this long connection and the subsequent invasions of the third century saw a gradual spread of elements of Punic society north with an obvious effect on local peoples.

SARDINIA

Sardinia experienced a long and intense contact with Phoenicio-Punic activity. From as early as the ninth century, the Phoenicians actively settled the area, which held discernible links with Spain, North Africa, and Cyprus among other regions. With the advent of the Carthaginians, we see a distinct change in policy when they forcibly moved into the island in the sixth century, taking over and resettling much of the island. Naturally the local peoples, collectively known as the Sards, interacted with both Phoenicians and Carthaginians and were often influenced.

Sardinia poses a dilemma when discussing aspects of the diffusion of Phoenicio-Punic culture. As we have already seen, especially during the Punic period, there was a direct Carthaginian policy of exclusion of certain groups of Sards.⁵³ The general ancient consensus held the Sards to be an indomitable and barbaric people occupying the mountainous interior of the island.⁵⁴ Coupled with this there is also the appearance of a networked system of Carthaginian fortifications excluding the interior Sards from the bulk of their own settlements.⁵⁵ This is natural considering the trouble which several Carthaginian expeditions faced on the island. Remains from a number of these interior forts suggest trade between the two cultures existed in some

⁵³ Once more we are hindered by the generic description of the Sards. It is certain that like any ethnic group of this type, the Sards comprised any number of separate tribes. Strabo names four of these tribes: Parati, Sossinati, Balari, and Aconites (V.2.8); Diodorus mentions another: the Iolaeans (IV.30.5). It is obvious that not all the tribes retreated to the interior. Presumably a considerable proportion maintained a relationship with the Phoenicio-Punic settlements. Most likely (as in other areas of the empire) the Sards were employed as the primary workforce in areas such as mining and agriculture.

⁵⁴ Diod. V.15.4.

⁵⁵ See Chp. IV, ns.166-171 and text.

quantity.⁵⁶ However, the general nature of our evidence, both literary and to a lesser extent archaeological, shows there was a distinct separation between Carthage and the Sards of the interior.

In light of such negative examples we may be forgiven for believing the inland Sards were completely cut off from contact from Phoenicio-Punic influence. Nevertheless, some evidence suggests the process of cultural diffusion continued regardless. Several Carthaginian centres were located beyond the line of interior fortifications suggesting that contact did exist.⁵⁷ From our archaeological record we have already seen a concerted Carthaginian presence in the interior.⁵⁸ This record increases in intensity and antiquity heading toward the coastal areas of Phoenicio-Punic settlement. In regard to Phoenicio-Punic influence on the Sards we must turn to our fragmentary literary record.

Pausanias provides a cryptic and aetiological account of the settlement of Sardinia. He describes several waves of settlers and invaders:

(2) The first to have crossed to the island is said to have been Libyan sailors, led by Sardus, son of Makeris whom the Egyptians and Libyans call Heracles...The Libyan expedition did not expel the native people who admitted them as fellow settlers, though more by force than kindness. Neither the Libyans nor natives knew how to build a city; they lived scattered in huts and caves. (3) Years after the Libyans, Aristaeus and his companions arrived on the island from Greece...(4) But they also built no city, as they were too few in number or weak to found one. (5) After Aristaeus the Iberians crossed over into Sardinia; the expedition was led by Norax, and they built the city of Nora. This was remembered as the first city on the island...Ialoas' army from Thespieae and Attica was the fourth element to land in the island; they built the city of Olbia... (7) But many years afterwards the Libyans came across into the island again, with a larger force, and went to war with the Greeks. The Greeks were totally destroyed, or few survived; the Trojans fled to the high points of the island where they occupied the mountain fortresses made unapproachable with banks and

⁵⁶ Rowland, pp.24ff.

⁵⁷ The north-eastern settlement of Olbia is such an example (see Chp. IV, n.172)

⁵⁸ See F. Barreca, "Nuove scoperte sulla colonizzazione fenicio-punica in Sardegna", in *Phönizier im Westen*, 1982, pp.181-184, *La Sardegna fenicia e punica, passim*; Cecchini, *passim*; Rowland, pp.20-39.

*palisades. They are still called Ilians even in my day, but they and their weapons and their whole way of life have an entirely Libyan appearance.*⁵⁹

Pausanias' comment is most likely based on an account of Ephorus and one can instantly detect several connections in the text between Phoenicians, Carthaginians, and Sardis. The first quasi-historical group mentioned are Libyans under Sardus (a fictive eponymous founder of Sardinia) son of Makeris (Melqart the Phoenician God⁶⁰). Pausanias claims that the Libyans did not attempt to dominate the native tribes but dwelt with them. He also claims that neither the Libyans nor the native population knew how to build cities.⁶¹ This is recognisable as a common theme in several areas of Phoenician settlement. The Phoenicians (possibly originating from North Africa) established peaceful contact with the Sardis and traded with them. As was proved Phoenician practice, they most likely constructed seasonal or temporary *emporion* rather than permanent settlements. Pausanias then claims that it was Norax from Iberia who founded the first city of Nora on Sardinia.⁶² By this stage Phoenician activity on the Spanish peninsula was probably established, and as we have seen Nora was in fact a nuraghe site resettled by the Phoenicians. The text implies that Norax taught the native Sardis how to construct settled, functioning towns. If Norax was actually Phoenician, or at least Phoenician influenced, we can see a direct diffusion of Phoenicio-Punic culture in Sardinia. Pausanias then describes the final wave of bellicose Libyans arriving at an unspecified later date destroying the Greek presence on the island.⁶³ The parallels from this passage to the Carthaginian seizure of Sardinia

⁵⁹ X.17.2-7, πρώτοι δὲ διαβῆναι λέγονται ναυσὶν εἰς τὴν νῆσον Λίβυες, ἡγεμῶν δὲ τοῖς Λίβυσιν ἦν Σάρδος ὁ Μακρήριδος Ἡρακλέους δὲ ἐπονομασθέντος ὑπὸ Αἰγυπτίων... οὐ μέντοι τοὺς γε αὐτόχθονας ἐξέβαλεν ὁ τῶν Λιβύων στόλος σύννοικοι δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἱ ἐπελθόντες ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ εὐνοίας ἐδέχθησαν. καὶ πόλεις μὲν οὔτε οἱ Λίβυες οὔτε τὸ γένος τὸ ἐγγώριον ἠπίσταντο ποιήσασθαι. σποράδες δὲ ἐν καλύβαις τε καὶ σπηλαίοις ὥς ἕκαστοι τύχοιεν ᾤκησαν (3) ἔτεσι δὲ ὕστερον μετὰ τοὺς Λίβυας ἀφίκοντο ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἰς τὴν νῆσον οἱ μετ' Ἀρισταίου...(4) πόλιν δ' οὖν οἰκίζουσιν οὐδεμίαν οὐδ' οὔτοι ὅτι ἀριθμῶ τε καὶ ἰσχύι ἐλάσσονες ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν ἢ κατὰ πόλεως ἦσαν οἰκισμὸν. (5) μετὰ δὲ Ἀρισταίου Ἰβηρες εἰς τὴν Σαρδῶ διαβαίνουσιν ὑπὸ ἡγεμόνι τοῦ στόλου Νώρακι καὶ ᾤκησθη Νώρα πόλις ὑπὸ αὐτῶν. ταύτην πρώτην γενέσθαι πόλιν μνημονεύουσιν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ...τετάρτη δὲ μοῖρα Ἰολάου Θεσπείων τε καὶ ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς στρατιὰ κατήρην εἰς Σαρδῶ καὶ Ὀλβίαν μὲν πόλιν οἰκίζουσιν...(7) ὕστερον μέντοι πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν οἱ Λίβυες ἐπαιρώθησάν τε αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν νῆσον στόλῳ μείζονι καὶ ἥρξαν ἐς τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν πολέμου. τὸ μὲν δὴ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐς ἅπαν ἐπέλαβε φθαρῆναι ἢ ὀλίγον ἐγένετο ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπολειφθέν. οἱ δὲ Τρῶες ἐς τῆς νήσου τὰ ὑψηλὰ ἀναφεύγουσι καταλαβόντες δὲ ὄρη δύσβατα ὑπὸ σκολόπων τε καὶ κρημνῶν Ἰλιεῖς μὲν ὄνομα καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ἔτι ἔχουσι Λίβυσι μέντοι τὰς μορφὰς καὶ τῶν ὅπλων τὴν σκευὴν καὶ ἐς τὴν πᾶσαν δαίαιαν εἰκάσιν.

⁶⁰ J.G. Frazier, *Pausanias's Description of Greece* (London 1898) Vol. V, pp.321-322.

⁶¹ X.17.2.

⁶² X.17.5.

⁶³ X.17.7.

during the sixth century are obvious.⁶⁴ Finally he states that the Greeks and Trojans that survived this invasion fled to the interior where despite still being called Ilians, their weapons and society are Libyan in appearance.⁶⁵ The Ilians were actually the Iolaëis, supposedly settled by Iolaüs, the nephew of Heracles.⁶⁶ These people were in fact the Sards who fled to the interior after the Carthaginian invasions of the sixth century.⁶⁷ Pausanias has connected the two similar names to establish a tradition of Trojan/Greek people on Sardinia. Now that we know these people were native Sards, Pausanias' next admission becomes particularly interesting. He claims that despite being independent, the Ilians were in warfare and appearance like the Libyans i.e. the Carthaginians in his day.⁶⁸ This may suggest the spread of Carthaginian culture into the unconquered tribes of Sardinia. Despite Roman domination of the island for several centuries, this suggestion is possible when considering the survival of Punic language and religion in North Africa and Sicily after the fall of Carthage.⁶⁹ Although Pausanias' description of early Sardinia is legendary, it appears to be influenced by some actual events. These demonstrate several characteristics and changes consistent with our knowledge of Phoenician and Carthaginian activity on Sardinia.

Literary accounts regarding Punic Sardinia become even more sporadic and fragmentary. The Carthaginians' exclusive nature regarding this important province means we have little evidence from the period.⁷⁰ Our best indication regarding the survival and diffusion of Punic elements is from the period immediately after the

⁶⁴ The Greek presence on Sardinia is slightly more problematic. Presumably the Greek settlers mentioned by Pausanias are legendary. Nonetheless the Etrusco-Carthaginian battles at Alalia and Cumae against Greek encroachments coincide both geographically and chronologically with Carthaginian involvement in the area.

⁶⁵ X.17.7.

⁶⁶ Diod. V.15.2.

⁶⁷ Diodorus also describes the Iolëis in some detail. He claims that it was them who fled after the arrival of the Carthaginians (V.15.4). He also describes their way of life and despite many attempts by both Carthaginians and Romans they remain unconquered (IV.30.3-6).

⁶⁸ Pausanias is most likely referring to his own time during the second century AD. It is possible however, that he is copying this from another source earlier than himself. Ephorus is a possibility writing in the fourth century BC, but his accounts are probably too early for such a comment.

⁶⁹ Such an idea may be possible when we consider the rugged, inaccessible terrain of the Sardinian interior coupled with the harsh treatment the Romans dealt to the Sards. This may have fostered a reluctance to accept Roman culture and maintain their own.

⁷⁰ The exclusive nature of Carthaginian activity on Sardinia is demonstrated by Polybius in the first treaty with Rome in 509/8, who claims that any merchant wishing to trade in either Libya or Sardinia needed to do so in the presence of a vendor of the state (III.22.8-9). The second treaty ca. 306 specifically states that Rome was forbidden from founding a colony on the island (III.24). Polybius best describes the nature of the Carthaginian presence on Sardinia himself when discussing the first treaty: "The wording of this treaty shows that the Carthaginians consider Sardinia and Africa as belonging absolutely to them", ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν συνθηκῶν περὶ μὲν Σαρδόνος καὶ Λιβύης ἐμφαίνουσιν ὥς περὶ ιδίας ποιούμενοι τὸν λόγον (III.23.5).

Punic expulsion from Sardinia. Although the native Sards had revolted and seriously undermined the Carthaginian presence on the island, it was not until Rome seized the island in 238 that official Carthaginian authority ceased.⁷¹

The later revolts on the island suggest Carthaginian sympathies were not extinguished completely. The best account is that of the Sardinian rebel leader Hampsicora. A revolt broke out in 215 under Hampsicora, apparently as a result of harsh Roman rule in the island. It appears that the Romans saw Sardinia as nothing more than a tribute-state populated by Barbarians and treated it accordingly.⁷² The brief history of the revolt, as told by Livy, provides certain insight into obvious Carthaginian sympathies and influences remaining in Sardinia. If we look at the figure of Hampsicora himself, Livy claims that he was the most wealthy and influential individual (i.e. Sardinian) on the island. It was also he that went into direct negotiation with the Carthaginians. It is possible that Hampsicora built or at least inherited his standing from the Carthaginian legacy on Sardinia. Although at best guess a native Sard, it is likely he had Carthaginian contacts and influences. The ease at which he negotiated with Carthage and succeeded in getting help from Hasdrubal and a Carthaginian force suggests that he was well aware of Carthaginian interests on the island.⁷³ In addition to this we must consider that Carthaginian rule was preferred to that of Rome. Surely Hampsicora realised that if Carthage were victorious, Sardinia would revert to a Carthaginian controlled province. Finally there is an interesting description of Hampsicora recruiting from the wild 'Goatskins' of the mountainous interior absent during the first Roman attack.⁷⁴ Although Hampsicora's force was probably based around the territory of Caralis in the south of the island, there is specific mention of the 'Goatskins' suggesting that these tribes were distinct from the majority of Hampsicora's forces. It is likely that these tribes were those driven into the interior by the Carthaginians and forced to eke out a pastoral existence.⁷⁵ This

⁷¹ Polyb. III.27.

⁷² Livy XXIII.32.9, states that the Romans had been particularly harsh rulers in Sardinia. He claims the revolt was triggered off by the previous year of excessive tribute and grain requisition: *ad hoc fessos iam animos Sardonum esse diuturnitate imperii Romani, et proximo iis anno acerbe atque auare imperatum; graui tributo et colonatione iniqua frumenti pressos*. The Roman attitude toward the Sards was equally harsh and is best attributed by Festus, *Sardi uenales: alius alio nequior* (p.428 L.).

⁷³ Livy XXIII.40.

⁷⁴ XXIII.40.3, *Hampsicora tum forte profectus erat in Pellitos Sardos ad iuventutem armandam qua copias augetet*.

⁷⁵ The *Pelliti Sardi* as Livy calls them appear to be the same group as the Iolaëns or Iliaes that fled from the Carthaginian invasion into the interior. Diodorus helps explain the development of the term 'Goatskins'. He claims that the Iolaëns fled into the interior abandoning agriculture to concentrate on

further suggests that Hampsicora was a 'lowland' Sard based around the old Phoenicio-Punic settlements of the coast. It is also interesting that although there was a distinction between the more civilised Sards and those in the mountains, there was an obvious connection. Unfortunately for Hampsicora and Carthaginian interests on Sardinia, the Romans put down the revolt and the Sards were dispersed.

From these accounts of some Phoenicio-Punic activity on Sardinia, we are able to discern constant interaction between the Sards and a long succession of Phoenicians and Carthaginians. There was an obvious distinction between the Sards that fell under Phoenicio-Punic control and those which remained independent. From such evidence, it seems likely that these groups were still affected by Phoenicio-Punic culture either directly or more indirectly through other more 'Punicised' groups. Elements of Phoenicio-Punic culture are evident in seemingly remote interior regions and also during periods of no official contact. Although traditionally deemed as hostile to the Phoenicio-Punic presence, the native Sards were open to its influence.

The concept of a developed nation, or in the case of Carthage, an empire imposing its own social and cultural character on its subjects is natural. This also applies to those states and peoples bordering these provinces. It is interesting that we can discern areas of influence in areas both geographically and chronologically distinct from Phoenicio-Punic control. Throughout its provinces, Carthage bordered less developed peoples. The effect of Phoenicio-Punic culture on these peoples can often be witnessed by their legacy. We have seen examples of tribal states embarking on uncharacteristic and reasonably evolved socio-political endeavours. These include examples of *synoikismos* from Spain, the use of the Punic language among the Numidian Kings, and the influence of a culture as seen in Elymian Eryx. Presumably there were countless other examples of Phoenicio-Punic influence on other cultures. The removal of settled Carthaginian rule in an area (usually by Rome) often left a residual influence on technically autonomous peoples. Often the Punic system and several aspects of society continued after the removal of Carthaginian power. It is likely that a more obvious Punic influence on neighbouring peoples would be

raising flocks in the mountains, existing on a diet of meat, milk and cheese (V.15.4). It is most likely that goats were the main animals herded in the mountainous interior, hence their identification as 'Goatskins'.

apparent if not for Carthaginian territory so rapidly falling to Rome which brought and installed its own dominant culture.

Carthage maintained, as it was, a political and cultural hegemony over its empire, which spilled over into neighbouring territory. Even within its old borders, Carthaginian influence remained after the destruction of centralised power. The Punic legacy outlived Carthage and was testament to its ability to influence various peoples throughout and beyond its empire.

VI. CONTACT BEYOND THE EMPIRE

The nature of the Carthaginians' activity abroad saw them present in a number of developed states and in areas beyond the reach of their contemporaries. We have previously witnessed aspects of such contact within the Carthaginian Empire and with those on its borders. However, Carthaginian activity in areas beyond the contemporary bounds of the Mediterranean community in Africa and the Atlantic add to our understanding of Carthaginian intention and activity. Otherwise the Carthaginians' interaction with other developed Mediterranean cultures is evident. Our literary tradition suggests that Carthage was despised by many it dealt with, and indeed its treatment of others presumes a mutual Carthaginian attitude. Nevertheless, contact through various means was essential to Carthage and also to a number of allied and hostile states. Carthage often maintained long and enduring relationships with other developed nations based on several motivating factors including trade, diplomacy, and cultural interaction. The Carthaginians, like the Phoenicians before them, were able to interact on several levels with developed states despite variable military policies.¹ By looking at Carthaginian activity in remote areas and contact with developed peoples in the Mediterranean we are better able to characterise the nature of Carthaginian interests and its empire

EGYPT AND THE NORTH AFRICAN GREEKS

Carthage inherited its relationship with Egypt as part of its Phoenician legacy. We have seen from early accounts that Phoenicia actively traded with Egypt from the second millennium onwards. We have also witnessed aspects of Phoenician activity within the Egyptian Empire through the Amarna letters of the fourteenth century² and the accounts of Wen Ammon in the eleventh.³ Such accounts demonstrate a fair amount of Phoenician autonomy and a close trading relationship with Egypt. Even though Egyptian domination of the Levantine coast faded during the twelfth century, the Phoenicians still maintained a mercantile relationship with their old master. This

¹ The Phoenician states actively traded with and served several larger and officially hostile states including Egypt, the Hittites, Assyria, and Persia. Nevertheless, foreign policy did not usually infringe on financial potential, allowing relatively free trade between traditionally hostile areas.

² EA. 139-152.

relationship endured the Phoenician expansion in the West and became established in Carthage from an early period.

The exact nature of relations between Carthage and Egypt is unclear. There was a strong mercantile and cultural connection between the two states, however, there is little evidence for political and diplomatic interaction. Although economic and political spheres were often quite separate, Egypt and Carthage (both Phoenician and Punic) had a long and settled relationship. Presumably there was an understanding, either official or otherwise, between Carthage and Egypt. There is a later allusion to such a relationship during the First Punic War. Appian claims that in 252 the Carthaginians, destitute of funds, asked Ptolemy II for a loan of 2000 talents.⁴ Ptolemy was apparently on terms of friendship with both Rome and Carthage and preferred to attempt to broker a peace between the two sides. This reference is unclear regarding the exact relationship between Carthage and Egypt. There is an obvious friendship present, justifying the Carthaginian request for 2000 talents. It is possible that this may have been part of an official alliance, which was either a defensive treaty or possibly a military treaty negated by Ptolemy's alliance with Rome. Although this relationship is attested during the third century, it is the probable nature of Egypto-Carthaginian relations for several centuries. Their relationship was economic in nature, based on trade. Any further alliances were probably secondary in nature.

Trade between Carthage and Egypt seems to have existed from an early period, originally under Phoenician influence. From the mid-seventh century a distinctive Egyptian influence on aspects of Carthaginian material culture develops. From this period onwards a number of Carthaginian tombs start revealing large amounts of Egyptian wares including quantities of Egyptian scarabs and amulets. Such items are common in Punic tombs and suggest a widespread Egyptian influence within Carthaginian funerary culture.⁵ Egyptian remains of this type appear throughout areas of Phoenician and Carthaginian territory. Temples from this period also appear to be of Egyptian type. As the Picards suggest, the Carthaginians became accustomed to making their temples the dwelling-places for the gods much like the

³ *ARE*. Vol. IV, 557-591.

⁴ *Sic.* 1.

⁵ Jean Vercoutter, *Les objets Égyptiens et Égyptisants du mobilier funéraire Carthaginois* (Paris 1945). Vercoutter has collected a large catalogue of Egyptian scarabs (Chp. III) and Egyptian amulets (Chp. VI) discovered in tombs in Carthage.

Egyptian practice.⁶ Inscribed bands and religious urns with obvious divine depictions are found in some quantity in Carthage and throughout the Punic world.⁷ Even the stelae that dominate the Carthaginian topheth have common Egyptian depictions of the gods Horus and Ptah as well as common solar disc motifs.⁸ There are various other Egyptian materials discovered in Carthage which suggest cultural interchange. Inscribed razors have been discovered along with rings and religious figurines for example. Various aspects of décor evince strong Egyptian influence. An Egyptian decorative idiosyncrasy also became standard in Punic architecture. The so-called 'Egyptian throat' was a concave entablature or cornice usually above a columned rectangular door, which became a common aspect of Carthaginian temple architecture.⁹

During the seventh and sixth centuries, Egyptian material goods were popular in Carthage. However, the fifth century saw a distinctive drop in such goods, which suggests a possible decline in trade. Some have surmised that the reason for this change may have resulted from a more xenophobic attitude in Carthage following the severe defeat at Himera in 480. Another possibility is the advent of Athenian naval superiority in the East. Such considerations are all worthwhile, but we should reflect that during the fifth century, Carthage entered into one of its most vigorous periods of activity abroad. The expeditions of Hanno and Himilco, dated to the fifth century, do not suggest a sullen Carthage in recession. What seems more likely, to explain the hiatus in Carthaginian-Egyptian trade, is that Carthage, probably owing to increasing competition in the East, turned to the West and developed its interests there. Besides, the continuation of the interior route to Egypt probably remained unmolested by Greek encroachments. The fourth century saw an increase of Egypto-Carthaginian trade once again. It is possible that the arrival of Alexander in the East saw the redevelopment of the old Carthaginian-Egyptian trading routes in the latter half of the fourth century.¹⁰ This relationship was cemented under the early Ptolemaic Kings of Egypt, who seem to have traded actively with Carthage.

⁶ Picard, *Daily Life in Carthage*, pp.35-6.

⁷ Vercoutter, Chp. IX.

⁸ Soren *et al.*, p. 135. Such influence was certainly a legacy of earlier Egyptian influence on the Phoenicians of the Levantine coast.

⁹ Serge Lancel (ed.), *Byrsa : mission archéologique française à Carthage* (Rome 1982) Vol. II, p.184.

¹⁰ For a basic overview of Egypto-Carthaginian trade based on the archaeological evidence see Vercoutter, pp.347-348. For more specialised remains see Brigitte Quillard, "Les étuis porte-amulettes

The large quantity of Egyptian artefacts in Carthage enables us to discern a reasonable chronology of the contact and trade between the two states. Punic Carthage actively traded with Egypt as had its Phoenician predecessors. It abated briefly, perhaps as a result of external pressures or an internal redirection of Carthaginian energy. It is also testament to the separation between the mercantile and political spheres. Although Carthage was dealing with Egypt, it was often forced to do so with the latter under the control of Persians or Greco-Macedonians.

There is limited evidence of Carthaginian travellers in Egypt. Siwah, the western interior oasis town, likely experienced the most intense travel in this regard as an important station on the interior route between Egypt and Carthaginian territory.¹¹ Further east and along the Nile, there is Punic and Neo-Punic graffiti in Memphis which attest to travellers from the west.¹² Our evidence is more obvious regarding an Egyptian presence in the Punic centres to the West. This suggests that either Egypt was the dominant trading partner or Carthaginian commodities were not durable or obvious in the archaeological record.

Finally, the relative geographical positions of both Carthage and Egypt predisposed them for contact. Originally Phoenician traffic from the Levantine coast would hug the North African coast, making Egypt a natural port-of-call *en route* to the West. The same would certainly have operated in the opposite direction. A similar process seems to exist regarding the interior route and its connection to Trans-Saharan routes beginning to the south of Leptis Magna and to the east. As we will see both Egypt and Carthage, through the use of various intermediary tribes benefited from such routes and were naturally brought into further contact.

The position of Carthage and its territory in relation to the Greek settlements along the North African coast to the east suggests some form of contact existed. The eastern trade routes to Carthage, both along the coast and in the interior passed by these Greek settlements. Unfortunately there is little definite evidence of direct contact between the two states. Presumably the first area of contact would be trade. Possible Greek trade evident in the material remains at Carthage may have been

carthaginois", *Karthago* XVI, 1971-1972, pp.1-32; Jean Leclant, "Egyptian Talismans in the Cemeteries of Carthage", *Archaeologia Viva* I.2, 1968/9, pp.95-102.

¹¹ Siwah remains the natural point of contact between the two cultures and is likely to have seen considerable Carthaginian activity, see Klaus P. Kuhlmann, *Das Ammoneion, Archäologie, Geschichte und Kultpraxis des Orakels von Siwa* (Mainz am Rhein 1988) pp.97-98.

¹² *CIS*. I.197.

routed through centres like Cyrene or Naucratis. There is little evidence of Punic remains in any Greek centre. As in Siwah, there is limited evidence of Punic trade in the *emporion* of Naucratis.¹³ Otherwise we must assume that Carthaginian evidence generally had little impact on the archaeological record. It is also likely that Carthage was trading with a traditional competitor, Cyrene. Although the interior route often bypassed Cyrene on the coast, it seems as though trade was conducted between merchants of both states. Strabo suggests such a connection, when during the reign of Ptolemy Soter, he describes an interior settlement called Charax.¹⁴ He claims that this site was accustomed to trade Carthaginian wine for silphium and its juice which had been smuggled from Cyrene. Although the accepted relationship between Carthage and Cyrene is here treated as hostile, evidence of trade exists between the two states.

There is also slight evidence of diplomatic relations between the North African Greeks and the Carthaginians. We have already seen a possible alliance between Ptolemaic Egypt and Carthage during the third century. Although we have placed this in an Egyptian context, technically it was an alliance between a Greek-run state and Carthage. There is one example from the fourth century when Carthage is named as an allied state of Cyrene.¹⁵ During the siege of Thibron in 322, the Cyrenaeans asked and received support from the neighbouring Libyan tribes and Carthage, which are both described as allies. There is little further evidence to suggest whether this alliance was temporary or had existed longer. Otherwise we only know of the supposed boundary war between the two states. The *Ara Philaeni* traditionally demarcated eastern Carthaginian territory from that of Cyrene.¹⁶ It is interesting however, that Sallust claims this boundary was put in place to settle a long and bitter conflict between Carthage and Cyrene.¹⁷ This war is unsubstantiated, and although possible, remains doubtful. Wherever this supposed boundary lay is unclear, however, Carthage obviously controlled territory at least to Leptis Magna. Despite an obvious gap in our knowledge of relationships between Carthage and the Greek states on the North African coast, there is some evidence suggesting there was basic interaction between them. Carthage maintained relationships with most powers in its vicinity, and the short distance between these two parties implies active contact.

¹³ Vercoutter, pp.9-10, 354-355.

¹⁴ XVII.3.20.

¹⁵ Diod. XVIII.21.4.

¹⁶ See Chp. II, n.86.

¹⁷ *Iug.* LXXIX.

THE ETRUSCANS

Central Italy and Carthage maintained an enduring relationship which had existed for centuries before the two areas went to war. This relationship began with the Romans' predecessors, the Etruscans, incorporating both trade and foreign policy. Etruria played an important part in Carthaginian foreign affairs, probably resulting from Phoenician settlement on Sardinia. Its importance to Carthage saw it continue a relationship with the Etruscans' successor Rome, the very state which would later orchestrate its destruction.

Official Carthaginian relations with the Etruscans were extremely close. Presumably the Phoenicians would have been the first to make contact with the western shores of Central Italy. The relationship between the Phoenicio-Punic and the Etruscan seems to have been based first on trade, but later extended also to a close alliance. The nature of the Etrusco-Carthaginian relationship is best attested by Aristotle who claims:

*A state, if it is not just a pact of mutual protection nor an agreement for trade and business; for then the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and all others with agreements with each other, would be taken as citizens of a single state. Certainly they have trade agreements, non-aggression pacts, and written documents governing their alliance.*¹⁸

From this account, Aristotle uses Carthage and Etruria as an example of two states with intimate ties which nonetheless retain their respective independence. It is an interesting account which shows a Greek opinion that the Carthaginians and Etruscans had well established trading ties and an official military treaty, but remained independent.

The first area of contact between the Phoenicians and Etruscans was most certainly trade. This first becomes apparent in Sardinia. Even before the Phoenicians'

¹⁸ *Pol.* III.5.10-11, 1280a, νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν μήτε συμμαχίας ἔνεκεν ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ γὰρ ἂν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ πάντες οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὥς μὲν ἂν πολῖται πόλεως ἦσαν. εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας.

arrival, the Etruscans and Sards actively traded.¹⁹ The growth of Phoenician settlement and influence on the island saw the steady development of trade with Etruria. There are considerable Etruscan material remains in areas of Phoenicio-Punic Sardinia.²⁰ The importance of this trade can be witnessed further afield. Remains from Carthage and indeed other Phoenicio-Punic settlements show a flourishing trade with Etruria. It appears that Etruscan traders, or at least Etruscan wares were reaching Carthage with some regularity.²¹ Likewise in Etruria, Phoenicio-Punic remains demonstrate Etruscan taste for various wares.²² Initial Phoenicio-Punic interest in Etruria was in its wealth of metals. Although the Phoenicians had settled good metal producing regions in Southern Spain and Sardinia, Etruria offered them a wealth of iron and copper. Likewise, Sardinia offered the Etruscans trade in silver and lead. Several Phoenician ports located on Sardinia in particular, and Western Sicily were well-located for facilitating trade with the western shores of Italy.

Naturally, the Phoenicians, as they had done throughout their trading empire, needed a base of operations in Etruria. The southern Etrurian settlement of Pyrgi, connected to its port Caere, seems to have fulfilled this role. There is evidence from this area that Phoenician and Carthaginian traders not only traded actively, but also settled. The best example of a concerted Phoenicio-Punic presence are the Pyrgi inscriptions, two in Etruscan and the other a translation into Phoenicio-Punic dated to ca. 500. These inscriptions tell that the Etruscan King, Thefarie Velianas established two temples, one of which was to the goddess Astarte (assimilated as Uni in Etruscan).²³ Although the reasons behind such a generous dedication are clouded, to

¹⁹ There is direct evidence of contact from ca. 800 and possibly earlier. The port of Olbia on the east coast of the island testifies to such contact with a number of Etruscan remains present at the site. It appears that Etruscan contact with the local Sards influenced their own production of wares and architecture. According to Strabo (V.2.7), the Tyrrhenians once possessed the island, suggesting a close association with, and possible influence over the Sards, see Michael Grant, *The Etruscans* (London 1980) pp.26-29, 183-186.

²⁰ For a brief description of Etruscan trade with Sardinia and examples, see Acquaro, "Phoenicians and Etruscans", pp.614-616.

²¹ Much of our information is sporadic in nature. Early contact with the Phoenicians in the East has been established with the discovery of an Etruscan amphora in Syrian Tripoli. Probably the best example is an ivory plaque at Carthage bearing an Etruscan inscription most likely from the town of Vulci. Otherwise the most common archaeological evidence remains the black *bucchero* pottery which permeates the Mediterranean, including parts of Carthage and its empire. Most of the trade seems to have concentrated on metals from Etruria and Sardinia. Cultural influence is also evident based on trade with Carthage in fine Etruscan gold work, or at least in a decidedly Etruscan style.

²² Two Phoenician silver bowls from the Bernadini tomb in Praeneste dated to the late seventh century and the sarcophagus of Laris Partunus in Tarquinia from the fourth century are good examples of the trade in luxury items.

²³ KAI. 277.

build a temple to Astarte suggests a reasonable Phoenicio-Punic population and a close connection between it and the local Etruscans. It is also interesting that the inscriptions exist in two parallel accounts in both Etruscan and Phoenicio-Punic. This suggests that they were accessible to populations of both groups. Therefore there must have been a considerable Phoenicio-Punic population either living or visiting the site. The area around Pyrgi attests a strong Phoenicio-Punic presence which extended beyond the end of the sixth century. There are Phoenicio-Punic material remains at the site dating from the fifth century.²⁴ Dionysius of Syracuse attacked and plundered the site in 384 BC.²⁵ Apparently his main goal was to plunder the rich temples there to fund a war against Carthage. Certainly such an action would have been intended against the Carthaginians in Pyrgi, possibly including the temple of Astarte. From the plunder he amassed some 1500 talents, also suggesting that the temple had grown extremely wealthy off trade in the area.²⁶ Further evidence from Pyrgi and its surrounds also implies a settled Phoenicio-Punic presence. The coastal town immediately to the north was known as Punicum during the Roman period. It is possible that this town retained its name based on some form of contact or settlement from Carthage. Both Phoenicians and Carthaginians were well adjusted to the idea of semi-permanent coastal settlements in foreign lands. This was most likely the case in parts of Etruria. The case of Pyrgi, and in particular the presence of a distinctively Phoenicio-Punic temple, suggests that this settlement was more substantial especially given the close relationship and understanding between the Carthaginians and the Etruscans.

The Carthaginians and Etruscans maintained an active military alliance for a considerable period. This mutual assistance pact saw both states protect their interests surrounding the Tyrrhenian Sea, and its lucrative trade routes. The major problem both states faced was attempting to check the rapid expansion of Greeks north from Southern Italy and Sicily. With such an imminent threat, both parties actively sought a military pact most likely eventuating in the late seventh century.

The first major conflict in the area which suggests such an alliance is attested (although not named) by Thucydides when the Carthaginians were defeated in a naval

²⁴ Moscati, *Italia Punica*, p.347.

²⁵ Diod. XV.14.3-4.

²⁶ Diodorus reckons that Dionysius took 1000 talents from the temple complex itself. The other 500 was from selling booty in Syracuse, mostly slaves.

battle by the Phocaeans, who then went on to found Massilia.²⁷ This Phocaean colony was founded around 600 and was the most westerly Greek foundation of the time. It seems likely that the foundation of a Greek colony in the area would have caused a great deal of concern among the Carthaginians and Etruscans. Such an event could certainly have precipitated an alliance between the two states, if in fact, one did not already exist. The natural routes linking Massilia to other groups of western Greeks meant passage through the Tyrrhenian Sea: an area too close to the important coastal areas of Etruria, Sardinia, and Corsica.

The reason for such initial alarm was realised only sixty years later. According to Herodotus, the Phocaeans established a settlement at Alalia on Corsica around 540.²⁸ Herodotus claims that the settlement was founded twenty years previously, dating Phocaean settlement on the island to 560. A second wave of settlers started causing disruption to the trade routes in the Tyrrhenian for some five years before a joint Carthaginian-Etruscan fleet confronted them. Herodotus claims that the one hundred and twenty Carthaginian and Etruscan ships defeated the Phocaeans' sixty, despite suffering heavy losses themselves. The result of this battle was the abandonment of Alalia with the Greek survivors returning to Rhegium.

The Carthaginian-Etruscan practice of attempting to exclude foreign incursions in the Tyrrhenian Sea seems to have continued. The Battle of Cumae in 474 saw Hieron defeat the Etruscans and the Carthaginians. Although a Carthaginian presence is not attested in the account of Diodorus,²⁹ Pindar cites a 'Phoenician' presence in his ode to honour Hieron in 470.³⁰ By this period we would expect to see more of a Carthaginian presence considering that they were specifically named in previous encounters in the region. A scholiast to Pindar seems to correct this poetic oversight by claiming that Phoenicians and Carthaginians combined with the Etruscans at Cumae.³¹ Although the scholiast attests a Phoenician and Carthaginian presence, it is likely that, based on other examples, the Carthaginians were the official power. The presence of the Carthaginians at Cumae may extend hostilities with the Sicilian Greeks during this period beyond the defeat at Himera only six years previous. Based on later Carthaginian activities on Sicily it is uncharacteristic for

²⁷ Thuc. I.13.

²⁸ Hdt. I.166.

²⁹ XI.51

³⁰ *Pyth.* I.71-72. Pindar also mentions the Carthaginian defeat at Himera in 480 shortly after (I.77-78).

³¹ Schol. *Pyth.* I.137a (ed. Drachmann).

Carthage willingly to invest in hostilities so soon after a heavy defeat. This may suggest that the Carthaginian contingent at the battle was not large and the fleet was primarily Etruscan. This may explain why the Carthaginian presence is absent from other reports of the battle.³² However, a larger Carthaginian presence is not inconceivable given Carthage's renowned ability to recover quickly from defeat. This is particularly obvious on this occasion as during this period, following defeats at Himera and Cumae, the Carthaginians commissioned two major missions of settlement and exploration under the command of Hanno and Himilco respectively.

For several decades, Carthaginian and Etruscan efforts in protecting their interests around the Tyrrhenian Sea seem to have been reasonably successful. However, they were dealt a double blow in the first half of the fifth century. First, Gelon defeated a large Carthaginian army at Himera in 480. This loss caused Carthage to reconsider its approach in the area. After this it preferred to consolidate its holdings in Sicily temporarily, while expanding elsewhere. Only a few years later in 474, the Carthaginians and Etruscans were defeated at the Battle of Cumae by Hieron. This loss effectively saw the end of Etruscan dominance in Campania. It furthermore heralded the steady decline of the influence of the Etrusco-Carthaginian alliance. The Etruscans were already in rapid decline after the loss of Rome in 509, and were proving unable to cope with continual encroachments on their territory.

The losses at Himera and Cumae greatly altered the appearance and effectiveness of the Etrusco-Carthaginian alliance, although they did not completely destroy it. The Etruscans, no longer an equal of Carthage, would most likely have fallen back on their earlier agreement of trade. We have already witnessed the plundering of the Etrusco-Carthaginian temples of Pyrgi by Dionysius of Syracuse in 384. These temples would have certainly continued to function as sanctuaries for both Etruscans and Carthaginians. The amount of bullion plundered suggests they were still in full operation and were being well maintained by the lucrative trade of both states. The final example of Carthaginians and Etruscans taking the field together is testament to the decline of the latter's influence. We find Etruscan mercenaries fighting in the Carthaginian army during the war with Agathocles in 311 and 310.³³ These were not Etruscan regular troops assisting an ally in Carthage, but Etruscans fighting for pay, or possibly exiles. It seems certain that by the fourth century, any

³² Diod. XI.51; Tod, 22.

alliance had reverted back to a mercantile basis. After the foundation of Rome and the defeat at Cumae, the Etruscans had steadily lost influence in Italy, to the point where they were not able to maintain their position of equal partners in alliance with Carthage.

ROME

Carthage and Rome maintained a long and steady relationship from the late sixth century until the first half of the third century. The relationship between the two later deteriorated resulting in the outbreak of the First Punic War in 264. The best examples of the earlier peaceful relationship between the two states are the three Romano-Carthaginian treaties preserved by Polybius which stipulate a number of mercantile, political, and military agreements. It appears that Rome and Carthage were quite willing to recognise the other's interests from an early period.³⁴

The relationship between Carthage and Rome should not be viewed as a new era of foreign policy but rather a continuation. Although Rome became a state independent of the Etruscans in 509, it most likely had a pre-existing relationship with Carthage as an Etruscan city. Therefore the first Romano-Carthaginian treaty of 509/8 was little more than a transition of partners rather than a new foreign alliance. The Carthaginians still remained allies of the Etruscans, they were just ensuring that they remained on good terms with all states bordering the Tyrrhenian Sea. The change of the political map simply saw Carthage adjust its policy to incorporate the newly independent city of Rome.

The full independence of Rome in 509 heralded the first treaty between the new and still relatively insignificant state in Central Italy and Carthage. This treaty,

³³ Diod. XIX.106.2, XX.11.1.

³⁴ The nature of these treaties is a subject of modern discussion. Polybius claims that the treaties were preserved in his day on bronze tablets in the treasury of the Aediles beside the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus (III.26). He claims that the existence of these tablets disputes the pro-Carthaginian and therefore erroneous claims of the historian Philinus. The latter apparently claimed the treaties between Rome and Carthage stipulated that Rome was forbidden access to Sicily and likewise Carthage to the whole of Italy. This is important, as according to Philinus, it was Rome who broke the original treaty and not Carthage. Although this may seem an attractive alternative given the unreliability of pro-Roman accounts, especially in light of the events and positioning of Saguntum at the outbreak of the Second Punic War, the nature of the Carthaginians' activity in Italy and their open markets in Sicily suggests that Polybius' account is more likely. The most comprehensive modern work on the three Romano-Carthaginian treaties is that of Barbara Scardigli, *I trattati Romano-Cartaginesi* (Pisa 1991). Also see Werner Huss, *Geschichte der Karthager*, Chps. IX, XVII, and XXIII; Hatto H. Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* (Munich 1960) Vol. II, pp.16-20, 306-309; Vol. II, pp.53-55, 101-106.

supposedly the best translation Polybius was able to provide, survives extant. Although we have discussed some aspects of this treaty, it is useful if we look at it here as a whole:

There shall be friendship between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and their allies on these terms:

The Romans and their allies shall not sail beyond the Fair Promontory unless compelled to do so by storm or by enemy action. If one of them is carried beyond it by force, he shall not buy or carry away anything more than is required for the repair of his ship or for sacrifice, and he shall depart within five days.

Those who come to trade shall not conclude any business except in the presence of a herald or town clerk. The price of whatever is sold in the presence of these officials shall be secured to the vendor by the state, if the sale takes place in Libya or Sardinia. If any Roman comes to [that part of] Sicily which the Carthaginians rule, the Roman shall be as everyone else. The Carthaginians shall do no injustice to the peoples of Ardea, Antium, the Laurentes, and the peoples of Circeii, Tarracina or any other city of those Latins who are subject to the Romans.

As regards those Latin peoples who are not subject to the Romans, the Carthaginians shall not interfere with any of these cities, and if they take any one of them, they shall deliver it up to the Romans undamaged. They shall make no fortified settlement in Latin territory. If they enter a territory as enemies, they shall not spend a night there.³⁵

The nature of this first treaty certainly supposes the political position of both Carthage and Rome. Carthage assumes the role of senior partner in the alliance and is therefore able to benefit more from the agreement. After all, this treaty was sworn

³⁵ Polyb. III.22.4-13, ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίων συμμάχοις, μὴ πλεῖν μακραῖς ναυσὶ Ῥωμαίους μηδὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχους ἐπέκεινα τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρωτηρίου ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ χειμῶνος ἢ πολεμίων ἀναγκασθῶσιν. ἐὰν δὲ τις βία κατενεχθῇ μὴ ἐξέστω αὐτῷ μηδὲν ἀγοράζειν μηδὲ λαμβάνειν πλὴν ὅσα πρὸς πλοίου ἐπισκευὴν ἢ πρὸς ἱερά ἐν πέντε δ' ἡμέραις ἀποτρεχέτω. τοῖς δὲ κατ' ἐμπορίαν παραγινόμενοις μηδὲν ἔστω τέλος πλὴν ἐπὶ κήρυκι ἢ γραμματεῖ. ὅσα δ' ἂν τούτων παρόντων πραθῇ δημοσίᾳ πίσται ὀφειλέσθω τῷ ἀποδομένῳ ὅσα ἂν ἢ ἐν Λιβύῃ ἢ ἐν Σαρδόνι πραθῇ. ἐὰν Ῥωμαίων τις εἰς Σικελίαν παραγίνηται ἢς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσιν ἴσα ἔστω τὰ Ῥωμαίων πάντα. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖτωσαν δῆμον Ἀρδεατῶν Ἀντιατῶν Λαυρεντίνων Κιρκαιτῶν Ταρρακινιτῶν μηδ' ἄλλον μηδένα Λατίνων ὅσοι ἂν ὑπήκοοι. ἐὰν δὲ τινες μὴ ὦσιν ὑπήκοοι τῶν πόλεων ἀπεχέσθωσαν. ἂν δὲ λάβωσι Ῥωμαίοις ἀποδιδότωσαν ἀκέρατον. φρούριον μὴ ἐνοικοδομεῖτωσαν ἐν τῇ Λατίνῃ. ἐὰν ὡς πολέμιοι εἰς τὴν χώραν εἰσέλθωσιν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ μὴ ἐννυκτερεύετωσαν.

within the first year of the overthrow of Etruscan rule in Rome and the formation of the Roman state. The first section of the treaty demonstrates this authority by stating that the Romans were forbidden to sail beyond the Fair Promontory (possibly either Cape Farina to the north and west of Carthage or Cape Bon to the south and east³⁶). If a Roman ship was driven beyond this boundary, it was to depart within five days. Polybius comments on this clause, claiming that it was established in order to protect the *emporion* along the coast south of Carthage.³⁷ The control Carthage exhibited over its North African settlements certainly justifies the nature of this clause.

The second part of the section covers trade, and once again Carthage assumes the superior position. In both North Africa and Sardinia (two more exclusive Carthaginian territories), if a Roman wished to trade he would have to do so in the presence of a state official who also secured the price of sale.³⁸ Polybius claims that Roman traders were welcome in these areas of Carthaginian control, but they had to trade under strict state control, thus maintaining the Carthaginian domination in the area.³⁹

The concept of Carthaginian territory is also attested in the treaty. Polybius claims the Carthaginians considered Sardinia and Africa to be their sole possessions, Sicily on the other hand is treated differently with only mention of the Carthaginian controlled area.⁴⁰ We have already witnessed that Polybius in this treaty and the next defines Carthaginian territory on Sicily probably in a manner close to how the Carthaginians defined it themselves. For Africa and Sardinia, we already know of the exclusive Carthaginian control present in these areas. Despite being a defined Carthaginian province, Carthaginian Sicily is mentioned in more open terms, stating that any Roman in Carthaginian Sicily would receive the same rights as any other

³⁶ See F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* (Oxford 1957) Vol. I, pp.341-342. He argues that Polybius has misunderstood the treaty: in reality (so Walbank) the Romans were excluded from sailing *west* of Cap Farina. Ameling, *Karthago*, pp.142-147, has, however, argued that Polybius was correct in his indication of the direction: the Carthaginians wanted to exclude not Roman traders, but Roman pirates from Carthage itself and the African coast to the South and East of Carthage.

³⁷ Polyb. III.23.2.

³⁸ Ameling, *Karthago*, pp.147-151, argues that this provision was to Roman traders' benefit. In any case the Carthaginians themselves could only have profited from increased trade with the Romans.

³⁹ III.23.4-5, "To Carthage itself, and to all parts of Africa on this side (that of the Fair Promontory), to Sardinia and to Sicily which the Carthaginians rule over, the Romans may come for trading purposes, and the Carthaginian state undertakes to secure payment of their just debts.", εἰς δὲ Καρχηδόνα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐπὶ τὰδε τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρωτηρίου τῆς Λιβύης καὶ Σαρδόνα καὶ Σικελίαν ἧς ἐπάρχουσι Καρχηδόνιοι κατ' ἐμπορίαν πλεῖν Ῥωμαίοις ἔξεστι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπισχνοῦνται βεβαιώσειν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι δημοσίᾳ πίστει.

⁴⁰ III.23.5, Polybius claims when discussing Sicily "they use a different language to define their interests".

(presumably non-Carthaginian). The nature of Sicily meant constant trade between a number of peoples continued, both official allies and enemies of Carthage. Unlike politics, trade was not particular and permitted merchants from virtually anywhere access to visit and to conduct business.

Finally, the treaty covers the area of Central Italy, in particular Latium. Carthage was not excluded but merely forbidden to attack several small towns and peoples. In addition to this the Carthaginians were not supposed to attack any non-Roman controlled towns in Latin territory. The clauses of the treaty however, are dubious as while Carthage is forbidden to attack such settlements, it is still permitted to keep any slaves or booty captured while raiding this territory and to carry arms in the territory so long as they do not stay there overnight. These clauses protecting Roman interests are not overly concerned with Carthaginian raiding, rather they project a Roman fear of permanent Carthaginian occupation. The Carthaginians were not allowed to build a fort in the area, nor were they allowed to occupy a captured city, nor for armed men to spend a night. The clause forbidding the building of forts could allude to the Carthaginian practice of settling in fortified trade positions such as Monte Sirai and others on Sardinia, and Motya on Sicily. All three entries are designed to limit Carthaginian expansion into Latium while not necessarily forbidding piracy.

When we compare the rights of Carthaginians and Romans in this first treaty, the Romans are definitely the junior partners. This stands to reason however, as Rome was still a nascent city-state with little political power or military influence enabling it to demand better conditions. Rome was probably more than happy to swear this treaty which would protect its existence from the major naval power in the area, Carthage. By doing this, Rome had managed to broker a treaty with the staunch ally of its former enemies, the Etruscans.

The treaty of 509/8 defines a number of political and geographical conditions applicable to both Rome and Carthage. From it we are able to discern a relative Carthaginian advantage over the new city of Latin Rome. This is defined in both political and mercantile terms. It appears that Carthage, in particular, and Rome were willing to formalise a trade agreement which would benefit both parties. In the political sphere, Rome needed the major power in the Western Mediterranean to recognise it and to grant it protection from attack; Carthage on the other hand needed

to maintain its exclusive trading rights in Central Italy after the disruption caused by the expulsion of the Etruscans. For the time being, both parties literally got what they wanted.

The second treaty between Rome and Carthage was probably introduced around 306 BC as a renewal of Romano-Carthaginian relations after two centuries.⁴¹ In many respects it runs similar to its predecessor. All the same, we are able to discern several developments:

There shall be friendship on the following conditions between the Romans and their allies, and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, people of Utica and their allies. The Romans shall not make raids, or trade or found a city on the farther side of the Fair Promontory, Mastia, or Tarsium.

If the Carthaginians capture any city in Latium, which is not subject to Rome, they shall keep the goods and men, but deliver up the city.

If any Carthaginians take prisoner any of a people with whom the Romans have a treaty of peace in writing, but who are not subject to Rome, they need not bring them to Roman harbours, but if one be brought in and a Roman claims him, he shall be set free. The Romans need not act according to the same principles.

If a Roman obtains water and provisions from any place which is under Carthaginian rule, he shall not use these supplies to do harm to any member of a people with whom the Carthaginians enjoy peace and friendship. Neither shall a Carthaginian act in this way. [If either party does so,] the injured person shall not take private vengeance, and if he does so, his wrongdoing shall be a public injustice.

No Roman shall trade or found a city in Sardinia or in Africa, or remain in a Sardinian or African port no longer than he needs to obtain provisions or to repair his ship. If he is driven there by a storm, he shall depart within five days.

In Sicily, [that part] which the Carthaginians rule, and at Carthage he may transact business and sell whatever is permitted to a citizen. A Carthaginian in Rome may do likewise.⁴²

⁴¹ This date is also attested by Livy who claims that in this year the treaty between Rome and Carthage was renewed for the third time (IX.43.26). The second renewal apparently occurred in 348 when Carthaginian envoys visited Rome seeking an alliance (VII.27.2). It is possible that other treaties, or better perhaps, renewals, such as this did exist. See Huss, *Geschichte der Karthager*, pp.167-168; and Robert E. A. Palmer, *Rome and Carthage at Peace* (Stuttgart 1997) pp.15ff; see n.43.

⁴² Polyb. III.24.3-13, ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχοις καὶ Καρχηδονίων καὶ Τυρίων καὶ Ἰτυκαίων δῆμῳ καὶ τοῖς τούτων συμμάχοις, τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρωτηρίου

The obvious development in the second treaty from the first is growth of Rome, and its importance in Italy. This is understandable, as Rome, without major molestation from states like Carthage, had grown strong in Central Italy, and was now able to negotiate better terms. Carthage was no longer dealing with a nascent city-state which it could bully, but an established capital of an ever increasing dominion.

The treaty stipulates a change in Carthaginian allies. We find the metropolis of Tyre and the city of Utica named as allies of Carthage. By 306, the role of Tyre had changed significantly. It was besieged and destroyed by Alexander in 332, not before a considerable amount of the population had been removed to safety in Carthage.⁴³ Although rebuilt, it lost a great deal of its influence in the East. The mention of Tyre as an ally of Carthage is certainly not presuming it as an equal, rather a courtesy of its legacy and connection to its colony. A similar courtesy most likely explains the mention of Utica. Although this Phoenician colony traditionally predated the foundation of Carthage and maintained some basic forms of independence, by the end of the fourth century it would certainly have been under Carthaginian influence, if not official control. The treaty also defines the area of Roman exclusion in better detail. They were literally forbidden beyond the Fair Promontory or the sites of Mastia and Tarsium. These last two settlements were most likely in Spain, which was by this period had developed into a major area of Carthaginian influence. Mastia was probably the old capital Masieni, which would later become the site of New Carthage.⁴⁴ Tarsium may have some connection to the old area of Tartessus in Southern Spain. Otherwise the Romans were still forbidden to conduct any business or to settle in Africa and Sardinia although the five-day grace period was still granted.

Μαστίας Ταρσηίου μὴ λήζεσθαι ἐπέκεινα Ῥωμαίους μὴδ' ἐμπορεύεσθαι μὴδὲ πόλιν κτίζειν. ἐὰν δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι λάβωσιν ἐν τῇ Λατίνῃ πόλιν τινὰ μὴ οὖσαν ὑπήκοον Ῥωμαίοις τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐχέτωσαν τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἀποδιδότωσαν. ἐὰν δὲ τινες Καρχηδόνιων λάβωσιν τινὰς πρὸς οὓς εἰρήνη μὲν ἐστὶν ἔγγραφτος Ῥωμαίοις μὴ ὑποτάττονται δέ τι αὐτοῖς μὴ καταγέτωσαν εἰς τοὺς Ῥωμαίων λιμένας. ἐὰν δὲ καταχθέντος ἐπιλάβηται ὁ Ῥωμαῖος ἀφιέσθω. ὡσαύτως δὲ μὴδ' οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ποιεῖτωσαν. ἂν ἔκ τινος χώρας ἥς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσιν ὕδωρ ἢ ἐφόδια λάβῃ ὁ Ῥωμαῖος μετὰ τούτων τῶν ἐφοδίων μὴ ἀδικεῖτω μὴδὲνα πρὸς οὓς εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία ἐστὶ Καρχηδόνιοις. ὡσαύτως δὲ μὴδ' ὁ Καρχηδόνιος ποιεῖτω. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἰδίᾳ μεταμορενέσθω. ἐὰν δὲ τις τοῦτο ποιήσῃ δημόσιον γινέσθω τὸ ἀδίκημα. ἐν Σαρδόνι καὶ Λιβύῃ μὴδεὶς Ῥωμαίων μὴτ' ἐμπορενέσθω μὴτε πόλιν κτιζέτω εἰ μὴ ἕως τοῦ ἐφόδια λαβεῖν ἢ πλοῖον ἐπισκευάσαι. ἐὰν δὲ χειμῶν κατενέγκῃ ἐν πένθ' ἡμέραις ἀποτρεχέτω. ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἥς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσι καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι πάντα καὶ ποιεῖτω καὶ πωλεῖτω ὅσα καὶ τῷ πολίτῃ ἔξεστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος ποιεῖτω ἐν Ῥώμῃ.

⁴³ Diod. XVII.46.

⁴⁴ See Diod. XXV.10.3-12.

By such regulations, Carthage not only maintained its exclusive rights in North Africa and Sardinia, but also in Spain.

After reconfirming Carthaginian control in traditional areas, we are now able to witness the growth of Roman power implied in the text. Like the treaty of 509/8, the Carthaginians were permitted (under probable duress) to capture non-Roman towns in Latium but were immediately to vacate sites only taking moveable plunder. However, if Carthaginians captured Roman allies (not subjects), and they disembarked in a Roman port, a Roman could claim the captives and therefore free them. Apart from a rapidly developing sense of bureaucracy, we can discern evidence of Rome's expansion and its incorporation of allied states. Once again though, the Carthaginians are not specifically forbidden from plundering such sites, so long as they did not depart from or call in at a Roman port and so long as its expedition had not been provisioned in a Roman port.

By this stage Rome was permitted to trade more actively with other areas of Carthaginian territory. Carthaginian Sicily was still considered an area of *laissez faire* with Roman traders enjoying equal trading rights as citizens. Romans were permitted to supply themselves with water and provisions from a Carthaginian town, but they were forbidden to use such items to cause any harm (namely plunder) to any Carthaginian settlement or ally. The same clause also applied to the Carthaginians. If the person who is wronged should seek private vengeance, that person will be committing an offence. Such an admission suggests that both Roman and Carthaginian traffic was active throughout both territories. By forbidding both acts of plunder or robbery and personal revenge, this treaty is ultimately regulating trade and ensuring fair practice by merchants on both sides. It appears that the growth in trade was certainly relaxing restrictions, especially for Rome. This is emphasised by the new treaty granting Roman traders rights in Carthage, similar to those enjoyed in Carthaginian Sicily, and likewise to Carthaginian traders in Rome itself. The guarded attitude of Carthaginian territory was slowly lifting to accommodate the growth of Rome and the potential benefits from a free-trade agreement. The growth of Roman power was certainly starting to improve its relations with Carthage.

The final treaty between Rome and Carthage can be dated to ca. 279 BC, only sixteen years before the end of amicable relations between the two states and the outbreak of the First Punic War. It is possible that Carthage instigated this treaty to

stop a possible alliance between Rome and Pyrrhus, who harboured ambitions of invading Africa.⁴⁵ This treaty moves away from the basic non-aggression and trade clauses present in the first two treaties and concentrates solely on a military compact:

If they (the Romans and the Carthaginians) make a written alliance against Pyrrhus they shall both conclude it in such a way that it shall be possible (for them) to come to each other's aid in the land of those who are being attacked.

Whichever party may need help, the Carthaginians shall provide these ships both for transport and for operations, but each shall provide the pay for its own men.

*The Carthaginians shall also give help to the Romans by sea if necessary, but no one shall compel the crews to land against their will.*⁴⁶

This treaty is an *addendum* to an earlier alliance between Rome and Carthage to aid each other if Pyrrhus attacked either one. Polybius' initial claim that Carthage and Rome agreed to maintain previous agreements is evident, although the exact details are not preserved. The nature of the treaty is of interest, as it appears that Carthage was the state with the greatest desire to formalise it. This is hardly surprising as after Pyrrhus defeated the Romans at Asculum, he led his force to Sicily and nearly drove the Carthaginians from the island. Ultimately this *addendum* is to ensure that neither party enter an exclusive compact with a third party state which ruled out mutual aid against Pyrrhus. Although the original treaty was most likely defensive, in this section we find Carthage willing to use its large naval capacity to provide ships for both transport and battle. The threat of Pyrrhus obviously unnerved the Carthaginians and a Pyrrhic-Roman treaty could prove catastrophic. Therefore Carthage needed to adjust its trade-based and non-aggression pact with Rome. However, to achieve this, it needed to make it more attractive to Rome by offering full naval support free of charge in return for its aid. Although short, this third treaty between Rome and Carthage finally saw a Carthaginian admission of Roman equality after more than two hundred years. Ironically, it would only take another forty years before Rome would not only justify this equality, but even prove its superiority.

⁴⁵ Plut. *Pyrr.* XIV.6.

⁴⁶ Polyb. III.25.3-5, ἐὰν συμμαχίαν ποιῶνται πρὸς Πύρρον ἔγραπτον ποιείσθωσαν ἀμφοτέρωι ἵνα ἐξῇ βοηθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ τῶν πολεμουμένων χώρᾳ. ὁπότεροι δ' ἂν χρειάν ἔχωσι τῆς βοηθείας τὰ πλοῖα παρεχέτωσαν Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἔφοδον τὰ δὲ ὀψώνια τοῖς αὐτῶν

The Romano-Carthaginian treaties are useful in tracking the development of relations between the two states. We are able to discern a heavy mercantile tone in the first two treaties before a shift toward military matters later. Carthage maintained its reputation as a trading power by forbidding Roman traffic (or possibly just piracy) in areas such as North Africa, Sardinia, and Spain. By exerting rights in such rich areas, Carthage could control them and exploit their wealth better. In areas of competition such as Western Sicily and Carthage itself, Carthage certainly saw fit to allow monitored Roman trade along with that of other states in order to benefit further from the trade this produced. It is likely that the original treaty was based on an earlier one held with the Etruscans, which was simply transferred to Rome. Later when Carthage saw the benefits of widening access with Rome, it permitted Roman traders in Carthage and presumably other areas of its empire. We find this reciprocated by Rome allowing Carthaginian traders into the city. These three treaties allow us insight into how Carthage maintained its empire and had no major preference between rivals and allies regarding trade. Rome grew as a Carthaginian ally and trading partner. This growth saw it develop into a more viable partner for Carthage, which treated it accordingly.⁴⁷

The Romans tended to describe most Carthaginian activities in a derisive manner. There is, however, evidence that the treaties between Rome and Carthage actively protected and promoted trade between the two states. A gradual familiarity grew between the two cultures. Naturally, we have very little in Carthage, but from various Roman accounts, it appears that in times of peace, Carthaginians were present in Rome and its territory. Probably the best example of this familiarity is the most unorthodox. The *Poenulus* of Plautus was performed around 190 BC and provides

ἐκάτεροι. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν Ῥωμαίοις βοηθείωσαν ἂν χρεία ᾦ. τὰ δὲ πληρώματα μηδεὶς ἀναγκαζέτω ἐκβαίνειν ἄκουσίως.

⁴⁷ There were several other supposed treaties between Rome and Carthage. Two of these were sworn at the conclusion of the First and Second Punic Wars in 241 and 202 respectively. Others may be implied from the dispute over Saguntum at the beginning of the Second Punic War, see Chp. VII, ns.114-116 and text. Polybius states that Philinus of Agrigentum claims a treaty existed forbidding Romans from Sicily and Carthaginians from Italy, and that it was the Romans who broke it during the First Punic War (III.26). This treaty may refer to the existence of Livy's treaty between Rome and Carthage in 348, otherwise it may refer to another undisclosed treaty between the two states. A more interesting treaty, or at least an allusion to it, survives in Diodorus (XVI.69.1). He claims that Rome and Carthage settled a peace in 344/3 BC. It is possible this was a renewal or *addendum* to the first treaty of 509/8, to establish a non-hostility pact against Timoleon in Sicily. It is also possible that this treaty, which Diodorus reports as the first between the two states, is a misrepresented account of the second treaty of 306. Livy (VII.27.2) also claims a similar treaty was established between Rome and Carthage in 348. It is possible that either Livy has mistaken this treaty or Diodorus is misreporting the later renewal date of 306.

invaluable insight into Romano-Carthaginian relations. There are several relevant points from the *Poenulus* that suggest an obvious familiarity with Carthaginians in Rome.⁴⁸

First, Plautus did not invent this play himself but rather developed it from an earlier Greek model dating from the Hellenistic period. His ultimate source remains anonymous, although he alludes to its original title, *Carchedonios*.⁴⁹ The nature of the characters are primarily Greek, as is its setting in Aetolia all of which suggests that the original Greek playwright and audience were also familiar with the Carthaginians and their practices. This leads us to the Roman representation of 'The Little Carthaginian'. The exact timing of the play is not of major importance. Any time during the first thirty years of the second century is possible, although it is most likely earlier, ca. 190. This would place the production at least a decade after the end of the Second Punic War. Rome had become the largest and undisputed power in the Central and Western Mediterranean. As for Carthage, its power and potential threat had waned and was therefore presumably easier to satirise.

Various aspects of the play suggest that the Roman audience was quite familiar with Carthaginian culture and especially its merchants. The most notable is the *gugga* or Carthaginian merchant himself, Hanno.⁵⁰ Hanno assumes a common Phoenicio-Punic name and is described as wearing a stereotypical tunic with no belt.⁵¹ Automatically, the Roman audience is besieged by a range of stock Carthaginian characteristics, which presumably they had become familiar with over several centuries of contact and most likely more recently after the end of the Second Punic War and the resumption of trade.

One of the more interesting aspects of the depiction of Hanno is his lengthy 'Punic' speech which heralds his arrival. Naturally the text is not in the Punic alphabet but a phonetic transliteration into Latin letters. The accuracy of the Phoenician in this speech has been contested, but is largely irrelevant to our discussion.⁵² The inclusion of this speech (whether accurate or not) presumes some

⁴⁸ Palmer has provided an excellent overview of the *Poenulus* including its representation in Rome and many of its finer points, Chp. III. For our discussion, we only need look at several of these examples.

⁴⁹ *Poen.* L.53.

⁵⁰ L.977, *guggast homo*.

⁵¹ Ll. 975, 1009.

⁵² There have been various interpretations of Hanno's speech (Ll. 930-950) ranging from dismissal to painstaking analysis. See A.S. Gratwick, "Hanno's Punic speech in the *Poenulus* of Plautus", *Hermes* 1971, XCIX, pp.25-45; "Plautus, *Poenulus* 967-981: Some Notes", *Glotta* 50, 1972, pp.228-233,

Roman knowledge of the Punic language. Presumably after the first two Punic Wars, many Romans would be familiar with at least a phonetic recognition of a distinctive dialect or accent. Either way, this suggests Romans were familiar with Carthaginian individuals such as Hanno.

If Punic traders such as Hanno had long been commonplace in Rome, it seems reasonable that their wares would also become familiar to the Romans. Although constructed in a comical manner, there are several stereotypical commodities which the Carthaginian merchant carries and with which he is associated. In his cargo, Hanno carries nuts and digging implements for harvesting.⁵³ Palmer has suggested that these nuts possibly refer to the well-known African figs or in fact the Punic apple or Pomegranate.⁵⁴ The digging implements are more ambiguous, but considering the high esteem in which Romans such as Varro and Columella held Punic agricultural expertise, especially with regards to writers such as Mago, this may be a direct attempt to associate an obvious aspect of Punic culture with the merchant Hanno.

There appear to be other possible allusions to stock Carthaginian commodities and their familiarity in Rome.⁵⁵ First, the term *manstruca* is of interest.⁵⁶ Although unusual, it refers to a type of pelt or fleece, and in particular one from Sardinia and Corsica. Plautus may well be referring to a notable export from the once Carthaginian Sardinia.⁵⁷ Although Roman traders were once forbidden from trading directly with Sardinia, they were accustomed to Sardinian wares and by 190 they had access to the island. Following this reference, Plautus uses the term *hallex* or *allec*, referring to fish sauce or *garum*.⁵⁸ As we have seen in the Far West, especially around Gades, New Carthage, and the Balearic Islands, the production of *garum* was a mainstay industry. It is most likely that Rome, although now in control of these areas, was well aware of this association. Even before this more obvious connection, Plautus possibly uses a

Gratwick claims that the speech is more a dramatic technique and is nothing more than gibberish. Gonzalez Lodge, *Lexicon Plautinum* (Hildesheim 1962) Vol. I, pp.915-917, provides a more detailed lexicon of Phoenicio-Punic words plucked from the text. Gregor Maurach, *Der Poenulus des Plautus* (Heidelberg 1988) pp.142-143, 146-149, provides further interpretation of the nature and context of the speech and the supposed Punic text.

⁵³ L.1014, *nuces*, Ll.1019-20, *palas vendundas sibi ait et mergas datas, ad messim credo*.

⁵⁴ p. 40.

⁵⁵ Again Palmer (pp.36-39) provides a comprehensive description of these few lines, Ll.1298-1314.

⁵⁶ L.1313.

⁵⁷ This is a possibility as other states have become renowned for their production of such items. Probably the best example is Megara and its production of woollen jackets (Aristoph. *Arch.* 519). The Athenian embargo of these items threatened to wreck the Megarian economy.

⁵⁸ L.1310.

similar metaphor when Hanno's two daughters describe themselves as salted fish.⁵⁹ Although such examples seem little more than subtle allusion, to a knowing Roman audience, mercantile and geographic nuance would not go unappreciated.

There are other obvious references of Plautus which suggest Roman familiarity with things Carthaginian. The background of the narrative is certainly germane to some notorious aspects of Phoenicio-Punic culture. We find the young boy Agorastocles stolen from Carthage and then later his cousins Adelphasium and Anterastilis abducted along with their nurse.⁶⁰ Although this is a common theme for ancient drama and comedy, it is particularly ironic that this took place in Carthage. It was the Carthaginians, continuing a legacy of the Phoenicians, who were renowned for kidnapping unsuspecting individuals. We have seen this image present in Greek and Roman sources since the time of Homer. Although these abductions took place in Carthage, there is a strong connection between the city and such an action with which the Romans were familiar.

Following this we discover the fate of the two Carthaginian maidens. They are to be sold as courtesans at the shrine of Venus.⁶¹ Such an image in the Phoenicio-Punic world was common: the practice of young maidens prostituting themselves at the temple of Astarte (Venus).⁶² This religious practice was despised by Greeks and Romans, and the girls are, perhaps by design, presented in a sympathetic manner. It is their captor, Lycus who is to blame for this action.⁶³ Naturally the Roman audience would be quite familiar with such an image.

Finally there is the Poenulus himself, Hanno. His image, as constructed by Plautus, as a typical Carthaginian *gugga* suggests that such a figure was instantly familiar in Rome. His appearance is noted, as we have already seen, with his wearing

⁵⁹ Ll.240-243, *Soror cogita amabo item nos perhiberi, quam si salsa muriatica esse autumantur, nisi multa aqua usque et diu macerantur, olent salsa sunt tangere ut non velis.*

⁶⁰ Ll.65ff., 83ff.

⁶¹ Ll.339-340, *Quia apud aedem Veneris hodie est mercatus meretricius, eo conveniunt mercatores ibi ego me ostendi uolo.*

⁶² Along with human sacrifice, Phoenician and Carthaginian ritualised prostitution of maidens to Astarte (Venus) was probably their most famed and despised religious practice in antiquity. This practice (eastern in origin) acted as a religious rite in order to raise temple funds. Herodotus describes the practice of women prostituting themselves to Ishtar (Astarte) once in their life (I.199). The money raised from this service passed into the temple coffers. This practice appears widespread in the Phoenicio-Punic world. Elissa *en route* to Carthage stopped off at Cyprus and captured eighty maidens who were about to prostitute themselves for Astarte (Justin XVIII.5). According to Valerius Maximus (II.6.15) there was a similar cult practice at the temple of Venus at Sicca (Cirta Nova).

⁶³ Ll.449-469.

a distinctive tunic and no belt.⁶⁴ Even before meeting Hanno, Agorastocles, visually identifies him as a Carthaginian merchant: *facies quidem edepol Punacista*.⁶⁵ His opening speech is in Punic which, although dubious, at least aims to be recognisably Punic to the Roman audience. His distinctive cargo and the other references leave little doubt about his occupation as a Carthaginian merchant. To emphasise this image, Plautus has Hanno described as *nullus me est hodie Poenus Poenior*.⁶⁶ To find such a stereotypical character amusing, Plautus and therefore the average Roman theatre patron must have had familiarity with merchants from Carthage such as Hanno.⁶⁷

It may seem unusual to employ a comic text such as the *Poenulus* to gauge evidence of Carthaginian presence in Rome. However, the play was designed to be enjoyed by the general populace. The familiar tones and images regarding both Carthage and a typical Carthaginian *gugga* suggest that Romans were accustomed to seeing and hearing both on a regular basis. From such a social commentary, it appears that Carthaginian merchants were regular visitors to Rome.

THE PHOCAEAN COLONIES

From the end of the seventh century the Phocaeans began to settle a number of sites in the Western Mediterranean and by doing so, came into contact with Carthage. The accepted date of the Phocaean foundation of Massilia is ca. 600 BC.⁶⁸ This settlement followed a naval victory over the Carthaginians. Only forty years later the Phocaeans settled on Corsica and within twenty years they were apparently disrupting Etruscan and Carthaginian shipping in the area. The Etrusco-Carthaginian alliance managed to drive the Phocaeans off Corsica and maintained its collective thalassocracy in the Tyrrhenian Sea. Although limited from expansion in the Tyrrhenian basin, Massilia settled areas to its east and to the west, establishing a number of coastal settlements in southern coastal France and down the eastern coast of Spain. Massilia settled

⁶⁴ See n.51.

⁶⁵ L.977.

⁶⁶ L.991.

⁶⁷ Plautus adds to these images at different points in the play. During the prologue he claims that Hanno knows all languages, but dissembles his knowledge, and is therefore a complete Carthaginian, Ll.112-113, *et is omnis linguas scit sed dissumulat sciens, se scire Poenus plane est*.

⁶⁸ Thuc. I.13.6.

Emporion and several other sites down the east coast of Spain, extending its trade routes as far south as Cape Nao and possibly beyond.

The documented battles between Carthage and the Phocaeans and the spread of Phocaean colonies along the Mediterranean coast of Spain would suggest some anxiety in Carthage. On a political level this may have been apparent for some time. During this period the fall of Tartessus and the waning Phoenician influence saw a power vacuum develop in Spain. The Carthaginian arrival in Spain can be dated to the second half of the sixth century. Initially its interests saw Carthage assume control over the Phoenician areas of settlement, along the southern coastal strip. The Phocaeans were able to push further south unopposed. By the time Carthage had established a more stable territory in Southern Spain, the Phocaean settlements to the north were also more developed. Such a situation would inevitably lead to conflict. Although there are some possible examples of this, the situation in Spain remained relatively peaceful. Carthage, which was renowned for exclusivity of territory, seemingly permitted the Phocaean colonies to trade in the region.

There is evidence from the Phocaeans' settlements that they were trading with Carthage and its empire. It may be possible that both parties were eventually satisfied with their respective areas of activity and were content to benefit from trade with the other. This is quite plausible considering the Carthaginians' relationship with Greek states in Sicily, where they preferred to keep the political and mercantile spheres quite separate. Otherwise it is possible that a peace treaty between Carthage and Massilia existed at some stage. Justin, in listing several Massiliot victories, briefly mentions a war with Carthage, where the latter was defeated. Apparently then the Massiliots and Carthaginians swore an oath of peace.⁶⁹ The prominence of Massilia probably meant that accord most likely included the other Greek colonies in the area. The exact battle is unclear. It is possible that it was the Carthaginian defeat before the founding of Massilia. It is more likely, however, that it is the Battle of Artemisium in 490. After this battle there is no direct evidence for open conflict between the Greeks and Carthaginians in the Far West before the Second Punic War.⁷⁰ This treaty possibly

⁶⁹ XLIII.5.

⁷⁰ Sisylos claims that the second Battle of Artemisium in 217 saw a sound Carthaginian defeat at the hands of the Massiliots (*F.Gr.Hist.* 176, F.1; Polyb. III.95-96; Livy XXII.19-20). Massilia's colony Emporion exhibits similar allegiance to Rome and deserts the Carthaginians first by sending an embassy to Rome for aid against the spread of Carthaginian expansion in Spain and second by allowing Scipio use the town as his base of operations on the peninsula (*App. Ib.* 6, 40).

coincided with next peace treaty mentioned by Justin between the Greeks and the Spaniards. The existence of a peace might help explain the increased evidence of a friendly relationship between Greeks and Carthaginians in the area.

There is evidence of such a relationship in the main Phocaean settlement of Massilia and in the areas surrounding the mouth of the Rhône. Although settled as a direct result of a victory over the Carthaginians, it appears that the latter were quite active in the area. Testament to a settled relationship in Massilia is the existence of a large Punic inscription dating from the end of the third century BC. The inscription itself sets forward tariffs for temple sacrifices at the Temple of Ba'al Sapon in Massilia:

Temple of Ba'al Sapon. Tariff of offerings which the 30 Men fixed who were in charge of tariffs in the time of the N(oble) HLSB'L, the Suffet, son of 'BDTNT, son of 'BD'SMN and of HLSB'L the Suffet, son of 'BD'SMN, son of HLSB'L and their colleagues.

For an ox: for a holocaust, or a sin offering, or a substitution offering, the priests take 10 pieces of silver for each; in the case of a holocaust they receive beyond this tariff 300 Shekels' weight of meat; for a sin offering, however, the knuckles and the joints. But the pelt and the ribs and the feet and the rest of the meat shall belong to the offerer.

For a calf whose horns... still missing, or for a ram: for a holocaust, or a sin offering, or a substitution offering, the priests take 5 pieces of silver for each; in the case of a holocaust they receive beyond this tariff 150 Shekels' weight of meat; for a sin offering, however, the knuckles and the joints. But the pelt and the ribs and the feet and the rest of the meat shall belong to the offerer.

For a ram or a goat: for a holocaust, or a sin offering, or a substitution offering, the priests take 1 Shekel and 2 ZR of silver for each; and in the case of a sin offering the priests receive beyond this tariff the knuckles and the joints. But the pelt and the ribs and the feet and the rest of the meat shall belong to the offerer.

For a lamb or a kid or a young ram: for a holocaust, or a sin offering, or a substitution offering, the priests take three quarters (of a Shekel) of silver and 2 ZR for each; and in the case of a sin offering the priests receive beyond this tariff the

knuckles and the joints. But the pelt and the ribs and the feet and the rest of the meat shall belong to the offerer.

For a 'GNN-bird or a SS-Bird: for a substitution offering, or a SSP-offering or a HZT-offering, the priest will take 3/4 (of a Shekel) of silver and 2 ZR for each, and the meat will belong to the offerer.

For another bird or holy first fruits or a meal-offering or an oil-offering: the priests will take 10 obols for each....

For each sin offering, that they bring before the god, the priests receive the knuckles and the joints and for a sin offering....

For baked goods and milk and fat and for each offering, which somebody wishes to offer as a minha-offering, the priests receive...

For each offering which a man poor in livestock or a man poor in birds offers, the priest receives nothing.

Each clan and each family and each gathering for the deity and all people who sacrifice... these people (shall pay) a tariff for an offering according to what is fixed in the document...

Every tariff, which is not fixed on this tablet, shall be paid according to the document which the men have written who were in charge of the tariffs in the time of the N(oble) HLSB'L, the Suffet, son of 'BDTNT, son of 'BD'SMN and of HLSB'L the Suffet, son of 'BD'SMN, son of HLSB'L and their colleagues.

Any priest who collects a tariff contrary to what is fixed in this document shall be punished...

Every offerer, who does not give silver for the tariff which....⁷¹

The inscription is certainly bureaucratic in nature and precise in covering a variety of sacrifices and temple procedures. This document presupposes some interesting possibilities. First, it indicates the existence of a Punic temple in Greek Massilia or at least a cult. This furthermore suggests a reasonable Phoenicio-Punic population either resident or visiting the city. For two supposedly hostile states, this may seem unusual. However, the presence of a large trade-based population could necessitate the establishment of a foreign cult in Massilia. The Massiliots presumably

⁷¹ KAI. 69. This type of systematised listing for sacrificial quantities and protocol has an earlier eastern precedent. The book of Leviticus explains several types of sacrifice, both public and private in some detail (1:1-7:38).

welcomed the lucrative trade of Carthage and were willing to consent to the building and operation of a temple or cult.

The suggestion that Carthaginians were active and possibly settled in Massilia enlightens a poor archaeological record. Few Phoenicio-Punic remains have been found at the site. This does not discount the existence of trade, as a similar lack of evidence is also apparent in other developed Greek, Egyptian, and Roman centres despite maintaining active trade with Carthage.⁷² The Punic inscription suggests that there was considerable Carthaginian activity in Massilia. The text also shows direct class distinctions among the suppliants to the temple. After distinguishing between the larger offerings such as oxen, calves, and rams, there is a clause protecting the poorer of society exempting them from taxation. Presumably, if there was a poorer class of Carthaginians in Massilia, there were also other classes present. The text implicitly mentions a priest (but presumably several were present), a *suffet*, and a council of thirty men. Whether these last two groups actually resided in Massilia or established the law from Carthage is unclear. Another possible interpretation of this text is that it is a standard Carthaginian document of which a copy was sent to Massilia as well as to other centres not taking local circumstances into account. If this is true it is possible that Carthage established any number of cults in foreign ports throughout the Mediterranean. In this situation, however, the text suggests a considerable population, either living in or visiting Massilia.

The nature of the text also implies a high-level of Carthaginian activity in Massilia. It is possible that the temple was in fact managed by Carthage from abroad. We have a possibly earlier text from Carthage dated sometime between the fourth and second centuries BC defining tariffs on temple sacrifices.⁷³ This inscription possibly supports the idea of Carthage manufacturing standard temple inscriptions and using copies throughout their empire and beyond. It is similar to the Massiliot text. In both

⁷² Scant Carthaginian remains have been unearthed at Massilia but several connections can be supposed. As attested elsewhere, Carthaginian material remains generally do not affect the archaeological record of a number of known developed trading partners. Otherwise one of the main imports following the foundation of the site was Etruscan pottery imported by either Etruscan or even possibly Carthaginian merchants, see François Villard, "La céramique archaïque de Marseille", in *Marseille grecque et la Gaule*, pp.164ff. The lack of Carthaginian pottery in developed areas of contact is as evident in Massilia as elsewhere. Another connection can be witnessed in Massilia's tendency to be influenced by Greek states such as Himera, Acragas, and Syracuse in regard to coinage, see Claude Brenot, "Une étape du monnayage de Marseille: les émissions du V^e s. av. J.-C.", in *Marseille grecque et la Gaule*, pp.246-252. This can be dated to the fifth century, during which time Carthage was active in these states and later captured Himera and Acragas. In all three states there were constant populations of Carthaginian traders often regardless of the political situation.

inscriptions there is a 'council of thirty men' who oversee the temple regulations. This governing body appears to be a standard council overseeing the tax gleaned from temples both in Carthage and those abroad. Carthaginian officials may in fact have been present in Massilia. Beyond these officials, the texts and their respective tariff qualifications are near identical. Another fragmentary inscription from Carthage dating from the same period shows precise tariffs enforced on different offerings.⁷⁴ It appears that the Carthaginians treated temple offerings as taxable commodities and were willing to impose a standard on such actions. Although established in Carthage, it was most likely exported throughout Carthaginian territory and areas of settlement and trade.

There is further epigraphic evidence from areas near Massilia which suggest Carthaginians were active in the area for a considerable period. A second, shorter Punic inscription survives from Avignon from the mid-third century BC.

*The grave of ZJBQT, the priestess of the Mistress..., daughter of 'BD'SMN, son of B'LJTN, son of 'BD'SMN, wife of B'LHN, the temple overseer, the son of 'BDMLQRT, son of HMLQT, son 'BD'SMN. Not to open.*⁷⁵

It is interesting that a Punic inscription attests some form of Punic presence in the interior of a supposedly hostile nation. Avignon is located over 30 km. from the coast on the banks of the Rhône. It is not unusual that Phoenicio-Punic interests were centred around a navigable river leading into the interior. We have already seen the important role of the Guadalquivir River in Southern Spain leading to the lucrative areas of trade and minerals in Baetica. Carthaginian activity along the Rhône would give Carthage access to commodities of mainland Europe.

The nature of the inscription is obvious: an epitaph showing several distinctive Punic name-types with a priestess and priest specifically named. This leaves us with the impression that there was another possible Punic cult or temple present at the site. Donner and Röhlig, however, suggest that this inscription refers to individuals in Carthage and the inscription was simply transported to the grave of the deceased.⁷⁶ This is a distinct possibility. However, there is no reason why such an inscription

⁷³ KAI. 74.

⁷⁴ KAI. 75.

⁷⁵ KAI. 70.

could not have come from other areas of the empire, or even from nearby, perhaps from a site such as Massilia. The lineage of the deceased is quite illustrious, and such an individual in the area possibly suggests the image of a prominent merchant. Whether the sacred persons were present in Avignon, and with them a permanent cult such as in Massilia is unclear at best. Aside from this however, we know that there were Carthaginians active in the area, which appears to be a destination in a Carthaginian trade network.

To the west of Massilia and its surrounding colonies, the Massiliots established a number of colonies along the coasts of Southern France and Eastern Spain. Although the Tartessians were willing to trade with the Phocaeans, their collapse and the departure of the Phoenicians from Spain during the sixth century enabled the Phocaeans rapidly to expand down the coast unchecked at least as far as Cape Nao.⁷⁷

According to Herodotus, the Phocaeans first traded with the Tartessians under the rule of King Arganthonius probably during the late seventh to early sixth century.⁷⁸ This introduced the Greeks to Southern Spain for the first time. The foundation of Massilia ca. 600 and the Massiliots' subsequent expansion along the eastern Spanish coast saw a marked change in the Greek presence in the area. The abandonment of Phocaea in the East some sixty years after the foundation of Massilia make it coincident with the expansion of Massiliot colonies along the coasts of France and Spain.⁷⁹

Our archaeological record attests a distinctive change in the nature of Greek imports into Southern Spain during the second half of the sixth century, with eastern Greek imports replaced by wares from states such as Athens and Corinth. It is during

⁷⁶ KAI. 70, p.87.

⁷⁷ Before progressing we should remember that the Phocaeans were not the only group of Greeks actively settling in Spain. The town of Saguntum was supposedly settled by Zacynthus (Strabo III.4.6). The Rhodians also seem active in the area, settling Rhode across the Gulf of Rosas from Emporion. Rhodian material appears in reasonable quantity from the seventh century on the Iberian peninsula, see Benjamin Brian Shefton, "Greeks and Greek Imports in the South of the Spanish Peninsula", in *Phönizier im Westen*, pp.337-367.

⁷⁸ Hdt. I.163. Shefton presumes that Phocaean expansion coincides with the Persian capture of Phocaea in 546, which in turn was at the end of King Arganthonius' allegedly eighty-year reign. This would place Phocaean contact with Tartessus during the latter stages of the seventh century, Shefton, pp.346-348.

⁷⁹ The traditional settlement date of Ampurias is 575. Like a number of other Greek colonies, an initial settlement on a nearby island was established first; in this case the island of Palaiapolis (Strabo III.4.8), see W.E. Mierse, "Ampurias, A Greco-Roman city on the Iberian Coast", *Latomus* 53, 1994, pp.791-793.

this period that we find Greek imports arriving more steadily in Phoenicio-Punic ports throughout Southern Spain. Like other areas of Phoenicio-Punic settlement, Southern Spain provides evidence of early Greek imports dating from the eighth century.⁸⁰ There was a market for Greek-styled objects, which was enhanced by the recent arrival of the Phocaeans. A great deal of relevant material is evident in the *emporion* of Southern Spain and in Spanish settlements in the interior.⁸¹

The onset of Carthaginian authority in Southern Spain redesigned the political boundaries in the area. From the late sixth century, Carthage moved into the old Phoenician settlements along the coast and was faced with the expanding Greek *emporion*. From scanty evidence, it appears that Carthage limited Phocaean interests in the area north of Cape Nao and established a relatively exclusive zone of activity.⁸² The extent of Phocaean expansion down the east coast of Spain is not entirely known. There are several possible attested sites in the south. Such sites include Abdera and Mainake (possibly near to, if not actually either Toscanos or Malaga) have been suggested. It is unlikely that the Phocaeans were able permanently to settle in the heart of Phoenicio-Punic Spain. If such settlements did exist in this region they were most likely removed or resettled by the Carthaginians along with any other settlements during the sixth and fifth centuries.⁸³ Another possibility is that the Greeks were permitted to reside in or to visit Phoenicio-Punic centres for the purpose of trade. If the Greeks permitted Carthaginians to reside in their settlements, it is possible at some stage that the Carthaginians returned the courtesy. If such a situation existed, presumably it predated the full establishment of Carthaginian power in the region and the exclusive rights it later maintained. Regarding other possible Phocaean

⁸⁰ Shefton, pp.338-339.

⁸¹ For relevant information regarding the Greeks in Spain see Antonio García y Bellido, *Hispania Graeca* (Barcelona 1948) Vol. I, Chp. III, Vol. II, *passim*; Barcelo, pp.115-124; Hans Georg Niemeyer, "The Greeks and the Far West: Towards a Revaluation of the Archaeological Record from Spain", *La Magna Grecia e il lontano occidente: atti del ventinovesimo Convegno di studi sulla Magna Grecia, Taranto, 6-11 ottobre 1989* (Taranto 1989) pp.29-53.

⁸² This is demonstrated during the second treaty with Rome which excludes all Roman mercantile activity from Southern Spain. Shefton (n. 85) shows from Greek literary sources that from the first quarter of the fifth century the Greeks viewed areas beyond the Pillars of Heracles as forbidden. This would certainly coincide with the Carthaginian domination of the areas on both sides of the Pillars of Heracles and their policy of exclusion.

⁸³ Avienus *OM*, Ll.425-435; *GGM*, I, Ps. Scymnos Ll.147-50, p.200 (ed. Müller); Hans Georg Niemeyer, "Auf der Suche nach Mainake: Der Konflikt zwischen literarischer und archäologischer Überlieferung", *Historia* 39, 1980, pp.165-185, Niemeyer disputes Avienus' claim that Mainake was a Phocaean settlement as well as later scholarship which attempts to place it at either Toscanos or Malaga; B. Warning-Treumenn, "Mainake, originally a Phoenician Place Name?", *Historia* 39, 1980,

settlements in the south, Strabo claims that there were three settlements of Massiliot origin between the River Xucar (Sucro) and New Carthage, but nearer to the former.⁸⁴ He only mentions one by name: that of Hemeroskopion or Dianium, which lies on the promontory of Cape Nao and most likely marked the boundary between Carthaginian and Phocaean spheres of influence. Such settlements were perhaps created after the Carthaginian defeat at Artemisium in 490 off Cape Nao.⁸⁵ We have already seen the Carthaginians' exclusive policy limiting access to North Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, and the Tyrrhenian Sea. This formed a line extending west from Sardinia to the Balearic Islands and thence to Eastern Spain, with Cape Nao a likely position for a hypothetical boundary.

The situation in the Far West appears at first similar to that in the area around Southern France. Our literary evidence would suggest an enmity between the Carthaginians and the Phocaean Greeks. On closer inspection, however, it appears a similar process occurred in both areas. After the initial period of hostility, the opposing sides seem to embark on a policy of active trade with each other.

Perhaps the best way to indicate trade between the Carthaginians and Greeks in Spain is to look at one of the prominent Greek colonies, that of Emporion. Originally an early Massiliot foundation, Emporion (Ampurias) was located on the southern bay of the Gulf of Rosas. Of all the Greek foundations or supposed settlements in the region, owing to its location and importance, Emporion offers us the best insight into Carthaginian relations with the Greeks in the region. Emporion rapidly became the most important Greek settlement in the Far West, eclipsing even its metropolis of Massilia within a few centuries.⁸⁶ By the mid-fifth century, Greek wares were increasingly being imported from Greece throughout Spain. During this period Carthaginian settlements in Spain and elsewhere start importing such items. This suggests a growing demand.⁸⁷ Around 350 BC a major shift of production occurred suggesting that locally made black-gloss pottery replaced much of that imported from Greek centres in the East. The latter shift is particularly important to

pp.186-189, Warning-Treumenn assumes the supposed site of Mainake was in fact Toscanos which is a Semitic name.

⁸⁴ Strabo III.4.6.

⁸⁵ See ns.69-70.

⁸⁶ Mierse, p.795.

⁸⁷ Richard J. Harrison, *Spain at the Dawn of History – Iberians, Phoenicians, and Greeks* (New York 1988) p.76. Harrison describes the large influx of Greek imported wares in the East. The settlement of

Emporion, which became a major centre for the production of such wares and their diffusion throughout Spain.⁸⁸ Evidence from Emporion suggests that it underwent large-scale development during the fourth century.⁸⁹ This certainly accommodated its new role as a trading capital. It appears that originally Phoenicians and later Carthaginians were actively trading with this Greek settlement. Emporion developed into the main Greek centre in the area, so it is reasonable to assume that many of the Greek imports to the region were routed hither before being traded throughout the centres of the Far West. This can also be assumed for locally produced items which became popular throughout Spain from the mid-fourth century.

There is no literary evidence regarding an active mercantile policy between the Carthaginians and the Greeks in Far West (i.e. Emporion). Fortunately there are several surviving artefacts which suggest trade between the two peoples. The earliest item is an Attic bell krater discovered in Galeria in Southeast Spain dating from the mid-fifth century.⁹⁰ This vase contains a bilingual etching in both Punic and Greek. Similar bilingual examples survive from the mid-fourth century remains of the shipwreck of El Sec off Mallorca. This attests a close trading system between the Greeks and Carthaginians, producing a number of Greek vessels inscribed in Greek and others with Punic names.⁹¹ The location of such remains suggests that both Greeks and Carthaginians were actively in contact in the areas around Spain. As we know, Emporion was the major Greek settlement in the area and presumably influenced or witnessed much of this trade. Emporion itself most likely traded directly with Carthaginian settlements and Carthaginian merchants much like in Massilia to the northeast. Testament to such a relationship was Emporion's striking of coins based on Carthaginian models ca. 290. These coins departed from the normal Greek types which had been produced in Emporion and Rhode for nearly two centuries. The coins themselves copied a common Carthaginian model of the head of Persephone on

Ullastret, located only 20 km. from Emporion has revealed a huge amount of imported Greek pottery from this period, suggesting a considerable trade in such items.

⁸⁸ The production and export of amphorae from Emporion to sites in Southern Spain and Carthage is considered by David P.S. Peacock, "Punic Carthage and Spain: The Evidence of the Amphorae", *CEA* XVIII, 1986, pp.101-113. The nature of discerning local Punic wares from those imported wares from the Massiliot colonies to the north is difficult owing to the preponderance of the latter.

⁸⁹ Mierse, pp.796-797, it is during this period that Emporion constructed considerable walls in a similar fashion to those at Massilia, perhaps to cope with possible threats to its prosperity.

⁹⁰ Harrison, p.77. Similar examples have also been discovered in the Punic towns of Lixus and Kouass in North Africa.

⁹¹ Javier de Hoz, "El Sec: Les graffites mercantiles en Occident et l'Epave d'El Sec", *REA* LXXXIX.3-4, 1987, pp.117-130.

the obverse and a standing horse on the reverse.⁹² This suggests that Emporion was reliant on Carthaginian traffic to the point where it altered its coinage to facilitate trade. This change was probably due to the surge in Carthaginian activity in Spain during the fourth century. This change is also emphasised by the abandonment of this standard after the fall of Carthaginian power in Spain at the end of the century when Emporion fell under Roman influence. The initial change of Emporiot coinage emphasises the importance of Carthaginian trade in the area. Emporion no longer looked east for its main trading partner: Massilia and Etruria were in decline and during this period Carthage controlled massive areas of trade and bullion, especially in Spain. This also coincides with our evidence of Greeks and Carthaginians actively trading in the Far West as seen in Massilia and its surrounding settlements.

GREECE

Contact between Carthage and Greece originated between the latter and the Phoenicians from as early as the later stages of the second millennium. The importance and intensity of this early relationship continued with Carthage, albeit in lesser forms. This change is understandable as Greece lay beyond the primary Carthaginian trade routes. This was emphasised even more when the fall of Tyre to the Babylonians in 573/2 literally severed the major point of contact with the East. Following this Carthage predominantly turned west for trade and expansion. However, it is evident that Carthage maintained links with the eastern Greeks. These mostly revolved around trade. We have already seen the influx of eastern Greek items in Punic society in the fifth century and even earlier with the Phoenicians.⁹³ Originally

⁹² Harrison, pp.78-79; *HN*² p.2.

⁹³ This is most visible in areas of constant Greco-Carthaginian contact such as Sicily and Southern Spain. However, there is ample evidence from Carthage itself. Greek influence in Carthaginian society, like that of Egypt, is considerable. Pottery was certainly a major export from Greece and Greek Sicily. Large amounts of Greek pottery are evident in Carthage during the seventh and early sixth centuries BC (e.g. Ju. B. Tsirkin, "The Economy of Carthage", *Studia Phoenicia* VI, 1988, pp.126; E. Boucher, "Céramique archaïque d'importation au Musée Lavigère de Carthage", *Cahiers de Byrsa* III, 1953, pp.11-37). Considerable quantities of proto-Corinthian pottery are visible at the site along with extensive remains of Attic pottery from the fifth century. Types include basic vase forms, lamps, and even decorative tragic masks. The Greek influence on Carthaginian pottery is considerable when it dominated local Punic styles to the point where it is often relatively indistinguishable from original Greek types. It is likely that Greek potters were actually residing in Carthage to fulfil demand. For examples see H. Hurst *et al.*, Vol. II.2, Chp. II on Punic lamps; Lancel, *Byrsa II*, *passim*, on Greek style pottery both imported and locally produced. Similar influence on sculpture and other luxury items is also apparent especially from the fifth century.

many commodities were exported from Greece. It is likely that many of these products were taken to Sicily, Southern Italy, and the western colonies before being transported to Carthage and areas of its empire. Our evidence for such a connection is widespread. However, the questions of whether or not Greek states had direct relations with the Carthaginians and whether the latter were present in Greece still confront us.

There is some evidence of Carthaginians present in Greece. Naturally, the majority of the evidence we possess revolves around trade and to a lesser extent diplomacy and military affairs.⁹⁴ Although this is not always explicit, it often seems the likely reason for their presence.

There are a number of Phoenicio-Punic inscriptions surviving from Athens and the Piraeus. Such areas connect these inscriptions to the sea and in particular seaborne trade. Most of these examples are banal inscriptions in Phoenician or bilingual with Greek and date from the fourth century.⁹⁵ Most also seem to originate from Phoenicia itself, however, the dating of such inscriptions places them in periods of intense Carthaginian activity. One of these inscriptions suggests some connection to Carthage.⁹⁶ Although the inscription tells of Phoenicians from Sidon, one individual is named 'BDTNT (עבד־תַּנִּית), literally Servant (masc.) of Tanit. Such a name is commonplace in the West, where by the fourth century Tanit was developing into the predominate divinity in Carthage and the Punic world.⁹⁷ The goddess did not command much of a following in the East. The origin of these Phoenicians is ambiguous, as although they are identified as from Sidon, they presumably had some connection to the Punic West.

⁹⁴ There is some evidence suggesting a familiarity with Carthaginian traders in Greece. We have already discussed Plautus' *Poenulus* and the Roman familiarity with a Carthaginian *gugga* and the distinctive wares he was trading. Although this play was performed in Rome probably around 190 BC, it was based on an earlier Greek play which Plautus himself names as the *Carchedonios* (*Poen.* L.53). This suggests that the Greeks were equally familiar with Carthaginian traders and their distinctive idiosyncrasies. Such a theme is alluded to by Athenaeus (I.28a) who has Hermippus recount a list of foreign luxury items imported to Athens. Within the manifest he claims that Carthage supplies carpets and many-coloured cushions. He then cites Antiphanes who mentions kale from Carthage (I.28d). Finally he quotes Archestratus, a writer on banquets, who praises wine from the Punic land as the best of all (I.29b.c). These short citations suggest that several Carthaginian commodities were highly valued in Greece and that there was an active trade in such goods between Carthaginian ports and mainland Greece. Again as in other developed areas with which Carthage traded, there is little archaeological evidence suggesting such a connection. If these few perishable items mentioned here are characteristic Carthaginian exports, this gap in the archaeological records becomes more understandable.

⁹⁵ *KAI.* 53-60.

⁹⁶ *KAI.* 53.

There are a handful of Greek inscriptions which also attest the presence of Carthaginians on mainland Greece. Some are little more than a short reference attesting the presence of a Carthaginian individual in a particular Greek state.⁹⁸ One example survives from Boeotia, where the Boeotians are honouring a Carthaginian called Nuba.⁹⁹ Although the man bears a distinctly Numidian name, he is praised as a benefactor of the Boeotians some time after 364/3 BC. The text is unclear as to how Nuba actually aided the Boeotians. Nevertheless, his presence in mainland Greece is indisputable and such an inscription suggests that Carthaginians and their subjects were not uncommon visitors to such important states as Boeotia.

A second inscription from Athens dating from ca. 330 BC also attests a Carthaginian presence.¹⁰⁰ This small inscription honours a Carthaginian delegation which is comprised of two men: Synalos¹⁰¹ and Bodmilcar (Βοδμίλκαρ). Unfortunately, the exact nature of this delegation is not made clear, and instead we are left with the officious description of the writing and payment of the inscription itself. The interesting aspect of this inscription is that it appears that an official Carthaginian delegation was sent to Athens, which was received and treated accordingly. There are several possible motives behind such a delegation dependent on its exact dating, so we are left to speculate. Nevertheless, it appears that Carthage and Athens had official channels of diplomacy open during this period.

It appears that Carthage became more active in the political spheres of Greek states from the fifth century onwards. There are several examples of delegations, proposed actions, or treaties between the former and several Greek states. These never came to fruition, but we can discern an active interest from both sides implying some degree of prior contact and knowledge.

One of the better-attested states with an interest in Carthage was fifth century Athens. On several occasions there is evidence suggesting that Athens was definitely contemplating an attack on Carthage and even its empire. Although such an idea was sown during a time of imperial optimism, any attack was likely motivated by economic considerations. If Athens were to break the Carthaginian thalassocracy in

⁹⁷ The remains from the shipwreck at El Sec contain pottery with both Greek and Punic inscriptions of a similar type. See n.91.

⁹⁸ *IG*. II.3054, *IG*². II.9112.

⁹⁹ *Syll*³.179.

¹⁰⁰ *Syll*³.321.

¹⁰¹ This is possibly the same Synalos, the Carthaginian representative in Acragas who aided Dion in 357/6, see n.142.

the West, it could easily extend its own reach in the area and benefit from trade. Such a move is not beyond the contemporary Athenian appetite for expansion. This is the same Athens that sent invasion forces to Persian Egypt and to Sicily during the same period. Although not always the strong suit of the popular democracy in Athens, there was presumably some knowledge of Carthage and its empire in Athens. This would most likely originate from western Greeks and their steady contact with the Carthaginians. However, Athens may also have been familiar with Carthage through its own first-hand contact in Greece with both Phoenicians and then Carthaginians and likewise from Athenians in Carthaginian ports.¹⁰² Most evidence of Athenian interest in Carthage stems from the second half of the fifth century. Aristophanes claims that Hyperbolus was behind a plan to send a fleet against Carthage.¹⁰³ Plutarch and Thucydides both claim that Athenian dreams of conquering Carthage were championed by none other than Alcibiades. The first indication of such a tactic appears during the time of Pericles, and despite his own record of expansive strategies, Plutarch claims that Pericles was constantly trying to restrain the Athenians from undertaking such ambitious plans.¹⁰⁴ From this account, the Athenians under Alcibiades wished to conquer Tyrrhenia and Carthage in their, or better perhaps, his dream of western empire.¹⁰⁵ Thucydides echoes a similar sentiment in 415, when Alcibiades is described as desiring to conquer first Sicily and then Carthage.¹⁰⁶ Thucydides' own statement is reinforced (naturally by himself) during the debate at Syracuse when the Syracusans were contemplating which states they should approach for aid.¹⁰⁷ First, they name the Sicels, then the Italian Greeks, and then Carthage, as according to Thucydides, it was next in line for a possible Athenian attack. The final example of Athenian interest in Carthage is attributed to Alcibiades in Sparta discussing Athenian plans, and requires further discussion:

¹⁰² From the fifth century, Greek knowledge of Carthage increases dramatically. We have already touched upon the presence of trade between Athens and Carthage both directly and indirectly routed through the Sicilian Greeks. Carthage became an important political entity to the Greeks following its attempt to capture Sicily under Hamilcar in 480. This is best attested during the fourth century by Aristotle's insightful description of the Carthaginian constitution. By the second half of the fifth century we may assume that Athens was in contact with Carthage, however, the extent of its knowledge of the latter remains unclear to us.

¹⁰³ *Eq.* LI.1303-4, φασὶν αἰτεῖσθαι τιν' ἡμῶν ἑκάτον ἐς Καρχηδόνα, ἄνδρα μοχθηρόν πολίτην ὀξίνην ὕπερβον.

¹⁰⁴ *Per.* XXI.1, 'ἀλλ' ὁ Περικλῆς κατεῖχε τὴν ἐκδρομὴν ταύτην καὶ περιέκοπτε τὴν πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῆς δυνάμεως ἔτρεπεν εἰς φυλακὴν καὶ βεβαιότητα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων.

¹⁰⁵ *Per.* XX.3.

¹⁰⁶ VI.15.2.

*We sailed to Sicily first, if we were able, to conquer the Sicilians, and after them the Hellenes in Italy; then we intended to attack the Carthaginian Empire and Carthage herself.*¹⁰⁸

Alcibiades' supposed overview of Athenian plans in the West seems familiar. It appears that whenever the Athenians looked at Carthage, it was always on the end of a list of areas to conquer in the West. Plutarch places Tyrrhenia and Carthage together as possible western areas of conquest. These two states (Carthage and Etruria) are the same areas to which the Athenians, perhaps deceitfully, sent delegations preceding their attack on Syracuse. Otherwise Carthage is mentioned after the Sicilian Greeks, the Sicilians, and the Italian Greeks. It is possible that Plutarch and Thucydides are simply grouping different peoples and areas in a natural progression for Athenian conquest. However, it is also possible that the Athenians, buoyed by their recent success, did not realise the exact nature and extent of Carthage and its empire. It seems unusual that Carthage is simply mentioned as another city and territory to defeat. If the Athenians were aware of its actual size and empire, they may have thought differently, or at least mentioned it in more realistic detail. It is truly difficult to gauge Athenian and therefore eastern Greek knowledge of Carthaginian territory. Like the Phoenicians before them, the Carthaginians excluded any Greek traffic from areas under their exclusive control. However, trade and contact which existed between Greeks and Carthaginians would presumably familiarise both with each other. We probably should assume that the Athenians were reasonably knowledgeable about Carthage and its territory during the fifth century. However, their plans for a confrontation with the latter died alongside so many Athenians in the quarries of Syracuse.

Even though it may seem that Athens and Carthage were potential enemies, they both shared the same rival at the end of the fifth century: Syracuse. There is some evidence to suggest that both states were at least in diplomatic contact during this period. Apparently during the Athenian siege of Syracuse in 415/4, the Athenians sent delegations to Carthage and another to Tyrrhenia for aid, although Thucydides

¹⁰⁷ VI.34.1-2.

¹⁰⁸ VI.90.2, ἐπλεόσαμεν ἐς Σικελίαν πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δυναίμεθα Σικελιώτας καταστρεφόμενοι μετὰ δ' ἐκείνους αὐθις καὶ Ἰταλιώτας ἔπειτα καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἀρχῆς καὶ αὐτῶν ἀποπειράσοντες.

does not comment on any possible replies.¹⁰⁹ The Athenians kept their alleged greater plans a secret for the time being, as they were eager to gain assistance from two states which presumably had a known enemy in Syracuse. It would seem likely that Carthage especially did not wish to aid the Athenians even in what seemed an excellent opportunity to join forces and destroy Syracuse. This is further emphasised only a few years later when Carthage launched its own invasion of Sicily. This coincides with a further possible example of diplomacy between Carthage and Athens in the form of a fragmentary inscription excavated from Athens and dated to the final years of the fifth century. This inscription states that an Athenian delegation was sent to the Carthaginian forces under Hannibal and Himilco in Sicily in 406.¹¹⁰ The nature of this inscription is not overly clear, but we may assume that during this period with Athens faring poorly in the Peloponnesian War, it would be eager to support the entry of any third party against one of its own enemies. That this delegation was sent with official Athenian consent implies that it was a well-planned expedition with hopes of success. However, the presence of Athenian envoys is not mentioned in the corresponding section of Diodorus' account of the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily.¹¹¹ The fact that there is no evidence of any Carthaginian action in Greece (or even desire for it) suggests that the Carthaginians preferred to omit states such as Athens from their possible strategies. Either way, like the Athenians before them, the Carthaginians were also defeated outside Syracuse.

The increase of Greek mercenaries in Carthaginian armies may also have been a decisive factor in diffusing knowledge of Carthage to mainland Greece.¹¹² From the fourth century we find an ever-increasing number of mercenaries used in Carthaginian armies.¹¹³ The first use of Greeks actually fighting for Carthage probably came during the fifth century in the invasions of Sicily by Hamilcar and Hannibal. However, the first definite example is during the siege of Motya in 396.¹¹⁴ According to Plutarch, Gisco commanded Greek mercenaries when he campaigned against Timoleon in

¹⁰⁹ VI.88.6.

¹¹⁰ *IG*². I.47; also see Benjamin D. Meritt. "Athens and Carthage", *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, Supp. Vol. I, 1940, pp.247-253.

¹¹¹ XIII.80.

¹¹² For an overview of Greek mercenaries fighting in Carthaginian armies see Ameling, *Karthago*, pp.218-220.

¹¹³ Foreign soldiers, presumably mercenaries, are first evident in Carthaginian forces during the second Carthaginian invasion of Sicily under Hannibal in 409 (Diod. XIII.54-62).

338.¹¹⁵ Apparently, although an untested force, the Carthaginians were aware that Greek soldiers were the best fighters in the world.¹¹⁶ It is interesting that Greeks often comprised considerable parts of Carthaginian armies, especially during the Punic Wars, frequently serving as officers. On occasion these Greeks were responsible for warding off disaster from the Carthaginians. An example of such comes during the Roman siege of Lilybaeum of 250. According to Polybius, some 10000 mercenaries comprised of Celts and Greeks were prepared to hand the besieged town over to the Romans.¹¹⁷ This plot was discovered by Alexon, an Achaean, who reported it to the Carthaginian commander, and the city was saved. The Carthaginian victory over Regulus in 255 was also thanks to a Greek. On this occasion it was the Spartan commander Xanthippus who led the demoralised Carthaginian army to victory.¹¹⁸ The interesting aspect of Xanthippus' presence in Carthage is that Polybius claims that he was present among a large body of Greek soldiers brought from Greece by a Carthaginian recruiting officer.¹¹⁹ This suggests that Carthage was actively hiring mercenaries from the Greek mainland and by the third century was actively scouring such states as Sparta for willing manpower.¹²⁰ The Carthaginian use of Greek mercenaries implies a closer tie between Carthage and Greece. For the first time outside the spheres of trade and possibly diplomacy, we are aware of Greeks spending considerable amounts of time in and around Carthage and its empire before returning home, and likewise for Carthaginians in Greece.¹²¹

¹¹⁴ After the defeat the Greeks who sided with the Carthaginians and their leader, Daïmenes, were crucified (Diod. XIV.53.4). The text is unclear whether or not these Greeks were mercenaries, or in fact from towns allied to Carthage on Sicily.

¹¹⁵ *Tim.* XXX.2-3.

¹¹⁶ The exact origin of these mercenaries is unknown. It is possible they came from mainland Greece, however, it is more likely that they were of western origin.

¹¹⁷ I.42-43.

¹¹⁸ Polyb. I.32-36.

¹¹⁹ I.32.

¹²⁰ Picard, *Carthage*, p.204, has suggested that the Punic government avoided hiring Greek mercenaries in preference of cheaper labour from less developed peoples such as the Spaniards and Celts in order to avoid such incidents as that at Lilybaeum and during the Mercenary War. The constant presence of such peoples in Carthaginian armies during the fourth and third centuries certainly helps justify this claim. However, the presence of Greeks in Carthaginian forces during this period is also obvious and implies that the Carthaginians were accustomed to using experienced Greek soldiery to supplement their numbers.

¹²¹ The Punic Wars also gave Greek historians access to the intimate workings of Carthaginian government and society. Polybius, an Achaean, gained much first-hand knowledge from his travels including a journey to North Africa at the time of the final defeat of Carthage in the Third Punic War. Hannibal employed a Lacedaemon freedman, Sosylos, as the campaign historian during the Second Punic War. Unfortunately, his accounts are nearly lost except those which are paraphrased and criticised by the pro-Roman Polybius (III.20.1-5).

It is also likely that Carthage maintained links with Greece during the time of Alexander and the Hellenistic period. There is some evidence to corroborate speculation that Alexander was planning to turn west to conquer Carthage and its empire. The natural point of contact between Alexander and Carthage was the siege of Tyre in 332. We have already seen how the Carthaginians rescued a considerable amount of the civilian population from Tyre before Alexander finally captured the city.¹²² It appears that during this incident Alexander, although freeing visiting Carthaginian pilgrims himself, was offended by this action of Carthage.¹²³ According to Curtius, Alexander was angered by the Carthaginian involvement in evacuating Tyre and dismissed Carthaginian ambassadors, declaring war on Carthage (albeit postponed).¹²⁴ Following the fall of Tyre to Alexander, his relationship with Carthage remains unclear. Justin provides an interesting story, telling of the Carthaginian Hamilcar who pretended to act as a refugee from Carthage prepared to aid Alexander in an expedition against Carthage.¹²⁵ Hamilcar sent back information to Carthage of Alexander and his intentions. Unfortunately after Alexander's death, Hamilcar returned home and was executed, presumably for treason. One of the interesting aspects of this account, if there is any truth in it, is that there was a Carthaginian spy active in Alexander's army for almost a decade.¹²⁶ Otherwise, and probably more believable, is Justin's description of Carthaginian concern regarding the possible plans of Alexander. He had captured the Carthaginian metropolis, Tyre and possibly made some unfriendly overtures toward Carthage itself. His conquest of the Levantine coast would disrupt Carthaginian traffic with the East. This is emphasised by Alexander's establishment of Alexandria, which Justin claims was a direct rival to Carthage in North Africa. Carthage's old trading partner, Egypt was now under Greek control and shaping up as a potential rival in trade. The uneasy feeling Carthage had towards Alexander and his intentions is later revealed when the Carthaginians sent a

¹²² Diod. XVII.46.4; Justin XI.10.

¹²³ According to Arrian (II.24.5), a number of Carthaginian visitors were present in Tyre. These individuals were on an established pilgrimage to the temple of Melqart (Diod. XX.14). The Carthaginians fled into the temple for refuge. Alexander respected their position and purpose and granted their freedom.

¹²⁴ IV.4.18. Curtius earlier stated that Carthage was willing to help Tyre against Alexander with military aid but was unable owing to the war with Syracuse (IV.2.10, IV.3.19).

¹²⁵ Justin XXI.6.

¹²⁶ Justin claims that Hamilcar was despatched after the fall of Tyre and the establishment of Alexandria in Egypt early in 331 and only returned to Carthage after the death of Alexander in 323.

delegation to Alexander seeking his friendship.¹²⁷ The meeting took place in 323 when Alexander was returning to Babylon. The Carthaginians were one of several delegations from the Western Mediterranean, unsure about the intentions of Alexander now that he was master in the East. Alexander's designs on the West, including Carthage, are a point of conjecture. Plutarch claims that Carthage, along with tracts of its empire, had been slated for invasion.¹²⁸ This sentiment is echoed in Alexander's wishes announced after his death.¹²⁹ Unfortunately, although probably not for Carthage, Alexander's death cast any plans for the invasion of Carthage into the realms of speculation.

Regardless of whether or not Alexander planned to invade Carthage or parts of its empire, it appears both sides were in contact at a basic diplomatic level. There is evidence which attests Carthaginians present with Alexander, and likewise, from his contacts, he presumably possessed some knowledge of Carthage and its empire.¹³⁰

Diplomatic relations between Macedon and Carthage seem to have continued after the death of Alexander and the division of his kingdom. During the Second Punic War we find Hannibal in direct negotiations with Philip V of Macedon in 215. This treaty, as preserved by Polybius, is highly official, and includes several stipulations.¹³¹ It is ultimately a mutual treaty establishing friendship between the two states as well as both defensive and aggressive clauses. Bickerman has established that this oath was eastern in origin and it is likely that Hannibal was using a standard Phoenicio-Punic diplomatic technique which has a number of parallels in the East.¹³² The treaty itself is rather banal, but it emphasises unfamiliarity between the two states. There is a standard clause forbidding any underhanded ambushes or plots against the other party. The inclusion of this clause is not surprising, as from Philip's

¹²⁷ Arr. VII.15.4.

¹²⁸ Alex. LXVIII.1

¹²⁹ Diod. XVIII.4.4. Although this wish with several others was supposedly put before a common assembly by Perdikkas, they were all rejected. Another wish in this list was the construction of a trade route from Libya to the Pillars of Heracles with shipyards and ports constructed *en route*. Such a suggestion seems unlikely if Alexander knew of the routes already in place in the area and run mostly by Carthage. It is possible, if there is any truth in this account, that Alexander wanted to construct a new and systematised route which he (or his successors) could control, rather than simply adopting the existing system.

¹³⁰ Diodorus (XIX.2.2-7) relates a story regarding the upbringing of Agathocles. Apparently his father, Carcinus of Rhegium asked Carthaginian envoys who were making their way to Delphi to consult the oracle on his behalf. Although the story is a typical Greek theme, it suggests there was a possible Carthaginian presence in Greece, and in particular Delphi at this time.

¹³¹ VII.9.

¹³² Elias J. Bickerman, "Hannibal's Covenant", *AJP* LXXIII.1, 1952, pp.1-23.

point of view, he would feel uneasy with Hannibal acting unchecked across the Adriatic Sea. If the Romans were defeated, Macedon would retain the Greek states on the west coast of Greece including Corcyra, Epidamnus, and Apollonia. Both parties' subordinate states are clearly defined, but it was only those of Philip which were under threat in case of a breakdown in relations with Carthage. The final part of the treaty states that any clause of this treaty can be removed and others added, as both sides may mutually desire.¹³³ Such a statement is designed in case of any later change of circumstance. The treaty retains a distinctive tone of unfamiliarity and distrust between Macedon and Carthage in diplomatic channels, suggesting that neither side was inherently comfortable with the other. It seems likely that neither state would have pursued any diplomatic relationship in the absence of Rome.

The same can be said regarding Epirus. Although situated on the Adriatic coast and a possible destination for trade, there appears to have been no physical contact between Carthage and Epirus during peacetime. The only obvious literary connection we have is that of a proposed treaty between Pyrrhus and Carthage during the first quarter of the third century.¹³⁴ The Carthaginians apparently were quite eager for peace and accordingly were willing to provide money and ships. Pyrrhus, however, buoyed by his success, refused, stating that a peace would be considered only if the Carthaginians withdrew from Sicily completely and established the Libyan Sea as the natural border between themselves and the Greeks. Naturally the Carthaginians demurred and hostilities ensued. The fact remains, however, that the only reason for any diplomatic contact between Epirus and Carthage was that Pyrrhus was invading Sicily, and therefore entering a sphere of Carthaginian activity; otherwise we may assume that no such contact would have taken place.

SICILY AND MAGNA GRAECIA

For Carthage and its empire, the Greeks of Sicily and, to a lesser degree, Southern Italy were its primary contact with Hellenism. Contact with mainland Greece or the Phocaeans to the west was important, but paled by comparison to that with Sicily. The nature of the Carthaginian presence on Sicily renders it difficult to discuss the

¹³³ VII.9.17, ἐάν δὲ δοκῇ ἡμῖν ἀφελεῖν ἢ προσθεῖναι πρὸς τόνδε τὸν ὅρκον ἀφελούμεν ἢ προσθήσομεν ὥς ἂν ἡμῖν δοκῇ ἀμφοτέροις.

¹³⁴ Plut. *Pyrr.* XXIII.2.

magnitude of Greek and Carthaginian trade in this area as it was so intense. It is also difficult to discuss relations between Greeks and Carthaginians on Sicily without becoming involved with the wars fought between the Sicilian Greeks and Carthaginians for control of the island. The presence of Greeks in Carthaginian areas of Sicily or likewise Carthaginians in Greek towns on the island is also constant, attesting a widespread social contact between the two. These relations are defined in the treaties between Rome and Carthage. The defined Carthaginian territory is described and its open nature with free ports of trade to the Romans and presumably other peoples, including Greeks. Since social and economic contact was obvious for several centuries, let us turn to the other spheres of contact. Although the Greeks and Carthaginians were at war in Sicily, there is evidence which shows a number of Greek states were allied to Carthage, maintained friendships, or had other forms of official contact.

From the fifth century Carthage's main rival on Sicily was Syracuse. A number of costly and time-consuming wars were fought between the two in what could have destroyed Greek independence on the island. Because of this intense rivalry, both Syracuse and Carthage opened diplomatic channels as often as they went to war. Following the loss at Himera in 480 and that at Cumae only six years later, it appears that the Carthaginians were willing to sue for peace with Syracuse. Diodorus is vague in his dating, mentioning that peace was concluded some time before 442 BC.¹³⁵ Thereafter Syracuse and Carthage entertained terms for peace on a regular basis. With the accession of Dionysius I, Carthage and Syracuse saw a constant renewal of hostilities. Both sides were glad to settle for peace outside Syracuse in 405.¹³⁶ Despite an unfortunate end to its campaign, Carthage controlled Selinus, Acragas, Himera, Gela, and Camarina as a result of the peace settlement. The following treaty in 392, sought by the Carthaginians, saw Carthage cede dominion over Tauromenium and the Siceli to Dionysius after several years of often intense fighting.¹³⁷ Finally Carthage gained revenge against Dionysius, defeating him at Cronium in 383. Carthage once again made territorial gains from the peace terms gaining Selinus and Acragas and an indemnity of 1000 talents.¹³⁸ Dionysius II's brief reign saw a further peace treaty between Carthage and Syracuse in 359/8, but it was

¹³⁵ Diod. XII.26.3.

¹³⁶ XIII.114.

¹³⁷ XIV.96.3-4.

not to last.¹³⁹ The advent of Timoleon in the 340's saw Carthaginian fortunes fall once again. After their defeat at the Crimisus River and in other campaigns, the Carthaginians sued for peace with Timoleon at his base in Syracuse.¹⁴⁰ Once again Carthaginian influence shrank into the west of Sicily, this time behind the Halycus River. Hostilities resumed with Agathocles before a peace was brokered in 307 and again finally in 306.¹⁴¹ Although this was not the end of hostilities between Syracuse and Carthage, it saw the end of the concerted grappling for territory on Sicily which had become the norm for almost two hundred years. The Syracusan-Carthaginian peace treaties during this period naturally follow hostilities, but concentrate on the acquisition of territory. When necessary, both sides were willing to employ diplomacy throughout this period and presumably, it became a familiar part of their relationship.

There is some evidence suggesting that at various times, Syracuse, or at least its various political factions had Carthaginian connections. Dion apparently had such a relationship with the Carthaginian representative in Acragas in 357/6.¹⁴² Otherwise during the reign of Agathocles we find Sostratus and a proportion of the ruling oligarchy ally themselves to Carthage after being forced from Syracuse.¹⁴³ Carthage, as we have seen, maintained an active presence on Sicily and presumably was a viable choice as an ally. It is ironic that the final alliance between Syracuse and Carthage was to usher in the end of Carthaginian power on Sicily. At the outbreak of the First Punic War, Hieron II of Syracuse sided with Carthage in an attempt to check Roman power around the Straits of Messina.¹⁴⁴ Unfortunately the combined powers of Syracuse and Carthage failed to stop the advance of Rome, and in the next year Hieron II broke his alliance with Carthage and joined Rome.

Beyond the diplomatic sphere, it appears that Syracuse had a considerable Carthaginian presence at any given time. One such example was the Carthaginian Hanno who married a Syracusan woman and sired the general Hamilcar.¹⁴⁵ The very general who threatened all of Greek Sicily at Himera in 480 was half-Syracusan

¹³⁸ XV.17.

¹³⁹ XVI.4.2.

¹⁴⁰ XVI. 82.3.

¹⁴¹ XX.69.3, XX.79.5.

¹⁴² Plut. *Dion.* XXV.5; Diod. XVI.9.4.

¹⁴³ Diod. XIX.4.3.

¹⁴⁴ Polyb. I.11.

¹⁴⁵ Hdt. VII.166. Dynastic marriages, or at least high-profile marriages appear commonplace in Syracuse. Pyrrhus, the King of Epirus took the daughter of Agathocles, Lanassa as his wife, who bore him a son, Alexander.

himself. This connection may be evident in other centres of Greek Sicily. Herodotus claims that it was the pleas of Terillus of Himera and the support of Anaxilaus of Rhegium that convinced Hamilcar to launch his invasion of Sicily.¹⁴⁶ It is possible that the Magonid dynasty had actual blood connections to some of the ruling houses in Greek Sicily.¹⁴⁷ From another example, we are able to discern the important link between the economic and diplomatic spheres of Carthage and Syracuse. In 398, Dionysius of Syracuse expelled all the Carthaginians and Phoenicians in the city.¹⁴⁸ This apparently included a considerable number of people with both merchants and private citizens specifically named. This then spread to other Greek cities under the influence of Dionysius. The presence of a Carthaginian community in Syracuse, and indeed throughout any number of Greek cities on Sicily, demonstrates, in spite of constant conflict, that there was a strong economic connection between both powers. The presence of merchants in Syracuse is hardly surprising; their expulsion is considerable. This mention in Diodorus implies that this had not occurred previously, in spite of several periods of hostility. The economic relationship between the two states was beneficial to both parties and often continued regardless of the political situation, although this example was probably more the exception than the rule.

Apart from Syracuse we find a number of Greek cities with long and varied relationships with Carthage. The closest of these relationships probably existed between Selinus and Carthage. As the furthestmost Greek outpost in Western Sicily, Selinus became a natural point of contact between Greeks and Carthaginians. Therefore it was natural for the two states to maintain official contact and relations. The first example of such a connection took place during the Carthaginian invasion of 480. It is interesting that Selinus actually turned its back on its fellow Greeks and sided with Hamilcar in Sicily.¹⁴⁹ All the same Selinus would have felt threatened on the frontier of Carthaginian territory and so close to Carthage itself. This threat emerged during the following Carthaginian invasion of 409. Carthage sided with Segesta, the traditional enemy of Selinus, whereas the Selinuntians maintained a

¹⁴⁶ Hdt. VII.165. Anaxilaus was married to Terillus' daughter Cydippe.

¹⁴⁷ C.R. Whittaker, "Carthaginian Imperialism in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries", *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (Cambridge 1978) p.77. This is made even more probable when we consider the sizeable populations of Carthaginian merchants and citizens residing in a number of Greek towns. Presumably they would often be quite wealthy and may have commanded some influence in certain centres.

¹⁴⁸ Diod. XIV.46.

¹⁴⁹ XI.21.4-5.

treaty with Syracuse.¹⁵⁰ The ensuing hostilities saw Hannibal sack Selinus and reduce it to tributary status. Even during this period we find an existing connection between a remnant of the Selinuntian ruling class and the Carthaginians. When bartering for their freedom, the Selinuntians sent a prominent citizen, Empedion as their spokesperson. Although ultimately unsuccessful, he along with his kinsmen were granted freedom and permitted to re-inhabit Selinus because of their support of Carthage during this period.¹⁵¹ Although officially out of favour, there was an element in Selinus which was in contact with Carthage and supported an alliance between the two states. Naturally, it was this sympathetic part of the population which was re-installed in the new pro-Carthaginian town. The existence of a pro-Carthaginian party or even a sizeable Carthaginian population in Selinus, as in other Greek states on Sicily, is attested since it was the town where Gisco, the father of Hannibal was exiled.¹⁵² Apparently he lived there because of Hamilcar's defeat at Himera, but we may assume the family remained influential in Carthage by the appointment of his son as general in Sicily in 409. The relationship between Carthage and Selinus was maintained as we saw earlier with close contact between the two. This was only officially ended when Carthage physically removed the population to Lilybaeum in 250 and razed the town to keep it from the clutches of the advancing Romans.

It appears that a similar relationship may also have applied to Selinus' own colony Heracleia Minoa. During the Carthaginian brokered peace between Agathocles on the one hand, and Acragas, Gela, and Messana on the other, it is stated that the towns of Heracleia, Selinus, and Himera were to remain property of Carthage as they had before (καθὰ καὶ προὔπηρχον).¹⁵³ This suggests that Carthage had governed Heracleia for a period of time in a similar manner to its metropolis, Selinus. Such an example is comparable to earlier precedents on Cyprus where established Phoenician settlements gained control of neighbouring sites and governed them as their own.¹⁵⁴ Following this, during the invasion of Pyrrhus, Heracleia apparently contained a

¹⁵⁰ XIII.43.3-7.

¹⁵¹ XIII.59.1-3.

¹⁵² XIII.43.5.

¹⁵³ XIX. 71.6-7.

¹⁵⁴ See Chp. I, ns.38-42 and text.

Carthaginian garrison.¹⁵⁵ This may simply be a defensive policy of the Carthaginians, although it attests a continual presence much like that in Selinus.¹⁵⁶

Further along the southern coast of Sicily, the Greek city of Acragas also maintained ties with Carthage. A prosperous town like Selinus, Acragas was also situated precariously close to Carthaginian territory in Western Sicily. After the fall of Selinus, Acragas lay on the Greek frontier with Carthaginian territory.¹⁵⁷ Although possibly never allied with Carthage, Acragas maintained certain ties. The most obvious connection is trade. Diodorus claims that Acragas grew extremely wealthy from its olive trade with Carthage.¹⁵⁸ The volume of such trade must have been sizeable as we are later informed that the population of Acragas numbered 20000 citizens, which grew to a reputed figure of 200000 when including resident aliens.¹⁵⁹ Although Timaeus, whom Diodorus claims as his source, is probably exaggerating such a figure, it does provide an interesting image of the population of citizens and non-citizens in Acragas. We may assume that like Syracuse, Acragas had a resident Carthaginian population of some size, both private citizens and merchants. During the second Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, Carthage actively sought to ally itself to Acragas or at least to insure its neutrality rather than to attack it.¹⁶⁰ The Acragantines refused what appears to be an optimistic Carthaginian embassy. This suggests the existence of sympathetic individuals in the city. The main theme of the siege, in which Acragas was eventually defeated and plundered, was the inability of the Greek commanders against the Carthaginians. The feeling was that they had been successfully bribed by the Carthaginians to aid their attack. The Acragantines accused their generals, especially the Lacedaemonian commander Dexippus of treachery, even stoning four of them.¹⁶¹ Following this, Campanian mercenaries fighting for Acragas were bought by Himilcar for fifteen talents and switched sides. This was finally compounded by the withdrawal of the remaining Acragantine generals, under

¹⁵⁵ Diod. XXII.10.2.

¹⁵⁶ It appears that during this period that Carthage maintained a number of garrisons in smaller Sicilian towns. Enna was also garrisoned during the time of Pyrrhus' invasion (Diod. XXII.10.1). Unfortunately for Carthage, both Heracleia and Enna voluntarily went over to Pyrrhus upon his arrival. See Whittaker, pp.72-74. It is ironic that Heracleia Minoa was supposedly settled by the remnants of Dorieus' failed attempt at settling Eryx which was destroyed by the Phoenicians (likely the Carthaginians), Hdt. V.46.2.

¹⁵⁷ Diod. XIII.81.3, 'Ακραγαντῖνοι δέ ὁμοροῦντες τῇ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπικρατείᾳ διελάμβανον ὅπερ ἦν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πρώτους ἤξειν τὸ τοῦ πολέμου βάρος.

¹⁵⁸ XIII.81.4-5.

¹⁵⁹ XIII.84.3.

¹⁶⁰ XIII.85.1-2.

Dexippus (who had also apparently been bought for fifteen talents). Most of the population was evacuated and the town was pillaged. Although this is not certain, the defence of Acragas seems to have been constantly undermined. It is possible that there was a well-connected Carthaginian faction in the city. A Carthaginian merchant population would certainly aid this theory. Unlike in Syracuse, there is no account of the Acragantines expelling their sizeable alien population before the siege. This is further emphasised later when Dion arrived at Acragas in 357/6 when it was under Carthaginian control. Apparently he was well received by the Carthaginian representative, Synalos, who stored Dion's supplies ready to dispatch them.¹⁶² It would appear that certain groups in Acragas, although under Carthaginian rule at the time, maintained diplomatic links with sympathetic people and states. For a city such as Acragas we may never know the full extent of its relations with Carthage. Although never officially allied to Carthage, it appears to have maintained strong social and economic ties, which become evident in several reported encounters.

There is sporadic yet considerable evidence suggesting that Carthage maintained certain links with other Greek towns in Sicily. Although often separate and distant examples, these diplomatic ties between several Greek towns and Carthage suggest that such treaties were often attractive alternatives to alliances with such states as Syracuse.

One of the more important towns regarding Greco-Carthaginian relations in Sicily was Himera. Its position on the north coast of Western Sicily also made it a natural frontier between Carthaginian and Greek territory. Originally the site of the famous victory of Gelon over the Carthaginians in 480, it bore the brunt of Hannibal's vengeance in 409 and was destroyed. We have already witnessed the early connection between Hamilcar and Terillus of Himera in 480: an alliance based on supposed friendship.¹⁶³ The heavy toll exacted on Himera and its people in 409 presumes that such ties no longer protected the city much like Selinus. Although refounded by Carthage, Thermae was a subject state which still retained its Greek identity. It was often a Carthaginian tributary state until the First Punic War, alongside such states as Heracleia and Selinus in the south.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ XIII.87.5.

¹⁶² This account is mentioned by Plutarch (*Dion* XXV-XXVI) and Diodorus (XVI.9.4) who names the Carthaginian governor Paralus.

¹⁶³ Hdt. VII.165.

¹⁶⁴ Diod. XIX.74.7.

There are several smaller examples of eastern Greek Sicilian towns establishing diplomatic ties with Carthage. Contact between such states and Carthage is naturally intermittent, with Syracuse dominating the political geography and often the foreign policy of the area. As a result we usually find such contact in times of war. The war between Dionysius and Carthage was ostensibly over the autonomy of the Greek cities of Sicily. In 397 Carthage ruled the towns of Gela and Camarina in the east of the island.¹⁶⁵ These towns, along with Himera, Acragas, and Selinus all supposedly welcomed the arrival of Dionysius as a liberator from Carthage. At the conclusion of hostilities, both eastern towns gained their autonomy, unlike others in the west of the island.¹⁶⁶ It may be that Gela and Camarina were too far beyond the reach of Carthage to maintain much contact. This geographical distance, however, does not seem to have hindered other towns from seeking an alliance with the Carthaginians. During the invasion of Timoleon, Diodorus states that when he captured Entella, he executed fifteen Carthaginian sympathisers.¹⁶⁷ The existence of such a group was probably characteristic in any number of Greek towns on Sicily. During this time the tyrant of Leontini, Hicetas actively sought an alliance with Carthage. According to Plutarch, Hicetas did so for fear of Timoleon's treatment of other Sicilian tyrants.¹⁶⁸ Diodorus relates a similar story, but claims that it was Carthage which sent a number of embassies to Greek cities in Sicily seeking a treaty.¹⁶⁹ Such a policy would have seen a relatively busy period of diplomatic traffic between the Greeks and Carthaginians. It would seem moderately successful considering that Hicetas sided with Carthage along with the tyrant of Catana.¹⁷⁰

Despite their portrayal in literary sources, it appears that the Carthaginians were not always considered invading barbarians in Sicily. On several occasions there are examples illustrating a number of Greek towns on Sicily were willing to ally themselves to Carthage under no real threat of impending danger. This is best demonstrated by a number of towns deserting Dionysius of Syracuse to Carthage

¹⁶⁵ XIV.47.5.

¹⁶⁶ XV.17.5.

¹⁶⁷ XVI.73.2.

¹⁶⁸ *Tim.* XXX.2.

¹⁶⁹ XVI. 67.1.

¹⁷⁰ There is a dispute in our two sources as to whether or not Hicetas sided with Carthage before Gisco set sail from Carthage. Plutarch claims that the alliance was settled before the invasion. Either way it would suggest that both parties were becoming increasingly wary of Timoleon in Sicily.

during peacetime in 399.¹⁷¹ There was no threat of an impending Carthaginian invasion to force these Greeks begrudgingly to side with Carthage. Although it may seem from a number of examples that the threat of war was the motivating factor behind such alliances, it was not always the case.¹⁷² It appears that Carthage was not always despised as an aggressive non-Greek entity on Sicily. Instead on a number of occasions, it was an attractive ally to possess, one which brought security and possible economic benefits.

Departing from Sicily, there is evidence, albeit limited, of Carthaginian political contact with the Greek states of Italy. Ultimately Italy was beyond the Carthaginian political sphere, however, there is evidence of some contact between the two. Again, trade would have provided the major point of Carthaginian contact (passing several prominent Greek colonies) to Etruria and to the north. Beyond this activity there is little evidence for active political discourse between the two peoples, except in time of war.

Our earliest association once again survives in Herodotus. In 480 the tyrant of Rhegium, Anaxilaus offered his support to the Carthaginian invasion owing to his connections with the Carthaginians and his marriage to the daughter of another ally, Terillus of Himera. The general sense of Herodotus' description implies a noticeable degree of diplomatic intimacy between the three states, at least during the rule of the tyrants. A century later we find Carthage actively courting the support of the Italian Greeks against Dionysius of Syracuse.¹⁷³ Although non-specific as to which Greek states were involved, it appears that it was a considerable contingent, forcing Dionysius to split his defensive policy to counter both Phoenicians (i.e. Carthaginians) and the Italian Greeks to the north. Although Mago was killed in the initial defeat, Carthage gained moderate success from this brief war. Shortly after this the Carthaginians attempted to rally further support in Southern Italy against Dionysius. After the latter had captured and expelled the citizens of Hipponium in Bruttium, the Carthaginians later retook the settlement and restored the exiled population presumably to build support in the area.¹⁷⁴ This small example suggests the

¹⁷¹ Diod. XVI.40.1.

¹⁷² There are a number of examples of Carthage canvassing Greek support before invasions of Sicily. This is evident from Carthage's alliances with Selinus and Anaxilaus of Rhegium in 480 as well as from Carthaginian embassies to several Greek states during the invasion of Timoleon. For more information regarding some of these examples on Sicily during this period see Chp. VII.

¹⁷³ Diod. XV.15.2.

¹⁷⁴ Diod. XV.24.1.

Carthaginians considered areas of Southern Italy as potential allied states and were sometimes willing to negotiate terms of alliance.

The best examples of the Italian Greeks and Carthaginians in active political and diplomatic discourse naturally come during the latter's most intense period of interest in South Italy, the Second Punic War. Hannibal's invasion saw, for the first time, an official Carthaginian military presence on Italian soil over a long period. No longer with Sicily and Sardinia as Carthaginian bases of operations, Hannibal needed to divide Roman Italy and to rally support for his invasion: this made the Italian Greeks the prime candidates for alliance. It is ironic that in one respect Hannibal at the head of a Carthaginian army would appear as a possible liberator for the Italian Greeks, considering that for over two centuries the autonomy of Greek cities on Sicily from Carthaginian rule had been the ostensible reason for numerous conflicts. Several prominent Greek cities welcomed Hannibal, with some remaining loyal Carthaginian supporters for several years. Hannibal's presence in Southern Italy induced Greek (as well as Italian and Etruscan) towns to defect to Carthage. The Greek states of Locri, Taras, Metapontum, Thurii, Heracleia, and Croton all defected to Hannibal providing him a strategic monopoly of access to the Gulf of Taranto and to the south.¹⁷⁵ These defections were not simply limited to passive alliances. Hannibal treasured the strategic alliances with these towns and on several occasions moved entire populations to ensure loyalty or to protect them from Roman attacks.¹⁷⁶ In many respects these alliances served both Greeks and Carthaginians. Hannibal needed strategic allies to assist him against Rome and the Greeks ensured their own immediate safety through Hannibal's goodwill and saw his presence as a possible method of regaining their independence.

The absence of political and diplomatic relations between the Italian Greeks and the Carthaginians during the earlier period is natural as both parties were beyond the boundaries of the other's interests. During the fifth and fourth centuries, Carthage and the Sicilian Greeks battled for dominion over Sicily. Only on the odd occasion did the Italian Greeks become involved. Later, the presence of a unique and substantial Carthaginian invasion in Italy brought diplomatic ties closer to their doorstep. However, only during times of war do we find active diplomacy between

¹⁷⁵ Livy XXII.61, XXV.15.

¹⁷⁶ See Chp. IV, ns.13-21 and text.

the Greeks in Italy and the Carthaginians. As a result any connection beyond trade is sporadic and dependent on political developments abroad.

AFRICA

A poorly attested region of Carthaginian activity was the general area to the south of Carthage: the arid North African interior. Large tracts of this region are desert and mountainous, and being beyond the means and interest of contemporary Greek and Roman sources, we are left with little substantial evidence of Carthaginian activity in the area. Nevertheless, there is an obvious window of opportunity for trade with the interior which both Phoenicians and Carthaginians would have pursued. It may seem unusual for Carthage to depart from its highly successful maritime trade to explore interior trade routes, however, the interior of North Africa offered contact with a number of tribes and an interior route to Egypt. Like the Phoenicio-Punic system of networked trade, the desert routes were dotted with oases and native villages offering caravans intermittent 'harbours' *en route*. Also, the Phoenicians, who probably established such a trade route, were accustomed to using land routes in the East. There were obvious economic attractions from various sources in the desert and the astute Carthaginians were willing to capitalise upon them.

The geography of the North African hinterland beyond the coastal areas is primarily dominated by desert and mountainous terrain. Despite the inhospitable conditions, there existed a network of settlements, which Herodotus, describes as stretching from Thebes in Egypt to the Pillars of Heracles.¹⁷⁷ These so called 'chariot routes' of the interior seem to head generally west and south incorporating a number of named tribes, which are difficult to identify and locate.¹⁷⁸ It is possible, although not proven, that such routes reached into the interior as far as Lake Chad at one point and the River Niger at another. It is possible that several regional routes controlled by different groups comprised these general routes as a whole. Nevertheless, Herodotus' description suggests the existence of active interior trade lanes stretching from Egypt,

¹⁷⁷ Hdt. IV.181-185. Although Herodotus does not attest an active caravan route along the North African interior he does mention that oases were dotted in intervals of ten days' travel. He also lists several of the major native groups, which we know were active traders to the east of Carthage.

¹⁷⁸ For an overview of these routes and several possible identifications see R.C.C. Law, "The Garamantes and Trans-Saharan Enterprise in Classical Times", *Journal of African History* VIII.2, 1967, pp.181-186.

then through Libya, before generally heading southwest.¹⁷⁹ Much of the Carthaginian trade along the Trans-Saharan routes was to the east and to the south. The northern location of Carthage and the paucity of mountain passes directly to its south pushed the main Carthaginian centres of contact with the desert east, such as Leptis Magna, Oea, and Sabratha.¹⁸⁰ Their general location removed several hundred kilometres' distance and placed them closer to the major passes to the south and naturally closer to their trading partners. If we return to Herodotus, who remains the most insightful ancient geographer of the region, we find a detailed, if often colourful account of it and its peoples.¹⁸¹ For our interest, however, he demonstrates that there was a well established trade route by the fifth century. Herodotus was certainly gleaning his evidence from the Greeks in the region, concentrated around Cyrene. Greek interest in the area would have provided them with a good knowledge of the trade routes in the area, as the Cyrenaeans were probably accustomed to trading there themselves. Although Herodotus does not mention Phoenician or Carthaginian activity in the area, his account is by no means complete. We should remember that the climate of the region during the first millennium BC would have been less arid with higher moisture levels resulting in smaller desert areas than exist today.¹⁸² This is possibly suggested by the fanciful account of a Carthaginian named Mago who apparently crossed the desert three times only eating dry food and not taking a drink.¹⁸³ Presumably this was on three separate occasions. This account seems unlikely if we assume the desert to be the Sahara. If that desert had been smaller than at present, the feat becomes more feasible. Still it is possible that the desert referred to was only a specific section of the Sahara and not its whole distance, i.e. across a certain stretch of desert such as journeying to the Fezzan or between two oases or settlements such as those attested by Herodotus. Perhaps it is best to reject the image of an unbroken interior route

¹⁷⁹ A similar universal trade route, although maritime, is later suggested by Diodorus (XVIII.4.4) when reporting the list of projects Alexander hoped to complete. This route was to be constructed with ports and shipyards from Alexandria to the Pillars of Heracles.

¹⁸⁰ The only ancient evidence we have of an attempt to cross the Atlas Mountains survives in Pliny (V.14-15). Suetonius Paulinus (Cos. 66 AD) advanced south across the Atlas range and into the Sahara. Judging from the tone of the account the journey was difficult; Paulinus' party was forced to traverse snowy peaks before descending into an uninhabitable desert.

¹⁸¹ Hdt. IV.186ff.

¹⁸² e.g. Sharon E. Nicholson, "Saharan Climates in Historic Times", *The Sahara and the Nile*, Martin A.J. Williams and Hugues Faure (eds.), (Rotterdam 1980) pp.173-175. Studies have shown that the Saharan region, including East Africa was 'considerably wetter' around five or four thousand years ago. From this period, a general trend toward its current climate has progressed. Between ca. 1000-150 BC, the Sahara was not as large as in present times.

¹⁸³ Athen. *Deip.* II.44.d.

stretching from Egypt to the Atlantic as implied by Herodotus. It seems more likely that such a route was comprised of separate smaller routes operated by several groups of people.

The Trans-Saharan route to the south appears to have been an attractive area for Carthaginian trade. Although our evidence grows increasingly scarce as we travel south, it is likely that traffic extended at least to the territory of the Garamantes and possibly further to the region of Lake Chad and the Boele Depression. It is even possible that Phoenician and Carthaginian trade reached the areas of Timbuktu or the River Niger.¹⁸⁴ Such a trade route is not inconceivable when we consider Carthaginian interests along a similar latitude along the west coast of Africa. It is also possible given the Carthaginian use of intermediary groups for trade in North Africa. We have witnessed the importance of and effort behind Hanno's periplus of the fifth century. The design of such a journey was to establish a trade network on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. However, having achieved this, Hanno continued south exploring new lands for possible settlement and trade. This brought a Carthaginian presence to coastal equatorial Africa. Carthage was surely attracted by a number of resources in the area and was possibly hoping to settle there. It is possible, on the assumption of further exploration of the interior, that a route linking the interior route with the sea could have been established in Nigeria. Unfortunately, without further evidence we are unable to establish certain Carthaginian activity, if any, in what is an enormous area.

Several interior trade routes in North Africa can, however, be located with some certainty. We already know of the importance of Egypt in Carthaginian trade and its influence on Carthaginian culture. The Ammonioi described by Herodotus are presumably located at Siwah and are the first group *en route* from Thebes and the natural connection with Egypt.¹⁸⁵ From interior centres such as Siwah, the Carthaginians, either through their own caravans, or possibly tribal intermediaries were able to maintain routes to the east largely unaffected by the political climate of the Mediterranean. Beyond our scant archaeological evidence there is some literary evidence suggesting a tradition of contact between the Carthaginians and Siwah. Apparently Hannibal visited the oracle and learnt that he would be buried in his native

¹⁸⁴ Soren *et al.*, p.78.

¹⁸⁵ Hdt. IV.182.1.

land.¹⁸⁶ Whether true or not, such a claim connects the Carthaginian Hannibal with the oracle at Siwah and suggests a degree of familiarity. There is a more poetic allusion, suggesting that when Virgil has Aeneas arriving at Carthage, he spoils a possible marriage between Elissa and Hiarbus, the supposed son of Ammon and the nymph Garamantes.¹⁸⁷ The god worshipped at Siwah, after all, was Ammon. There are several layers of etymology and forced aetiology present in this myth, but the general connection between Carthage, Siwah, and intermediary tribes is presupposed. The limited literary tradition automatically connects Siwah with Carthage. This may simply be a geographic inference or possibly a more knowledgeable one based on established trade and traffic between the two sites.

The best way the Carthaginians were able to maintain long interior trade routes was through their use of intermediary peoples. Along the North African coast and in the interior there are several tribes, which benefited themselves and Carthage by maintaining trade through their respective territories. Some of these interior tribes apparently maintained close economic ties with Carthage. The Macae were an important ally of Carthage on their eastern border. It was with their help that the Carthaginians were able to repel the attempt of Dorieus to establish the colony of Cinyps somewhere in the vicinity of Leptis Magna.¹⁸⁸ The Macae would have been the first important tribe to the south or east. A good relationship with Carthage is understandable and certainly would have promoted trade in the area.

The Nassamones, who dwelt to the east of the Macae, were also an important tribe along the Saharan trade routes. Herodotus relates an anecdote of some Cyrenaeans visiting the oracle at Siwah. They claim that several young Nassamonian men attempted to explore the Sahara to the south.¹⁸⁹ Despite being kidnapped by pygmies, they returned to retell their story, which Herodotus preserved. Heading south they ventured west until they were carried off through a great marsh until they reached a large river which flowed from west to east. It is possible that this description is of the River Niger. If trade routes reached as far south as Lake Chad, the men may have travelled along several of them. Otherwise the story is useful, as not only does it describe a connection and familiarity between the Ammonioi (located in Siwah) and the Nassamones to the west, but some supposed knowledge of the

¹⁸⁶ Diod. XXV.19, Λίβυσσα κρύψει βῶλος Ἀννίβα δέμας.

¹⁸⁷ Aen. IV.198-199; H.W. Parke, *The Oracles of Zeus* (Oxford 1967) p.243.

¹⁸⁸ Hdt. V.42.

territory of the Sub-Sahara. It is likely that the Nassamones, like the Macae, both acted as intermediaries along such trade routes and traded with Carthage.

One of the more important tribes in the region was the Garamantes. They were located to the south of Leptis Magna and dominated a large and important stretch of territory in the North African hinterland with important trade routes. From our limited accounts, it appears that they were relatively civilised compared to their neighbouring tribes with a capital Garama, chariots, personal grooming including tattoos, and ostrich skin shields.¹⁹⁰ The paths of the southern and eastern trade routes would certainly have made the Garamantes an important tribe. They have been hailed as the 'middle-men' of the trade route with good reason.¹⁹¹ One of the main commodities traded with the Garamantes were precious carbuncle stones. This trade between the former and Carthage must have been considerable as the land of the Garamantes is described as the source of Carthaginian stones, i.e. carbuncles.¹⁹² Later sources also suggest a Carthaginian connection with the Garamantes. Silius Italicus mentions a contingent of Garamantes in the Carthaginian army.¹⁹³ Both Sallust and Pliny describe their huts as *mapalia*, a Punic word describing a specific type of mud hut in North Africa.¹⁹⁴ As we have seen, it is natural for a state such as Carthage to influence its neighbours, especially those not as highly developed.

The nature of Phoenicio-Punic trade with the Sahara and beyond is often difficult to pinpoint owing to the nature of the goods being traded. Trade with regions such as Egypt is attested by the amount of material remains scattered throughout Carthage and its territories. Carthaginian activity in such areas is not well attested by archaeological remains possibly owing to the nature of the commodities which they were exporting. A similar problem affects discussion of Carthaginian trade with the Sub-Sahara. We may assume that Carthage traded for raw materials and precious items which leave little discernible trace. Likewise, there is little evidence of Punic

¹⁸⁹ Hdt. II.32.

¹⁹⁰ Hdt. IV.174-175; Pliny *NH.* V.36. There is evidence of chariots depicted in rock art on two routes: one travelling north-south and another east-west suggesting two distinctive travel routes. See Law, pp.181-182.

¹⁹¹ Soren *et al.* p.77; Law p.187. The Garamantes controlled the important middle ground of both trade routes and thus became an indispensable participant in any trade in the area.

¹⁹² Strabo XVII.3.19.

¹⁹³ *Pun.* III.313-314.

¹⁹⁴ The term *magalia* is the Punic root form of the more common Latin *mapalia*. Both forms specifically describe a type of North African hut. The term *magalia* is used twice by Virgil in the *Aeneid* (IV.421, 259) and once by Livy (XLI.27.12). The Latin *mapalia* is employed by Virgil (*G.* III.340), Sallust (*Iug.* XVIII.8), and Tacitus (*Hist.* IV.50), and several other sources.

remains in the Sub-Sahara which demonstrates open trade between the two regions.¹⁹⁵ The only hint of more developed goods being traded with native African tribes points further to the west. Pseudo-Scylax claims that the Phoenicians traded Attic pottery, Egyptian stone, and perfume with the Ethiopians for wine, hides, and ivory from their island base of Cerne.¹⁹⁶ As yet, there is no further archaeological evidence proving such trade existed.

There appear to have been several major exports from the Sub-Sahara which Carthage actively traded, either itself, or more likely through intermediary tribes. Presumably ivory was a major commodity as a luxury item in the Greek and Roman worlds and Carthage as the main power in Africa was able to benefit from such trade. Further animal products such as skins may also have attracted Carthaginian interest. Another export may have been manpower. Black slaves were present in Carthage and possibly certain groups served as contingents in various Carthaginian armies. The Sub-Saharan trade also transported precious stones to Carthage including carbuncles (possibly garnets). To a lesser extent chalcedony, which would have fetched high prices throughout the Mediterranean. Carbuncles themselves were obviously an important part of trade in the area as Pliny and several other authors refer to these as 'Carthaginian stones'.¹⁹⁷ One of the other more valuable commodities traded in West Africa was gold. Herodotus and Palaiphatos both comment on the existence of West African gold, and the former describes a gold trade active between the Carthaginians and the Libyans living 'beyond the Pillars of Heracles'.¹⁹⁸ There is no contemporary evidence proving that there was a Saharan gold route, which certainly existed during later periods.¹⁹⁹ Although these two examples are located on the coast, it is possible that a secondary gold trade existed in the interior. Several commodities traded in the Trans-Saharan routes were in high demand among Greeks and Romans. By developing several possible routes and using intermediary groups Carthage benefited from acquiring such items despite the arduous journeys required into the Sahara and possibly beyond.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁵ Law, p.187.

¹⁹⁶ *GGM*. I. 112, pp.93-94 (ed. Müller).

¹⁹⁷ Pliny XXXVII.92; Strabo, XVII.3.19.

¹⁹⁸ Hdt. IV.196; Palaiphatos (F. 31) claims that the inhabitants of the West African island of Cerne were wealthy in gold.

¹⁹⁹ See Law, pp.188-190.

²⁰⁰ For aspects of Carthaginian trade in the Sub-Sahara and later into the Roman and Moorish periods see E.W. Bovill, *The Golden Trade of the Moors* (London 1958).

BEYOND THE PILLARS OF HERACLES

The Phoenicio-Punic monopoly in the West meant that the Atlantic regions beyond the Pillars of Heracles remained largely unknown to both Greeks and Romans alike. As a result, estimating the extent of exploration beyond the Mediterranean in antiquity is fraught with problems. This is of particular interest to this discussion considering the Phoenicians, followed by the Carthaginians, were probably the first Mediterranean people to travel extensively in this area of the Atlantic. The nature of the Carthaginians' restrictions on Greek and Roman traffic has certainly limited our knowledge of their involvement in areas beyond the Pillars of Heracles. Nevertheless, it appears that the Carthaginians, like the Phoenicians before them, were active in several important areas in the Atlantic beyond the reach of their competitors.

We have already looked at Carthaginian involvement in Atlantic Africa in some detail. The Phoenicians actively settled the area with important sites such as Lixus and Mogador. Carthage also expressed obvious interest in the area as the voyage of Hanno testifies. The Carthaginians settled a number of sites along the Atlantic coast, establishing a trade network of settlements facilitating coastal sea-borne trade while enabling Carthage to trade with the native populations in the interior. The heaviest traffic and settlement, as Hanno's account and archaeological evidence suggest, was along the west coast of Morocco.²⁰¹ Nevertheless, we have seen exploration and possible trade stretching as far south as Senegal, Ghana, or possibly Cameroon.

Other areas of possible Phoenicio-Punic contact were the Atlantic islands off the West African coast: namely the Canaries and the Madeira Islands, as well as several other possible groups.

The main group of islands which both Phoenicians and Carthaginians were likely to come in contact with were the Canaries. Sea-borne traffic along the Moroccan coast would certainly have spotted the islands, which at their most easterly point, Fuerteventura, lie only one hundred kilometres off the coast. Unfortunately no certain archaeological evidence attests any Carthaginian settlement. It was only under Juba II during the first century that the islands were more fully explored and exposed

²⁰¹ See Ch. III regarding the periplus of Hanno, other literary examples, and archaeological remains.

to those in the Mediterranean.²⁰² Any Phoenician and/or Carthaginian settlement on the Canaries must have been superficial as there is no lasting evidence of any habitation. Juba apparently noticed remains of buildings on the island of Canaria (Gran Canaria).²⁰³ The only other inhabitants known on the Canaries were the mysterious Guanches, themselves of Berber stock.²⁰⁴ This group remained in isolation until the thirteenth century. It is possible that the remains Juba discovered were part of an abandoned Phoenicio-Punic outpost. The islands did possess an excellent climate and various natural resources which may certainly have attracted some form of Phoenicio-Punic interest.²⁰⁵

The Madeira Islands may also have seen Phoenicio-Punic activity at some period. Once again there is no firm archaeological evidence to support permanent settlement. Our best evidence of Carthaginian contact is a story, probably by Timaeus and preserved in Diodorus. He transcribes a relatively lengthy account of a Carthaginian (he states Phoenician) ship blown off course from the Pillars of Heracles. For many days it travelled west into the Atlantic until reaching an island which, with the exception of navigable rivers which Diodorus claims existed there, resembles the island of Madeira.²⁰⁶ Apparently the Tyrrhenians wished to establish a colony on the island, however, they were refused access by their Carthaginian allies owing to the utopian image and prosperity of the island.²⁰⁷ A similar account is preserved in Pseudo-Aristotle who is presumably using the same source as Timaeus.²⁰⁸ This account also claims that the Carthaginians lived on the island and, observing their reputation, killed anybody who even proposed to sail there so that the

²⁰² Pliny VI.202-205.

²⁰³ Pliny VI.205, *apparere ibi vestigia aedificiorum*.

²⁰⁴ Otto Rössler, "Libyca", *Wiener Zeitschriften Kunde Morgenland* 49, 1942, pp.282-290. Rössler proved that native literary fragments discovered on the Canaries were linguistically related to Numidian.

²⁰⁵ Two island groups south of the Canaries may have also attracted interest from the Phoenicians and the Carthaginians if they were active in the area. The Carthaginians may have known of the existence of the Cape Verde islands. Although five hundred kilometres off the West African coast, these islands are far enough north to suggest the possibility of discovery. It is also doubtful, but possible that the Carthaginians discovered the equatorial islands of São Tome and Principe. The former lies just over two hundred kilometres off the coast of Equatorial Guinea. Such a possibility depends on the lasting success of the discoveries of Hanno and subsequent Carthaginian activity in the Gulf of Guinea. Naturally neither island group has revealed any evidence suggesting Phoenicio-Punic activity, let alone discovery.

²⁰⁶ Diod. V.20.3.

²⁰⁷ V.20.4. This would suggest a date which coincides with the Etrusco-Carthaginian alliance and previous to the crippling defeats of Himera and Cumae which destroyed Etruscan sea-power thereafter. A plausible date for this anecdote could be somewhere between 525-475 BC.

²⁰⁸ *Mira. Ausc.* 84.

island would not become overcrowded and spoilt. An interesting account survives in Plutarch's *Life of Sertorius*.²⁰⁹ While a fugitive in Gades, Sertorius supposedly met two seamen who had just travelled to a group of two islands a great distance off the coast of Africa (μυρίους σταδίους). The geography and description of the islands most likely points to the Madeira Islands. The large distance mentioned in the text seems an arbitrary guess. Regardless of the exact identification there is a possible connection between Carthage and the Madeira Islands. Sertorius was present in Gades in 82 BC, only about sixty years after the fall of the Carthaginian Empire, of which Gades had been an integral part. If any connection between the Madeira Islands had been established, it most likely originated from Gades. The sailors were possibly residents of the town with an acquired knowledge of such routes. Finally from the journeys of Himilco, there is a report of vast tracts of seaweed which float on the surface entangling ships.²¹⁰ It has been supposed that this reference is to the Sargasso Sea, which is closer to the Madeira Islands than any other group, although it lies further to the south and to the west. Himilco was reputedly absent for four months, which is ample time to explore sizeable tracts of the Atlantic as well as the coast of Europe and the British Isles.²¹¹ Evidence of Phoenicio-Punic knowledge, let alone settlement, on the Madeira Islands, as with other Atlantic island groups remains largely inconclusive. However, it is possible that the Phoenicians or Carthaginians discovered any number of such islands on their characteristic missions of exploration or long-range trade.

The areas north of the Pillars of Heracles offered both Phoenicians and Carthaginians new and relatively uncharted areas for exploration and trade. Although states such as Massilia and Emporion were accustomed to dealing with interior France and Spain, the west coast of Europe and the Atlantic remained mostly unreachable to both Greeks and Romans. Ironically, it was not until periods of weakness in Carthaginian naval power that traders and explorers such as Pytheas of Massilia (ca. 300 BC) were allowed maritime access to the area. Presumably for long periods the

²⁰⁹ *Ser.* VIII.

²¹⁰ Avienus *OM.* Ll.122-124, *plurimum inter gurgites, extare fucum et saepe virgulte vice, retinere pup(p)im*; 408-409, *exuperat autem gurgitem fucus frequens, atque impeditor aestus hic uligine.*

²¹¹ There has been some speculation that the Carthaginians reached the Azores which lie some 1800 km. from Europe. The supposed discovery of eight gold Punic coins on the island of Corvo in 1749 highlights this claim which has hitherto been unsubstantiated and must remain unreliable.

Phoenicians and Carthaginians possessed sole knowledge of some of the lands and peoples of Atlantic Europe.

The problem with any theory of Phoenicio-Punic settlement or activity along the European Atlantic coast is the lack of any substantial archaeological evidence. There are no settlements attested north of modern day Lisbon in Southern Portugal. This does not discount the existence of hitherto undiscovered or unknown settlements along the Atlantic coast. Avienus claims that inhabitants of Carthage once dwelt in villages and towns on the European side of the Pillars of Heracles.²¹² Gades would qualify as one of these towns along with several other smaller settlements in the vicinity. The text is vague as to how many of these existed along the west coast of Spain and Portugal. What seems more likely, however, is that any possible settlements would have been temporary shipping ports which often leave little trace. Such a system and a general lack of physical evidence are symptomatic for Phoenician and Carthaginian coastal networks in several areas.

There is some literary evidence of Phoenicio-Punic presence in the Atlantic north of the Pillars of Heracles. The most renowned, and unfortunately less detailed, is the account of the Carthaginian seafarer Himilco. Although only alluded to by Pliny and in Avienus, it appears that Carthage launched a mission of exploration into the North Atlantic probably during the first half of the fifth century.²¹³ We have previously encountered anecdotes suggesting Carthaginian activity in the Atlantic. In his four-month journey, however, it appears that his main purpose was perhaps to explore the coasts of Brittany and Britain. Avienus writes of islands known as the Oestrymnides and their native people.²¹⁴ He claims that the Tartessians once conducted trade with these people, stating that they were mercantile in their thinking

²¹² Ll.375-377, *ultra has columnas propter Europae latus, vicos et urbis incolae Carthaginiis, tenuere quondam.*

²¹³ The dating of Himilco's journey is as vague as several of the other details. A date of 480 has been widely suggested because of Pliny's phrase: *Carthaginiis potentia florente* (II.169). This would predate the disastrous Battle of Himera. However, we have on several occasions seen the ability of Carthage to recover from often serious loss to recover in matter of a few years. Pliny's dating simply states "when Carthage was powerful". This term is naturally vague, as Carthage was continually powerful in the Central and Western Mediterranean for several consecutive centuries. The temporal reference of Pliny seems more an arbitrary statement aimed at completing a vague anecdote. This is coupled with the unlikely simultaneous dispatch of both Hanno and Himilco. Presumably Himilco would have commanded a sizeable expedition with a number of ships and considerable manpower. Hanno supposedly commanded sixty penteconters and some 30000 colonists and crew. It seems unlikely that even Carthage could afford to send out a second expedition after such a drain. Therefore a different date seems more likely for Himilco's voyage, possibly ca. 450.

²¹⁴ Ll.95, 96, 113, 130, 154-155.

and that their land abounded in lead and tin.²¹⁵ Apparently this island lay only two days sailing from the Holy Island (*sacra insula*, also known as the Isle of the Blest). Avienus claims that Carthaginians came to these seas including Himilco himself. Unfortunately we are left to speculate which islands Avienus is referring to with no conclusive evidence.²¹⁶ The description of the Ligurian land is also ambiguous. Avienus claims that the Ligurian lands lay across from the Oestrymnides and that the inhabitants were driven from the coast by a band of Celts.²¹⁷ Whether this refers to Southern Britain or coastal France is unclear. The ambiguous nature and wording of the text has opened several possible avenues to identify vague terms with actual geographical locations.²¹⁸ Regardless of their exact identity, the texts suggest that the Carthaginians had some presence in or at least knowledge of the general area.

A second account provided by Strabo helps clarify Phoenicio-Punic activity in this area of the Atlantic. He describes a group of ten islands known as the Cassiterides.²¹⁹ Apparently the local people wore black robes and were of tragic appearance, much like the Furies.²²⁰ This description is similar to Tacitus' description of the Druids of Anglesey in the first century.²²¹ The islands also have deposits of tin and lead, with which the locals traded for basic animal, pottery, and bronze wares. Strabo continues by stating that the Phoenicians frequented these islands and once monopolised this trade based from Gades. The location of these islands is vaguely described as further from Spain than the south coast of England. These islands are again difficult to identify with any certainty. The two groups of islands in the immediate vicinity are the Channel Islands and the Scilly Islands. The latter of the two is probably the group Strabo is reporting. The geographical position is similar to the Scillies only about 45 km. from Land's End in Cornwall. The archipelago

²¹⁵ L1.98-100.

²¹⁶ It is possible that the Oestrymnides was possibly Cornwall, an area known for deposits of tin and lead. This would suggest that Himilco mistook the coast of Cornwall for islands and therefore the Holy Isle could be identified as Ireland. Another possibility is that the Oestrymnides were in fact the Channel Islands off the coast of France. The description of a group of several islands, which lie widely apart, seems a better description of the Channel Islands. The alleged deposits of tin, and especially lead also concur with such a description. This would mean that the large Holy Island was in fact Britain, which could be reached in two days' sailing from Europe.

²¹⁷ L1.129ff.

²¹⁸ See J.P. Murphy's notes to the text in *Ora Maritima* (Chicago 1977) pp.52-57.

²¹⁹ III.5.11, II.5.15.

²²⁰ III.5.11, αἱ δὲ Καττιτερίδες δέκα μὲν εἰσι κείνται δ' ἔγγυς ἀλλήλων πρὸς ἄρκτον ἀπὸ τοῦ τῶν Ἀρτάβρων λιμένος πελάγαι. μία δ' αὐτῶν ἔρημος ἐστὶ τὰς δ' ἄλλας οἰκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι μελάγχλαινοι ποδῆρεις ἐνδεδυκότες τοὺς χιτῶνας ἐξωσμένοι περὶ τὰ στέρνα μετὰ ῥάβδων περιπατοῦντες ὅμοιοι ταῖς τραγικαῖς Ποιναῖς.

²²¹ *Ann.* XIV.30.

comprises over 150 isles and rocky outcrops, several of which are large enough for habitation. The only problem with the Scillies being identified as the Cassiterides is that they contain no stocks of lead or tin which is the main reported reason for a Phoenicio-Punic presence.

It is possible that the Cassiterides and the Oestrymnides were in fact the same group of islands. If both groups are identified as the Scillies, then the lead and tin described by both Avienus and Strabo may have been transported from Southern Britain. The islands may have served as a depot where the Tartessians, Phoenicians, and Carthaginians may have traded stocks of tin and lead with Cornwall before transporting it south. The Phoenicians and Carthaginians were well accustomed to establishing offshore bases to trade with the mainland.²²² The Scillies were a perfect way station for trade, but also for further travel. Positioned in the west, Phoenicio-Punic ships would not have had to sail fully around the northern peninsula of the Bay of Biscay and into the English Channel. The nature of such trade may have normally been seasonal. This may also explain the lack of evidence suggesting a Phoenician or Carthaginian presence on either the south coast of Britain or on the Scilly Islands themselves.

The nature of Himilco's journey north of the Pillars of Heracles poses an interesting question. If the Phoenicians had been trading with Britain and presumably several other ports along the Spanish and French Atlantic coasts, why was he commissioned to spend four months exploring the area? The Tartessians and then the Phoenicians presumably travelled the European Atlantic coast for some time before the rise of an independent Carthage. Himilco, presumably departing in the spring would have naturally faced adverse winds and sea currents travelling to the north. Moreover, four months is an excessive period simply to sail along a familiar coast and possibly to the British Isles. It is likely that his intentions were somewhat greater and unfortunately lost to us. It is possible Himilco explored areas of the mid-Atlantic during his long voyage. The same may be said about the British Isles. If Britain, beyond the Bristol Channel, was still unknown to Carthage, its exploration may have been a task of Himilco. Even if Pliny was correct in claiming his main mission was to explore the European coast, we do not know how far north he reached or possibly

²²² This is suggested by M. Cary and B.H. Warmington, *The Ancient Explorers* (Baltimore 1963) pp.32-34. The account of Pytheas describes the tin trade with Cornwall based from the small offshore island of Ictis, which has been identified as St. Michael's Mount off Penzance (Diod. V.22.2.4; Pliny IV.104).

how far inland along several navigable rivers.²²³ Unfortunately our scanty sources leave us to speculate what Himilco's entire mission was and how far he actually travelled.

The nature of the Carthaginian Empire saw it come into contact with a number of peoples and areas, both developed and others virtually beyond the borders of the ancient world. Several of these areas became important points of contact, which Carthage benefited from for various reasons. Trade was a natural motivation behind several such areas of contact. Carthage's propensity for trade saw it interact with several highly developed states throughout the Mediterranean. Egypt, the Etruscans, the Greeks, and Rome were primary trading partners with Carthage. With the flow of trade, we find an increase in influence and types of contact. Such trade enabled Carthage to acquire commodities which were in high demand in other markets. The nature of this trade is of interest as material remains suggest it was one directional. It is possible that the types of commodities the Carthaginians were trading were less likely to leave a lasting impression on material remains. As a result, Punic remains are scarce in developed areas beyond Carthage's control, whereas trade with areas such as Egypt, Rome, and Greece is usually attested in Carthaginian centres alone. It is also interesting that trade, for the most part, endured political upheaval. There is evidence of constant trade with areas deemed hostile. Presumably Carthaginian merchants were a common sight in the harbours of Syracuse, Rome, or Massilia and a welcome economic occurrence, despite official enmity. This even extended to considerable Carthaginian populations residing in centres which we normally consider Carthaginian enemies. Trade was the motivating factor behind Carthaginian contact with areas beyond the boundaries of contemporary attention. Carthaginian trade spread into the Atlantic, both to the north and south as well as the Sub-Sahara. By creating trade routes, by both land and sea and by using local peoples as intermediaries for trade, Carthage was able to maintain distant trade and to obtain commodities, which were inaccessible, and therefore naturally in high demand in Mediterranean markets.

Beyond the realms of trade, we have seen that Carthage maintained active diplomatic contact with several states. From often fragmentary literary evidence there

²²³ II.169, *sicut ad extera Europae noscenda*.

is evidence showing Carthage was active in a number of alliances and Carthaginian envoys were often present in foreign states, as foreign delegates were likewise in Carthage. A number of treaties existed and were surely advantageous to participating states, as we have seen with Carthage and the Etruscans and then Rome. Others were more rudimentary, dealing with territory and the cessation of hostilities, as we have seen constantly on Sicily. It also appears that Carthage maintained a number of allied states, or at least sympathisers in other states. This is obvious in Sicily and Southern Italy, where on a number of occasions we find a number of Greek, Sicilian, and Italian centres supporting Carthaginian interests in the area, or at least containing a sympathetic party. Carthaginian diplomacy was not restricted to developed states. Examples from several areas under the Carthaginians' control or interest suggest that they often established, or at least attempted to establish, amicable links with local peoples. Although the Carthaginians became more aggressive toward foreign groups, like the Phoenicians before them, they still recognised the importance of establishing such ties to strengthen their influence abroad.

Carthaginian contact with areas and peoples beyond their control was a natural, yet integral characteristic of their empire. Through trade, diplomacy, and other various points of contact, Carthage was better able to maintain its position. From such contact the nature of the Carthaginian Empire becomes more apparent. A common conception regarding Carthage is that it maintained a hardline policy with its neighbours, to protect its own territory. However, it appears it actively sought contact with other states. Although it maintained areas of exclusivity within its empire, and a growing tide of expansion often brought it into conflict, Carthage benefited from various forms of contact with a number of areas and peoples, both allied and ostensibly hostile.

VII. METHODS AND MOTIVES OF CARTHAGINIAN AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION

We have witnessed in some detail various attempts, both successful and otherwise, of the Carthaginians establishing contact abroad for their own benefit. These developed in several forms: diplomacy, political influence, and trade for example. However, let us not forget the Carthaginians' proclivity for military conquest. Although this activity is evident throughout Carthaginian history, we have yet to discuss it as a specific Carthaginian activity.

On a number of occasions, Carthage actively invaded foreign territories or invited conflict for its own benefit. Although the results varied, we are now able to discuss possible motives for separate campaigns. Carthage launched military campaigns for different reasons, whether it was for territory, economic gain, or protection of pre-established interests. With a better understanding of Carthaginian expansion, both by military and political means, we may now turn to conflict as a direct policy of empire. Naturally such a discussion precludes any conflicts beyond the initiative and direct control of Carthage.¹ These activities were often sporadic and spread throughout several regions of the empire. Nevertheless, from such examples, specific motives behind Carthaginian campaigns as active foreign policies become apparent.

EARLY CONQUEST — BUILDING THE EMPIRE

The first period of Carthaginian expansion through military means can be dated to the period of 654/3 to 480 BC. The former date is the year in which Carthage founded the colony of Ebusus and in many respects, by completing this official and independent act, evolved into a developed political entity separate from its Phoenician forebears. The latter date excludes the disastrous campaign to Sicily which ended in the defeat at Himera. This early stage of Carthaginian military expansion perhaps can be defined as Carthage cementing its own position in its provinces and beginning to look abroad for further territory. Motives behind campaigns during this period may appear as simple

¹ The most obvious example of such conflict was the Third Punic War for which Carthage was not responsible and was certainly unwilling to initiate. Others include the invasions of Agathocles and Masinissa, and the revolts of the mercenaries in North Africa and the Sards in Sardinia.

expansion, but they do establish important precedents for later Carthaginian activity.² Carthage did not, like most ancient empires, need to acquire the bulk of its empire by conquest. The Phoenician legacy remained in several important areas in the Western Mediterranean. In a number of areas Carthage had been growing as the natural successor of the Phoenicians, and when the latter declined in the sixth century, Carthage assumed control as the economic and social centre of the old Phoenician 'Empire' in the West. There was no need for Carthage to exercise its physical authority over separate settlements or areas, as it already was the dominant city in the West.

THE GREEK ENCROACHMENTS

The first major conflict we are aware of is that mentioned by Thucydides: the Carthaginian naval defeat at the hands of the Phocaeans when they were founding Massilia ca. 600.³ Although there is no further evidence offered by Thucydides on the matter, we can make several assumptions. The location of the encounter is unknown; presumably it was in the region of Massilia or in the Tyrrhenian Sea. The Carthaginians' presence in this region during this period is attested through their connection with the Etruscans and their growing influence in Sardinia. Therefore we may assume that it was the Carthaginians wishing to forbid further Greek expansion which caused this battle. The Phocaeans were intent on founding a new colony and presumably would have avoided conflict if possible. Carthage on the other hand wished to protect its growing interests in the Tyrrhenian Sea and surrounding areas. Both the Phoenicians and the Carthaginians exercised exclusive settlement in areas of Western Sicily, Sardinia, and the Balearic Islands. Greek settlement along the Southern Gallic coast could undermine Carthaginian interests in the area and was most likely recognised as a direct threat.

The establishment of Massilia did not herald a period of peace between Carthage (and Etruria) and the Phocaean Greeks. The Battle of Alalia ca. 535 demonstrated a similar motive for attack as was shown sixty-five years previous at the founding of Massilia. Herodotus specifically states that the reason behind the joint

² The period ending in 480 is the most poorly attested in our literary sources. Often entire military campaigns are covered very briefly while others, we must assume, remain entirely unknown.

³ Thuc. I.13.6.

Carthaginian-Etruscan attack was the Phocaeans' pillaging of the areas surrounding their settlement at Alalia.⁴ Presumably both Carthaginians and Etruscans would have felt uneasy watching the establishment of a Greek settlement on Corsica. This is emphasised by the apparent prosperity of Alalia, no doubt on the back of trade and plunder in the region. What is certain is that both the Carthaginians and Etruscans were eager to put a stop to any piracy or trade competition from Alalia. The Greeks were defeated and forced to abandon the settlement. The Carthaginians and Etruscans were able to resume more or less exclusive activity in the Tyrrhenian Sea.⁵ This example is similar to the later Battle of Cumae in 474. Although this battle occurred in the period following the first major Carthaginian invasion of Sicily in 480, it is best discussed alongside similar earlier examples. The Etruscans and an unknown number of Carthaginians were defeated by Hieron while ostensibly attempting to check Greek expansion in the area.⁶ It appears as though this earlier tactic remained active especially regarding the protection of exclusive rights in the area.

The battle for control over the important trade routes between the Greeks and the Carthaginians extended further west. A fragment of Sosylos attests the Battle of Artemisium to the year 490.⁷ This battle most likely took place off Cape Nao in South-western Spain. The Carthaginians are not named as the opponents of the Massiliots and King Heraclides of Mylasa. The time and location implies the Carthaginians as the enemy during this period, as they were the only non-Greek power in the area capable of a naval battle.⁸ As we have discussed, Cape Nao is a natural and likely terminus for Greek settlement down the east coast of Spain. We may presume that this battle was a Carthaginian attempt to halt the progress of Greek expansion. Although they were defeated, the Carthaginians were actively attempting to protect their interests from the establishment and expansion of foreign rivals.

⁴ Hdt. I.166.1, καὶ ἦγον γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἔφερον τοὺς περιοίκους ἅπαντας στρατεύονται ὧν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς κοινῇ λόγῳ χρησάμενοι Τυρσηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι νηυσὶ ἐκάτεροι ἐξήκοντα.

⁵ It appears that Carthage did not actively wish to settle Corsica, however, the Etruscans did settle certain sites on the island (Diod. V.13.4). Nevertheless, both parties had vested interests in keeping the island and its surrounding sea-routes in friendly hands. The event is characteristic of Carthaginian policy: accepting the Etruscan presence while going to great lengths to exclude the Greeks.

⁶ Pind. *Pyth.* I.71-72; Schol. *Pyth.* I.137a (ed. Drachmann).

⁷ *F.Gr.Hist.* 176, F.1.

⁸ This fragment is followed by a second account in which Sosylos describes a later battle of Artemisium (presumably the same location as the first) between the Carthaginians and a combined force of Romans and Massiliots during the Second Punic War. It is likely that Sosylos was listing battles either in the area, or possibly between Carthage and the Greeks.

SARDINIA

One of the major areas where Carthage sought to extend its influence during this period was Sardinia. Like areas of Sicily and North Africa which were settled by the Phoenicians, the coastal network of settlements was predisposed toward Carthaginian authority and most likely transferred allegiance from the Phoenicians to Carthage. The native Sard population seems to have posed a potential threat to Carthaginian interests on the island. According to Justin, Malchus conducted war on Sardinia and was defeated with the loss of the greater part of his army.⁹ This campaign was presumably that against the Sards during the second half of the sixth century. This seemingly unsuccessful campaign is followed by that of Hasdrubal, son of Mago, who was wounded and died on Sardinia.¹⁰ This second campaign most likely took place during the last quarter of the sixth century. According to Polybius, Carthaginian Sardinia appears under control at the swearing of the first treaty with Rome in 509/8.¹¹ Other sources hint at a successful Carthaginian outcome on Sardinia but remain vague as to when or how it was accomplished.¹² Our archaeological evidence also suggests a partially successful Carthaginian campaign in Sardinia during this period. As we have seen, the Carthaginians constructed a series of interior fortresses during the fifth century to protect its increased territory in the south and west of the island.

It appears that the Carthaginian military intervention on Sardinia was directly aimed at the Sards. There is no evidence to suggest that Greeks, rival Phoenician settlements, or any other foreign peoples were involved. It is likely that Carthage assumed control over Phoenician Sardinia in a relatively peaceful manner. The interior Sards posed a larger threat and either because of this, or the desire to dominate the entire island along with its wealthy minerals, the Carthaginians launched a number of invasions.

⁹ XVIII.7.1-2.

¹⁰ Justin XIX.1.3.

¹¹ III.22, Sardinia is mentioned alongside Libya as areas of Carthaginian economic supremacy.

¹² Both Diodorus (IV.29.6) and Strabo (V.2.7) claim that Carthage either fought for or was master of Sardinia.

SPAIN

In a number of areas of the Carthaginian Empire, we are left to suppose how Carthage initially established its influence. Areas such as the Balearic Islands and Atlantic Africa were settled by means of orthodox colonisation. Parts of Sicily and North Africa seem to have simply been absorbed into the growing Carthaginian Empire. Sardinia was first assumed and then (in part at least) forcibly brought under Carthaginian influence. It is possible that the incorporation of Spain into the Carthaginian Empire was carried out differently.

We have discussed the likelihood that Carthage assumed control over the Phoenician *emporia* in Southern Spain. Although this was probably accomplished peaceably, there is evidence to suggest that Carthage initially entered the area under arms. According to Justin, the Carthaginians were initially invited into Southern Spain by the inhabitants of Gades, who were under direct threat from tribes in the interior.¹³ Although Justin's chronology is unclear when discussing the history of Spain, he claims that the Carthaginians entered Gades under terms of kinship to aid the locals against the threat from the interior.¹⁴ He simply states that the expedition was successful and that subsequently Carthage added the larger part of the province to its dominion.¹⁵ A second account from Vitruvius implies that the Carthaginians actually besieged Gades and took the site by force.¹⁶ This may suggest that Gades was at some

¹³ XLIV.5.

¹⁴ Justin mentions this account just before that of the Barcids in Spain during the third century. Although this suggests a later date, it seems likely that Justin remains oblivious to a major chronological gap. First, we know that the Carthaginian presence in Spain begins with the end of Phoenician influence during the first half of the sixth century. Justin also claims that the problems arose after the rule of the kings was at an end. The only influential monarchy in the region predating the Carthaginian presence was that of Tartessus. Previous to this description Justin narrates the story of King Habis in some detail. Therefore we may assume he is referring to the Kingdom of Tartessus which also collapsed during the sixth century. From this admission we may assume that Justin's events, if indeed factual, refer to an earlier period – i.e. long before the time of the Barcids. It also seems likely that after the fall of Tartessian and Phoenician influence in the area, the immediate period of confusion would encourage any number of Spanish tribes to attempt to attack the wealthiest and weakened settlement in the area: Gades. From such evidence coupled with our archaeological record, we can date the Carthaginian arrival in Southern Spain to the late sixth or early fifth century.

¹⁵ XLIV.5, *Post regna deinde Hispaniae primi Karthagenienses imperium provinciae occupavere. Nam cum Gaditani a Tyro, unde et Karthaginiensibus origo est, sacra Herculis per quietem iussi in Hispaniam transtulissent urbemque ibi condidissent, invidentibus incrementis novae urbis finitimis Hispaniae populis ac propterea Gaditanos bello lacessentibus auxilium consanguineis Karthaginienses misere. Ibi felici expeditione et Gaditanos ab iniuria vindicaverunt et maiore iniuria partem provinciae imperio suo adiecerunt.*

¹⁶ *De Arch.* X.13.1. The possibility of a Carthaginian siege of Gades is also attested by Athenaeus Poliorcetus (9), see Tsirkin, "The Downfall of Tartessos and the Carthaginian Establishment on the Iberian Peninsula", p.148.

stage, probably during this period, in favour of retaining its independence and possibly preferred itself as an independent centre in the area. Whichever account is true (possibly both), it appears that initially Carthage was forced to resort to military means to establish itself in the area.

Presumably with the addition of Gades, by force or other means, the Carthaginian desire to control the *emporia*, trade, and industry in Southern Spain was facilitated. If the Phoenician settlements in Southern Spain were incorporated into Carthaginian territory as a result of this military action, it certainly justifies and explains why it was launched. Initial Carthaginian influence in the area is difficult to estimate. Whether some form of military action heralded the Carthaginian presence in the area or Carthage simply assumed economic and cultural dominance over the Phoenician *emporia* remains unclear.

NORTH AFRICA

North Africa would seem the most likely candidate for Carthaginian military campaigning during this early period. However, Carthage's expansion into its own interior is traditionally viewed as contemporaneous with the establishment of the larger Carthaginian Empire and the development of Punic culture during the fifth century. Presumably Carthage encountered little difficulty in influencing and dominating well established Phoenician settlements in the area, as these were probably accustomed to dealing with Carthage as a provincial capital. It would have been but a small transition to Carthage's development into a fully independent capital based in the West. What is of interest, however, is how Carthage expanded into territory belonging to native peoples. In all probability the different Numidian and Berber tribes would not welcome the expansion of Carthaginian control in any form more intrusive than the occasional port. Unfortunately, we know very little of events during this period. It is likely that Carthage began to seize African territory by the end of the sixth century. There is a passage in which Justin claims that the general Malchus whom we have seen defeated in Sardinia in the later half of the sixth century was also active in North Africa prior to this.¹⁷ It appears that Malchus was placed in charge of the Sardinian expedition, partially owing to his prior success against the

¹⁷ XVIII.7.

Africans (probably Berbers). Although brief, this statement suggests that Carthage was actively pursuing a policy of expansion against the native Africans. It is likely that Carthage would expand its surrounding borders from an early period. Whether this began during the sixth century is unknown and most certainly would not have been as intense as during the following centuries.

SICILY

Sicily presents a similar problem as to whether or not Carthage conducted military campaigns prior to the invasion of 480. Once again we have several possibilities. In all likelihood the major Phoenician settlements in the west of the island were already accustomed to treating Carthage as a major ally and source of influence. Their adoption of Carthaginian control was probably peaceable and no cause for a major adjustment. Carthaginian relations with Greeks and Sicilians may, however, have led to hostility. Unfortunately Phoenician and Carthaginian relations with the Greeks in Sicily are practically unattested between Thucydides' short digression regarding Sicily (ca. 600) and the Carthaginian invasion of 480. Although no major conflict is attested during this period, there is some suggestion that Carthage did maintain a military presence on the island. It is likely when the Phoenicians retreated from the east of Sicily at the onset of Greek settlement, there was some struggle for power on the island which created spheres of influence: both Greek and Phoenician (later Carthaginian). It is possible that Carthage continued such a policy by sporadically fighting various Greek states. This certainly intensified during the fifth century. In addition to this, there is some evidence that Carthage was active in various military manoeuvres on Sicily. An example mentioned by Justin claims that Malchus, who in addition to waging war against the Africans and Sardinians, conquered part of Sicily.¹⁸ The lack of further literary evidence suggests two possibilities. First, Malchus only conquered a minor part of Sicily. Second, his success was probably against a non-Hellenic group (i.e. Sicanians or the Sicels). Presumably Carthage did not engage in hostilities with the Elymians who remained close allies of both Phoenicians and Carthaginians. Although Justin's claim is possible, it is certainly not substantial enough to suggest any major conflict on Sicily during the sixth century. Nevertheless,

¹⁸ XVIII.7.

the two failed attempts to colonise settlements by Pentathlus and then Dorieus show that Carthaginians/Phoenicians were willing to pursue an active military policy from the mid-sixth century to maintain exclusive rights in the western half of Sicily. Coupled with this we discover that Carthage was maintaining several probable military treaties with the Elymians and even the Sicanians. Thucydides claims that the Phoenicians initially withdrew to the west of Sicily partly because of an alliance with the Elymians. He claims that the Phoenicians relied on this alliance presumably to ensure their tentative position on the island. This alliance continued with Carthage, which also relied on amicable terms with the Elymians to maintain its presence on Sicily.

During this early period on Sicily we see a military policy continued from the Phoenicians. Carthaginian interests on the island are defensive in nature. We have no certain indication of Carthaginian hostility on Sicily before 480. Carthage was most likely content to establish itself on Sicily aided by a longstanding friendship with the Elymians, who in many respects acted as a buffer separating Carthaginian controlled territory from that of the Greeks to the east. Early Carthaginian military action on Sicily is best described as defensive. The possibility of further examples exists, however, our examples show that Carthage preferred to ward off would-be invaders rather than actively expanding their territory during this period. Even this seems to have depended heavily on aid from the Elymians in Western Sicily.

Early Carthaginian military endeavours are by no means consistent. As Carthage was still developing prior to 480, it chose its battles, which appear mostly minor. Its major attested attempts of military expansion were against smaller and less developed peoples such as the Sards, Southern Spanish tribes, and perhaps Berbers. Otherwise, during this period Carthage concentrated on protecting its borders against encroachment. On several occasions both against the Massiliots and the Greeks in Sicily, Carthage actively attempted to check Greek expansion in its territories. The period preceding 480 was certainly a developmental period for Carthaginian military policy abroad. In securing the majority of its basic territories, by the advent of the fifth century, Carthage had matured into a powerful and united state.

CARTHAGE AT ITS HEIGHT

The period from 480 to 279 BC saw Carthage reach its peak as an expansive power. Naturally this period also saw the bulk of active Carthaginian military activity. We find a number of full-scale invasions attempting to secure further territory. Carthage no longer had need of Phoenician protection and assumed full control of its foreign policies. From this period a number of Carthaginian tactics become apparent in several areas. As Carthage developed further, so did its ability to confront highly developed states in addition to those less developed peoples it was more accustomed to dealing with. The Carthaginian theatres of conflict during this period were those well associated with its empire: North Africa, Sicily, and to a lesser extent Spain and Sardinia. By investigating various reasons behind separate military offensives, we are able to characterise their use to and to understand Carthaginian motivation.

NORTH AFRICA

North Africa developed into a major area of Carthaginian activity during the fifth century. As previously mentioned, the date of Carthaginian expansion into the interior of North Africa remains vague. Owing to constant contact with the Berbers, it becomes almost impossible to date when control of numerous settlements became officially Carthaginian. When looking at Carthaginian military activity in the area it becomes apparent that Carthage actively expanded its interests and holdings in the interior by force. It appears that Phoenician settlements along the North African coast also developed into Punic influenced settlements during this period. Presumably this was both a cultural and political transition whereby these sites retained their local autonomy, but acknowledged greater Carthaginian control.¹⁹ The main obstacle confronting Carthaginian domination of the interior to the south and west remained the Berbers.

¹⁹ Several major settlements along the coast appear to become steadily more Punic from the sixth century onwards, including Leptis Magna, Hadrumantum, Sabratha, and Utica (Chp. IV, ns.27-32 and text). Their acceptance of Carthage as the major power and cultural influence in the area becomes apparent. Nevertheless it appears that they retained varying degrees of autonomy under this system, see Chp. II, n.90.

The main reason for dating the majority of aggressive military campaigns against the Berbers to this period (instead of to a possible earlier date) is that it coincides with the advent of Carthaginian expansion by similar methods elsewhere. Moreover, a scattering of literary references also supports such a date. The area of official conquest is presumably the interior south of Carthage incorporating the six *pagi* to the Gulf of Gabes and to the west incorporating such settlements of Cirta and Thugga. Such areas appear within the bounds of Carthaginian political control as well as cultural influence. However, the level of Carthaginian authority in the interior is unclear. Still, the means by which the Carthaginians obtained certain areas appear to have been aggressive.

Probably the best, and unfortunately shortest account of possible Carthaginian expansion in this part of North Africa during this period survives once again courtesy of Justin. He first claims that the Numidians demanded payment for the land on which Carthage was settled and confronted the sons of Mago, Hasdrubal and Hamilcar. This situation was apparently defused when Carthage paid the Numidians.²⁰ However, Justin then claims that during the time of the Magonid dynasty in Carthage, the Carthaginians made war on the Africans who were compelled to return the tribute for the building of the city (Carthage).²¹ This follows Justin's earlier account claiming that Malchus had begun conquering Numidian territory in the previous century. This dating also coincides with the accepted date of concentrated Carthaginian expansion into the interior during the first half of the fifth century.²² Whether Justin is continuing the literary theme of Carthaginian problems with neighbouring tribes since the time of Elissa is unclear. Whatever the Carthaginian motive, it seems likely that this offensive provided a major instance of land annexation in North Africa. It seems likely that there were precedents for such invasions and later attempts to expand the *chora* of Carthage. Such a strategic change mirrors the rapid rise of the Carthaginians' military strength and expansive ambition during this period. Initially preferring to choose their battles for defensive or consolidation purposes, by the fifth century they were able to mount aggressive military campaigns to increase their territory.

²⁰ XIX.1.

²¹ XIX.2, *itaque et Mauris bellum inlatum et adversus Numidas pugnatum et Afri compulsi stipendium urbis conditae Karthaginiensibus remittere.*

²² Justin claims that Hamilcar was killed in Sicily (at Himera in 480). He had three sons: Himilco, Hanno, and Gisco. Mago's other son Hannibal also had three sons: Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Sappho (the last name may be a textual corruption). It is possible any of these individuals could have commanded such an offensive in North Africa.

Possible Carthaginian military activity in North Africa is suggested by one of their more distinctive methods of warfare, the chariot. Although viewed as an archaic method of war by Greek and Roman sources, the Carthaginians' use of chariots served them well in areas where the terrain was generally level and unbroken.²³ Large areas of North Africa suited the use of war chariots. This is attested by constant Carthaginian use in addition to that of other North African states including Cyrene, Barca, and even the Garamantes to the south.²⁴ This tactic should have proved successful, as the Carthaginians were willing to experiment with chariots elsewhere despite widespread abandonment by contemporary powers.²⁵ The Carthaginians' continual use of chariots suggests their successful use in North African conditions. This is interesting as it shows that the Carthaginians were actively fighting in North Africa, presumably against the Berbers.

The fifth century presumably did not witness the end of Carthaginian expansion into North Africa. Since Carthage dominated the region until the end of the third century, it is reasonable to assume that Carthage expanded into the interior assuming control of the major Numidian towns including sites such as Thugga and Cirta. Such sites show evidence of Carthaginian influence and occupation. The expansion of Carthage into its North African hinterland only becomes apparent from later literary accounts. There are a number of accounts from the third and second centuries detailing a number of Carthaginian controlled settlements and forts. The area comprising the six *pagi* and beyond was most likely the result of stages of conquest that resembled the area we are familiar with by the third century.²⁶ This territory or possibly extended Carthaginian control formed a distinctive Carthaginian province. We have already witnessed the Punic coins of the third century referring to "in [the] lands/districts" probably in North Africa and the Neo-Punic inscription describing a 'land overseer' in similar phrasing.²⁷ Presumably beyond this area of control, there existed a boundary area where Carthage maintained a stronger presence to protect its core territory. Several sites are mentioned as possible Carthaginian outposts at various times. There are several sites which seem to have served as

²³ On this see generally Ameling, *Karthago*, pp.227-235.

²⁴ Cyrene or Barca: Xen. *Cyr.* VI.1.27, 2.8; Aen. *Tact.* XVI.14; Diod. XX.41.1, 64.2; Garamantes: Hdt. IV.183.4.

²⁵ The Carthaginians often employed war chariots on Sicily e.g. Diod. XIV.54.5, XIV.55.3, XVI.67.2, XVI.77.4, XVI.85; Plut. *Tim.* XXV.1, XXIX.1.

²⁶ See Chp. II, n.7, for their geographical descriptions.

²⁷ See Chp. VI, ns.145-146.

Carthaginian military outposts. Sites like Capsa and possibly Sicca Veneria operated in such a manner.²⁸ The exact extent of Carthaginian military expansion in the region is difficult to place. During the invasion of Agathocles, Archagathus captured five Carthaginian-run towns: Tocai (Thugga), Phellinê, Meschela, Hippo Arca, and Acris.²⁹ Hecatompylus (Theveste) was captured in 247 by Carthage but may already have been under previous Carthaginian control.³⁰ Again the town of Sicca was another likely candidate with Carthage removing its troublesome mercenaries there in 241.³¹ Presumably Sicca was under Carthaginian control, but far enough beyond its immediate reach for safety. Beyond the basic references of several authors, there is little evidence supporting official control in settlements beyond the six *pagi*. Further references to the extent of Carthaginian territory have already been discussed. During the period following the defeat after the Second Punic War, we find Masinissa seeking restitution of lost native territories, which presumably were taken by force. Masinissa disputed the territory known as ‘the big fields’ and the country belonging to the fifty towns called Tysca.³² The description of the disputed area is reminiscent of the extended Carthaginian territory which incorporated numerous Berber towns. Apart from this we also learn that Carthage was to surrender all its North African territory beyond ‘the Phoenician trenches’.³³ Later in the second century Masinissa claimed that Carthage had possessed too much territory in North Africa, referring to the original purchase of the Carthaginian *chora* (i.e. the Byrsa).³⁴ He also claimed that this territory had once belonged to the Numidians and that Carthage had unlawfully seized it.³⁵ Such evidence implies that Carthage was successful on more than one occasion in its attempts to extend its territory in North Africa by force.³⁶

²⁸ According to Sallust (*Jug.* LXXXIX.4) and Orosius (*Adv. Pag.* V.15.8), Capsa was supposedly founded by Heracles possibly explaining some Phoenicio-Punic influence associated with Melqart. Other centres including Theveste have been suggested as other possible sites, see Gsell, *HAAN* II, pp.98-99; Ilevbare, p.22.

²⁹ Diod. XX.57.4-6.

³⁰ Diodorus reports that the site was simply captured (XXIV.10.2). Polybius simply states that Hanno brought matters to a satisfactory conclusion (I.73.1). Unfortunately there is little other evidence of earlier Carthaginian involvement at the site.

³¹ Polyb. I.66.6-10. It was also used as a rallying point for a Carthaginian army slightly later (Polyb. I.67.1).

³² App. *Pun.* 68.

³³ App. *Pun.* 32, 54, 59.

³⁴ App. *Pun.* 67-70.

³⁵ Livy XXXIV.62

³⁶ There are a number of comprehensive guides to the expansion of Carthage into the hinterland of North Africa. Gsell, *HAAN* II, Chp. II, provides a wide-ranging geographical history of this expansion.

SICILY

At the beginning of the fifth century Sicily became the major target of Carthaginian expansion. This interest was not characterised by one or two sporadic invasions, but a number from the early fifth to the third century. The height of Carthaginian expansion is characterised by Carthaginian attempts to gain control of Sicily.

Presumably the major attraction for Carthage was the position of Sicily. It lay extremely close to Carthage as we have seen, making it an automatic choice for control. This is significant when considering that Carthage possessed all its surrounding territories and several others considerably further away. Coupled with this was its strategic location. If Carthage had full possession of Sicily, it could be used for a number of strategic purposes. Defensively it would act as a buffer between Carthage and the other major powers in the Mediterranean. After all several later invasions, including those of Agathocles and the Romans, were launched from the island.³⁷ Second, the strategic position of Sicily as a base of operations cannot be underestimated. For both trade and military operations, Sicily would have been an unparalleled possession in the Central Mediterranean. By the fifth century, Carthage was certainly attracted to Greek influence and trade. If Carthage could seize control of Sicily, it would not only control a large Hellenic population, but would also move into immediate contact with Greece itself. Sicily would also prove an invaluable area for the trade routes to the east and Carthage would also be able to extend routes further into Italy and the Adriatic. One of the most important advantages, from a purely strategic point of view, was the fall of Sicily would literally divide the Mediterranean in half and enable the Carthaginians to monitor and control all seaborne traffic in the west. Carthage could control all the strategic sea-lanes including the Straits of Messina. This is an important consideration when for over a century Carthage had often attempted to exclude Greek expansion in the Western Mediterranean. Coupled with this, Carthage would be better positioned for affairs in Italy, especially combined with its allies the Etruscans, and later Rome. The capture of Sicily held great

Regarding the territories of the Numidian Kings and their contact with Carthage see Maria R.-Alföldi, "Die Geschichte des numidischen Königreiches und seiner Nachfolger", in *Die Numider*, pp.43-74.

³⁷ This is earlier attested after the defeat at Himera in 480, apparently when the Carthaginians were concerned that Gelon would cross over into North Africa from Sicily and besiege Carthage (Diod. XI.23.3-4).

incentives for the Carthaginians. By controlling this island they would benefit from its economic and strategic potential.

Himera on the north coast of Sicily was the first major reported engagement between Carthaginians and Sicilian Greeks in 480. The campaign itself is mentioned in brief detail by Diodorus and alluded to by Herodotus.³⁸ Whether or not the Carthaginian commander, Hamilcar were acting in a private capacity (as Ameling has argued³⁹), presumably his intentions were greater than Himera. Although the figures of three hundred thousand troops and a fleet of two hundred warships are most likely exaggerated, it was still a major invasion force. The best evidence to support this is the reaction of Gelon. If the Carthaginian force had been small and only aimed at Himera, he would have been slower to act, if he would have acted at all. However, Gelon recognised the threat of a large invasion force early and preferred to strike afar rather than to deal with it in his own territory. He raised an army, which was probably of a similar size to that of Hamilcar.

Hamilcar's campaign perhaps foreshadows later Carthaginian attempts to conquer Sicily. First, the choice of Himera as the initial point of attack suggests Carthaginian caution. This was the first major Greek settlement east of the Carthaginian territory on the north coast of Sicily. If Himera fell, the continuous area of Carthaginian domination would increase. Selinus and Segesta were likely Carthaginian allies and did not pose a threat if Carthage proceeded along the northern coast.⁴⁰ If the attack did not go to plan, at least Hamilcar and his force could retreat to the safe haven of either Soloeis or Panormus. The location of Himera along the coast from Panormus also allowed for the Carthaginian fleet to follow the army.

There appears to have been a good deal of planning and preparation leading to the invasion. We have already discussed the large size of the invasion force. The fact that an agreement with Selinus had been reached in advance and with the apparent support of Terillus of Himera and Anaxilaus of Rhegium,⁴¹ it seems that Hamilcar had clearly been preparing this invasion for some time. However that may be, Gelon decisively defeated him.

³⁸ Diod. XI.20ff.; Hdt. VII.165ff.

³⁹ *Karthago*, pp.35-38.

⁴⁰ Segesta was a traditional ally of Carthage. Diodorus suggests Selinus was allied with Carthage and had a prior agreement to provide Hamilcar with reinforcements (XI.21.4).

⁴¹ Hdt. VII.165

Following this defeat, there was a lull in activity on Sicily. The Carthaginians, who had been badly defeated, preferred to avoid further engagement on the island and after the Battle of Cumae in 474, sued for peace with Syracuse, a peace which lasted most of the of the fifth century.⁴² Carthage preferred to expand its interests elsewhere, beyond immediate threat. It is during this period that the voyages of Hanno and Himilco emphasise the active nature of Carthaginian settlement and enterprise in the Far West. During this time Carthaginian culture appears to undergo a marked change with the full emergence of Punic culture and a number of constitutional developments. Despite the severe defeat at Himera, Carthage still maintained an active policy of expansion, and coupled with its internal developments, was ready for a second advance into Sicily at the end of the fifth century.

The second Carthaginian offensive on Sicily came some seventy years after the first, led by Hamilcar's own grandson, Hannibal. By the closing stages of the fifth century, Carthage, now the Punic capital with a stronger and established empire, was ready once again to try and accomplish its plan of conquering Sicily. The motive of the invasion of 409 was presumably that of 480: capture Sicily and bring the independent Greek city-states under a united Carthaginian rule. Gelon was long dead, as was his successor Hieron. Syracuse had recently defeated Athens but appeared at one of its weaker points in the last seventy years. Coupled with this there was disunion among other settlements on the island, namely Selinus and Segesta. The political situation at the time seemed inviting to the Carthaginians, in regard to their plans of conquering Sicily.

The Carthaginians embarked on their second reported invasion of Sicily ostensibly to aid the Segestaeans who were at war with the Selinuntians in 410.⁴³ The Segestaeans, faring badly, turned to Carthage offering to place their city in Carthage's

⁴² Diod. XI.24.4, XI.37.7, XII.26.3. It is possible that there was some intermittent fighting on Sicily between the invasion of 480 and that of 409. Although not located on Sicily, the Carthaginians appear to have joined with the Etruscans against Hieron at Cumae (see Chp. VI, ns.29-32 and text). Otherwise Pausanias (V.25.5) claims that Motya and Acragas went to war some time during the first half of the fifth century. It is possible a limited conflict occurred between Acragas and a Carthaginian city. Even if factual, the account may be misreported. We rarely find Phoenicio-Punic settlements on Sicily fighting independently during this period.

⁴³ This conflict had erupted five years previous, but owing to the Athenian invasion of 415, the main theatre of operations had shifted to the east of the island. Selinus had allied itself with Syracuse, whereas the Segestaeans, after first having been turned down by Carthage, had allied themselves with Athens. After the Athenian defeat the Segestaeans were concerned about a backlash from the Sicilian Greeks. Therefore they turned once again to Carthage for aid (Diod. XII.82-3).

hands if it would send aid.⁴⁴ Hannibal, like his grandfather before him, invested in preparation for an invasion, which would once again prove a showdown with Syracuse.⁴⁵ As Hamilcar had planned in his invasion, Hannibal landed his troops well within Carthaginian territory at Lilybaeum, while protecting the fleet off Motya. Once all was ready, the force proceeded inland. Once more the careful and defensive attitude of the Carthaginians can be seen early in their campaign. Hannibal maintained his position safely, carefully proceeding from the base of Carthaginian power in the west of Sicily.

The tactics of Hannibal demonstrate the Carthaginians' intentions on Sicily. They wished to conquer the separate Greek cities until the entire island was subdued. The first town to fall was Selinus.⁴⁶ This city was captured, not only because it was one of the protagonists of the war along with Segesta, but because it was the nearest Greek town to Carthaginian territory on the island. With its capture, uninterrupted Carthaginian territory increased. This is further demonstrated when the site was resettled as a Carthaginian tribute state. The next town was naturally Himera. Although the Carthaginians, and in particular Hannibal, held a personal grudge against this town, again it was a strategic attack.⁴⁷ Although Hannibal pillaged and razed the city gaining a great deal of plunder, the fall of Himera greatly increased Carthaginian territory in Western Sicily. The site was also resettled as a Carthaginian tribute state, Thermae. It is during this period that we see the full emergence of the Carthaginian plan systematically to conquer Sicily.⁴⁸ In 406, Hannibal began to organise another force to finish the task which he had started three years previous. The first settlement Hannibal faced was naturally the next major Greek settlement heading east from Carthaginian territory, Acragas.⁴⁹ From Selinus, to Himera, and then Acragas we see a definite trend of a large Carthaginian force moving east, overrunning Greek cities one by one. With the fall of Acragas, Carthage had established a clear boundary from north to south. Carthaginian territory had been

⁴⁴ Diod. XIII.43ff.

⁴⁵ Diodorus (XIII.54.5) quotes both his sources for figures of the invasion force. Ephorus believed the Carthaginian force comprised two hundred thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, Timaeus reckoned (more realistically, but still perhaps exaggerated) around one hundred thousand men.

⁴⁶ Diod. XIII.55-59.

⁴⁷ XIII.60-62.

⁴⁸ Even Diodorus describes this plan, claiming that Carthage planned to enslave all the cities on the island, XIII.79.8, ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἀπάσας τὰς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πόλεις καταδουλώσασθαι) and it was eager to become master of the entire island, XIII.80.1, σπεύδοντες ἀπάσης τῆς νήσου κυριεῦσαι).

⁴⁹ Diod. XIII.85-90.

greatly increased on Sicily, through a systematic process of conquest, a process Carthage wished to continue.

Following their initial success the Carthaginians pushed even further east and captured the next major Greek settlements on the southern coast of Sicily: Gela and Camarina which had been evacuated in advance.⁵⁰ Syracuse remained the final goal in the conquest of Sicily. Unfortunately the majority of the army was beset by a mysterious plague which decimated the ranks and the Carthaginians' resolve.⁵¹ Both sides were happy to swear a peace, and the tattered remnants of the Carthaginian force returned to North Africa.

Carthage had failed to fulfil its ambition of conquering Sicily. Nevertheless, the campaign of Hannibal was a resounding success. Carthage, according to the peace terms concluded with Dionysius of Syracuse, still controlled much of its conquered territory. Its holdings on the island had temporarily increased while the Greeks had been reduced to the eastern segment. In many respects the invasion of 409 is similar to that of 480. Both invasions appear well organised with considerable forces and good use of strategic bases on the island together with allies. Presumably the first invasion had the same goal as the first: the conquest of Greek cities on Sicily from the west. By conducting the campaign in such a manner, Carthage did not need to worry about hostile states harassing its progress or its supply lines. Each conquest increased unbroken Carthaginian territory on Sicily. The major difference between the campaign of Hamilcar and that of Hannibal is that the former faced a strong Syracuse led by Gelon whereas the latter exploited Syracuse's weakness.

The advent of the fourth century saw a shift in Carthaginian fortunes on Sicily. This was mostly brought about by the reign of Dionysius of Syracuse. With a powerful Syracuse, it was only a matter of time before the inflated Carthaginian territory on Sicily would be challenged. In 398 Dionysius attacked Carthaginian territory.⁵² Presumably the war progressed well for the Greeks as by 397 they had reached Eryx, deep in the heart of Carthaginian territory in Western Sicily.⁵³ Dionysius ravaged Carthaginian territory and captured Motya and destroyed the city.

⁵⁰ Diod. XIII.108, XIII.111.

⁵¹ Diod. XIII.113.

⁵² Diod. XIV.41. This attack coincided with a plague that was ravaging North Africa. This rumoured epidemic, if factual, was likely the same one which forced the Carthaginian withdrawal from Syracuse less than a decade earlier.

⁵³ Apparently the Greek cities which had been captured by Hannibal and the Carthaginians several years earlier had been liberated and readily supplied Dionysius with troop levies (Diod. XIV.47.5-6).

Carthage finally responded by dispatching Himilco with a considerable force, and joined by the Sicels, they defeated Dionysius and mounted another invasion of Sicily. Landing at Panormus, the Carthaginians concentrated on the north of the island, preferring to avoid direct conflict with Dionysius' army. The Carthaginian force, having been welcomed by the Himeraeans,⁵⁴ then seized Messana, and in doing so dominated the Straits of Messina and blocked Greek aid from Italy.⁵⁵ The Carthaginians then pushed south toward Syracuse, first capturing Naxos and then defeating Leptines, the Syracusan admiral at sea and capturing Catana. Himilco then besieged Syracuse by land and sea and on the eve of victory once again his army was supposedly struck down by a mysterious plague. Dionysius counterattacked and burnt Himilco's fleet.⁵⁶ Himilco sued for peace and returned home to Libya under truce, abandoning his mercenaries to the Syracusans.

Instead of simply attempting to defeat Dionysius in the field and to push him back to the east of Sicily, the Carthaginians attempted to capture Syracuse, which would prove the key to dominating the whole island. Therefore Himilco and the admiral Mago skirted the north coast of Sicily from the stronghold of Panormus. They then utilised some possible centres of Carthaginian sympathy at Himera and Messana to reach the north-eastern point of Sicily unscathed. Pushing south they defeated or subdued the major Greek settlements in the area before besieging Syracuse itself.⁵⁷ Unfortunately for Carthage, its campaign against Syracuse was defeated in spite of overwhelming odds supposedly by plague and a Syracusan counterattack.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, we can compare the Carthaginians' tactics with those during their two

⁵⁴ This may coincide with the resettlement of the site as *Thermae* following its destruction only a decade previous.

⁵⁵ A large proportion of the population was evacuated prior to the attack facilitating the capture of Messana. The Carthaginians then razed the site (Diod. XIV.57, 59).

⁵⁶ Diod. XIV.70ff.

⁵⁷ The tactic of subduing all pockets of possible resistance is obvious as after Naxos and Catana fell, Himilco unsuccessfully attempted to secure the allegiance of Aetna (Diod. XIV.58).

⁵⁸ This is the second consecutive time the Carthaginian army was decimated by a mysterious plague. Whether or not this plague actually beset the Carthaginians remains unclear. Diodorus has a habit of misrepresenting his sources, often resulting in unintentional doublets. The major problem we have is that for the first encounter the description of the plague is missing (Diod. XIII.113). However, its effects are prominent in the lead-up to this war against Dionysius. The second account is more descriptive regarding symptoms, and Diodorus claims that it was the same disease which ravaged the Athenians some fifteen years previous and his description appears to be adapted from that text (see Lionel Pearson, *The Greek Historians of the West* (Atlanta 1987) p.181). It is possible that two separate bouts of a mystery disease affected two Carthaginian armies. If so, it is likely that the first had the more deadly effect. The second was more of a distraction to the Carthaginians, who were then surprised and defeated by Dionysius' forces. It appears that in the subsequent peace treaty, a considerable portion of the Carthaginian army returned to North Africa. This seems to be the case also for the Sicels who returned home and the mercenaries who were either captured or re-employed by Dionysius.

previous attempts at invading Sicily. Syracuse remained the key to the domination of Sicily. Carthage had proved that it was quite capable of either capturing or subduing the other Greek city-states by various means. Although the Carthaginian strategy was sound, it failed again, and once again Carthaginian plans on Sicily were thwarted.

This third defeat at the hands of the Syracusans did not dull Carthaginian interest in the island. In 392 Mago led a fourth invasion force to the island, hoping to link with the Sicels of the interior and to move eastwards.⁵⁹ Unfortunately for Mago, he found himself isolated in the territory of the Agrinaeans and was forced to sue for peace. Although a brief and unsuccessful attempt, it is obvious Mago wished to push east and to concentrate on an interior route to Syracuse. Although he planned to join the Sicels, his attempts prove that unlike on previous expeditions, he did not invest in securing allies on Sicily in advance. Despite heading out from the Carthaginian stronghold in the west of the island, now augmented by the foundation of Lilybaeum, he advanced too far into unsecured hostile territory. Without supporting allies and bases of supply he found himself isolated and was forced to retreat.

The Carthaginians exacted revenge a decade later. It appears that the truce between Dionysius and Carthage had held with the former concentrating his activities in Southern Italy. However, by 383 Dionysius once again attempted to oust the Carthaginians from Sicily.⁶⁰ Although Carthage was not the instigator of this war, it did send over a sizeable army under the command of Mago. Upon arrival he joined with an unknown quantity of Italian Greeks and then split his army between Italy and Sicily in preparation for an attack. This is the first occasion in which we find Carthaginian troops active in Southern Italy. Once more we see a planned Carthaginian invasion with pre-established allies and a strategy determined in advance. The main theatre of conflict remained on Sicily, where after an initial setback, the Carthaginians defeated Dionysius at Cronium. However, instead of pursuing the defeated Dionysius, they secured peace which included tribute and the abandonment of the settlements of Selinus and Acragas together with all territory up to the Halycus River.⁶¹ It is unknown why Carthage did not pursue its victory in Sicily. For whatever reasons, Carthage chose to play a waiting game in Sicily. However, as we will see, it still considered the conquest of Sicily a primary goal.

⁵⁹ Diod. XIV.95ff.

⁶⁰ XV.15ff.

⁶¹ XV.17.5.

There was one final encounter between Dionysius and the Carthaginians. The peace was broken again in 368 when Dionysius decided to try once more to dislodge the Carthaginians from Sicily. Although successful in capturing Selinus, Entella, and Eryx, Dionysius was checked outside Lilybaeum where Carthage defeated his fleet before the onset of winter. During this time an armistice was arranged and Dionysius withdrew, fell ill, and died in 367.⁶² Carthage, for some reason, did not seem willing to continue this conflict despite a naval victory and the death of Dionysius.

The political upheavals in the mid-fourth century in Syracuse saw the next reported altercation between Carthage and the Greeks in Sicily.⁶³ The commotion in Syracuse which saw the deposition of Dionysius II, followed by the assassination of Dion, and the struggle between the former and Hicetas for Syracuse gave Carthage a new opportunity to attack its old enemy. In 345 Carthage moved a considerable force to Sicily and prepared for another attack on the Greek states of Sicily.⁶⁴ To compound matters Hicetas went into negotiations with the Carthaginians to secure his position as tyrant of Syracuse. Meanwhile, the Syracusans had implored their metropolis, Corinth for aid. Corinth promptly sent a small force led by Timoleon. The Carthaginian force led by Hanno initially was eager to divert Timoleon away from the island at Rhegium but failed. Hicetas and the Carthaginians under Mago occupied Syracuse briefly, but suspecting treachery, Mago left Hicetas to his fate.⁶⁵ Timoleon then made short work of Hicetas, who had been abandoned by his Carthaginian allies, and seized Syracuse and rallied the Greek cities of Sicily to his side. Following this he managed to secure a considerable following in Sicily with the support of several Greek states. With all prepared, he decided to meet the Carthaginians on their own territory in Sicily. Carthage responded by sending a new force to Lilybaeum in 340/339. Both armies met at the Crimisus River near Acragas, and owing to superior tactics on the part of Timoleon, coupled with the onset of a violent storm, the Carthaginians' superiority in numbers was nullified and they were defeated.⁶⁶ Despite an attempt by Mago to reinforce the Carthaginians at Messana, he was defeated and Carthage was forced to accept terms of peace.

⁶² Diod. XV.73.

⁶³ After the death of Dionysius, there was a general lull in activity on Sicily. Both parties seemed content with the *status quo* and a peace between Dionysius II and Carthage was concluded (Diod. XVI.5.2).

⁶⁴ Plut. *Tim.* II; Diod. XVI.67.

⁶⁵ Plut. *Tim.* XX.4.

⁶⁶ Plut. *Tim.* XXVII-XXIX; Diod. XVI.78-81.

The Carthaginians' activity on Sicily during this period is symptomatic of their attempts to capture the entire island. As in the period following the defeat at Himera, Carthage was probably wary of a strong Syracuse, and chose to bide its time until political weakness gave it an opportunity to attack. Carthage refrained from major unprovoked invasions on the island during the later reign of Dionysius and also during that of Dionysius II. With the political wrangling between Dionysius, Dion, and Hicetas during the 350's and 340's, Carthage saw its chance finally to defeat Syracuse and probably all of Greek Sicily. However, a mix of poor decisions, the advent of a strong figure in Timoleon, and poor fortune resulted in failure. It is obvious that there was planning behind both Carthaginian invasions. The first force under Hanno moved across from Libya and watched developments from the west of the island.⁶⁷ Although it ravaged territory, it was for the most part on the defensive, not prepared to move far beyond Carthaginian territory. Carthage also used its diplomatic skills in securing a prominent ally in Hicetas.⁶⁸ When Hicetas had secured most of Syracuse, the Carthaginian force under the admiral Mago simply sailed into the city and occupied the greater part of it.⁶⁹ Unfortunately for the Carthaginians' aspirations on the island, they made two fatal errors. First, they underestimated Timoleon. Despite attempting to blockade him at Rhegium, they failed to prevent him from reaching Sicily. Then, quite mysteriously, Mago, using the excuse of suspected treachery, abandoned Hicetas at Syracuse and left the city. This action practically handed the city to Timoleon, who naturally united it and several other Greek states against Carthage. The second Carthaginian force reverted to older tactics of moving from its power base in the west of the island. The commanders Hasdrubal and Hamilcar hoped to defeat Timoleon before conquering the rest of the island.⁷⁰ Even after the defeat, Carthage sent out an auxiliary force to Messana with hopes of disrupting the Greek campaign. Both invasions during the time of Timoleon demonstrate familiar Carthaginian tactics in Sicily, and familiar failures.

Following its defeat at the hands of Timoleon, Carthage seems to have abandoned its plans of capturing Sicily through full-scale invasion. Several heavy

⁶⁷ Plut. *Tim.* II.1.

⁶⁸ Diodorus (XVI.67) claims that Carthage made several representations to Greek cities in order to gain their support.

⁶⁹ Plut. *Tim.* XVII.1-2.

⁷⁰ Plutarch (*Tim.* XXV.1) claims that this time the Carthaginians did not want to continue fighting the Greeks in a piece-meal fashion but were gearing up to drive the Greeks from Sicily, ὥς οὐκέτι ποιησόμενοι κατὰ μέρος τὸν πόλεμον ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ πάσης Σικελίας ἐξελάσσοντες τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

defeats, each within living memory of the previous attempt, suggest that the Carthaginians were resigned to the fact that Sicily would not fall through conventional military methods. This however, did not diminish their interest in the island. Following the withdrawal of Timoleon, Syracuse resorted to its usual political wrangling. Carthaginian interest in the area is evident some twenty years after Timoleon's death in 317. The rise of Agathocles in Syracuse saw his ambitions conflict with those of the aristocracy and especially Sostratus. The latter two were expelled and immediately sided with the Carthaginians in order to re-establish themselves in Syracuse.⁷¹ After several pitched battles, the elitist 'Six-Hundred' managed to seize control of Syracuse and to force Agathocles to swear a peace treaty with themselves and the Carthaginians. Nevertheless, Agathocles feigned peace before enrolling more military support and recaptured Syracuse. Although this Carthaginian action in Sicily was not as extravagant as previous encounters, it does show an interest in undermining potential opposition from Syracuse and in installing a sympathetic government there. This was achieved, albeit temporarily, with limited military support. The Carthaginians' support of the deposed oligarchs shows their policy of establishing allies on Sicily before attempting an attack. Once again, however, their actions proved unsuccessful.

Following the establishment of Agathocles as tyrant of Syracuse, there are several indications of Carthaginian military activities on Sicily. Diodorus discusses a peace treaty in 314 between Agathocles and several Greek states in Sicily, which was actually brokered by Hamilcar, a Carthaginian.⁷² In 312, a fleet of sixty Carthaginian ships prevented Agathocles from rallying support in Acragas.⁷³ This is followed by a request from a Syracusan, Deinocrates to send aid against Agathocles.⁷⁴ A Carthaginian fleet of fifty light ships then attempted to enter the harbour of Syracuse, but failed to gain any advantage. The Carthaginians then joined with Deinocrates and his force occupying a hill near Gela. However when the latter was defeated, the Carthaginian force withdrew.⁷⁵ Once more we find a smaller Carthaginian attempt to disrupt political stability in Syracuse. By securing allies, Carthage believed it could install a sympathetic government and thus would be able to control larger portions of

⁷¹ Diod. XIX.4.3.

⁷² XIX.71.6-7.

⁷³ XIX.102.8.

⁷⁴ XIX.103.

⁷⁵ XIX.104.

Sicily without resorting to major conflict. Once again its efforts proved futile. With the situation in Sicily growing ever more hostile under the command of Agathocles, Carthage decided to mount a major offensive in 311.⁷⁶ Setting out with a sizeable force under Hamilcar, son of Gisco, the fleet met a storm *en route* to Sicily and apparently suffered great loss. Nevertheless, the surviving force disembarked in Sicily (presumably at Lilybaeum) and re-enforced its numbers. According to Diodorus, several Greek towns were ready to defect to the Carthaginian side, and this number greatly increased when Hamilcar defeated Agathocles outside Gela. Once more Carthage was in a strong position to deal Syracuse the killer blow and finally dominate the whole of Sicily. However, Agathocles did the unthinkable by gathering his forces and invading North Africa, catching the Carthaginians unawares. Agathocles caused havoc in North Africa while inexplicably Hamilcar was defeated outside Syracuse ending another promising but unsuccessful attempt to capture the city and with it all of Sicily.⁷⁷

Following the defeat outside Syracuse and the pressure placed on Carthage by Agathocles, Carthaginian influence on Sicily waned. Despite several attempts of varying size, by the end of the fourth century, Carthage had little more to show for its efforts than what it had possessed two hundred years previous. Carthage had gained some ground, presumably in Thermae (Himera) and Selinus as well as building larger support bases in centres such as Messana, Rhegium, Acragas, and even Syracuse. However, its desire to dominate the island of Sicily went unfulfilled.

We have seen that Carthage used various strategies in its attempts to conquer Sicily. It certainly possessed the resources and manpower to defeat the Greek states, especially Syracuse. Therefore the question remains as to why Carthage failed to capture Sicily especially in light of other successful campaigns elsewhere. Although we have avoided looking at the Carthaginian military in detail previously, it may be useful here to suggest an explanation for the failures on Sicily. There have been several arguments addressing the flaws of the Carthaginian army and system of command. Often the Carthaginians' reliance on mercenaries has been identified as an inherent weakness of their military strength. However, Carthage was simply following a larger trend. By the fourth century most Greek and non-Greek powers used mercenary forces to a large extent. During the third century we find Hannibal

⁷⁶ XIX.106.

⁷⁷ XX.29-30.

successfully maintaining a large mercenary force on campaign for many years. In addition to this, Carthage still used large numbers of its own troops from throughout its empire on campaign.⁷⁸ Another possible reason was the lack of Carthaginian military leadership. This may be true of some individuals, but a number of Carthaginian commanders were noted for their leadership including Hannibal and Mago in Sicily, and later the Barcids in Spain. Neither of these arguments can explain the countless failings on Sicily.

Perhaps the problem lay deeper in the Carthaginian political and military ethos. The one failing evident in most of the Carthaginians' campaigns on Sicily was their lack of initiative in the face of defeats, which more often than not were final. Despite ostensibly having the ability to send reinforcements, Carthage preferred to withdraw, regroup, and try again at a later date. The fear of loss seems to have played heavily on the minds of the Carthaginians. On several occasions, Carthage was defeated by Syracuse and simply retreated, although the Greeks were exhausted themselves. Vague descriptions of plagues and possible treachery before defeats appear as common but insufficient explanations. The problem with Carthage was most likely systemic. The lack of determination on the part of the generals was probably reinforced by the overriding attitude in Carthage. The terrible fate which often awaited a number of unsuccessful generals on their return to Carthage is symptomatic of this failing.⁷⁹ The harsh reaction to failure of the Carthaginian government did not warrant the risk of multiple failures for a Carthaginian general. This is further emphasised by the lack of interest in sending out auxiliary forces or campaigns with a view to deliver the *coup de grâce* to the Sicilian Greeks. This failing again appears during the Punic Wars and especially in Hannibal's Italian campaign where he succeeded almost on his own despite the constant failure of Carthage to supply him. It is possible that the mercantile character of Carthage denied it the determination to succeed where Rome would later prove. Often it appears too

⁷⁸ Diodorus (XVI.73.3) and Plutarch (*Tim.* XXVII.3) describe the Carthaginians amassing reinforcements to counter Timoleon in 341. The Carthaginians raised a levy of Carthaginian citizens, drafted Libyans, and hired mercenaries from Spain and North Africa. Such a force was characteristic of Carthaginian armies and, although mixed, it was not totally dependant on mercenaries. For a comprehensive overview of the use of Carthaginian citizens, subjects, and mercenaries fighting Carthaginian armies see Ameling, *Karthago*, Chp. VII.

⁷⁹ The Carthaginians often crucified or stigmatised defeated generals. During the First Punic War for instance, Hanno was crucified for surrendering to the Romans at Messina; as was Hasdrubal in 241; and another Hanno after the capture of the Aegates Islands. Otherwise there appears to be an obvious stigma regarding defeat. Hamilcar's son, Gisco, was exiled to Selinus rather than allowed to remain in Carthage (Diod. XIII.43.5). The same fate earlier befell Malchus (Justin XVIII.7).

willing to abandon ideas of conquest in favour of reverting to its economic mainstay of trade. This failure in its foreign policy was perhaps a legacy of its Phoenician forebears who also avoided military action especially against developed nations. Often defeats on Sicily are followed by an obvious shift in Carthaginian interests. Between the invasions of 480 and 409 there were at least two major voyages of settlement and exploration into the Atlantic as well as presumable expansion into North Africa and Sardinia. The situation on Sicily required a stronger form of aggression than one based on mercantile interests. Unfortunately for Carthage, it did not possess the determination to press its interests in Sicily. Although it was fighting a developed nation, was prepared to experiment with its strategies, and to make several attempts, the Carthaginians failed to conquer Sicily because of their own systemic failings which manifested themselves in a reluctance and inability to force a conclusion regardless of the price.⁸⁰

SPAIN

Following the supposed defeat at the Battle of Artemisium ca. 490 there is no surviving evidence of further hostilities involving the Carthaginians in Spain. This lack of evidence, however, does not discount the possibility of further hostilities in the area. Carthage had two possible rivals in the region: the Greeks and the native Spaniards. It seems possible that by the fifth century the Greeks had expanded down to Cape Nao and possibly beyond. It is uncertain how Carthaginian and Greek boundaries were settled in the region. Presumably, following the defeat at Artemisium (probably around Cape Nao) Greek interests would have held the ascendancy. This could make several Greek settlements in the area, including such proposed sites as Mainake and Hemeroskopion, appear more probable.⁸¹ If Greek settlement did stretch further south, it is likely that it did not last. By the third century the Greek and Carthaginian spheres were reasonably well defined and both cultures were actively trading with each other. Carthage had redeveloped a number of settlements in

⁸⁰ It is perhaps best to suppress further speculation regarding the problems of the Carthaginian military as it is not essential to this discussion. There have been a number of modern interpretations which provide more detailed accounts. The most comprehensive modern account covering facets of the Carthaginian military is Ameling, *Karthago, passim*. Also see Werner Huss, *Die Karthager*, Chps. XIff. For more specific descriptions of the nature of the army see Gsell, *HAAN* II, Chps. II-III and Picard, *Carthage*, Chps. II-VI.

⁸¹ Strabo III.4.6.

Southern Spain during the fourth century and shown a distinct lack of interest in expanding further into the interior or up the east coast. If Carthage did remove Greek settlements in Spain, it is reminiscent of the scenario in Sicily and North Africa where it acted with such motives to remove Greek competition by destroying the settlements of Dorieus. Presumably the motive would have been the same: to maintain exclusive zones of activity and to remove any possible threat. This was a tactic employed early by both Phoenicians and Carthaginians, but one the latter would certainly become known for during this period. Whether Greco-Carthaginian boundaries in Spain were set after a period of mutual hostility is a possibility, however, this must remain a matter of conjecture.

The native Spaniards in Southern Spain could have posed another threat to Carthaginian interests in the area. During this period Carthaginian interests were mostly concentrated on the coast with areas of industry in the interior. We have already witnessed possible problems faced by Gades following the fall of Phoenician and Tartessian influence in the region. Presumably several Spanish tribes attempted to seize power in the region by confronting Gades. The latter's plight was only relieved by the arrival of a Carthaginian force which defeated the Spaniards and assumed control of the area for Carthage. The next reported hostilities between Carthage and Spaniards was during the third century when the Barcids fought several prominent tribes before defeating the Orissi, seizing their territory, and founding several settlements, including New Carthage. The period between these events remains poorly illuminated regarding possible encounters. It seems unlikely that Carthage undertook any major campaigns against the Spaniards during this period. At this time Carthage was not overly interested in acquiring further territory in the region, preferring to redevelop pre-existing settlements and to concentrate on the silver industry. As for the Spaniards, they were probably content with interacting with the Carthaginian settlements in the area as there is no record of incursions into this area.

SARDINIA

Evidence from Sardinia during the fifth and fourth centuries, much like Spain, is sparse and often leaves little room for solid conclusion. Once again we have the scene set during the sixth century with Carthage sending a number of invasions to secure the

island from the native Sardis.⁸² Although our literary record suggests that Carthage met with mixed fortunes, it is apparent that the Carthaginians still managed to force the Sardis back from the southern and western coastal areas into the interior of the island.⁸³ The next period is not attested, and we next hear of a Sard revolt in the third century against the Carthaginian mercenaries. Although relations with the native inhabitants possibly relaxed over time, we can assume that there was more fighting between the Carthaginians and the Sardis. Diodorus briefly claims that the Carthaginians made war upon the Sardis on a number of occasions with large armies after they had withdrawn into the interior.⁸⁴ Unfortunately he, or rather his source, goes no further in his description. The major evidence, as we have discussed, is the establishment of an interior line of fortifications in Central Sardinia. These appear to have been mostly constructed during the fifth century.⁸⁵ The establishment of such a strategic defensive network suggests that the Sardis continued disturbing the Carthaginians' activity on Sardinia to the point of the latter's constructing an elaborate and expensive system to check their encroachments. Although not a conventional method of military conquest, this system shows the Carthaginians' policy on Sardinia: maintaining a zone of exclusive operation, more concerned with any foreign intrusion rather than their own expansion. Further evidence suggests that the Sardis remained a constant threat and a presumable cause of sporadic fighting.⁸⁶ According to Diodorus, the Sardis remained unconquered by the Carthaginians for the entire period they were present on Sardinia.⁸⁷ This sentiment is echoed by Pausanias who that claims a group of Corsicans, a tribe known as the Iliaes, remained free from Carthaginian rule.⁸⁸ As in the case of Spain, however, we can only assume such conflict in the absence of evidence.

The fifth century witnessed the advent of true Carthaginian expansion through more aggressive means. We have witnessed varying degrees of the Carthaginians'

⁸² Justin XVIII.7.1-2, XIX.1.3.

⁸³ Justin does not say whether or not Mago was successful during his invasion (XIX.1). It is likely he did succeed as the first Carthaginian treaty with Rome considers Sardinia a Carthaginian possession by 509/8.

⁸⁴ Diod. V.15.5.

⁸⁵ Chp. IV, ns.170-171 and text.

⁸⁶ One such example is mentioned by Diodorus (XV.24.2) ca. 379. He states that because of a plague in Carthage the Sardis revolted along with the native Libyans. Both revolts were apparently subdued.

⁸⁷ Diod. V.15.5, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων πολλάκις ἀξιολόγοις δυνάμενεσι στρατευσάντων ἐπ' αὐτούς διὰ τὰς δυσχωρίας καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς καταγείοις δυστραπέλειαν διέμειναν ἀδούλωτοι.

⁸⁸ X.17.8-9.

military involvement throughout the major areas of its empire. Carthaginian military planning during the fifth and fourth centuries met with mixed success. Although Carthage managed to extend its influence as well as its territory in other areas of developed settlement, it was often opposed. Nonetheless, we can discern the full maturity of the Carthaginians' use of aggressive tactics to increase their domain. No longer was Carthage content with inhabiting coastal strips; it now attempted to conquer entire regions and populations. The acquisition of territory to supplement interests had reached a point of deliberate expansion. In separate military endeavours we can discern certain Carthaginian interests. However, by looking at all reported actions within a certain timeframe we can see the true extent of this phenomenon in Carthaginian policy.

THE LATER STAGES OF MILITARY EXPANSION

The final stage of Carthaginian expansion was to prove the most eventful and the most unfortunate. From 279 with the invasion of Pyrrhus to the destruction of Carthage in 146, the Carthaginians faced a new set of enemies, initially from Greece in the form of Pyrrhus and then their greatest foe in Rome. The focus of most interest during this period is naturally the Punic Wars. It is best for this discussion, however, to look at the basic motives for Carthaginian aggression, thus leaving the more intense scrutiny to the military historians. In many respects the unconditional wars Carthage faced removed its older practice of limiting an invasion to one specific area. Carthage now found itself fighting on several fronts often throughout the Western Mediterranean. Carthage still maintained its aggressive tactics during this period and was still eager to increase its territory and influence abroad.

THE LEAD UP TO THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

The first foe Carthage was to face during this period was Pyrrhus. Although he is seen as the aggressor, the Carthaginians reacted with force. The best example is the third Romano-Carthaginian treaty which we have discussed already in some detail.⁸⁹ Carthage appears eager to forbid the arrival of another strong force on Sicily. This

⁸⁹ Polyb. III.25, see Chp. VI, n.46.

mutual aid treaty makes several concessions to Rome which until then had been viewed as a junior partner of Carthage. The treaty certainly does not encourage Roman intervention on Sicily, preferring to leave the island as free from foreign intervention as possible. According to Diodorus, after Carthage had sworn this treaty, a Carthaginian force was dispatched to Rhegium in order to secure the Straits of Messina.⁹⁰ Following this, before Pyrrhus landed in Syracuse, there was a Carthaginian force besieging the city. On both occasions we see Carthage actively taking the initiative on Sicily in order to promote its interests there. The siege of Syracuse is particularly important as Carthage controlled most other Greek centres on Sicily and with the fall of the former, its desire to control the island exclusively would have been fulfilled.⁹¹

Following the arrival of Pyrrhus and his force the Carthaginians were gradually pushed westward through Sicily, as one by one their garrisoned and occupied towns were taken. Pyrrhus' advance then stalled outside the last remaining Carthaginian stronghold Lilybaeum and after two months he abandoned the siege and retreated. Pyrrhus' supposed parting words, "my friends what a wrestling ground we leave behind us for the Romans and Carthaginians",⁹² although seemingly prophetic, is slightly exaggerated as Sicily had been an area of constant struggles for several centuries.

With Pyrrhus now departed, the Carthaginians were left to reclaim their shattered territory on Sicily. Under Hanno and with the Carthaginian forces mobilised on Sicily, the Carthaginians recaptured Soloeis and re-occupied Acragas under amicable terms.⁹³ It is possible that the Carthaginians sought to continue their expansion throughout the island. Then Hieron of Syracuse approached the Carthaginians looking to join forces and to drive the Mamertine forces from Messana. Rome, possibly alerted to the threat of a united Carthaginian Sicily, decided to aid the besieged Mamertines and thus brought Rome and Carthage into direct conflict for the first time.

⁹⁰ XXII.7.5-6.

⁹¹ Apparently there were a number of Carthaginian garrisons stationed in Greek settlements during this period (Diod. XXII.10).

⁹² Plut. *Pyrr.* XXIII.6, οἷαν ἀπολείπομεν ᾧ φίλοι Καρχηδονίοις καὶ Ῥωμαίοις παλαίστραν.

⁹³ Diod. XXIII.1.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

It appears from the outbreak of the First Punic War that Carthage was not the aggressive state. Still, this cannot be entirely true for one of the two protagonists taking part in a war that lasted over twenty years. There has been much discussion regarding the outbreak of the First Punic War in literature, both ancient and modern.⁹⁴ One aspect which becomes evident when looking at the First Punic War in detail is that the theatres of conflict are mostly in Carthaginian territory.⁹⁵ This suggests that the Romans were the more aggressive of the two states. The nature of the conflict is also of interest. The Romans, despite some success with borrowed fleets, eventually realised that the best method of defeating Carthage lay in victory at sea. The Romans usually commanded the field after land battles against Carthage,⁹⁶ but until supremacy at sea was theirs, Carthage was able to keep fighting. It was not until more than twenty years that Rome was able to construct a fleet and to win a decisive naval victory off the Aegates Islands and thus to force Carthage to surrender. In many respects the war was conducted in familiar circumstances to Carthage, both in its own territory and with military tactics to which it was accustomed.⁹⁷

The main area of contention was again Sicily. As the war progressed it became apparent that the conquest of the island and its associated benefits were the main objective for both sides. The major trend of the First Punic War fought on Sicily was a slow but steady push west across the island, whereby the Romans drove the

⁹⁴ Polybius (I.7ff) claims that the Romans entered the war out of kinship with the besieged Mamertines in Messana. This explanation seems flawed when we consider that a Mamertine force under Decius had revolted against the Romans in Rhegium and was itself besieged, captured, and executed. It seems more likely that with the fall of Rhegium to Rome, it now controlled the entire Italian peninsula. Polybius then claims that if Carthage had been able to capture Messana, Sicily would have fallen and Carthage would have dominated much of the surrounding territory of Italy and would have had a perfect staging point for invasion. It seems more likely, however, that Rome was the power wishing to gain at least a foothold on Sicily with a view to expand further. For some modern opinions on the outbreak of the First Punic War see Brian Caven, *The Punic Wars* (London 1980) Chp. I; Adrian Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars* (London 2001) Chp. II.

⁹⁵ Dio Cassius (XI.19) best demonstrates this Roman policy when providing the motives for the invasion of Regulus. He claims that the Romans believed it best to take the war to the Carthaginians' land (i.e. North Africa). If it failed, it would be of little consequence, if successful then the Romans would be at a great advantage.

⁹⁶ It is ironic that the greatest victory on land for Carthage during the First Punic War near Tunis in 255 was commanded by a Greek, Xanthippus (Polyb. I.32-36).

⁹⁷ This is best highlighted by the Romans' constructing a fleet of their own based on the designs of a Carthaginian warship which had washed ashore (Polyb. I.20.15). Polybius claims that this was the model upon which Rome constructed its first fleet in order to challenge the Carthaginian supremacy at sea.

Carthaginians from their extended territory in Greek Sicily back to their own more traditional areas of occupation. Within a few years of the beginning of hostilities, Agragas had fallen to the Romans; in 254 Panormus; in 252 Thermae and Lipara. By 250, the Carthaginians, partly through their own tactics were left defending the well-fortified sites of Drepana and Lilybaeum. There are several occasions when Carthage sent considerable forces to Sicily, but these proved inadequate to halt the Roman advance. One of the few successes the Carthaginians enjoyed late in the war was under Hamilcar Barca who, with an invasion force, recaptured the town of Eryx in 244.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, this success proved inconclusive, as Hamilcar was unable to relieve the besieged Drepana. Carthaginian actions on Sicily, except for the odd occasion, remained defensive. Rome proved a superior land power, and like the Spartans trying to deliver the final blow to Athens in the Peloponnesian War, was finally able to adapt to become a match at sea. Rome achieved what had been Carthage's goal for centuries when after the war the former was willing to lessen the war indemnity in exchange for exclusive rights to Sicily and its surrounding islands.⁹⁹

There were several lesser theatres of conflict in the First Punic War. Sardinia, one of the prize possessions in the Carthaginian Empire was the site of some fighting. During the war, Carthage utilised the island as a strategic base. It planned a possible invasion from Sardinia during the early stages of the war in an attempt to draw Roman forces away from Sicily.¹⁰⁰ Nothing eventuated from this manoeuvre, but the Carthaginian planning is clear: take the war to Rome on its own territory. Whether this action was a trick or not remains uncertain. The Romans also maintained an obvious interest in Sardinia. Polybius claims that as soon as Rome took an interest in the sea, it attempted to seize control of the island.¹⁰¹ Sardinia proved a useful Carthaginian base for launching raids along the Italian coast. In 259 we are told of a Roman offensive against Carthaginian positions on Sardinia.¹⁰² After capturing Aleria on Corsica, Lucius Scipio and his fleet then proceeded to threaten Olbia on Sardinia before retreating. This was followed by a fleet under C. Sulpicius Paterculus, which tricked a fleet dispatched under the command of Hannibal and blockaded it in Sulcis. Hannibal was put to death, and another officer, Hanno defeated the Roman forces on

⁹⁸ Polyb. I.56.

⁹⁹ I.63.

¹⁰⁰ Zonar. VIII.10.

¹⁰¹ Polyb. I.24.7.

¹⁰² Zonar. VIII.11

land.¹⁰³ Sardinia was important to the Carthaginian war effort. It was from this base which Carthage was able to muster some form of offensive against Roman territory. Its importance to Rome is apparent. Dio claims that Regulus' original demands for Carthaginian surrender included Sardinia along with Sicily.¹⁰⁴ It is possible that there was further action on or around Sardinia during the First Punic War. Our evidence and knowledge of the island's role during the war is brief and possibly incomplete.¹⁰⁵ The Roman desire for Sardinia transcends simple military purposes, and from limited literary accounts, this becomes apparent during the First Punic War. This is further emphasised by the Roman annexation of Sardinia from Carthage in 238 under threat of war only a few years after the cessation of hostilities.¹⁰⁶

Probably the only example of Carthage actively pursuing its own initiative in military affairs during the First Punic War was its raids on the Italian coast. There are several examples of this Carthaginian policy which can be justified by their dominance at sea. Presumably these raids were launched mostly from Sardinia and possibly Corsica, but Sicily also remains a possible location. In 261 we find Hannibal ravaging the coasts of Italy by sea so as to upset Roman plans in Sicily.¹⁰⁷ This policy is echoed later when Hamilcar Barca arrived in Sicily fresh from pillaging the territory of Locri and Bruttium in Southeast Italy.¹⁰⁸ There is further Carthaginian activity suggesting that this policy was pursued extensively. Naturally it depended on Carthaginian supremacy at sea, and examples occur before the development of a Roman fleet or while this fleet was unavailable. These raids coupled with the aforementioned possible invasion from Sardinia provide the only examples of Carthage managing an attack on Rome in its own territory.

Carthage was never able to pursue its own military tactics so long as the Roman advance across Sicily continued. It undertook some minor actions in areas of coastal Southern Italy, but these were never more than raids. Carthage, as with its earlier failings in Sicily, remained unable to mount a proper war with large invasions. It preferred to operate the war at a distance and paid dearly for such a policy. In many respects Carthage was always a move behind Rome. The latter was able to dictate

¹⁰³ Zonar. VIII.11; Polyb. I.24.5-6.

¹⁰⁴ Cass. Dio XI.22.

¹⁰⁵ See E. Lipinski, "Carthaginois en Sardaigne à l'époque de la première guerre punique", *Studia Phoenicia* X, 1989, pp.67-73.

¹⁰⁶ Polyb. I.88.8-12.

¹⁰⁷ Zonar. XI.10.

¹⁰⁸ Polyb. I.56.1.

policy and to keep the war away from its own territory, further weakening Carthage. Eventually Carthage could not compete with Rome and was soundly beaten. Its empire was severely diminished with the losses of Sicily and then Sardinia.

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

From the costly loss of the First Punic War and then the Mercenary War, Carthage emerged battered, but still relatively powerful. After the dust had settled, Carthage still held sway over its territory in North Africa and Southern Spain. Nevertheless, it needed new territory to redevelop its former strength. With Rome now its rival in the Central Mediterranean, it was forced to look to the West. In the lead-up and the opening years of the Second Punic War, we see a decided shift in Carthaginian foreign policy. Despite being humiliated by Rome and its own subjects in war, losing large sections of its empire, and being forced to pay large war indemnities, Carthage shook off its malaise and went on the offensive again.

The cause of the Second Punic War, like that of the First, has been discussed at great length. The apparent act of war when Hannibal attacked Saguntum was simply the culmination of Carthaginian expansion coupled with Roman wariness at the former's rapid recovery and newfound strength. The driving force behind this offensive was the Barcids. As one of the few competent and surviving Carthaginian generals following the First Punic and Mercenary Wars, Hamilcar Barca moved into Southern Spain in 238/7 and began to implement an obvious strategy of expansion. Diodorus provides the best account of his campaign in Spain.¹⁰⁹ Hamilcar spent nine years establishing Carthaginian dominance in the interior of Spain possibly as far north as Cape Nao. We find a standard policy for invasion followed by permanent occupation. Hamilcar settled the site of Acra Leucê (modern Alicante) as a permanent base of operations against Spanish tribes named as Iberians, Tartessians, and Celts. His method of conquest is reminiscent of Carthaginian policy on Sicily with a number of cities won over by diplomacy as well as by conflict. By the time of his death in 229, he had conquered a large area of Southern Spain with the exception of the Orissi.

Despite the ancient opinion that revenge was the main reason behind Hamilcar's invasion of Spain, there appear to be more practical motives at work. The

¹⁰⁹ XXV.10.

most obvious incentives for such an invasion are income and manpower. Following the First Punic and Mercenary wars Carthage was short of both. Hamilcar himself suggests the former motive. When he was quizzed as to why he was acting in this manner by Rome, he replied that it was so that Carthage could repay its war debt.¹¹⁰ This was reinforced by the eventual Carthaginian ability to do so in such rapid time. The attraction of obtaining further manpower is obvious, as Carthage would have been decidedly undermanned following years of conflict. Even during his campaign we find Hamilcar actively enrolling defeated forces into his own ranks, showing leniency to others, and preferring diplomatic solutions instead of possible costly military action. Such a policy was also to continue under the command of his son-in-law and son.

Following the death of his father-in-law, command of Carthaginian interests in Spain passed on to Hasdrubal. Like his father-in-law, Hasdrubal continued Carthaginian development in Southern Spain. The nature of Carthaginian intentions in the area is obvious with the foundation of New Carthage. This base along with another unknown settlement suggests that Hasdrubal wished fully to utilise and to settle the area.¹¹¹ The nature of this settlement and the wealth it generated in bullion and other commodities shows that the Carthaginian goal was to glean as much wealth from the area as possible. Also like his predecessor, Hasdrubal showed a tendency to avoid conflict when possible, preferring more diplomatic channels.¹¹² Evidence suggests that he would incorporate both to produce the best result as we see when he defeated the twelve cities of the Orissi and took a native princess as his bride, and by doing so united both Spanish and Carthaginian interests. Diodorus and Polybius claim that Hasdrubal commanded considerable power in Spain.¹¹³ This appears the main motive for the Barcid expedition into the area. It is most likely that during this period

¹¹⁰ Hamilcar's untimely death leaves the question of whether or not he harboured plans against Rome. Some Roman sources claim that he acted without the consent of the Carthaginian government so as to shift the blame of the Second Punic War onto the Barcid family. This is most evident in Polybius and Livy where it appears that Hannibal practically inherited the war from his father. It is possible that he, much like Philip in the East against the Persians, planned an eventual attack after all the preparations were made. Hannibal carried out the invasion only a decade later, but at least for the moment, Hamilcar's (and later Hasdrubal's) main priority was establishing a strong and lucrative province for Carthage in Southern Spain.

¹¹¹ Diod. XXV.12; see Chp. III for the strategic purposes and benefits of New Carthage.

¹¹² Diod. XXV.11, "ὅτι Ἀσδρούβας μαθὼν πρακτικωτέραν οὖσαν τῆς βίας τὴν ἐπιείκειαν προέκρινε τὴν εἰρήνην τοῦ πολέμου.

¹¹³ Diod. XXV.12. Diodorus claims that he commanded sixty thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry, and two hundred elephants; Polybius (II.13.3) states the Romans were concerned that he was rebuilding the Carthaginian Empire stronger than it had ever been.

Rome, concerned with a Gallic revolt and the growth of Carthaginian power to the west, arranged for a treaty limiting Carthaginian expansion to the region south of the River Ebro. Hasdrubal entered into a unilateral covenant with Rome stipulating that he would not cross the Ebro under arms.¹¹⁴ Hasdrubal never broke this covenant, but according to Polybius, the Carthaginian government did not recognise the validity of this treaty.¹¹⁵ Therefore Hannibal's actions were not bound by the previous oath sworn by his brother-in-law, nor was the Carthaginian government.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, Carthage was buoyed by its success and the rewards that came with it and continued north.

Hasdrubal also died after less than a decade in command in Spain in 221. Like his father-in-law, he had expanded and settled the growing Spanish province. Command now passed to Hamilcar's son Hannibal. Under Hannibal, Carthaginian military expansion reached a new height. He inherited a profitable and secure province from his father and brother-in-law as well as considerable forces. His goal is unknown at this stage, however, the result certainly implies a strong will, careful preparation, and a strategy for invasion.¹¹⁷ However, when Hannibal decided to break his brother-in-law's agreement with Rome and to commit to an invasion of Italy is unclear.¹¹⁸ Roman interference in Spain regarding Saguntum would certainly have raised concern and anger in Carthage. The fact was that Carthage remained a major power in the Western Mediterranean, a power which had been unfairly treated by the Rome and, more importantly, had grown strong again. It is natural that Rome was to feel the brunt of Carthaginian aggression. The events and legality of the attack on Saguntum are largely irrelevant. By 221, Carthage, led by Hannibal, was ready to re-establish its dominance again and go to war with Rome.

The theatres of conflict of the Second Punic War offer an interesting contrast to that of the first. During the First Punic War, Carthage suffered as it was unable to shift the bulk of conflict from its own territories. Rome and its territory had escaped relatively unscathed and was able to resupply its forces seemingly at will. The Second Punic War saw a marked shift. This time Hannibal was able to take the war to Italy. He made his presence felt by defeating Roman armies, ravaging the Italian

¹¹⁴ Polyb. III.27.9.

¹¹⁵ III.21.

¹¹⁶ Bickerman, pp.18-19.

¹¹⁷ See Goldsworthy pp.147-8, regarding Hannibal's preparations for the war.

¹¹⁸ See Bickerman, pp.19-20.

countryside, and breaking the previously secure network of Roman allies throughout Italy. Hannibal had learnt from the mistakes made during the First Punic War in which Carthage was only able to carry out small-scale raids along the Italian coast. By occupying or pillaging any area he wished to, he was able to strike fear into Rome and to disrupt large areas of its territory. Again the Carthaginian inability to supply him or to protect the vital province of Spain meant that Rome was able to isolate Hannibal before drawing him back to North Africa and defeating him.

Beyond the orthodox military side of the Second Punic War, Hannibal also exercised a degree of skill in more political and diplomatic spheres. His main tactic beyond the battlefield was certainly diplomacy. During his ascendancy in Italy he embarked on a campaign of diplomatic manoeuvring with numerous settlements and peoples in Italy. The drive behind such thinking was naturally to whittle down Roman allies in Italy and to weaken their stranglehold on the peninsula. Hannibal attempted to surround Rome with hostile peoples. As we have seen, the Carthaginians had employed this practice against the Sicilian Greeks for some time. Hannibal's success at such a policy was mixed as it had been in the past for the Carthaginians. He managed several decisive coups by enrolling the support of the likes of Capua in 216, the Bruttians along with several other Italian tribes, and a number of Greek settlements in the South.¹¹⁹ Despite Livy's claim that the Italians went over to Hannibal's side, he never was able to command the loyalty he desired and desperately needed even after such crushing victories as that of Cannae.¹²⁰ The Gauls' and Italians' support was fickle despite a number of attempts to gain it. These groups and others seemed reluctant to desert Rome or to remain Carthaginian allies for long. An unlikely alliance was even arranged between Carthage and Philip V of Macedon.¹²¹ However, this treaty never resulted in the support Hannibal needed. Hannibal was unable to trouble Roman interests beyond his initial, meteoric success. The Romans, however, were able to harass Carthaginian supply lines from Spain and then take the to war once again to Carthaginian territory ensuring final victory.

¹¹⁹ Livy XXII.2-10, XXIII.11. These temporarily included the Lucanians, Samnites, and Campanians (of which Capua was the capital); Greek states were divided over allegiances with Hannibal with states such as Thurii and Metapontum joining him (XXV.15) while others such as Rhegium remaining loyal to Rome.

¹²⁰ XXIII.11.

¹²¹ Polyb. VII.9-10.

Beyond the diplomatic policies of Hannibal, the several theatres of conflict demonstrate Carthaginian strategies. The Italian theatre would have proved the decisive area of the war if Hannibal had been able to achieve more by uniting more peoples against Rome and gained better support from Carthage. He proved unable to exert enough pressure on Rome and allowed the Fabian policy of avoiding the Carthaginians on the battlefield in Italy while the Romans launched offensives in Spain, to a lesser extent the Balearic Islands, and eventually North Africa which would spell doom for Carthaginian hopes of victory. Rome's ability to bring the conflict to Carthaginian territory was reminiscent of the First Punic War and as equally effective.

Two smaller events during the Second Punic War suggest that Carthage had an obvious desire to reclaim its lost empire. Although minor in comparison with other events, Carthage made attempts to reclaim the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. On Sardinia the harsh nature of Roman rule led to the uprising of native Sards led by Hampsicora in 215.¹²² Despite having experienced heavy losses in Spain, Carthage dispatched a force led by Hasdrubal (a Barcid) to unite with the Sards to and defeat the Romans on the island. Although Hasdrubal managed to link up with Hampsicora, Manlius defeated the force, and all hope of reclaiming Sardinia was lost.¹²³ A similar scenario developed regarding Carthaginian efforts to recapture Sicily. In 215, Hieron of Syracuse died leaving the maintenance of his kingdom to his fifteen-year-old grandson Hieronymus. Political instability quickly followed, and Syracuse once again looked to Carthage for an alliance.¹²⁴ According to Livy, the island of Sicily was supposed to be redivided between Syracuse and Carthage once the Romans were expelled. Once again civil strife handed Carthage an opportunity to regain one of its lost provinces from the Romans; once again it failed dismally. Although Carthage sent a number of forces and reinforcements to Sicily, had some successes, and persuaded a number of towns to desert to its side, a mixture of poor fortune, bad decisions, and lack of initiative proved the downfall of Carthaginian hopes on the island.¹²⁵ The capture of Sicily, or at least the use of part of the island might have

¹²² Livy XXIII.32.

¹²³ XXIII.40-41. This may not have been the first Carthaginian attempt to incite a Sardinian revolt against the Romans. According to Zonaras (VIII.18), the Carthaginians secretly persuaded the Sards to revolt shortly after Rome had annexed the island.

¹²⁴ Diod. XXIV.4-7.

¹²⁵ For an overview of these events of the war on Sicily see Goldsworthy, pp.260-268.

proved decisive in the outcome of the war. With more support and a number of strategic ports close to Italy, Carthage would have been connected to Hannibal in Italy and better able to resupply his forces. This benefit and that gained by the recapture of Sicily was never realised - to the detriment of Carthage and its war efforts.

After the Second Punic War the Romans were able to strip Carthage of its empire and its ability to regain its power. Carthage, now a city-state in North Africa was surrounded by its enemies, and despite an economic and social recovery following the Second Punic War, was doomed to be dictated to, rather than pursuing its own initiatives. The remaining conflicts during this period are testament to such a development. Masinissa harassed Carthage until the latter, goaded into conflict, invited Rome again to begin the Third Punic War which led to the final defeat and destruction of Carthage and the last official remnants of the Carthaginian Empire in 146.

Carthage used its developing aggressive nature to good effect in its empire. From the sixth century the growing expansive nature of Carthage compared to that of the Phoenicians becomes increasingly apparent. This increase, spurred on by successful conquest and the wealth it brought, only grew over time. Initially Carthage used military force to secure the basis of its empire and to ward off would-be rivals. With a power base established, it was then able to use conquest to expand this territory and to create for itself a Carthaginian Empire. This growth naturally began to intrude on more powerful neighbouring states and, beginning in the fifth century, we find the Greeks and then the Romans develop as the main Carthaginian rivals. The motives behind certain campaigns are certainly varied, as are Carthaginian strategies. In areas where there was a distinct lack of a developed power, Carthage initially maintained a basic presence as the Phoenicians had before them. However, aggressive Carthaginian tactics soon saw them expand into further territories for various reasons, often economic. Once these areas were subdued, then better settlement patterns were introduced and Carthaginian provinces were established. Developed nations proved more difficult to Carthage and more often than not exposed frailties inherent in the Carthaginian system. The nature of the Carthaginians' military activities is varied in accordance with their campaigns and the strategies they devised. Military conquest was supplemented with diplomacy. Carthage was prepared to conquer areas such as

Sicily and Sardinia by mounting several campaigns which as we have seen utilised different tactics. However, it was not able to commit to unconditional wars where attrition was the deciding factor. When a campaign went awry, Carthage preferred to remove itself and to re-address the situation or even to turn its attention elsewhere, when in fact a more decisive action was necessary. The mercurial nature of Carthaginian military expansion attracted mixed results in different areas. Nevertheless, through such methods Carthage was able to establish its dominion in several prominent areas of the Mediterranean and by doing so helped define its developing nature and the activities it employed.

CONCLUSION

Carthaginian activity abroad is an essential component of any study of the city and its empire. Carthage was never an isolated settlement, but developed from one Phoenician port into a capital which commanded an expansive empire. Like the Phoenicians before them, a great deal of Carthaginian activity and society was based around endeavours abroad.

One of the more interesting aspects when considering the nature of the Carthaginian Empire and activity is the ever-changing social and political climate of Carthage and the Western Mediterranean. As Carthage developed, so did aspects of its presence and influence abroad. This was by no means limited to Carthage itself, which dominated an ever-evolving area. Unlike the Phoenicians, who operated in the Western Mediterranean largely without competition from developed rivals, Carthage was not as fortunate and had to endure encroachments from Greeks and Romans. Carthage was forced to remodel the way it maintained and operated its activities, not only to protect its own interests, but also to ensure their profitability. Carthage was forced to develop its own tactics to cope with foreign pressure. This is most recognisable in the way Carthage used aspects of trade, settlement, and expansion to operate its empire and its relations with others.

The unique development of Carthage meant that it maintained its activities in several ways. Trade remained the mainstay of the Carthaginians, as it had for the Phoenicians before them. It was the prospect of trade which drove Carthage to expand its interests abroad. Trade also remained the one constant of the Carthaginian Empire. It expanded this further into areas of limited contact such as the Sub-Sahara and possible destinations in Southern France and along the Atlantic coasts. Unlike aspects of settlement and conquest, which remained sporadic and often fickle, trade continued to flow within and beyond the empire. Its durable nature meant that it was a continual means of contact with its territories and a wide variety of peoples.

As a Phoenician city, Carthage was established with a pre-existing legacy of colonisation. Although it did not need to establish a large colonial empire, Carthage still used various methods of settlement for various reasons both within and beyond its recognised boundaries. Carthaginian settlement was unique as it operated on several distinctive levels. Carthage literally 'recolonised' the Phoenician settlements it

had subsumed. This process was usually lengthy and varied, however, Carthage was able to maintain its influence while gradually acculturating Phoenician settlements under a Carthaginian system. Otherwise we see Carthage settling colonies and *emporia* similar to Greek and Phoenician practice. The real Carthaginian development in this field was an ability to adapt settlement to suit specific areas and needs. This is emphasised by the range of settlement practices Carthage utilised over several centuries.

Finally, Carthage developed techniques of its own to cope with its ever-changing position in the Western Mediterranean, of which the most obvious was its increased aggression from the sixth century onward. Unlike the Phoenicians, who created a seaborne 'empire' with relatively little territory, Carthage was fully prepared to conquer large areas and to dominate them. This activity became more obvious throughout its history and was not limited to specific areas, with Carthage fighting to maintain or strengthen its influence in all its major provinces at some point, as well as conducting campaigns in foreign territory. Again Carthaginian practice was not homogeneous. Areas such as Sardinia, North Africa, and Spain were not as highly developed as other areas, so Carthage waged a number of campaigns in these regions relatively unopposed by developed nations. In Sicily the political situation was completely different. Carthage was forced to adopt several military, diplomatic, and political techniques to increase its territory, which met with mixed success. These tactics came to dominate ancient, and to an extent, modern opinion regarding the nature of Carthage and its foreign policies. However, as we have seen it was one tactic among several, and even then it was not governed by a single strategy.

The Carthaginians conducted their activities in a varied and changeable manner. Unlike the Phoenicians who settled for trade, or the Greeks for necessity, or even the Romans who colonised for several social and military reasons, Carthage had a range of specific motivations which defined its activity, and in many respects Carthaginian history and society. As we have witnessed, these methods combined several techniques encompassing trade, settlement, conquest, and influence abroad. Although our evidence provides a varied picture of Carthaginian activity, we are still able to form several solid conclusions regarding its function and character. These themes are vital in attempting to illustrate such an important aspect of Carthage,

which defines its image as one of the more powerful and enduring empires in antiquity.

EXTERNAL AND CARTHAGINIAN INFLUENCES

The development of Carthage from a ninth century trading port on the North African coast to a powerful empire in a matter of only three centuries is remarkable. The Carthaginian Empire dominated much of the Western Mediterranean until the second century, largely unopposed in many areas. In many respects, the prominence of Carthage remained indebted to the support and influence of others.

The first of these groups, and certainly the most important was the Phoenicians. We have looked at the so-called Phoenician legacy to Carthage on several occasions. The most obvious, and perhaps the most unusual aspect of this legacy was the expansive network of pre-existing settlements, territories, and trade routes. Carthage inherited an existing and functioning empire when the Phoenicians withdrew from the West in the sixth century. Carthage, as the most prominent Phoenician settlement in the area, assumed control of this empire over the next century relatively peacefully. Unlike more traditional empires in antiquity, Carthage was able to expand rapidly with relatively little effort, only needing to employ more aggressive tactics on certain occasions. It did not need to spend time and huge resources establishing its initial territory abroad.

The development of Carthage was aided by its era as a Phoenician city. Until the sixth century it grew powerful from Phoenician trade and protection. Even its first reported independent action of founding Ebusus in 654/3 BC appears to have been carried out under Phoenician protection. It almost appears that Carthage was being groomed as an obvious heir to Phoenician activity in the West. Tyre naturally developed and protected its colony until it could operate and function independently. As a part of the Phoenician 'Empire', Carthage remained a semi-independent settlement for over two centuries, growing into a prosperous and powerful state and eventually assuming control of the old Phoenician settlements by means of assimilation and limited conquest.

There are several other major areas of Phoenician influence which remained obvious in many of the Carthaginians' activities. Carthage followed in the footsteps of its Phoenician forbears in two of the three main methods it used to expand and

maintain its empire: trade and settlement. Although Carthage developed these and also increasingly used military and political tactics, the basic methods of trade and settlement were handed down from the Phoenicians. Trade (especially maritime) remained the major income of Carthage throughout its history, as it had for the Phoenicians. Although new patterns, routes, and tactics arose, Carthage remained a mercantile state, often developing its empire for this very purpose. Settlement was also a theme common to both Phoenicians and Carthaginians. The Phoenician practice of founding colonies and *emporia* continued as a Carthaginian policy. Although Carthage developed its own methods of settlement, which became quite distinct from earlier Phoenician models, they were based on a common culture of settlement.

It is impossible to discuss every aspect of society, culture, and policy the Phoenicians introduced in Carthage. As the latter was a Tyrian colony and essentially recognised as a Phoenician city until the late sixth century, the basis of Carthaginian, and to a large extent Punic society, was essentially Phoenician. We have witnessed this in detail both in Carthaginian activity abroad and aspects of Carthaginian society. Government, religion, economy, and ethnicity were all initially identifiably Phoenician. Although we look at the Phoenicians to help us understand the origins and nature of the Carthaginians, in many respects we can look to the latter as the continuation of the Phoenicians in the West.

The Phoenicians were not the only group which influenced Carthage, its empire, and the development of Punic culture. The Greeks certainly aided in defining the nature of Carthage and its foreign policies. Greek influence in Carthage and throughout its empire is obvious. As with many non-Hellenic peoples, the Carthaginians appear to have been influenced by several aspects of Greek culture. This is most evident in the material remains of many Carthaginian sites, where there was an obvious taste for Greek commodities and evidence of thriving trade. Contact with the Greeks defined much of Carthaginian history. Their co-existence on Sicily, despite often resulting in conflict, was enduring and prosperous to both parties. The Greeks were ultimately responsible for introducing Carthage to systematised coinage, which it adopted to facilitate trade in the late fifth century. This influence was to help modernise the Carthaginian economy which was heavily reliant on trade.

It is likely that the Greeks were also influential in developing Carthaginian colonial techniques. After Carthage assumed control over the Phoenician 'Empire', it

was able to develop its own foreign policies, which notably became more aggressive. This is evident in the field of settlement where Carthage tended to settle large permanent foundations which resembled Greek colonies rather than the majority of pre-existing Phoenician settlements. The nature of sites such as Lilybaeum and New Carthage may have been direct results of Greek influence on Carthaginian policy. Contact with Greeks in Sicily, Southern France, Spain, and in the East certainly influenced several aspects of Carthaginian society. Although the majority of our Greek sources depict Carthage as a constant enemy, there was also constant interaction between the two cultures.

Carthage's reliance on trade brought it into contact with a number of peoples who also influenced its development and activities abroad. From the late sixth century onwards, the Etruscans remained a close Carthaginian ally before, and to a lesser extent after the decline of the former. The obvious military treaty they maintained¹ saw them joining forces on a number of reported occasions, the most notable were their defeat of the Greeks off Alalia in 535 and their loss to Hieron at the Battle of Cumae in 474. This contact was probably initially based on trade. From Sardinia, the Carthaginians continued a probable pre-existing Phoenicio-Etruscan relationship and continued the lucrative trade between the two nations. This is best emphasised by the existence of a probable Carthaginian trading community at Pyrgi, operating in the territory of the Etruscans.²

This relationship continued with Rome. Although the intimate connection the Etruscans and Carthaginians shared appears absent from any Romano-Carthaginian treaty, the two powers maintained an enduring non-aggression pact for several centuries, which ensured the continuation of trade between the Carthaginian Empire and Central Italy.

Contact with Egypt, initially established by the Phoenicians, continued with Carthage and remained a strong cultural influence. Along with Greek material, Egyptian remains are among the most recognisable foreign imports in Carthaginian settlements. Although we do not know whether or not Carthage and Egypt maintained an official accord, Egyptian influences appear to have had several profound effects in Carthaginian society and culture. From a stylistic perspective Egypt seems to have been a constant influence on several aspects of Carthaginian taste including art,

¹ Arist. *Pol.* III.5.10-11, 1280a, see Chp. VI, ns.18, 28-33 and text.

² *KAI.* 277; Chp. VI, ns.23-26 and text.

architecture, and luxury items.³ Egyptian contact may also have resulted in several cultural changes in Carthage. This is most evident in religion. Egyptian type motifs are common on stelae in the *topheth* of Punic Carthage as is other influence in temple design and function.⁴ It appears as though Carthage remained a willing and constant trading partner with Egypt, which led to cultural influence in Carthage and its empire.

The effect of contact with a number of less developed peoples throughout the empire had on Carthage should not be underestimated, although it is often impossible attempting to identify the influence such smaller cultures may have had on Carthaginian society. From several larger groups, however, we may possibly detect some form of influence. Naturally the major point of contact was trade. Carthage actively traded and used many groups of peoples as markets, industrial bases, and for mining/cultivation. Presumably the nature of such markets helped define settlement and trading patterns. This is evident along the coasts of Southern Spain and Atlantic Africa. Unfortunately the majority of such contact is poorly reported in most areas and can only be assumed in others.

We may assume that several areas of Carthaginian culture were partially influenced by native or localised peoples. The most obvious area for such contact is in North Africa. The development of Punic culture appears to be largely a result of contact with foreign peoples. The native Berbers in North Africa appear to have been the major influence in this development. Through intermarriage and persistent contact, Carthaginian culture gradually 'acclimatised' to North Africa.⁵ It is natural that the Carthaginians, living in close proximity with several groups of Berbers, would show signs of acculturation, despite largely depriving them of political rights and social status. The best example of this within the greater development of Punic culture was the adoption of Tanit as the primary divinity of Carthage by the fifth century. Contact with Berber influences appears the most likely reason behind this change.⁶ A similar process can be seen elsewhere in the Carthaginian Empire.

³ This is obvious from the considerable remains littering Carthaginian tombs and temples. Items such as amulets and scarabs etc. appear to have been widely accepted in Carthaginian culture, e.g. Vercoutter, *passim*; Quillard, pp.1-32; Leclant, pp.95-102.

⁴ See Chp. VI, ns.5-9 and text. *Topheth* iconography is obviously influenced by Egyptian types including sun motifs. The adoption of the so-called 'Egyptian throat' for Carthaginian temple architecture is another example of cultural influence and active adoption in Carthaginian society.

⁵ This was by no means limited to the Carthaginian period. Original Phoenician settlement and mixing with native Berbers created the Libyphoenicians, which were a distinctive group particularly in North Africa but also attested in other areas of the Carthaginian Empire.

⁶ See Chp. II, ns.67-71 and text for some possible explanations of the origins and development of Tanit.

Elymian Eryx was developed into a mixed Punic-Elymian settlement based around the adoption of the local cult which was assimilated as Astarte.

Beyond the cultural sphere, it appears that several groups were influential on Carthaginian foreign policy. The indomitable Sardis radically altered Carthaginian military policy on Sardinia and had an obvious effect on settlement and trading patterns. The same can be argued to a lesser degree in North Africa with the Berbers and later in Southern Spain. Otherwise we see the constant use of a number of peoples, both from highly developed societies and localised peoples, as mercenaries and allies in Carthaginian armies. Groups of Numidian cavalry, Balearic slingers, and Celtiberian troops all became commonplace in a number of conflicts. Carthage utilised the manpower available to it throughout the empire which largely characterised its army and its military campaigns. This aspect was also influenced by a number of allied groups which fought alongside Carthage. The best reported of these groups were the Elymians in Sicily. Even from an early period they were allied to the Phoenicians to the point where Thucydides claims that their location was partly responsible for the Phoenician settlement pattern in Western Sicily.⁷ On a number of occasions the Elymians joined or supported Carthaginian invasions or activities on the island. Carthage also occasionally often enjoyed the support of the Sicani and the Siceli on Sicily. The relationships with all three groups also seem to have been aided by trade.

Although Carthage remained open to foreign influence, we have seen detailed examples of Carthaginian influence on others. This phenomenon is particularly true for smaller, less developed peoples throughout the Carthaginian Empire or in neighbouring territory.⁸ This is evident in several forms and often ironically appears after the removal of Carthaginian power demonstrating the residual nature of its influence and that of Punic culture. Legacies of political and social organisation were evident in North Africa and Spain after the removal of Carthaginian power.⁹ The survival of the Punic language can also be witnessed in North Africa, Sicily, and possibly Spain several centuries after the withdrawal of Carthage.¹⁰ Several larger states were obviously influenced by aspects of Carthaginian society. We have seen a

⁷ Thuc. VI.2.6.

⁸ This phenomenon was present in most areas of Carthaginian activity, both within the areas it controlled and those beyond. For examples of such diffusion of culture, see Chp. V.

⁹ Chp. V, ns.2-17, 39-52 and text.

¹⁰ Chp. V, ns.23, 35, 41.

connection between models of Carthaginian agriculture in North Africa and the Roman system of *latifundia*, or large slave-run estates.¹¹ A more isolated example was when the Romans apparently modelled their entire navy on a Carthaginian warship after Carthage had shown its dominance at sea during the opening years of the First Punic War.¹² Probably the greatest influence of Carthaginian contact with developed nations such as the Romans and the Greeks was their trade. Although both parties became familiar with Carthaginian society and culture through a number of costly wars, the real point of contact and influence was trade. Because Carthage commanded such a vast empire, it also controlled its commodities, which were heavily exploited and exported to such nations.

It is natural for such a dominant and dynamic state to influence its neighbours. This is even more feasible when we consider the active nature of Carthage as both a trading nation and an expansive power. We can trace several prominent influences on peoples with which Carthage came into contact: presumably such influences, although often subtle, were widespread. The expansive nature of Carthaginian activity abroad dictates that Carthage came into contact with a range of peoples and was open to foreign influence, but in turn was also influential to others.

THE PROBLEMS OF CHARACTERISING CARTHAGINIAN ACTIVITY

As we have seen on numerous occasions during this discussion, there are a number of inherent problems in identifying various aspects of Carthaginian history and activity. We are left with gaping holes in our knowledge of important periods of Carthaginian history and aspects of society and culture. Often we are forced to piece together fragmentary evidence in an attempt to reach important conclusions. There are several problems which confront us when looking at the nature of Carthaginian activity which unfortunately often interact to compound matters further. In some respects the nature of Carthaginian activity, which is the main topic of our discussion, is elusive and often responsible for the problems we encounter.

¹¹ Obvious Roman interest in Carthaginian agricultural techniques is attested by writers such as Varro and Columella, see Chp. II, ns.14-19 and text.

¹² Polyb. I.20.15

The major reason behind this is the nature of our sources, both literary and archaeological. Our main hindrance remains the lack of a comprehensive Phoenicio-Punic literary tradition. Beyond a handful of scattered inscriptions there are virtually no surviving written records. Such records existed in reasonable amounts in antiquity as we have seen from various citations, however, these have rarely survived in any detail. Unfortunately we possess very little of the Carthaginians' input as to how they described themselves and their activities.

We therefore turn to the other major literate societies in contact with Carthage, namely the Greeks and Romans. Again we are hindered by an obvious enmity which was standard among many of the authors discussing affairs between the Carthaginians and their own respective nations. Testament to this problem is the nature of the accounts which survive. The vast majority of detailed accounts regarding Carthage describe interactions with the Greeks and Romans. Our first major account survives in Diodorus (using primarily Timaeus and occasionally also Ephorus) regarding the Greek wars on Sicily. The major Roman sources which survive cover the Punic Wars courtesy of Polybius, Livy, and Appian. Naturally these accounts are generally hostile towards the Carthaginians and other authors who portrayed Carthage in a sympathetic light such as Philinus were naturally unpopular and their works have not survived. Other accounts regarding Carthaginian society such as Aristotle's description of the constitution and Mago's agricultural treatises have survived because they were essentially part of larger popular documents. On the whole our ancient literary coverage of Carthage remains entrenched in Greek and Roman bias. A large number of fragmentary citations spread across a wide spectrum of Greek and Roman authors are often anecdotes based on sensationalism and speculation. Unfortunately for such a large and prominent state as Carthage, which existed in a period with a reasonably high literary output, the literary tradition is poor and remains a major problem in any study of Carthage.

The nature of our archaeological evidence also poses a number of problems regarding our understanding of Carthaginian activity, influences, and contact. Although our knowledge is increasing with more data being constantly discovered, we are still left with shortfalls generally uncharacteristic of a prominent colonising and trading state such as Carthage. Several problems develop when we attempt to gain a comprehensive archaeological record of Carthaginian settlements or areas of activity.

The sheer size of the Carthaginian Empire means that it is nearly impossible to provide a thorough archaeological record. Coupled with this is the ambiguous nature of a number of Carthaginian settlements. Many Carthaginian settlements are unknown because of previous occupation (usually Phoenician) and later settlement (evident in sites such as Leptis Magna and New Carthage). The guarded nature of Carthaginian activity in a number of areas also meant that many settlements were relatively unknown in antiquity (such as possible examples along the Atlantic coasts of Africa and Europe). Although a better archaeological picture of Carthaginian activity and settlement may emerge over time, like our literary tradition, we must at present deal with a number of limitations.

One of the primary areas of Carthaginian activity was trade. The Carthaginians were trading a wide variety of commodities with many peoples over large areas throughout the Mediterranean and beyond. One of the startling discrepancies in these records is the virtual absence of Carthaginian remains in developed areas where trade is attested. Carthage was trading heavily with Egypt, the Greeks, and Rome, yet there are very few Carthaginian remains discovered in these areas. On the other hand there are considerable remains and evidence of influence from other groups (especially Egypt and the Greeks) in Carthage emphasising the existence of trade. Among less developed peoples, Carthaginian remains are better attested, especially in areas under Carthage's control or bordering its territory. This is discernable in North Africa, Sardinia, Spain, and Sicily. Less developed cultures exhibit more Punic material culture than highly developed peoples who were perhaps not interested in such items as they produced them in high levels themselves. Carthage was obviously exporting heavily to maintain such trade, but such export items are often unspecific and untraceable. Presumably many of these commodities were perishable and therefore largely invisible in our archaeological records. Other items may have been exported in raw bulk form and were manufactured elsewhere to leave no discerning trace as to their origins. Our indications are that Carthage was particularly interested in the extraction of metals, both precious and base. Silver, iron, copper, lead, and gold were prevalent in different areas of Carthaginian contact and probably were heavily exported and often leave little trace of their origin. We have also seen the trade in various perishable commodities which became associated with Carthage. Items such as Carthaginian wine, Punic apples (pomegranates), *garum* (fish sauce), and esparto

grass all became synonymous with Carthaginian trade.¹³ These specialty items do not even cover other major Carthaginian exports such as salted fish, grain, and other possible crops.¹⁴ Presumably such items were exported heavily by Carthage and leave little impression on archaeological records. Unfortunately literary evidence of specific types of trade is usually brief and rare. Carthage was obviously trading with its neighbours and despite the anomalies in our records, it is obvious that trade was flowing in both directions.

Another interesting aspect regarding Carthaginian trade was its durability. Presumably the sight of a Carthaginian *gugga* was as common in Plautus' Rome as it was throughout much of the Greek world (especially in the West), Egypt, and Etruria. Plautus' *Poenulus* is obviously recognisable to Romans in the early second century. Such trade was a staple for many Mediterranean communities and was accepted regardless of current political climate. It is interesting that our abiding image of relations between the Greeks such as the Phocaeen states and Carthage is one of hostility. However, we have seen evidence of Punic trading communities flourishing in a number of these states. We have also seen the prosperous Greek settlement Emporion accept the Carthaginian coinage standard to facilitate trade with Carthaginian territory.¹⁵ Otherwise on Sicily, it becomes apparent that there were considerable Carthaginian populations (based on trade) at Acragas and Syracuse, presumably in addition to several other Greek states.¹⁶ We have seen the Punic inscriptions in Massilia and Avignon also suggesting a reasonable Carthaginian presence in a predominately Greek area.¹⁷ These examples are dated the fifth century onwards when hostility between the Greeks and the Carthaginians was obvious. Trade was evident in a number of hostile states, however, it only receives brief mention or usually none at all. It appears that it was an accepted part of numerous economies, which only imminent conflict could deter.

¹³ Again Plautus mentions several of these stock Carthaginian commodities when describing Hanno and his cargo (Chp. VI, ns.52-59 and text). Athenaeus also lists several Carthaginian commodities (see Chp. VI, n.94).

¹⁴ Based on the variety of crops being grown in North Africa during the invasion of Agathocles in the late fourth century (Diod. XX.8.3-4), it is possible that Carthage was exporting a variety of produce from the region and other regions in its empire.

¹⁵ Chp. VI, n.92 and text.

¹⁶ Dionysius even expelled a considerable population of Carthaginian merchants from Syracuse in 398 (Diod. XIV.46). This suggests that it was a possible precedent despite a number of preceding wars between Syracuse and Carthage.

¹⁷ *KAI*. 69-70.

The nature of the Carthaginians' settlement in various areas has also affected evidence of their activity at several sites. The Carthaginians' settlement patterns were unique: inheriting large numbers of prefabricated operational Phoenician and other localised settlements which they assumed as their own. They developed many of these sites in addition to settling further sites to increase their territory and influence. The developing nature of Punic civilisation which was often grafted onto existing Phoenician and localised cultures makes it difficult to distinguish exact settlement movements. In truth there is probably no exact point at which a pre-existing Phoenician site became a Punic site. It was likely a long process which never erased the existing culture entirely. Processes of urbanisation, resettlement, and redefined trade routes often aid us in determining the changing nature of several settlements. However, many more are still ambiguous regarding Carthaginian activity. Our sources are of little help in defining the exact nationality of many settlements. Often the terms 'Phoenician' and 'Carthaginian' are used loosely and appear interchangeable. Other authors claim specific sites as Carthaginian, but we know of earlier Phoenician inhabitants. This is compounded further by the lack of literary coverage especially in areas beyond the reach of Greco-Roman writers. The fluid nature of Carthage resettling pre-established sites forces us to look at specific sites to determine their origins. Although Carthaginian influence becomes apparent at a later stage, we are often forced to guess whether or not it was Carthaginian in origin.

Carthaginian colonial activity also often leaves us unsure of its exact nature. We have established that Carthage did not need to send out many colonies within the boundaries of the old Phoenician 'Empire'. It chose its foundations carefully, preferring to redevelop existing sites and areas, and if need be, to establish singular foundations often designed to dominate a specific area. We only find examples of multiple Carthaginian settlements beyond traditional Phoenician boundaries such as those of Hanno along the West African coast and possibly some along the European coast. Carthaginian colonialism manifested itself in several forms, which unlike other colonising nations such as the Greeks and Phoenicians, often makes it difficult to trace and identify.

The other major flaw in our knowledge of Carthage and its various activities is the exclusive manner in which it controlled large areas of its empire. The most common reason as to why Greek and Roman sources do not comment on a number of

Carthaginian settlements and activities may be as simple as they did not know about them. Even when a rumour regarding a Carthaginian settlement is reported it appears exaggerated and unlikely. Unfortunately, such a simple explanation does little to enlighten us regarding Carthaginian movements and settlement. The exclusive nature of Carthaginian territory was varied. In areas such as Carthage itself or Western Sicily, open trade and traffic presumably welcomed all foreign groups. Other areas remained open only to Carthage and its allies, such as the Etruscans in areas of the Tyrrhenian Sea and possibly Sardinia. Otherwise areas west of Carthage became progressively exclusive to all except Carthaginians.¹⁸ This included a complete ban on all foreign activity west of Carthage including the North African coast, Sardinia, Spain and territories beyond the Pillars of Heracles.¹⁹ The Carthaginians apparently resorted to extreme tactics to ensure their control including piracy, drowning sailors, and even open conflict against the Phocaeans in the Tyrrhenian Sea and Dorieus in Sicily and North Africa. Although such practices were beneficial for Carthaginian activity, they left many of their contemporary and later Greek and Roman authors in the dark. As a result we have scant literary evidence regarding several key areas of the Carthaginian Empire.

Finally the natural geography of the Carthaginian Empire does little to aid a coherent literary and archaeological record. The size and scope of the empire saw it operate in several areas beyond the knowledge of contemporary nations. Sub-Saharan Africa, the West African coast (and its interior), the European Atlantic coast, and possibly Great Britain were areas of Carthaginian activity for centuries. Many of these regions remained undiscovered for centuries after the collapse of Carthaginian power. The immense size of several of these areas has limited a comprehensive archaeological record of Carthaginian activity. Virtually no Carthaginian remains have been discovered north of Lisbon in Portugal or further south than Mogador on the West African coast, although we know of activity beyond both locations. A similar scenario exists in the interior trade routes in North Africa. Although fragments

¹⁸ The nature of the problem is best demonstrated in an anecdote surviving in Diodorus (V.20.4). The account describes a fertile group of islands beyond the Pillars of Heracles which were discovered by the Carthaginians. The Etruscans wished to settle the islands but were refused access by Carthage which apparently wanted to keep the islands to itself. Although the excuse of wishing to ensure the islands' pristine nature is suggested, it is more likely Carthage wished to maintain its stranglehold on all territory and shipping past the Pillars of Heracles.

¹⁹ This area of exclusive activity is defined in the first two treaties between Rome and Carthage in 509/8 and 306, see Chp. IV, ns.163-165.

attest some presence, the amount of likely Carthaginian activity suggests more should exist. Unfortunately the likely nature of commodities being traded and the expanse of territory involved means our archaeological evidence of Carthaginian activity is often as scant as our literary record.

There are several reasons behind our relatively poor literary and archaeological records attesting Carthaginian activity and influence abroad. The general enmity toward Carthage surviving in Greek and Roman sources and the lack of a comprehensive surviving Phoenicio-Punic literary tradition are major problems in our understanding of Carthage and its activities. However, this does not account for the varied archaeological evidence we possess. In many respects Carthaginian tactics are the primary reason behind our scant sources. The nature of Carthaginian trade and activity in certain areas of their empire and beyond are not conducive to supplying a constant and thorough record.

THE EVOLUTION OF 'CARTHAGINIAN'

The development of Carthaginian society was based on a number of existing activities and influences. This is particularly evident in the Carthaginians' activities abroad which saw them in regular contact with various cultures throughout the Mediterranean. This contact in turn had direct consequences in Carthage itself. We have looked at a number of Carthaginian activities abroad which demonstrate a varied and evolving foreign policy based on factors such as trade, settlement, politics, and conquest both within and beyond the empire. In many respects this has aided in defining a specific Carthaginian character distinct from the preceding Phoenicians and other contemporary nations.

One of the obvious differences between the Phoenician 'Empire' and that of Carthage was its manner of operation. Previously, the Phoenicians had maintained coastal provinces in the West from the East. The Phoenicians were able to continue in such a manner by retaining several basic policies. The primary limitations facing the Phoenicians' establishment of an orthodox empire in the West were obvious. Primarily, based on the technology they possessed, they were too far away and too few in number to maintain large areas of conquered territory and subjugated populations. Coupled with this, they themselves were often under the vassalage of

larger eastern powers. Therefore the maintenance of several coastal tracts of smaller networked trading settlements made up for the Phoenicians' inadequacies. These settlements often operated on a seasonal or temporary basis maintaining ties with local peoples. The establishment of a few larger settlements such as Gades, Lixus, Motya, and later Carthage enabled the Phoenicians to operate further and more efficiently.

With the decline of Phoenician influence in the West during the sixth century and the rapid rise and influence of Carthage, the latter was able to assume control of the Phoenicians' settlements. It is from this period that we can discern a major shift in Carthaginian practice from those previously employed by the Phoenicians. Carthage was not willing to continue operating a sea-borne empire based on several narrow coastal regions of settlement. The central location of Carthage coupled with vast potential resources meant that it was able to increase and maintain its territory by conquest. From the late sixth century we find Carthage actively expanding in North Africa and Sardinia, two areas where it remained the sole developed power. The fifth century saw this taken further with the first of several major attempts to conquer Sicily. The development of Spain followed during the fourth century and during the second half of the third century under the Barcids. In most of these areas we find Carthage often willing to depart from the Phoenician practice of partnership with local peoples. Carthage assumed control over larger areas of territory and with them their respective inhabitants. Although Carthage still maintained several key alliances with groups such as the Elymians in Sicily and still needed large native populations to maintain local industries, it used the more orthodox policies of a conquering nation.

We might consider that an increase of military activity was the main new development in Carthaginian activity abroad. Although this helped characterise Carthaginian interests, they were active in several other important pursuits.

Carthage continued the Phoenician policies of widespread trade and settlement, however, it adapted them further to suit its own needs. Trade remained the mainstay of the Carthaginian economy and in many respects its society, as it had once been for the Phoenicians. We can see the continuation of this in many ways. Even during times of turmoil and war, trade continued to dominate the Carthaginians' economy. Many of their techniques continued in the manner of the Phoenicians. Carthage still excluded all foreign traffic from certain areas of its empire, as the

Phoenicians had once done. Many of the commodities exported remained Phoenician in nature and developed little from the original successful model. It was not so much the concept and practice of trade that developed under Carthage, it was more the way the latter redefined it in conjunction with other activities.

Although Carthage continued to supply the majority of Phoenician commodities, it was also able to develop its own industries. The most obvious of these came as a direct result of the larger amount of territory under Carthaginian control and its use. Unlike the Phoenicians who were forced to rely on an unsecured hinterland or sea-borne traffic to supply the majority of its settlements, Carthage had the luxury of establishing large areas for farming and production. This is most obvious in areas of North Africa. We have discussed at some length the development of farming in the area. Carthage was able to utilise its hinterland, developing it into an efficient area of production. The apparent development of Roman-style *latifundia* was testament to the high level of organisation in the area. These large slave-run estates were populated largely by captured peoples as a direct result of Carthaginian conquests abroad. In addition to this specialised type of farming in North Africa, Carthage also depended on the Libyan farmers who supplied large amounts of produce for Carthage and its empire. Elsewhere we find areas where direct Carthaginian control helped diversify and dominate commodity production. The foundation of New Carthage meant that Carthaginian territory in the area dominated its natural resources. The silver mines and smelters were obvious possessions which meant Carthage no longer needed to rely on unsecured labour in order to operate them. According to Strabo the site also possessed a thriving salt fish industry and was famed for its production of *garum*.²⁰ The increase of territory in all areas of Carthaginian control meant that Carthage was able to control larger areas of commodity production. Unlike the Phoenicians who relied on set relationships to maintain trade, the Carthaginians were able to assume control of large areas of production, both maintaining existing trade and diversifying.

A legacy of the Phoenicians' reliance on trade was characteristic superficial settlements designed to fulfil this practice. Many original Phoenician sites such as Utica and Leptis Magna reveal relatively few authentic Phoenician remains. A number of these sites show a clear phase of permanent resettlement during the Punic

²⁰ III.4.6.

period which often dominates the remains of pre-Roman habitation.²¹ Unlike the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians generally preferred to settle a higher percentage of permanent sites and developed them to a higher level. As a result we often find smaller numbers of urbanised Punic settlements along coastlines once dominated by numerous smaller Phoenician *emporia*.²² A similar phenomenon occurred in a number of interior sites in several areas. In areas of Sardinia and North Africa we find a more intensive Carthaginian presence than during the Phoenician period. The change of Carthaginian settlement patterns reflects distinctive motives. The Carthaginians were no longer content with establishing small trading ports with a small hinterland. They were now interested in the permanent settlement of civic centres based on trade and protection with large hinterlands comprising provincial networks.

Coupled with the new policy of establishing permanent Carthaginian settlements in larger Carthaginian territories we find a general increase of the establishment of military settlements and larger fortified provincial capitals. We have discussed the nature of Carthaginian settlement at length. The policy of establishing fewer settlements is apparent. Even then the attested Carthaginian colonies tend to be large single settlements designed to dominate specific provinces and their associated activities. Sites such as New Carthage and Lilybaeum are examples of this policy. Even the nature of many pre-existing sites changes with general increases of fortification and military application.²³ In addition to this we find a direct escalation of military settlements designed primarily to protect and to dominate specific areas. We have witnessed these in Spain with the development of Acra Leucê and the 'Towers of Hannibal'; in Sicily with several interior sites established; North Africa on the bordering territories of the six *pagi*; and in particular on Sardinia with the formation of a line of fortified posts dominating the interior of the island in the fifth century.

Carthaginian settlement patterns assumed a new image of permanence and dominance as opposed to the superficial and co-existent nature of the older Phoenician settlements. This practice did not develop quickly or universally. Carthage

²¹ It is likely that initial Phoenician contact and permanent settlement were often centuries apart in several areas. Sites such as Gades and Utica were supposedly settled ca. 1100, but only reveal remains from the eighth century onwards. As a result a number of permanent Phoenician sites were only settled for two or three centuries before the decline of the official Phoenician presence in the area and the growth of Carthaginian influence which later instituted Punic culture.

²² This process is most notable in Spain where numerous smaller Phoenician *emporia* gave way to fewer, more urbanised centres during the Punic period, see Chp. IV, ns.127ff. and text *passim*.

²³ This is particularly evident in the development and use of Motya in Sicily and Monte Sirai and Sulcis in Sardinia.

developed its settlement patterns over several centuries and maintained an open policy rather than an intractable policy of expansion. Carthage's first official settlement was that of Ebusus in 654/3. This was little more than a strategic foundation under the protection of the Phoenicians. Even then the foundation of Ebusus was essentially based on trade within the greater Phoenician 'Empire'. We next find Carthage actively settling in the fifth century. The periplus of Hanno was designed to settle a designated stretch of the African coast south of the Pillars of Heracles. This mission was to create a networked system of small ports similar to those settled by the Phoenicians. The reason behind such a large undertaking was to establish a basic mercantile presence in a new area. Carthage had no desire to dominate the interior of West Africa, preferring instead to revert to the Phoenician practice of maintaining coastal bases from which to interact with local peoples for trade. Further examples from the fifth century demonstrate other aspects of Carthaginian settlement. In both Selinus and Himera, Carthage destroyed the existing Greek colonies and resettled them as Hellenic settlements under Carthaginian control. This practice demonstrates a new level of Carthaginian settlement. Instead of moving into existing settlements and developing them into Carthaginian centres, as had been common elsewhere, Carthage exercised military force to complete its task of removing two Greek colonies and basically re-establishing them as its own. The evolving nature of Carthaginian settlement continued. Lilybaeum was founded as a replacement to Motya which was destroyed in 397. It was a large fortified position which could oversee all activity in Sicily, and also traffic between Carthage and to the north. The evolution of Carthaginian settlement reached its peak with the foundation of New Carthage by Hasdrubal Barca in 228. New Carthage was the ideal of Carthaginian settlement. It possessed all the required natural attributes including an excellent harbour and a perfect defensible location. It was strategically located to dominate the southwest of Spain and was a perfect staging point for invasion. It also possessed vast economic potential, dominating extensive silver producing areas as well as good supplies of other exploitable commodities.

The nature of Carthaginian settlement did not remain constant. Its major characteristic was its ability to adapt and evolve, drawing on established methods when required, but also developing new methods to cope with the changing nature of the Carthaginian Empire and its activities.

With the increase of activity between Carthage and other nations we find that the Carthaginians maintained a variety of policies to monitor and influence this contact. One such method was the Carthaginians' continuation of the Phoenician practice of excluding foreign competitors from lucrative territories and trade routes. However, under Carthaginian control it was employed to a new level. Perhaps the greatest change was the hard-line Carthaginian attitude which often saw Carthage defending areas of control with considerable force. Unlike the Phoenicians (to a certain degree), the Carthaginians were more than willing to engage potential enemies. The Phoenicians apparently withdrew from Sicily with the onset of Greek colonists. In contrast to this strategy, Carthage destroyed a number of attempted Greek colonies which threatened to encroach on its territory as well as engaging the Phocaeans in three major naval battles in just over a century to maintain exclusive rights in areas of the West. Ultimately Carthage preserved its exclusivity in a similar manner to that employed by the Phoenicians. However, it did so with a greater military presence throughout its empire and a greater willingness to use force when it felt threatened.

Carthage was willing to use force as a means of defence. However, it was mainly used to increase its empire and ensure its influence. Unlike the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians often launched invasions against their enemies regardless of their identity. This is emphasised by the Carthaginian invasions of Sicily and the wars against Rome. The aggressive nature, which had developed in other areas of Carthaginian society and activity, steeled Carthage for war. This was not only aimed against less developed neighbouring peoples but also against highly developed nations. Even defeat did little to dim Carthaginian desire for conquest as demonstrated when several defeats on Sicily were not enough to stop later Carthaginian attempts at conquering the island. Even after the costly defeat following the First Punic War, Carthage recovered quickly and was able to mount a massive offensive only twenty years later. Although the military nature of Carthage struggled with several systemic deficiencies,²⁴ it remained its salient image, one which brought it great success but eventually led to its downfall.

Another area of development which becomes increasingly evident in the Carthaginians' activity is their developing reliance on political relations and

²⁴ Some of these are briefly discussed in Chp. VII, ns.78-80 and text.

diplomacy. Although the Phoenicians possessed a high degree of political development, there is a general increase of associated activities by the Carthaginians. This was a natural consequence of increasing contact with developed states. The nature of the Carthaginians' policy saw them in regular contact with Etruscans, Romans, Greeks, and Egyptians often beyond the basic military and mercantile spheres. We see a range of relationships between Carthage and various states existing at a diplomatic level. The Etruscans were close allies of Carthage and maintained strict policies of mutual aid and protection. Carthage also continued precise mercantile and non-aggression treaties with Rome for several centuries before their relationship soured. Carthage also maintained a possible diplomatic link with Egypt in order to operate the lucrative trade between the two states. Carthaginian relations with the Greeks were an obvious example of the development of political and diplomatic activity. The regular contact in areas of Sicily, Southern Italy, Southern France, and Greece itself saw relations develop into various forms over several centuries. Carthaginian relations with the Greeks (especially in Sicily) revolved primarily around trade and invasion. However, we have also looked at a various forms of contact including diplomacy and political manoeuvring. Carthage was able to maintain an official presence in Sicily despite Greek opposition. In a number of Greek centres we find evidence of Carthaginian sympathisers and sometimes resident populations. Otherwise we see a range of treaties between Greek states and Carthage from different periods. Carthage was a strong military and political presence on Sicily and it seems as though courting its favour could potentially hold attractive incentives for some Greek states. We have also witnessed examples of Carthaginian attempts to undermine various Greek cities through bribery and conspiracy on one hand, and others mediating peace between two or more Greek centres on the other. The increase of Carthaginian political and diplomatic actions and their variety characterised this aspect of Carthaginian activity. Although the Carthaginians maintained several areas of exclusivity, they became increasingly interested in the actions of others, often taking active roles themselves. Although such a practice is natural for a prominent state such as Carthage, it became a specific characteristic of Carthaginian foreign policy which increased over time.

Perhaps one the defining characteristics of the Carthaginians abroad was their own concept of their empire. The greatest change in Carthaginian policy from that of

the Phoenicians before them was their concept of territory, in particular the formation of an empire based on several prominent provinces. Although the sea still played a primary function within the empire, Carthage established a tangible territory based on land. No longer content with the *imperium sine terra* of the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians advanced their inheritance of several coastal territories inland. In a number of areas we are able to discern, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the Carthaginian conception of *chora*. In North Africa we find several examples of defined territory of varying degrees. The six *pagi*, ‘the Phoenician trenches’, ‘the big fields and the fifty towns of Tysca, and the *Arae Philaeni* all demonstrate varying degrees of Carthaginian control based on defined territory.²⁵ Even Carthaginian division of such systematised districts is attested in various form including the Neo-Punic inscription detailing a ‘land overseer’²⁶ and the third century Punic coins describing “in [the] lands/districts”, i.e. North Africa.²⁷ In Western Sicily, the first two treaties with Rome define Carthaginian territory in a distinctly Carthaginian manner, which suggests that it was a direct description of how they viewed their own territory. In Sardinia, we find a line of demarcating fortresses defining areas of Carthaginian control and those which remained relatively independent. A similar process can be witnessed in Spain, to a lesser extent in several phases during the sixth, fourth, and third centuries. Carthage was able to maintain several distinctive provinces which were sub-divided accordingly. This naturally assumes a higher level of bureaucracy than it took to maintain Phoenician territories in the past.

An interesting aspect regarding Carthaginian provinces is their common geography. We only find provinces dominating a separate geographical landmass evident on smaller islands such as the Balearic Islands and Malta. Even larger islands were naturally seen as potential single provinces, and as a result we find several Carthaginian attempts to conquer the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. These failed forcing Carthage to maintain smaller provinces on both islands. In other areas of Carthaginian control such as North Africa and Spain, although we find Carthaginian conquest expand territorial control, no efforts were made to conquer the entire region. North African territory was naturally defined by its arid and mountainous interior. Spain however saw little conquest of the interior until the Barcid invasion during the

²⁵ See Chp. IV, ns.145-156 and text.

²⁶ *KAI*. 141.

²⁷ Baldus, *Unerkannte Reflexe der römischen Nordafrika-Expedition*, p.178.

second half of the third century. It seems that Carthage was willing to define its larger territories in relation to its continued dependence on the sea. Although increased territory meant that some areas under Carthaginian control were further from coastal areas, official areas of control rarely extended beyond 200 km. into the interior. Naturally other activities such as trade continued beyond this, as interest in Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates. Although Carthage developed larger land-based provinces, in many respects it maintained the Phoenicians' reliance on the sea, dictating a reasonable limit to territorial expansion into the interiors of Spain and Africa. Carthage maintained its maritime nature to a large degree, although it developed it to accommodate its expansive nature based on the conquest of territory.

The concept of a unique Carthaginian identity and distinctive activities abroad can be seen developing in several prominent areas. Carthage was also in contact with several prominent Mediterranean societies and was always open to foreign influences. In addition to this Carthage was developing its own character based on its actions and policies both at home and abroad. Carthaginian activity continually evolved based on its own activities and external influences. We have witnessed this evolving in a number of forms at different periods. Aspects such as trade, settlement, and conquest continued but developed to cope with new circumstances and demands. In many respects Carthage was a hybrid of established Phoenician practices, external influences, and its own development. Precipitated by its own actions and those it came into contact with, Carthaginian activities were often as characteristic for their progression as they were for their more accepted roles in Carthaginian history and society.

THE NATURE OF THE CARTHAGINIANS ABROAD – THE ACTIVITIES OF AN EVOLUTIONARY STATE

The nature of Carthaginian activity abroad is characterised by its variety and continual development. Carthage was not a state based on conquest or trade alone. It had several major areas of activity which were distinguishable and interrelated. Carthage developed into a unique society in antiquity. In many respects its institutions and activities were identifiable with other contemporary societies, however, its distinctive composition and application formed a uniquely Carthaginian character. Carthage was

a true hybrid of cultures. Although it was in essence an eastern, and in particular Phoenician society, it embraced contact with others often resulting in considerable social and cultural change. The Phoenician legacy remained strong in Carthage as it did in Punic culture, however, the position and nature of Carthage saw it in varying degrees of steady contact with groups of Berbers, Greeks, Etruscans, Egyptians, and Romans. Although Carthage maintained varying degrees of contact with such peoples, traffic continually flowed and with it cultural diffusion and influence.

Several obvious developments occurred in Carthaginian policy defining it as distinctive from its original Phoenician heritage and other contemporary nations. The most noticeable development in Carthaginian activity was its aggressive nature. This ever-increasing feature permeated every aspect of Carthaginian policy. Large-scale military expeditions became increasingly prevalent from the sixth century. These concentrated primarily on conquest and increasing Carthaginian territory abroad. Tactics of exclusion, which had been evident in Phoenician practice, became more hostile often developing into open conflict on a number of occasions. Settlement patterns also tended to become more defined. Often entire regions were operated according to defensive or strategic considerations. Even trading practices became more aggressive. The standard Phoenician policy of maintaining amicable links with many smaller groups for trade purposes was not as evident during the Carthaginian period. Carthage still dealt with some peoples in the Phoenician manner, but in other regions it resorted to subjugation in order to control territories and their commodities.

One of the causes of this attitude appears to have been a growing Carthaginian desire for control. The Carthaginians appear to have consistently opposed the Phoenician practice of maintaining an unobtrusive presence. This was a noticeable Phoenician system: preferring to remain located on coastal or off-shore bases, not generally becoming involved in conflicts or the affairs of others, and ultimately maintaining a smaller mercantile presence. Carthage, however, developed into almost the complete antithesis of the Phoenicians in this regard. The Carthaginians' desire for control is evident in their conquest of several areas of older Phoenician activity. The control of territory also brought control of its people and its natural resources. This was oftentimes harsh resulting in resentment among local populations demonstrated by several revolts in Sardinia and North Africa and the invasions of Agathocles and Masinissa. This desire for control, or at least active participation in the affairs of

others is particularly evident in examples from Sicily. Despite the failure of a number of invasions aimed at conquering the island, Carthage remained active in its political affairs. Its efforts maintained a Carthaginian presence in a number of Greek cities, which was often influential. Unlike the Phoenicians who withdrew at the onset of the Greeks on Sicily, the Carthaginians were willing both to dominate and to influence them whenever possible.

Probably the most consistent aspect regarding the nature of the Carthaginians' activity abroad was their ability to adapt to specific situations. Unlike other powers which maintained rigid mercantile or military policies, Carthage was able to develop and implement specific tactics for specific occasions. Such a characteristic is noticeable in a number of Carthaginian activities. Regarding settlement, Carthage sent out relatively few original foundations. However, all the major settlements attested fulfilled a specific function. Lilybaeum replaced the site of Motya and provided Carthage with a strong new base of operations in Sicily. New Carthage did the same but was able to oversee the extraction and production of its surrounding silver deposits. The *periplus* of Hanno was designed to lay a network of new Carthaginian settlements along an undeveloped section of West African coast. All had specific roles depending on circumstance. Although the mechanisms of each example had precedents in other societies, they were isolated strategic solutions. In other areas of settlement, we have witnessed a number of innovative approaches to specific problems. We have seen how instead of troubling themselves by founding numerous settlements, the Carthaginians often redeveloped those which were inherited from the Phoenicians. On other occasions we find highly innovative policies of resettling potentially hostile states as Carthaginian settlements, as seen at Himera, Selinus, and on a number of occasions in Southern Italy during the Second Punic War under Hannibal. On the whole Carthaginian settlement was economic by nature, preferring to utilise pre-existing locations and populations rather than establishing both at great personal cost. However, this was by no means limited by strict policy, with Carthage able to adapt to specific conditions and to form appropriate settlement strategies.

One of the major developments within Carthaginian society was military. Not so much the nature of the military itself, which had obvious shortcomings, but its strategic use. We have seen the various deployment of Carthage's military forces throughout its history. It became obvious that Carthage did not maintain a universal

policy regarding warfare and conquest. This is best demonstrated again on Sicily, where a number of invasions were carried out using various tactics. Although never entirely successful, Carthage devised several distinctive tactics, including orthodox land invasions, resettlement policies, and political intrigue to undermine specific states. Often a Carthaginian invasion of Sicily was preceded by Greek political upheaval, usually in Syracuse. Otherwise we have seen Carthage using military force specifically to repel foreigners from encroaching into its territories. Carthage used its military strength for both conquest and defensive needs. The variety of specific tactics, often applied to a specific area, was characteristic of its variable nature. Following an initial loss, Carthage was rarely prepared to risk a subsequent defeat, preferring to regroup and perhaps try again later. Although this policy enabled the Carthaginians to expand their interests elsewhere, it ultimately cost them their plans of complete domination of Sardinia and especially Sicily. Although we may think that Carthage was governed by its military ambition, in many respects it was interrelated with other important strategies and was thus bound by the capricious nature of Carthaginian activity.

This quality of adaptation can be seen constantly throughout Carthaginian history and in part aided maintaining Carthage's image of constant change. The mutable nature of Carthaginian policy manifested itself in several areas. After the defeat at Himera in 480, Carthage consolidated its presence on Sicily while turning its interest elsewhere such as Atlantic Africa and Europe as attested by the journeys of Hanno and Himilco. The continual development of trade routes in Africa beyond the control of developed Mediterranean powers also demonstrated Carthaginian initiative in its trading strategies. Even after the costly defeat following the First Punic War, Carthage went on the offensive in Spain to secure a larger province and its wealth of natural resources. Defeat in Sardinia saw the Carthaginians develop an interior line of defences, abandoning much of the northeast of the island, and preferring to consolidate and protect their interests on the rest of the island. By commanding such a vast area and many resources, Carthage was in a fortunate position of often being able to choose its foreign policy at will. Without foreign intervention, it could concentrate on developing new trade routes and areas for exploitation. Even when more pressing issues forced Carthage to take specific action, many of its provinces and areas of activity seem relatively unaffected and could continue to operate as normal.

Carthage was able to maintain a variety of activities, which in turn were managed according to circumstance. Reliance on a variety of pursuits meant that Carthage was not characterised by a single function, e.g. trade or conquest. This permeated Carthaginian society and we find constant development in policies abroad.

One of the obvious developments in Carthaginian history was the development of a distinctive Punic culture. Although our understanding of the nature of Punic culture is chequered, it still stands as the salient image of Carthaginian civilisation and in many respects what distinguished it from its Phoenician origins. Punic culture defined the changing nature of Carthage. It was both a motivating factor for change and itself was greatly influenced by the effects of such change. Although the image of a new distinctive cultural style may suggest uniformity of culture, Punic, like the Carthaginian Empire remained a cosmopolitan entity open to influences from a variety of sources. In many respects the development of Punic coincided with several other major changes in Carthaginian society. Although this may seem an obvious candidate to explain such change, the development of Punic culture, like other aspects of Carthaginian society, was dependent on and related to several other contemporary movements. Punic was based primarily on the existing Phoenician culture, however, the increase of interaction with groups such as the Berbers and Greeks formed a new culture which spread from Carthage throughout its empire. Even then Punic did not tend to dominate existing cultures entirely. It existed in several forms often adhering to existing cultures and influencing them to form a type of hybrid culture. We have seen this evident in the pre-existing Phoenician settlements of Utica and Gades as well as its remnants during the Neo-Punic period under several Numidian Kings. This acceptance and evolution gave Punic a residual presence in several areas after the departure of centralised Carthaginian rule. Areas which had been exposed to Carthaginian contact often retained traces of Punic culture and language as well as Carthaginian political and social organisation.

The nature of Carthaginian activity abroad is visible in a variety of forms. It both mirrored greater changes in Carthage, and was itself responsible for change. From a small Phoenician centre in the ninth century, Carthage developed into the capital of the Punic world and the Carthaginian Empire. A range of factors contributed to this development which in essence identified Carthage as unique. Pre-

existing Phoenician culture mixed with foreign influences and its own development and activity formed to create a distinctive Carthaginian character: a constantly evolving hybrid state encompassing old and new influences. Naturally this development was based heavily on the activities of Carthage. The prosperity, and to a large extent, the survival of Carthage depended on its activities abroad: both within its empire and beyond. Carthaginian activity was varied, relying on various forms of trade, settlement, and expansion. The large area of Carthaginian activity coupled with continual external pressures meant that Carthage was constantly re-inventing the way in which it conducted its affairs and maintained its influence abroad. Although such factors as the development of Punic culture and its increasing aggressive nature tend to characterise Carthage, it was active in several other important fields. Ultimately, the nature of Carthaginian activity abroad, like the nature of Carthage itself was unique. Although separate activities, institutions, and social changes can be distinguished and identified with reference to other contemporary states, they all combined to form a distinctive entity. The nature of Carthaginian activity was not based on any established model. It was varied and influenced by constant change in its environment. Although Carthage was often maligned in antiquity and designated a failure because of its destruction, in many respects it was the paragon of a successful empire which was not bound by the limitations of its endeavours as much as others. Carthage rose to prosperity on the back of these activities, which would largely define the state itself, its empire, and its legacy.

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